


HISTORICAL DICTIONARY *of*

TOGO



JENNIFER C. SEELY
SAMUEL DECALO

FOURTH
EDITION

HID

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY

The historical dictionaries present essential information on a broad range of subjects, including American and world history, art, business, cities, countries, cultures, customs, film, global conflicts, international relations, literature, music, philosophy, religion, sports, and theater. Written by experts, all contain highly informative introductory essays on the topic and detailed chronologies that, in some cases, cover vast historical time periods but still manage to heavily feature more recent events.

Brief A–Z entries describe the main people, events, politics, social issues, institutions, and policies that make the topic unique, and entries are cross-referenced for ease of browsing. Extensive bibliographies are divided into several general subject areas, providing excellent access points for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more. Additionally, maps, photographs, and appendixes of supplemental information aid high school and college students doing term papers or introductory research projects. In short, the historical dictionaries are the perfect starting point for anyone looking to research in these fields.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES OF AFRICA

Jon Woronoff, Series Editor

- Senegal, Second Edition*, by Andrew F. Clark and Lucie Colvin Phillips. 1994.
- Comoro Islands*, by Martin Ottenheimer and Harriet Ottenheimer. 1994.
- Uganda*, by M. Louise Pirouet. 1995.
- Tanzania, Second Edition*, by Thomas P. Ofcansky and Rodger Yeager. 1997.
- Equatorial Guinea, Third Edition*, by Max Liniger-Goumaz. 2000.
- Swaziland, Second Edition*, by Alan R. Booth. 2000.
- Djibouti*, by Daoud A. Alwan and Yohanis Mibrathu. 2000.
- Liberia, Second Edition*, by D. Elwood Dunn, Amos J. Beyan, and Carl Patrick Burrowes. 2001.
- Zimbabwe, Third Edition*, by Steven C. Rubert and R. Kent Rasmussen. 2001.
- Somalia, Second Edition*, by Mohamed Haji Mukhtar. 2002.
- Western Sahara, Third Edition*, by Anthony G. Pazzanita. 2005.
- Madagascar, Second Edition*, by Philip M. Allen and Maureen Covell. 2005.
- Sierra Leone, New Edition*, by C. Magbaily Fyle. 2005.
- Burundi, Third Edition*, by Ellen K. Eggers. 2007.
- Republic of Cape Verde, Fourth Edition*, by Richard A. Lobban Jr. and Paul Khalil Saucier. 2007.
- Zambia, Third Edition*, by David J. Simon, James R. Pletcher, and Brian V. Siegel. 2008.
- Mali, Fourth Edition*, by Pascal James Imperato, Gavin H. Imperato, and Austin C. Imperato. 2008.
- Mauritania, Third Edition*, by Anthony G. Pazzanita. 2009.
- Nigeria*, by Toyin Falola and Ann Genova. 2009.
- Angola, Second Edition*, by W. Martin James. 2011.
- Malawi, Fourth Edition*, by Owen J. M. Kalinga. 2012.
- Republic of the Congo, Fourth Edition*, by John F. Clark and Samuel Decalo. 2012.
- Namibia, Second Edition*, by Victor L. Tonchi, William A. Lindeke, and John J. Grotper. 2012.
- Benin, Fourth Edition*, by Mathurin C. Hounnikpo and Samuel Decalo. 2013.
- Burkina Faso, Third Edition*, by Lawrence Rupley, Lamissa Bangali, and Boureima Diamitani. 2013.
- Sudan, Fourth Edition*, by Robert S. Kramer, Richard A. Lobban Jr., and Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban. 2013.

Ethiopia, Second Edition, by David H. Shinn and Thomas P. Ofcansky. 2013.

Egypt, Fourth Edition, by Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. 2013.

Lesotho, Second Edition, by Scott Rosenberg and Richard F. Weisfelder. 2013.

Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Fourth Edition, by Peter Karibe Mendy and Richard A. Lobban Jr. 2013.

Guinea, Fifth Edition, by Mohamed Saliou Camara, Thomas E. O'Toole, and Janice E. Baker. 2013.

Ghana, Fourth Edition, by David Owusu-Ansah. 2014.

Libya, Fifth Edition, by Ronald Bruce St. John. 2014.

Kenya, Third Edition, by Robert M. Maxon and Thomas P. Ofcansky. 2014.

Algeria, Fourth Edition, by Phillip C. Naylor. 2015.

Rwanda, Second Edition, by Aimable Twagilimana. 2016.

Côte d'Ivoire (The Ivory Coast), Third Edition, by Cyril K. Daddieh. 2016.

Central African Republic, New Edition, by Richard Bradshaw and Juan Fandos-Rius. 2016.

The Gambia, Fifth Edition, by David Perfect. 2016.

Morocco, Third Edition, by Aomar Boum and Thomas K. Park. 2016.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Fourth Edition, by Emizet François Kisangani. 2016.

Tunisia, Third Edition, by Kenneth J. Perkins. 2016.

Gabon, Fourth Edition, by Douglas A. Yates. 2018.

Botswana, Fifth Edition, by Barry Morton and Jeff Ramsay. 2018.

Chad, Fourth Edition, by Mario J. Azevedo and Samuel Decalo. 2018.

Mozambique, New Edition, by Colin Darch. 2019.

Republic of Cameroon, Fourth Edition, by Mark Dike DeLancey, Mark W. DeLancey, and Rebecca Neh Mbuh. 2019.

Eritrea, Third Edition, by Dan Connell. 2019.

Niger, Fifth Edition, by Abdourahmane Idrissa. 2020.

South Africa, Third Edition, by Christopher Saunders and Peter Limb. 2021.

Togo, Fourth Edition, by Jennifer C. Seely and Samuel Decalo. 2021.

Historical Dictionary of Togo

Fourth Edition

Jennifer C. Seely and Samuel Decalo

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD
Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Rowman & Littlefield
An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowman.com

6 Tinworth Street, London, SE11 5AL, United Kingdom

Copyright © 2021 by Jennifer C. Seely and Samuel Decalo

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Seely, Jennifer C., 1970– author. | Decalo, Samuel, author.

Title: Historical dictionary of Togo / Jennifer C. Seely, Samuel Decalo.

Other titles: Historical dictionaries of Africa (Unnumbered)

Description: Fourth edition. | Lanham, Maryland : Rowman & Littlefield, 2021. | Series: Historical dictionaries of Africa | Includes bibliographical references. | Summary: “The fourth edition of Historical Dictionary of Togo contains a chronology, an introduction, an extensive bibliography, and more than 100 cross-referenced dictionary entries on important personalities, politics, economy, foreign relations, religion, and culture”—Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020046507 (print) | LCCN 2020046508 (ebook) | ISBN 9781538122778 (cloth) | ISBN 9781538122785 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Togo—History—Dictionaries. | Togo—Bibliography.

Classification: LCC DT582.5 .S44 2021 (print) | LCC DT582.5 (ebook) | DDC 966.81003—dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020046507>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020046508>

∞TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Contents

Editor's Foreword <i>Jon Woronoff</i>	ix
Acknowledgments	xi
Reader's Note	xiii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations	xv
Maps	xxix
Recent Political Chronology	xxxix
Introduction	1
Dictionary	19
Appendix	391
Bibliography	395
About the Authors	427

Editor's Foreword

Most of our historical dictionaries on African countries are very complex, with repeated changes of government and periodic coups and wars. This one on Togo is much more straightforward, with one family in charge since 1967, constantly pushing back against the struggle of an array of opposition forces fighting for change. Togo is a small country, with many ethnic groups and a small economy depending mainly on minerals and agriculture. Less straightforward was the colonial history: lacking the centralized precolonial kingdoms found in neighboring Ghana and Benin, Togo was first dubbed by Europeans the rather unflattering name of the “slave coast” until it became the German protectorate of Togoland and French trusteeship territory of French Togoland, and then won independence as the country of Togo in 1960. Early leadership in Togo was characterized by competition between the country's first president, Sylvanus Olympio, and the second president, Nicolas Grunitzky. By 1967, however, General Gnassingbé Eyadéma had installed himself as president, where he remained until his death in 2005, when he was followed by his son Faure Gnassingbé, who remains president today. Readers can follow the intrigue and struggle that have characterized this history in what is still one of the best guides to a unique country, now in its fourth edition.

Like other books in the series, this one also consists of, first, a chronology which goes back well before independence. It also has a bibliography which helps readers find articles, books, and other works on the country to offer greater detail and provide more specialized information as needed. But the most important part is obviously the core dictionary with entries on historical periods, ethnic groups, economic and social features, and much more. The “much more” is worth repeating because this is now the fourth edition of the book which has been periodically updated and expanded, to the advantage of readers and researchers. This edition is especially welcome, as the previous edition dates back to 1996, and a great deal has happened in Togo in the interim.

The author of the previous editions is already well known to readers not only of this volume but the series in general: Samuel Decalo who also wrote

our volumes on Benin, Chad, and Niger as well as numerous books, articles, and monographs on the West Africa region and francophone Africa more broadly. This edition was updated, expanded, and revised by Jennifer Seely, who is an associate professor and chair of the Politics Department of Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana. She serves as the director of the Peace Corps Prep program at Earlham, drawing on her past Peace Corps service in Côte d'Ivoire. Her publications include the 2009 book *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa: The Cases of Benin and Togo*, and she is the recipient of two Fulbright fellowships and other grants supporting fieldwork in Togo and neighboring countries. This means our volume on Togo will remain one of the best English-language sources of information on the country.

Jon Woronoff
Series Editor

Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge first Samuel Decalo, whose work first inspired and supported me more than 20 years ago when I began studying African politics. I am also grateful to the late Victor LeVine, whose encyclopedic knowledge showed me what was possible. Thanks to my loving and supportive family, and to all the wonderful people of Togo who have encouraged and rewarded my interest in the country. I must particularly thank my very able and wonderful student collaborators: Olivia Tienen, Agathe Chapelle, and Idai Makoni, assisted also by Edita Danielyan. I very much appreciate my supportive colleagues, particularly among them Womai Song and Margaret Hampton, and Jonas Mayrhofer for helping with the German. Many thanks to John, for the love and support, and to Kaila and Elly, who make it all worthwhile.

Reader's Note

Many of the names of Togo's ethnic groups or towns are spelled differently in English and in French. In most cases, the variations are easy to recognize as with Gurma-Gourma, Kotokoli-Cotocoli, Chokossi-Tyokossi, Ehve-Ewe, Watchi-Ouatchi and Cabrais-Kabyé. The procedure in this dictionary has been to use the most common form of spelling in the literature (usually the French) while cross listing other variants for the convenience of the reader.

With respect to the names of Togolese personalities, it should be noted that the cultural authenticity drives of the early 1970s resulted in numerous adoptions of ethnic names and the discarding of Christian ones. At the same time, a number of towns also reverted to a more phonetic transliteration of their original (precolonial) name. A good example of this is the "renaming" of Aného (instead of Anécho) and Notsé, instead of the colonial Nuatja. Where there are multiple possible names for a person or place, older variants are cross-referenced, and biographical listings may offer name variants that have fallen in or out of common usage.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACMT	Association des Cadres Musulmans au Togo/Association of Muslim Officials of Togo
ACP	African Caribbean Pacific
ADDI	Alliance des Démocrates pour un Développement Integral/ Democratic Alliance for Integrated Development
ADR	Alliance de Démocrates pour le Renouveau/Democratic Alliance for Renewal
AEC	All-Ewe Conference
AEEMT	Association des Élèves et Étudiants Musulmans au Togo/ Muslim Student Association in Togo
AEF	Afrique Équatoriale Française/French Equatorial Africa
AFD	Agence Française de Développement/French Development Agency
AIGE	Aéroport Internationale de Gnassingbé Eyadéma/Gnassingbé Eyadéma International Airport
AJMT	Association de la Jeunesse Musulmane du Togo/Muslim Youth Association in Togo
ALT	Assemblée Législative du Togo/Legislative Assembly of Togo
AN	Assemblée Nationale/National Assembly
ANC	Alliance Nationale pour le Changement/National Alliance for Change
ANT	Assemblée Nationale du Togo/National Assembly of Togo
AOF	Afrique Occidentale Française/French West Africa
APG	Accord Politique Global/Global Political Accord
ART	Assemblée Représentative du Togo/Representative Assembly of Togo
APRT	Association Professionnelle des Revendeuses de Tissus/ Professional Association of Women Cloth Retailers
ATD	Alliance Togolaise pour la Démocratie/Togolese Alliance for Democracy
ATOP	Agence Togolaise du Presse/Togolese Press Agency
ATP	Agence Togolaise du Presse/Togolese Press Agency

ATT	Assemblée Territoriale Du Togo/Territorial Assembly of Togo
AU	African Union
BAD	Banque Africaine de Développement/African Development Bank
BALTEX	Banque Arabe-Libyenne-Togolaise du Commerce Extérieur/Arab-Libyan-Togolese Bank for External Trade
BAO	Bank of West Africa
BCEAO	Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest/Central Bank of West African States
BIDC	Banque d’Investissement et de Développement de la CEDEAO/Investment and Development Bank of ECOWAS
BIA-TOGO	Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique du Togo/International Bank for Africa in Togo
BIAO	Banque Internationale de l’Afrique de l’Ouest/International West Africa Bank
BIR	Batallion d’Intervention Rapide/Rapid Intervention Battalion
BOAD	Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement/West African Development Bank
BTCI	Banque Togolaise pour le Commerce et l’Industrie/Togolese Commerce and Industry Bank
BTD	Banque Togolaise de Développement/Togolese Development Bank
C14	Coalition De 14/Coalition of 14
CAF	Collectif d’Associations des Femmes/Women’s Associations Collective
CAIT	Collectif des Associations Islamiques du Togo/Muslim Associations Collective
CAP 2015	Combat pour l’Alternance Politique en 2015/Fight for Political Turnover in 2015
CAR	Comité d’Action pour le Renouveau/Action Committee for Renewal
CATC	Confédération Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants/African Confederation of Workers and Believers
CATR	Comité d’Action contre le Tribalisme et le Racisme/Action Committee against Tribalism and Racism
CCCE	Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Économique/Central Fund for Economic Cooperation
CCFOM	Caisse Centrale de la France Outre Mer/Overseas French Central Fund
CCI	Chambre de Commerce d’Industrie/Chamber of Commerce and Industry

CCIT	Chambre de Commerce d'Industrie du Togo/ Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Togo
CCTT	Congrès des Chefs Traditionnels du Togo/Togolese Traditional Chief's Congress
CDC	Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations/Deposit and Consignment Fund
CDI	Chengdu Design and Research Institute of Building Materials Industry
CDP/CDPA	Convention Démocratique Panafricain/Panafrican Democratic Convention
CEB	Compagnie Électrique du Benin/Benin Electric Company
CEET	Compagnie Énergie Électrique du Togo/Electric Energy Company of Togo
CEDEAO	Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest/ Economic Community of West African States
CEJP	Conseil Épiscopal Justice et Paix/Episcopal Council for Justice and Peace
CENI	Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante/Independent National Electoral Commission
CERK	Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches de Kara/Research and Study Center of Kara
CES	Conseil Economique et Social/Economic and Social Council
CFA	Communaute Financière Africaine/African Financial Community
CFAF	Communaute Financière Africaine francs/African Financial Community francs
CFT	Chemin de Fer du Togo/Togo Railways
CFDT	Compagnie Française pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles/French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers
CFN	Convention des Forces Nouvelles/Convention of New Forces
CFU	Convention des Femmes pour UNIR/Women's Convention for UNIR
CI-AF	Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children
CIMAO	Ciments de l'Afrique de l'Ouest/West African Cement
CIMTOGO	Ciments du Togo/Togo Cement
CIREL-VB	Centre International des Recherches et d'Étude de Langues, Village du Benin/International Research and Language Study Center, Benin Village

CNCA	Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole/National Agricultural Credit Fund
CNDH	Commission Nationale pour le Droits de l'Homme/National Human Rights Commission
CNP	Conseil National de Patronat/National Employers Council
CNRS	Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique/National Scientific Research Center
CNS	Conférence Nationale Souveraine/Sovereign National Conference
CNSS	Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale/National Social Security Fund
CNTT	Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo/National Confederation of Togolese Workers
COD	Collectif d'Opposition Démocratique/Democratic Opposition Collective
COD-2	Collectif d'Opposition Démocratique 2/Democratic Opposition Collective 2
COMPEL	Complex Petroleum du Lomé/Lomé Petroleum Complex
CONGAT	Conseil des Organismes Non-gouvernementaux en Activité au Togo/Council of Nongovernmental Organizations and Activities in Togo
COTOMIB	Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Benin/Togolese Company of Benin Mines
CPCD	Cadre Permanent de Dialogue et de Concertation/Permanent Dialog and Consultation Framework
CPP	Convergence Patriotique Panafricain/Panafrican Patriotic Convergence
CPS	Comité Paritaire de Suivi/Joint Monitoring Committee
CRN	Comité de Reconciliation Nationale/National Reconciliation Committee
CROAD	Cercle de Réflexion et d'Orientation d'Actions de Développement/Development Action Think Tank
CSI	Collectif Syndicale Indépendent/Independent Trade Union Collective
CST	Collectif Sauvons Le Togo/Let's Save Togo Collective
CSTT	Confederation Syndicale des Travailleurs du Togo/Trade Union Confederation of Togolese Workers
CTM	Compagnie Togolaise Maritime/Togolese Maritime Company
CTMB	Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Benin/Togolese Company of Benin Mines

CTR	Comité Togolaise de Résistance/Togolese Resistance Committee
CUT	Comité de l'Unité Togolaise/Togolese Unity Committee
CVJR	Commission Verité, Justice et Reconciliation/Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EDITOGO	Établissement National des Éditions du Togo/National Publishing House of Togo
EEC	European Economic Community
EEC	Ewe Evangelical Church
EEPT	Église Évangélique Presbytérienne du Togo/Presbyterian Evangelical Church of Togo
ENA	École Nationale d'Administration/National Administration School
ENFOM	École Nationale de la France Outre-Mer/Overseas French National School
EPC	Ewe Presbyterian Church
EPZ	Export Processing Zone
EU	European Union
EUA	Ewe Unionist Association
FAC	Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération/Aid and Cooperation Fund
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FAR	Front des Associations pour le Renouveau/Association Front for Renewal
FAT	Forces d'Armées Togolaises/Togolese Armed Forces
FDR	Forces Démocratiques pour la République/Democratic Forces for the Republic
FEANF	Federation des Étudiants de l'Afrique Noire en France/Black African Students' Federation
FED	Fonds Européen de Développement/European Development Fund
FIDES	Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social des Territoires d'Outre Mer/Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development of Overseas Territories
FIR	Forces d'Intervention Rapide/Rapid Intervention Force
FN	Forces Nouvelles/New Forces

FNLT	Front National de Liberation du Togo/National Front for Togolese Liberation
FOD	Front d'Opposition Démocratique/Democratic Opposition Front
FOGEES	Fondation Gnassingbé Eyadéma Pour l'Éducation Et La Santé/Gnassingbé Eyadéma Fund for Education and Health
FORS93	Force de Réconciliation et Sécurité 93/Reconciliation and Security Force 93
FOSEP	Force de Sécurité Election Présidentielle/Presidential Election Security Force
FP	Front Patriotique des Peuples Africaines/Patriotic Front for African Peoples
FPSNT	Front Populaire de Salut National du Togo/Popular Front for Togolese National Salvation
FRAC	Front Républicain pour l'Alternance et le Changement/ Republican Front for Alternance and Change
FTF	Fédération Togolaise de Football/Togolese Football Federation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GF2D	Group de Réflexion et d'Action Femme, Démocratie et Développement/Women's Discernment and Action Group for Democracy and Development
GMC	Compagnie Générale de Matieres Colorantes/General Dyeing Company
GRAD	Groupe de Réflexion et d'Action des Jeunes pour la Démocratie/Youth Group for Democracy Discernment and Action
GSP	Groupe Social Panafricain/Panafrican Social Group
GTFT	Groupement du Théâtre et du Folklore Togolais/Togolese Theater and Folklore Troop
HAAC	Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication/High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication
HCR	Haut Conseil de la République/High Council of the Republic
HCRRUN	Haut-Commissariat à la Réconciliation et au Renforcement de l'Unité Nationale/Reconcilliation and National Unity Reinforcement High Commission
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Viruses
IAEC	Institut Africain d'Administration et d'Études Commerciales/ African Institute for Administration and Business

IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IESB	Institut d'Enseignement Supérieur du Bénin/Higher Education Institute of Benin
IFAN	Institut Français d'Afrique Noire/Black African French Institute
IFG-Togo	International Fertilizer Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INARES	Institut National de Recherches Scientifiques/National Institute for Scientific Research
INFAL	Institut National de Formation Agricole de Lomé/Lomé National Institute for Agricultural Training
INPT	Institut National des Plantes à Tubercules/National Institute of Tuber Plants
INSE	Institut National de Science de l'Éducation/National Institute of Education Sciences
INTSHU	Institut Togolais des Sciences Humaines/Togolese Social Sciences Institute
IOTO	Industrie Oléagineux du Togo/Oil-Producing Plant Industry of Togo
IPN	Institut Pédagogique National/National Pedagogical Institute
IRAT	Institut de Recherches Agronomiques Tropicales/Tropical Agriculture Research Institute
IRCC	Institut de Recherche du Cacao et du Café/Cocoa and Coffee Research Institute
IRCTE	Institut de Recherches du Coton et des Textiles Exotiques/ Cotton and Foreign Textile Research Institute
IRHO	Institut de Recherches pour les Huiles et Oléagineux/Research Institute for Oils and Oil-Producing Plants
IRTO	Institut de Recherches du Togo/Togo Research Institute
ITF	International Trade Federation/Fédération internationale des ouvriers du Transport (ITF)
ITOCY	Industrie Togolaise du Cycle et du Cyclomoteur/Togolese Bicycle and Scooter Industry
ITP	Industrie Togolaise des Plastiques/Togolese Plastics Industry
ITT	Industrie Textile Togolaise/Togolese Textile Industry
JPA	Jeunesse Pionnière Agricole/Agricultural Youth Pioneers
JRPT	Jeunesse du Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais/Youth Gathering of the Togolese People
JUVENTO	Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise/Togolese Youth Movement

LTDE	Ligue Togolaise des Droits des Éléves et Étudiants/Togolese Student Rights League
LTDH	Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l'Homme/Togolese Human Rights League
MAPAH	Ministère de l'Agriculture, de la Production Animale et Halieutique/Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Production and Fisheries
MATDCL	Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale, de la Décentralisation et des Collectivités Locales/Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization of Territorial Collectivities
MCD	Mouvement Citoyen pour la Démocratie et le Développement/Citizen Movement for Democracy and Development
MELD	Mouvement Étudiant de Lutte pour la Démocratie/Student Movement for the Struggle for Democracy
MJU	Mouvement des Jeunes UNIR/UNIR Youth Movement
MNU	Mouvement Nationaliste pour l'Unité/Nationalist Movement for Unity
MO-5	Mouvement d'Octobre 5/October 5 Movement
MODENA	Mouvement pour la Développement Nationale/Movement for National Development
MONESTO	Mouvement National des Étudiants et Stagiaires Togolais/National Movement for Togolese Students and Trainees
MPDD	Mouvement Patriotique pour la Démocratie et Développement/Patriotic Movement for Democracy and Development
MPT	Mouvement Populaire Togolais/Togolese Popular Movement
MRN	Mouvement de Regroupement National/National Rallying Movement
MTD	Mouvement Togolaise pour la Démocratie/Togolese Democratic Movement
MTP	Manufacture Togolaise des Plastiques/Togolese Plastics Manufacture
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NET	Nouvel Engagement Togolais/New Togolese Engagement
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NIOTO	Nouvelle Industrie Oléagineux du Togo/New Oil-Producing Plant Industry
NOUVELLE-SOTOMA	Nouvelle Société Togolaise de Marbrerie et de Matériaux/New Togolese Society for Marble and Building Materials

NSCT	Nouvelle Société Cotonnaire du Togo/New Coton Society of Togo
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OBUTS	Organization pour Bâtir dans l'Union un Togo Solidaire/ Organization to Construct a United Togo
OCAM	Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache/African and Malagasy Communal Organization
OCAMM	Organisation Commune Africaine, Malgache et Mauritanienne/African, Malagasy and Mauritanian Communal Organization
ODEF	Office National de Développement et Exploitation des Ressources Forestières/National Office for Developing and Operating Forest Resources
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OIF	Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie/International Francophonie Organization
ONADEC	Office National du Développement de l'Élevage/National Office for Animal Breeding Development
ONAF	Office National des Abattoirs Frigorifiques/National Office of Refrigerated Slaughterhouses
ONP	Office National des Pêches/National Fishing Office
ONPV	Office National des Produits Vivriers/National Office of Food Products
OPAT	Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo/Togo Office of Agricultural Products
OPDAD	Organisation des Premières Dames d'Afrique pour le Développement/Organization of African First Ladies for Development
OPTT	Office des Postes et Télécommunications du Togo/Post and Telecommunication Office of Togo
ORPV	Office Régionale pour la Population des Produits Vivriers/ Regional Office for Food Producing Populations
OTP	Office Togolais des Phosphates/Togolese Phosphates Office
OTTD	Organisation Togolaise des Travailleurs Démocratiques/ Togolese Democratic Workers Organization
PAD	Parti d'Action pour le Développement/Action Party for Development
PAL	Port Autonome de Lomé/Autonomous Port of Lomé
PCT	Parti Communiste Togolais/Togolese Communist Party
PDP	Parti Démocratique Panafricain/Panafrican Democratic Party

PDR	Parti pour la Démocratie et le Renouveau/Party for Democracy and Renewal
PDT	Parti Démocratique Togolais/Togolese Democratic Party
PDU	Parti des Démocrates pour l'Unité/Democrats for Unity Party
PEP	Parti Écologiste Panafricain/Panafrican Ecologist Party
POMAR	Société Pierres Ornementales et Marbres du Togo/Ornamental Brick and Marble Society of Togo
PND	Plan Nationale de Développement/National Development Plan
PNP	Parti National Panafricain/Panafrican National Party
PPT	Parti Progressiste Togolais/Togolese Progressive Party
PRDD	Parti Populaire pour la Démocratie et le Développement du Togo/Working Class Party for Democracy and Development
PRR	Parti du Renouveau et de la Rédemption/Renewal and Redemption Party
PRSB	Parti de la Révolution Socialiste du Benin/Socialist Revolution Party of Benin
PSD	Parti Social-Démocrate/Social-Democrat Party
PSP	Parti Socialiste Panafricain/Panafrican Socialist Party
PSR	Pact Socialiste pour le Renouveau/Socialist Renewal Pact
PSRT	Parti Socialiste Révolutionnaire du Togo/Socialist Revolutionary Party of Togo
PTP	Parti Togolais du Progrès/Togolese Progress Party
PTT	Postes, Telephones, Telegraphs
PUT	Parti de l'Unité Togolaise/Togolese Unity Party
RIAT	Régiment Inter-Arme Togolais/Togolese Weapons Regiment
RPT	Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais/Gathering of Togolese People
RSDD	Rassemblement pour le Soutien de la Démocratie et du Développement/Gathering for the Support of Democracy and Development
RTNM	Radiodiffusion Télévision de la Nouvelle Marche/Television Broadcasting of the New Road
SABER	Société Africaine des Biocarburants et des Énergies Renouvelables/African Society for Renewable Engergy and Biocarburants
SALINTO	Société des Salines du Togo/Salt Mining Society of Togo
SATAL	Société Agricole Togolaise-Arabe-Libyenne/Toglese-Arab-Li byan Agricultural Society
SEPT	Syndicat des Enseignants Protestants du Togo/Union of Protestant Teachers of Togo
SGMT	Société Générale des Moulins du Togo/General Grain Mill Society of Togo

SIAB	Société Interafricaine de Banque/Inter-African Banking Society
SIPAL	Société Industrielle de Préparations Alimentaires/Industrial Food Preparation Society
SNCT	Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Togo/National Railways Society of Togo
SNIT & FA	Société Nationale d'Investissement et Fonds Annexes du Togo/National Society for Investment and Annex Funds of Togo
SNPT	Société Nouvelle des Phosphates du Togo/New Phosphate Society of Togo
SNS	Société Nationale de Sidérurgie/National Steel Society
SOLITO	Parti Sociale-Libérale du Togo/Social-Liberal Party of Togo
SONACOM	Société Nationale de Commerce/National Commerce Society
SONAD	Société Nationale de Développement/National Development Society
SONAM	Société Nationale Maritime/National Maritime Society
SONAPH	Société Nationale pour le Développement de la Palmeraie et les Huileries/National Society for the Development of Palm Groves and Oils
SOPROLAIT	Société de Produits Laitiers du Togo/Togolese Milk Products Society
SORAD	Sociétés Regionales de Développement et d'Aménagement/Regional Development and Improvement Societies
SOTOCO	Société Togolaise du Coton/Togolese Cotton Society
SOTOMA	Société Togolaise de Marbrerie et de Matériaux/Togolese Society for Marble and Construction Materials
SOTONAM	Société Nationale Maritime/National Maritime Society
SOTOPROMER	Société Togolaise des Produits du Mer/Togolese Seafood Society
SPAR	Sociétés Publiques d'Action Rurale/Public Rural Action Society
SRCC	Société Nationale pour la Rénovation et le Développement de la Cacaoyère et de la Cafetière Togolaises/National Society for the Renewal and Development of Togolese Coffee and Cocoa Plantations

SSRC	Société Sucrière de la Région Centrale/Centrale Region Sugar Society
STALPECHE	Société Togolo-Arabe-Libyenne de Pêche/Togolese-Arab-Libyan Fishing Society
STB	Société Togolaise de Boissons/Togolese Beverage Society
STH	Société Togolaise de l'Hôtellerie/ Togolese Hotel Society
STH	Société Togolaise des Hydrocarbures/ Togolese Hydrocarbon Society
STS	Société Togolaise de Sidérurgie/Togolese Steel Industry Society
STSL	Société Togolaise de Stockage de Lomé/Togolese Storage Society of Lomé
STT	Synergie des Travailleurs du Togo/Workers Trade Union of Togo
SYNPOT	Syndicat des Praticiens Hospitaliers du Togo/Hospital Practitioners Trade Union of Togo
Togobund	Bund der Deutschen Togolander/Togoland Federation
TOGOFRUIT	Société Togolaise pour le Développement de Culture Fruitière/Togolese Society for Development of Fruit Farming
TOGOGRAIN	Office National des Produits Vivriers/National Office of Food Products
TOGOPROM	Société Togolaise de Promotion pour le Développement/ Togolese Society for the Promotion of Development
TOGOROUTE	Société Nationale de Transports Routiers/National Society of Road Transportation
TOGOTEX	Compagnie Togolaise des Textiles/Togolese Textile Company
TOLIMO	National Movement for the Liberation of Western Togoland
TVT	Télévision Togolaise/Togolese Television
UAC	United Africa Company
UB	Université du Bénin/University of Benin
UCPN	Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord/Union of Chiefs and Northern Populations
UCTT	Union des Chefs Traditionnels du Togo/Union of Togolese Traditional Chiefs
UDPT	Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais/Democratic Union of Togolese Peoples

UDS-Togo	Union pour la Démocratie Sociale/Union for Social Democracy
UEMOA	Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine/West African Economic and Monetary Union
UFC	Union des Forces de Changement/Union of Forces for Change
UGSL	Union Générale des Syndicats Libres/General Union of Free Trades
UJD	Union pour la Justice et la Démocratie/Union for Justice and Democracy
UK	Université de Kara/University of Kara
UL	Université de Lomé/University of Lomé
ULI	Union des Libéraux Independents/Union of Liberal Independents
UMOA	Union Monétaire de l'Ouest Afrique/West African Monetary Union
UMT	Union Musulmane du Togo/Togolese Muslim Union
UNB	Université Nationale du Bénin/National University of Benin
UNCTT	Union Nationale des Chefs Traditionnels du Togo/National Union of Togolese Traditional Chiefs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNELCO	Union Électrique Coloniale/Colonial Electric Union
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNETO	Union Nationale des Étudiants Togolais/National Union of Togolese Students
UNHCR	United Nations High Council of Refugees
UNFT	Union Nationale des Femmes du Togo/Togolese Women's National Union
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIR	Union Pour La République/Union for the Republic
UNJT	Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Togolaise/National Union of Togolese Youth
UNTT	Union Nationale des Travailleurs Togolais/National Union of Togolese Workers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UT	Unité Togolaise/Togolese Unity
UTB	Union Togolaise de Banque/Togolese Banking Union
UTD	Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie/Togolese Union for Democracy
UTR	Union Togolaise pour la Reconstruction (Rénouveau)/Togolese Union for Reconstruction (Renewal)

WACEM	West African Cement
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZAAP	Zones d'Amenagement Agricole Planifie/Agricultural Planning Development Zones
ZFTE	Zone Franche de Transformation pour l'Exploitation/ Processing Operations Development Zone

Maps





Recent Political Chronology

4 July 1884 German Protectorate Treaty with Chief Mlapa III of Togo.

8 August 1914 Anglo-French invasion of Togo.

10 July 1919 Anglo-French partition of Togo under League of Nations mandates.

13 December 1946 Anglo-French Trusteeship over Togo ratified by the United Nations (UN).

6 February 1952 Double Electoral College System abolished.

9 May 1956 Plebiscite in British Togoland; territory opts to merge with the Gold Coast.

28 October 1956 Following a referendum, France establishes the Autonomous Republic of Togo under the leadership of Nicolas Grunitzky.

17 April 1958 UN-supervised elections bring Sylvanus Olympio to power.

27 April 1960 Proclamation of Independence.

13 January 1963 Coup d'état of the demobilized veterans.

5 May 1963 New constitution and Grunitzky administration set up.

21 November 1966 Lomé uprising against Grunitzky regime.

13 January 1967 Coup d'état of General Gnassingbé Eyadéma.

14 April 1967 General Eyadéma gathers all powers and sets up his administration.

August–November 1969 Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) established.

8 August 1970 Attempted coup sponsored by self-exiled leader Nöe Kutuklui.

9 January 1972 National Referendum on the continued leadership of General Eyadéma.

24 January 1974 General Eyadéma's plane crashes near Lama Kara. Shortly after, the nationalization of Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Benin (COTOMIB) is announced.

17 September 1974 RPT drive against "imported names" as part of the authenticity policy of General Eyadéma.

30 November 1976 RPT Congress "rejects" a return to civilian rule, and modifies government and party structures.

1 February 1977 Cabinet reshuffle results in Eyadéma remaining the only military officer in the government. Massive intensification of the Cult of Personality in Togo.

October 1977 Mercenary assassination plot against Eyadéma thwarted.

November 1978 Core "Brazilian" families, including the Olympio and de Souza ones implicated in the 1977 plot.

26 August 1979 Trial commences of the ten main conspirators of 1977.

30 December 1979 Election of Togo's first National Assembly since 1967 under a new constitution with Eyadéma as president of the Third Republic.

16 June 1980 Inauguration of the last segment of the paved North-South axis.

27 November 1982 Major economic stress brings about the reimposition of a 5 percent solidarity tax on all salaries.

3–4 December 1982 RPT Congress examining the bloated, inefficient, corrupt parastatal sector recommends the dissolution of several companies and the placing on probation of others.

June 1984 Rescheduling of Togo's large (\$812 million) international debt.

December 1984 Privatization of the steel industry.

24 March 1985 High turnout for Togo's second legislative elections under Eyadéma.

23 September 1986 Armed plot against Eyadéma from across Ghana; France dispatches 250 soldiers to stabilize the situation.

23 December 1986 Eyadéma reelected to another seven-year term by 99.85 percent of the vote.

5 October 1990 Violent demonstration calling for Eyadéma's resignation or overthrow erupts in Lomé; numerous dead and wounded. Eyadéma concedes liberalization and multipartyism.

18 April 1991 Brutal Bè Lagoon massacres take place in Lomé's outskirts. Eyadéma's elite units responsible.

6 June 1991 Tens of thousands demonstrate for a National Conference and declare an "indefinite strike" when Eyadéma seems to renege on his political liberalization promise. Eyadéma capitulates on 12 June.

20 June 1991 Memory of Sylvanus Olympio rehabilitated.

6 July 1991 Gilchrist Olympio returns to Togo from exile and is greeted by thousands of supporters; other opposition exiles also return.

8 July 1991 National Conference convenes, to last 52 days: it lambasts Eyadéma and the armed forces, declares its sovereignty, dissolves existing National Assembly and RPT party, and abrogates the 1980 Constitution.

23 August 1991 Revelations that 900 billion CFAF have been embezzled under the Eyadéma regime, one-third by Eyadéma himself.

26 August 1991 National Conference selects a transitional government (Haut Conseil de la République or HCR) under Joseph Kokou Koffigoh pending elections in June 1992.

October–November 1991 Troops seize Radio Lomé multiple times to call on Eyadéma to dissolve the transitional government.

3 December 1991 Troops move in strength into Lomé, kidnap Koffigoh, and demand changes in his HCR government. Koffigoh agrees on a government of national unity including RPT ministers, which is set up on 31st of December.

25 March 1992 Hundreds of heavily armed policemen go on a rampage in Lomé over nonpayment of salaries for up to nine months.

16 April 1992 HCR amends the constitution to prevent both Koffigoh and Eyadéma from running for the presidency.

5 May 1992 Olympio's campaigning motorcade ambushed in North Togo by army units. The wounded Olympio is evacuated to Paris.

9 May 1992 Southern Togo paralyzed by a general strike.

22 October 1992 Army storms the HCR over the confiscating of RPT party funds. HCR members beaten up.

26 October 1992 Unlimited general strike erupts in southern Togo, tapering off in May 1993 at a cost of 60 billion CFAF; up to one-third of Lomé's population eventually flees to Ghana.

9 February 1993 Reconciliation talks fail at Colmar, France; soon afterward, the French suspend all cooperation with Togo.

25 March 1993 Intra-military attempt on Eyadéma's life fails with the death of several key senior officers.

17 June 1993 Talks commence in Ouagadougou to break impasse on election dates.

24 August 1993 After Olympio is disqualified on a technicality, most opposition leaders boycott the presidential elections; Eyadéma elected in a poll with 35 percent turnout.

6 February 1994 Parliamentary elections take place, boycotted by Olympio's and affiliated parties. Yao Agboyibo's Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR) party emerges the largest party, narrowly trailed by the RPT.

14 February 1994 Eyadéma appoints Edem Kodjo, who had only won seven seats as prime minister. Kodjo forms a coalition with the RPT and a few smaller parties.

21 June 1998 Presidential elections between Olympio and Eyadéma—harassment by the military during balloting and vote count causes the electoral commission to resign and the Ministry of the Interior to claim victory for Eyadéma.

July 1998 Protests against the election results banned, opposition resorts to dead city strike in Lomé; victims of the security crackdown wash up on beaches.

21 March 1999 National Assembly elections won by the RPT, opposition boycotts.

29 July 1999 Lomé Framework Agreement signed, electoral code modified so opposition will contest new legislative elections, and Eyadéma agrees not to run for president in 2003.

February 2001 National Assembly changes the electoral code, in contravention of the Lomé Framework Agreement.

August 2001 Opposition leader Agboyibo jailed for defamation.

27 October 2002 Delayed legislative elections boycotted by the opposition, RPT wins majority.

December 2002 National Assembly implements constitutional changes to remove two-round system, term limits, lower age of presidential eligibility.

1 June 2003 Eyadéma elected for a third term (under the constitution of the Fourth Republic), defeating Union des Forces de Changement (UFC) candidate Emmanuel Akitani-Bob.

5 February 2005 Gnassingbé Eyadéma dies, the military suspends the constitution and swears allegiance to his son Faure Gnassingbé as president.

25 February 2005 After an international outcry, Faure is forced to step down in favor of a member of the National Assembly, Abass Bonfoh, as interim president until new elections can be organized.

24 April 2005 Presidential elections won by Faure Gnassingbé against UFC candidate Akitani-Bob.

April–May 2005 Postelection violence reported leads to 790 deaths and more than 4,000 injured, while tens of thousands flee to neighboring Ghana and Benin.

June 2005 Gnassingbé names Edem Kodjo, of the opposition Convergence Patriotique Panafricain (CPP), prime minister.

July–August 2006 President Gnassingbé and opposition negotiate the Global Political Accord (APG) to set the terms for participating in government and the next legislative elections.

September 2006 Yao Agboyibo of the opposition CAR accepts post of prime minister.

14 October 2007 Legislative elections declared free and fair, RPT wins majority and UFC comes in second.

November 2007 Full economic cooperation restored between Togo and international donors.

November 2008 Togo admitted to international program for debt relief.

February 2009 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation commission (CVJR) established to acknowledge victims of political violence in Togo 1958–2005.

April 2009 Gnassingbé's half-brother and former defense minister Kpatcha Gnassingbé arrested for plotting a coup.

8 January 2010 Togolese national soccer team attacked in Angola.

4 March 2010 Gnassingbé reelected against UFC candidate Jean-Pierre Fabre.

May 2010 Olympio negotiates separate deal with Gnassingbé for seven UFC portfolios in a unity government.

10 October 2010 Fabre and his supporters split from the UFC to form a new party, the Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC).

November 2010 ANC deputies ousted from the National Assembly for switching party allegiance while in office.

September 2011 Kpatcha Gnassingbé sentenced to 20 years in jail for attempted coup.

April 2012 RPT disbanded, new Union Pour La République (UNIR) takes its place; Collectif Sauvons Le Togo (CST) formed with ANC as member; CVJR submits final report.

12–14 June 2012 CST organizes mass protests in Lomé, Sokodé, and Dapaong.

13 January 2013 Fire burns grand marchés in Lomé and in Kara, CST members later arrested.

July 2013 Legislative elections for an expanded 91-seat National Assembly, opposition CST wins more seats than the disgraced UFC, but new UNIR party wins the majority.

25 April 2015 Faure Gnassingbé wins third term in office in presidential elections with 60 percent of the vote.

May 2016 Gnassingbé invited to China for state visit.

19 August 2017 Anti-government protests in Sokodé marking 50 years of rule by one family turn violent, opposition Parti National Panafricain (PNP) supporters killed, many arrested.

5–11 September 2017 Government shuts down Togo's Internet access for six days in an effort to stop protest organization on social media.

April 2018 Bolloré scandal breaks with arrest of Vincent Bolloré for helping Faure Gnassingbé's 2010 election in exchange for lucrative Lomé port contracts.

July 2018 Scheduled legislative elections delayed due to ongoing protest marches demanding term limits on the presidency and a return to other principles of the 1992 constitution.

20 December 2018 Legislative elections boycotted by opposition Coalition of 14, UNIR wins majority.

8 May 2019 UNIR-dominated National Assembly passes constitutional reforms including a new Senate, and term limits on the presidency, but they do not apply retroactively to President Gnassingbé.

30 June 2019 Municipal elections held for the first time in more than 25 years; UNIR candidates win in a majority of localities.

22 February 2020 Incumbent president Faure Gnassingbé wins fourth term in office against Agbéyomé Kodjo with 72 percent of the vote, raising widespread skepticism of the poll.

11 April 2020 Death of Edem Kodjo.

21 April 2020 Abéyomé Kodjo arrested.

3 May 2020 President Faure Gnassingbé inaugurated for his fourth term in office.

30 May 2020 Death of Yao Agboyibo.

28 September 2020 Victoire Tomegah-Dogbé becomes the first female prime minister of Togo.

Introduction

In many ways, Togo defies classification because it has fallen between precolonial kingdoms, between colonial powers, between military and civilian government, and today between democracy and dictatorship. Since 1963, Togo has been dominated by one ruling family in competition with another and has struggled to find a steady place in the world economy because of its small size and vulnerability to changes in world commodity prices. Togo faces challenges common to many sub-Saharan African states, including a history of military coups, one president (General Gnassingbé Eyadéma) who ruled for more than 30 years, debt and economic fluctuations, ongoing negotiations with international donors, and the struggle of ordinary people to claim their political freedom in the face of repeated violations of their human rights.

Since the attempted democratic transition of 1991 and immediate aftermath, Togolese politics has been liberalized in the sense of greater freedom of the press and more political parties, but meaningful reforms reluctantly negotiated across political lines have frequently been stymied or rolled back. The result is that Eyadéma's son, President Faure Gnassingbé, maintains his father's political dynasty with greater attention to the economics of international relations with partners and donors and carefully consolidates power domestically, even as the opposition undergoes frequent party and coalition realignment in an attempt to loosen his hold. Today, Togo's economy is more stable than in the past, but the country and its people still strive for better representation in domestic politics and on the world stage.

THE COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE

Togo is a small state in West Africa with an area of 56,000 square kilometers (21,620 square miles), extending from a narrow 32-mile Gulf of Guinea coastline to a point 320 miles inland. Nestled between Benin to the east and Ghana to the west, Togo—which occupies two-thirds of the territory of the original German colony of the same name—has a northern border with Burkina Faso, providing the latter country with an access to the sea.

Togo is composed of six natural geographical regions stretching from (1) sandy beaches, estuaries, and inland lagoons (the biggest being Lac Togo) to (2) the terre de barre Ouatchi plateaus in the immediate hinterland, followed by (3) the higher Mono tableland (highest altitude: 1,500 feet) drained by the Mono River and its tributaries, and (4) the Chaîne du Togo Mountains that dissect the country in a southwest-northeast direction and are part of a range beginning with Benin's Atakora Mountains and ending in Ghana's Akwapim hills. Togo's highest altitude is found here at Pic Baumann (986 meters, or 3,235 feet). The country's two other regions are (5) the northern sandstone Oti plateau (drained by the Oti, a tributary of the Volta River) and (6) the northwestern granite regions in the vicinity of Dapaong.

The country is, in general, more heavily wooded than neighboring Benin, though grasslands are the predominant vegetation. The highest rainfall—70 inches a year—falls at Kpalimé, 120 kilometers in the interior, with the coast essentially dry, recording an average of 25 to 35 inches of rainfall per year. The north has one rainy season between April and July (45 inches per year), while in the south there are two rainy seasons—from April to July and from October through November.

Togo's population has doubled in the last 25 years to an estimated 8.6 million people, and is composed of between 18 and 30 ethnic groups (depending upon the classification used), of which two of the most important are the Ewe (and other Adja-related groups) in the south (encompassing 44% of the people) and the Kabyé and related ethnic groups (27%) in the north. Prior to the colonial intrusion, the various groups had little contact with each other, except in cases of contiguous territorial occupation. Large-scale centralized political organizations did not flourish, with most entities (apart from two small kingdoms in the north) being decentralized groupings of villages under military pressure from both the Ashanti in the Gold Coast and the Dahomey kingdom to the east. Thus, from the colonial point of view, the region was a power vacuum, a weak neutral zone between two other strong West African states.

As elsewhere in West Africa, the coastal elements and groups immediately adjacent developed socioeconomically at a much earlier date and at a much faster pace than groups in the interior. In Togo, the Ewe (composed of 120 clans and subclans), Mina, and other related groups were the first to experience contact with Europeans and to adjust to the changing socioeconomic context. They rapidly seized venues for upward social and economic mobility, a fact that brought on its heels their political and administrative ascendance during the colonial and postcolonial eras. The northern populations, by contrast, opposed the colonial intrusion, fought the penetration of their

territory, and were, in turn, kept isolated and undeveloped by the German and, to a lesser extent, the subsequent French administration. The growing socioeconomic disparities between northern and southern ethnic groups created interethnic hostility and mutual resentment that contributed to the growth of regionalism and the rise of antagonistic regional political parties in the pre-independence period and after the political liberalization of the 1990s. In the intervening decades, populations considered “northern” have moved to the center, and the capital Lomé has attracted Togolese of all backgrounds, disrupting the conventional wisdom of a sharp ethno-regional divide between north and south. Though there are ongoing attempts at reconciliation, transfer of power from father to son upon the death of longtime president Gnassingbé Eyadéma in 2005 has kept power firmly in the hands of one family, and political competition and conflict continue to have ethno-regional overtones.

THE ECONOMY

The Togolese economy has undergone four periods of rapid growth: the first during the German colonial era (followed by stagnation between 1920 and 1940), the second after the end of World War II, the third sparked by the temporary (1974) boom in global phosphate prices, and finally a slow recovery from the economic and political crises of the early 1990s. Since 2003, growth has held steady at around 4–5 percent annually (see Appendix figure 1).

During the colonial era, German efforts to transform their new possession into a model self-sufficient colony (*Musterkolonie*) brought economic advances in its wake in the southern part of the territory. There a plantation economy developed that resulted in steadily increasing exports of coffee, cocoa, palm products, and cotton, which benefited from the construction of Togo’s three railway lines. During this period, Togo surged ahead in the spread of education, which in 1914 covered 9 percent of school-age children, a ratio not achieved by Senegal, for example, until 1938. Following the Anglo-French partition of the colony, Togo entered a period of stagnation aggravated by the global economic crash of the 1920s and 1930s. Average GDP growth during these twenty years was barely 1.5 percent per year, and as late as 1949 Togo’s volume of exports was much the same as during the German era. After the end of World War II, the economy started to improve as a result of investments by the French Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social des Territoires d’Outre Mer (FIDES) program. In the mid-1960s, new state funds became available as the country’s phosphate industry came of age. In 1974, a massive but temporary global price increase

for phosphates quadrupled state revenues from them and ushered in the country's third period of economic expansion. Togo's main cash crops are cocoa and coffee (grown in the humid hilly Kpalimé area, snug against the Ghana border), palm nuts, and cotton, the latter strongly expanded in the 1980s. In the past, these four commodities accounted for up to two-thirds of the country's export earnings, with maize, millet, cassava (manioc), and yams grown for local consumption.

Historically, phosphate exports have been the key to much of the Togolese economy. From some of the richest deposits in the world, conveniently located near the coast, heavy exports of phosphate ore (especially after the regional mining concern *Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin* [COTOMIB] was nationalized in 1974) and by-products stabilized what would otherwise have been a very shaky agrarian economy. Though other mineral deposits abound, they are mostly found in quantities too small or too distant from the coast to be commercially exploitable due to the massive infrastructure outlays necessary. Togo continues to rely on phosphates as a prime extractive industry, but changes in world commodity prices mean that oil and gold—though not originating from Togo—are the largest export earners today.

Fueled by a short-lived boom in global phosphate prices and heavy French and German largess in the 1970s, the Togolese economy underwent a transformation at a time when many other countries were struggling with debt from the oil crisis. Dozens of parastatal and joint enterprises, plants, corporations, and ventures were mounted, sharply setting off Togo from neighboring Benin. A liberal investment code, a balanced developmental policy promoting the transformation of the neglected north, and a blind eye to the smuggling activities to and from Ghana and Benin carried out by Lomé's market women and other entrepreneurs, all helped Togo present the image of a stable, albeit military, state, keeping important constituencies satisfied while developmentally forging ahead.

What was referred to as the "Togolese economic miracle" collapsed rapidly by the early 1980s. Massive corruption and administrative incompetence had seeped in during this period of economic growth. Indeed, in the inevitable postmortem of the deficitary state sector—built in the 1970s and closed down, restructured, or privatized at bargain-basement prices in the 1980s and 1990s—it was discovered that, at times, enterprises were authorized by cabinet members solely for the anticipated (10%) kickbacks from contractors. Some senior officials were in due course purged for corruption, but most were merely shuffled to less sensitive posts, where they continued their personal misdemeanors. The activities of the presidency, in any case, were not scrutinized until the remarkable revelations attending the attempt at democratization that came with the convening of the National Conference in 1991.

The fiscal austerities triggered by the need to downsize the bloated Togolese economy and civil service and control the staggering national debt (at one time among the highest in the world on a per capita basis) destabilized the political system. This process was accelerated by domestic pressures for democratization in the 1990s and the continental “winds of change” in Africa. However, Togo’s early willingness to privatize and embrace free-market principles would prove to be an asset, as the country was perceived internationally, and to key donor countries, like France, as less resistant to globalization, and therefore a better credit risk than many other countries in the region. Eyadéma held on to power through the troubled 1990s and the economy recovered somewhat, but his reliance on military crackdowns prevented full international cooperation from being restored until after his death in 2005. His son Faure Gnassingbé, who succeeded him, gradually consolidated power through a pragmatic economic strategy of both public- and private-owned industries under the advice of technocrats, investing in sectors like phosphates and selling off debt-laden state-owned banks. Full economic cooperation with donors was restored in 2007 after government and opposition fully participated in legislative elections, and Togo has seen much steadier and more consistent economic growth in the years since. In terms of human development, Togo is reportedly on track to reach the goal of universal primary education by 2020, but many ordinary people still struggle to meet the rising costs of health care and other basic needs. The greatest danger to the economy lies in political protests and strikes, as when uprisings in 2017 and 2018 prevented economic growth in line with forecasts. Togo’s National Development Plan for the period 2018–2022 foresees Togo as a financial and business hub in the West African region, boosting commercial agriculture and infrastructure to increase economic growth rates to 6–7 percent per year.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The first Europeans to see the Togolese coast were the Portuguese navigators Joao de Santarem and Pedro Escobar, traveling from 1471 to 1473. In the 19th century, the coastal region between Accra and Lagos rapidly became an area of contention among a number of colonial powers, including France, Great Britain, and Germany. (Previously the Danes were quite active in the western part of the coastal littoral, but they withdrew from the area with the sale of Keta to Britain in 1850.) The main town in the region was Aného (at the time better known as Petit Popo), a small Mina slave port in which various nationalities were established. The town never became a preferred port of call because of the alleged “bad disposition” and shrewd middleman practices

by local traders, as well as the more plentiful supply of slaves available at Ouidah (Benin) and along the Gold Coast.

The territory obtained its name from the small coastal village of Togo (To = water, Go = coast), where, on 4 July 1884, German imperial commissioner Gustav Nachtigal signed the first protectorate agreement with Chief Mlapa III. The push inland from the coast was slow and punctuated by the resistance of the indigenous population, especially in the north. Still, resistance was feeble compared to the opposition that France and Britain encountered in neighboring Dahomey and Gold Coast, where military campaigns had to be mounted. Germany's slow expansion inland resulted in the frustration of one prime imperial goal—attaining a bridgehead on the Niger River. The colony's definitive borders were fixed in a number of conferences with the other colonial powers and ratified in the Treaty of Paris of 1897.

Although the German colonial era was brief (lasting thirty years, until August 1914) and was very authoritarian, it was during this period that the basis for much of Togo's infrastructure was laid. A good road system was developed, Lomé's breakwaters and wharf were constructed, and, just prior to the outbreak of World War I, a third of the territory's railroads was completed (later to be extended by the French), greatly facilitating the movement of cash crops to the coast. The parallel expansion of Togo's agriculture made the colony the first in West Africa to balance its own budget (1906). Despite such advances and similar efforts toward education, the harshness of the German administration led to considerable opposition, Ewe migration to the Gold Coast, and a welcome to Allied troops when the Great War broke out.

The conquest of Togo in 1914 by an Anglo-French force was the first Allied victory in the war, taking only eighteen days. After the end of the war, the two occupying powers were given League of Nations mandates over the partitioned territory. The division of the Ewe by the Gold Coast and British and French Togoland was the root of the so-called Ewe "problem" that emerged to occupy the attention of the UN Trusteeship Council after World War II. The nationalist aspirations of the Ewe translated into several unification movements in the Gold Coast and French Togo, one of which was the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT) of Sylvanus Olympio, Togo's future president.

The Ewe goal of unification within the borders of one political entity was not attained. Failure was due to a variety of factors: mutual Anglo-French suspicions as to each other's colonial ambitions, divergent decolonization policies within their respective trusteeship territories, interclan rivalries among the Ewe, and personality clashes among their leaders. With the approaching independence of Ghana, Britain informed the United Nations that she could no longer maintain her duties in British Togoland (that had been

administered from the Gold Coast). Consequently, a plebiscite on the future of the territory was held in 1956, with the majority of the population (though not the Ewe) opting for unification with the soon-to-be independent Ghana. France, suspicious of Britain's intentions and fearful of the panafrican pull of Kwame Nkrumah, resisted pressures to conduct a similar plebiscite. Instead, French Togo moved toward independence under the conservative pro-French Nicolas Grunitzky after a referendum in which the French administration was helped by a CUT boycott. Grunitzky's Autonomous Republic (1956–1958) collapsed, however, and his political allies were humiliatingly defeated in 1958 when a UN-supervised vote brought a dramatic victory for the CUT and Olympio.

As power became centralized in the hands of CUT militants, Togo became more and more authoritarian. Olympio's leadership was characterized by a drive to set Togo on an internationally nonaligned course, one requisite of which was fiscal independence from France. His friction with Nkrumah led to the closure of the border with Ghana, hurting the livelihood of Lomé's traders, while his clash with Lomé's archbishop alienated him from a segment of the Ewe intellectual elite. Finally, his austerity policies and anti-military stances led to the 1963 ex-servicemen confrontation and coup and his own cold-blooded murder by Eyadéma.

The 1963 coup set off a wave of disapproval from other African states (this was West Africa's first coup, and Olympio's murder was traumatic to other leaders) that was barely soothed by the putschists' handover of power to Grunitzky and Antoine Meatchi and the May elections in which Togo's resurrected parties united to form a joint electoral list. From the outset, the new regime was not popular with the masses: in the north, feelings ran in favor of a Meatchi presidency (he was Grunitzky's vice president), while in the south the new government was seen as identical to the one turned out of office in 1958. In addition, relations with Ghana remained poor, continuing to adversely affect local trade; the economy was weak and sapped by new expenditures for an army that tripled in size to accommodate the authors of the 1963 coup.

Grunitzky was also the target of several plots sponsored by opposition members still in exile and from within his own cabinet. The most serious of these erupted in November 1966 when, after a cabinet crisis, massive popular demonstrations (sponsored by Nöe Kutuklui, the self-styled political heir to Olympio) occurred in the capital, calling for the ouster of Grunitzky. Two months later, on the fourth anniversary of Olympio's murder, the army moved in to dismiss the Grunitzky regime. After a brief military interregnum, Eyadéma moved into the vacuum to establish his own authoritarian regime that remained in office until forced to symbolically democratize in 1991.

THE EYADÉMA ERA

Eyadéma's years in power moved through distinct phases, beginning with the period to 1969, during which he was acutely aware of his extralegal status in a hostile Ewe environment and strove to project an image of "honest broker" abetted by stage-managed spontaneous demonstrations in his favor; and then the period from 1969 to 1980, during which, aided by increased state revenues from booming phosphate exports and a generally improved economy, the regime created a single party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT), and developed an ubiquitous Cult of Personality of grotesque proportions—a continuation of earlier efforts to orchestrate support for the regime. Paradoxically, much of the relaxed style in Lomé in the 1970s, the early stability of the regime, and even some of the favorable accolades heaped on it, could be attributed to Eyadéma's early surprisingly astute leadership of both armed forces and the country in general. The army's chain of command during this period was kept largely intact through judicious promotions, constraints against the involvement of too many officers in political or civilian posts, and a low-keyed effort at keeping military self-aggrandizement within limited bounds.

In its early years, the regime was relatively "forgiving" of opposition activity and open to the infusion of new talent at the highest reaches of the political hierarchy, including the cabinet. Thus, the loyalty that was denied Eyadéma because of his northern, military, and nonintellectual credentials and his role in the murder of Olympio was gained through a pragmatic, easygoing political style, liberal economic policies, and the political cultivation of outstanding Mina and Ewe technocrats. Benefiting from increasing phosphate revenues, the regime was able to accelerate development in the south, commence the first serious and large-scale efforts at the socioeconomic modernization of the north, and construct major public works projects throughout the country (paving the entire north-south road artery, a major urban renovation of Lomé, etc.), while keeping the civil service and armed forces happy with increased budgetary allocations. It was the short-lived 1974 spurt in phosphate royalties that tripped the regime into a frenzy of public spending, the price for which was austerity at a time of rising expectations and multiple demands which lead to the harshness of Eyadéma's latter years.

The late 1970s and 1980s were marked on the one hand by Eyadéma's claim to permanence in office as Togo was granted (on 1 January 1980) a constitution, legislature, and (uniparty) elections which allegedly constitutionalized and civilianized Eyadéma's rule, and, on the other hand, by the erosion of the Togolese economic dream as the costs of the etatist error had to be paid. The acutely upwardly mobile and educated southern Togolese had

become too sophisticated to be swayed by the stifling personality cult and incredible political mythology that had been built up to prop the credentials of the unlettered “Le Guide” (who allegedly even had aspirations to be nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in the mid-1990s), but Eyadéma also became increasingly more heavy-handed and authoritarian. His early astute appointments gave way to the nomination of sycophants, incompetents, personal cronies, family members (especially in command of key units in the armed forces, the Forces d’Armées Togolaises [FAT]), and individuals out to siphon the benefits of office in full. High officials caught embezzling state funds were forgiven their transgressions and shifted to less lucrative pastures in the public sector. Abuses of human rights increased until the country came to be judged by some as having Africa’s worst human rights record.

By the mid-1980s, the economy had collapsed due to Eyadéma’s mismanagement and the persistent, increasingly violent efforts, primarily by southerners (including Gilchrist Olympio, one of Sylvanus Olympio’s sons), to permanently dislodge him from office. With development funds drying up, sinecure posts becoming increasingly difficult to locate, corruption and mismanagement of the state sector bankrupting the economy, and popular grievances building up, the social glue that had kept society together slowly dissolved, and political instability again became a fact of life. During this period, most of the systematic and brutal abuses of human rights took place: arbitrary and mass arrests, imprisonment without trial, torture, and liquidation while in prison.

Then came the unstable era 1990–1998, when the economic crisis, global winds of change, and external donors forced Eyadéma to convene a broadly representative National Conference that promptly declared itself sovereign. Eyadéma was aided by a French hands-off policy and used his loyalist northern army to terrorize society into submission, clawing his way back to power in 1993. Referring to this period, when one-third of Lomé’s population fled to Ghana during a paralyzing 18-month strike and riots and societal tumult in the south (costing the economy 200 billion CFAF), the Economist Intelligence Unit noted (Togo, Niger, Benin, Burkina: Country Report, no. 1 [1993]: 10) “only the absence of weapons in the hands of the opposition is preventing a full scale civil war . . . Eyadéma’s mainly Kabyé army is operating as an army of occupation in the center and south of the country.”

Notwithstanding the resolutions of a euphoric National Conference, no doubt feeling it was writing history when it stripped him of executive power, denied him the right to run for office again, banned the RPT and expelled it from its headquarters, and publicly revealed (though accounts had previously been published overseas) sordid details of brute murder and crass corruption by him and his close associates (as former lieutenants “cleansed” themselves

by revealing all in public), Eyadéma remained serene in his residence inside the capital's army barracks. It was interim prime minister Joseph Koffigoh (1991–1994) who was at risk, humiliated by troops who multiple times seized Lomé's radio station to lambaste him and his interim government, mounted several attempted coups, stormed the interim legislature, and finally kidnapped him for a confrontation with Eyadéma that led to a coalition of supposed national unity with the RPT, and the passing of a compromise constitution of the Fourth Republic of Togo at the end of 1992. Members of the interim government were assaulted, murdered, or intimidated right up to the much-flawed presidential elections of 1993 and somewhat improved legislative elections of 1994. Gilchrist Olympio, Eyadéma's prime nemesis and contender for the political throne, was ambushed by the military (led by one of Eyadéma's sons) while campaigning in central Togo and was later disqualified from the presidential elections on a technicality.

The result of "democratization" in Togo was Eyadéma's reelection in August 1993 in a contest boycotted by all weighty candidates. Voters turned out primarily in the north, and most international observers (including former U.S. president Jimmy Carter) withdrew from monitoring the irrelevant event. Olympio, back in self-exile in Paris, redoubled his efforts to oust Eyadéma by force, with assaults reaching right into the presidential residence at the Tokoin barracks. The legislative elections of February 1994 were also marked by intimidation and violence by the army, though they were ultimately certified fair. The RPT emerged as Togo's second largest party, though now clearly a regionalist northern formation. With Gilchrist Olympio's party out of the race, the southern vote split among several contenders (to date, hundreds of political parties have been certified in Togo though few are active at any one time) with the predominantly southern Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR) of Yao Agboyibo (a lawyer, and prime catalyst of the National Conference) emerging as the country's largest party. Edem Kodjo, an Ewe leader from Kpalimé, came third (after the RPT) with just seven seats. Koffigoh, thoroughly discredited by his cooperation with Eyadéma, barely secured his own seat in the National Assembly. Indicating he had no intention of being relegated to the sidelines, Eyadéma stunned the country on 22 April 1994 by appointing Edem Kodjo as prime minister, leading to the formation of a coalition between Kodjo's Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD) and the RPT (as well as a few minor parties). The RPT reclaimed a majority in the legislature a few months later with some strategic by-elections, and Eyadéma and the RPT were firmly back in control, but of a country in political and economic ruin.

In an attempt to woo back international support and financing, Eyadéma lifted the restrictions that had kept Gilchrist Olympio ineligible to run for the presidency in 1993, and the two faced off in the presidential election of 1998. Though the campaign was marked by intimidation of opponents and

irregularities, pro-democracy forces saw a real opportunity to oust him via the ballot box and right the historical wrong of Eyadéma's assassination of Sylvanus Olympio, 35 years earlier. They were helped by a provision in the 1992 constitution that if no candidate achieved a majority in the first round, the top two contenders would face off in a second round, setting up the possibility of a decisive defeat for Eyadéma. Neither Eyadéma nor the military could stomach this possible outcome, however, and when early returns appeared to show Olympio might win, or at least force a runoff, the military sprang into action, shutting down the count in southern areas and causing sufficient chaos in the independent electoral commission to force members to resign. The Ministry of the Interior then stepped into the breach and announced it would takeover the counting of ballots, shortly afterward pronouncing a narrow first-round majority for Eyadéma (52%) which satisfied no one. Shortly afterward, bodies began to wash up on the shores of Togo and neighboring Benin; apparently, political opponents were killed by security forces and then dumped in the ocean from helicopters, according to the Amnesty International report, "Togo: Rule of Terror" published in 1999.

The remainder of Eyadéma's life and rule consisted of attempts at international mediation to resolve the political deadlock resulting from the 1998 debacle, but none were successful. Opposition and government did work out a deal such that the opposition would participate in the 2002 elections in exchange for Eyadéma not running for the presidency in 2003, but the National Assembly altered the election law without input from the opposition, prompting the latter to boycott the elections, and Eyadéma to run and win another term in 2003. Though Olympio did not run again in 2003, his partisan stand-in, Emmanuel Akitani-Bob, ran under the banner of Olympio's Union des Forces de Changement (UFC) party, winning about 34 percent of the vote to Eyadéma's 58 percent. International donors still refused to offer Togo their full economic cooperation, and the country continued to suffer as a result of these political troubles. Eyadéma's health began to fail—he was less seen in public and appeared thinner while rumors frequently circulated about his ultimate demise. When he finally passed away in February 2005, his death was overshadowed by a constitutional crisis over succession, and in the aftermath fewer international dignitaries attended the funeral than his 37 years in power would have suggested.

THE GNASSINGBÉ ERA

It was becoming clear from 2002 that Eyadéma wished to have his son Faure Gnassingbé succeed him as president: Gnassingbé, popularly known as "Faure," was elevated to a ministerial post at a young age, and among the

constitutional changes of 2002 was a provision lowering the age of eligibility for the presidency from 45 to 35 years, which appeared to favor the 36-year-old Gnassingbé. While some in Eyadéma's circle, especially those in the military, may have preferred Kpatcha Gnassingbé (Faure's half-brother) to have the honor, the fact that the two brothers were by their father's side at his death and appeared united when the military suspended the constitution and swore allegiance to Faure as the new president, calmed immediate fears of a divide.

International outcry at the extra-constitutional means of carrying out Eyadéma's final wish, however, produced a scramble in which the constitution was modified several times in a few short weeks, and an interim president, Abass Bonfoh, took over for two months until elections could be held in April 2005. As Gilchrist Olympio was still ineligible from having been out of the country in the year prior to the election, Akitani-Bob ran for the UFC again, and this time the rest of the opposition parties refrained from submitting their own candidates and threw support behind him. When the official results showed him not just losing to the relatively unknown Gnassingbé, but earning just a few percentage points more of the vote than in 2003, it seemed clear that the mechanism of elections had failed to reflect the will of the Togolese people yet again. The international community may have been mollified by the appearance of a contested election in a constitutional framework, but the domestic opponents of the RPT and supporters of democracy certainly were not. They came out in force to protest the fraud evident in that election (video of soldiers in uniform snatching ballot boxes from polling places circulated on the Internet), and the bloody crackdown led tens of thousands to flee the country in the worst political violence the country had seen since the 1990s.

From the start of his tenure, Faure Gnassingbé had to rally domestic support from the military and "barons" of the RPT, make peace with the political opposition, and demonstrate to international donors and trading partners that the Togolese economy represented a good investment. He began by naming Edem Kodjo as his prime minister (as his father had ten years before), and negotiating the Accord Politique Global (APG) in 2006 to which all members of the opposition, including Olympio's UFC, signed on. The most important provisions were a free and fair legislative contest for a new National Assembly in 2007, reigning in security forces, and a pledge to return to features of the 1992 constitution, including term limits on the presidency. In exchange for these concessions, the opposition entered into a unity government and Yao Agboyibo took over as prime minister in September 2006 to supervise the holding of legislative elections. These elections were deemed free and fair, held in relative peace and security, and the flow of international aid resumed in the aftermath. Full cooperation with the European Union, as well as

the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), were resumed and Gnassingbé was quick to take advantage of all opportunities, signing a three-year adjustment package with the IMF in 2008 and joining the international program for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) to help clear Togo's heavy debt burden.

Only with the 2007 legislative election results did Gnassingbé's domestic political strategy become clear: he preferred adjusting the rules of the game to the outright fraud and manipulation of his father. The UFC won just 55,000 votes less than the ruling RPT (out of 2.5 million ballots cast), but because the sparsely populated north had almost as many multimember districts as the densely populated south, the UFC won only 27 seats to the RPT's 50 (out of 81), giving the latter clear control over the body, and the power to implement (or drag its feet while claiming to implement) the remainder of the APG. The UFC protested the distorted nature of the results, but given that the opposition had cooperated in creating the rules, they had little recourse. In the following three years, Gnassingbé turned his attention to the economy, using new donor funds and the power of the state to refurbish the phosphates sector and shed debt-ridden state-owned banks. He also uncovered what appeared to be a coup plot against him by his brother Kpatcha Gnassingbé in 2009, using the opportunity to neutralize other potential opponents in the military ranks and shift more power to the hands of technocrats.

By the presidential elections of March 2010, Gnassingbé was ready to face off against Gilchrist Olympio in a highly anticipated contest between the two sons of the two former presidents, Eyadéma and Sylvanus Olympio. But at the last minute Olympio blinked, and instead endorsed his new UFC vice president Jean-Pierre Fabre to run in his stead, perhaps not fully realizing that the younger Fabre would prove an adept mobilizer and help to usher in the new era of political opposition to the Gnassingbé dynasty. Gnassingbé defeated Fabre (61–34%, with several others in the race including Agboyibo and Brigitte Adjmagbo-Johnson, Togo's first woman candidate for the presidency) and the election would have been par for the course but for the fact that Olympio sidestepped Fabre's protests against election irregularities and forged his own deal for a joint RPT-UFC government in the weeks following the contest. In a stroke, the powerful UFC undercut years of uncompromising opposition and became a "traitor" in the eyes of many opponents of the RPT, not least Fabre's faction of the UFC, which split from Olympio to form a new party, the Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC), headed by Fabre. In the tumult that followed the Togolese security forces found themselves in the novel position of defending the UFC from angry attacks by Fabre's supporters, and by the end of the year the Constitutional Court, not known to be a friend of the pro-democracy opposition, stripped nine members of the

National Assembly, including Fabre, of their seats because they owed them to the UFC party lists.

Though Gnassingbé stumbled in delaying negotiations with the IMF when their three-year deal came to an end in 2011, he quietly continued the process of rebuilding the Togolese economy and even overcame internal resistance from supporters of his father in 2012 to lay down the RPT, with its long history of negative associations and undemocratic behavior, in favor of a new political party, the Union Pour la République (UNIR). Meanwhile, the locus of the “radical” opposition to the RPT/UNIR dominance shifted to Fabre’s ANC, which organized protests in mid-2012 not just in Lomé, but in Sokodé in the center of the country and Dapaong in the north, demonstrating that opponents of the ruling party were to be found throughout the country. The ANC joined with several other parties and civil society groups to form Collectif Sauvons le Togo (Let’s Save Togo Collective or CST), demonstrating and clashing with security forces regularly in their demands to fully implement the APG and restore term limits on the presidency, in addition to other reforms. Women’s groups in Togo even called for a sex strike in August 2012. Their aggressive tactics did not sit well with all pro-democracy groups, some of which joined Agboyibo’s CAR party in a separate grouping, the Alliance Arc-en-Ciel (Rainbow Alliance) by the end of 2012. In January 2013, the pride of Togolese commerce, the Grand Marche of Lomé (Assigamé) was burned, causing billions of FCFA in damage. Though it seemed highly unlikely that pro-democracy protesters would set fire to the market given its location in the opposition stronghold of Lomé, the security forces blamed the CST, arresting dozens and prompting others to flee the country.

Against this backdrop, the government organized the legislative elections, making additional changes to expand the size of the legislature from 81 to 91 seats and redrawing district boundaries that gave an even greater advantage to populations in the north, and other areas supportive of the ruling UNIR party. Meanwhile, the CST continued to protest regularly even when the government banned protesting altogether, and elections were delayed for several months to convince opponents to take part. Finally held at the end of July 2013, UNIR won a supermajority of 62 of the 91 seats, despite winning less than half of the total votes cast. The CST came in second with 19 seats, and the Rainbow Alliance won six. Olympio’s UFC scraped only three seats, an embarrassing loss of 24 seats from the 2007 contest. With a majority secured, UNIR was in a position to implement the constitutional and electoral code changes necessary to placate the opposition, but continued dragging its feet. Faure Gnassingbé undertook a number of high-profile infrastructure projects in the aftermath of the legislative elections, notably expanding the size of

the important commercial port of Lomé, while also positioning himself for reelection to a third term in office in 2015.

The CST continued regular protest marches leading up to the April 2015 elections and the government tried various tactics to dissuade them, including banning protests, requiring permits, and limiting their scope. In addition to concerns about lack of term limits, the opposition noted that voter rolls were inflated, and that the population had little confidence in the electronic system designed to tally all the votes. Despite a ten-day delay to address these concerns, the presidential contest followed the established pattern, with Gnassingbé winning 59 percent of the vote and Fabre 35 percent. This result seemed to galvanize the opposition to fight for term limits as the only viable means of removing Gnassingbé from office and establishing a system of truly competitive national elections. Though the National Assembly took up these questions more than once, term limits and other reforms were continually voted down by the UNIR majority.

By 2017, the 50-year anniversary of Gnassingbé Eyadéma's rise to power, a new political party had emerged on the scene: the Parti National Panafricaine (PNP) of Tikpi Atchadam organized well-attended protests in Lomé and in the interior of the country on 9 August 2017, demanding a return to the principles of the 1992 constitution. The protesters in Sokodé burned the police commissioner's office and security forces used live ammunition against them, killing several. This action energized the rest of the Togolese pro-democracy opposition, sparking a series of mass protests for the remainder of 2017 and into 2018. Some of these protests drew tens of thousands of people, and prompted the two competing coalitions (CST and Rainbow Alliance) to form a new coalition together in October 2017, the Coalition of 14 (C14). The government tried multiple tactics to deter protesters, including shutting down the Internet multiple times in 2017 to prevent mobilization on social media, as well as more typical tactics of arrests, intimidation, and torture. During 2018, the weekly protests continued throughout the country, and the government made various concessions including the release of political prisoners and offering a referendum on a constitutional amendment for term limits that did not apply retroactively to President Gnassingbé. The protests and related strikes began to have a negative impact on the economy, on which Gnassingbé had staked his political legitimacy. This legitimacy was further undermined when Vincent Bolloré was indicted by French authorities in April 2018, for a scheme in which the investment firm Bolloré Groupe was said to have offered Gnassingbé discounted help with his 2010 election campaign in exchange for lucrative contracts to renovate and operate the Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL). Opponents of the president seized on the story

as evidence that the work of building up the Togolese port was enriching the president at the expense of the people.

The legislative elections of December 2018 saw another victory for UNIR as the C14 parties all declined to participate, despite delays and negotiations designed to bring them on board. The ruling party won 59 seats and the UFC six, along with 18 independent candidates and a few other smaller parties winning a handful. In the wake of these elections, the protest movements slowed, and the C14 began to collapse in March 2019, further slowing momentum. The legislature, with its supermajority of UNIR members and supporters, then took the unilateral step of modifying the constitution to impose two-term limits on the presidency, as the opposition had been demanding, but did not make them retroactive, clearing the way for Gnassingbé to continue in office until at least 2030. Other changes came in the form of extending the term of National Assembly representatives from five to six years and adding a Senate, one-third of whose members would be named by the president and the remainder determined by territory, ensuring additional representation for supporters of the president and diluting the representation of his opponents. Municipal elections of 2019—the first held in the country for more than 30 years—also showed a victory for UNIR-backed candidates, though candidates supported by the ANC, C14, and UFC also contested and each won a few hundred of the 1,490 council seats contested.

The presidential elections of February 2020 saw the rise of a new challenger, Agbéyomé Kodjo, who had formerly been on the side of the RPT/UNIR as a legislative deputy, and served as Gnassingbé Eyadéma's prime minister 2000–2002. Now an outspoken critic of the party in power, Kodjo eclipsed other contenders like Fabre (PNP leader Atchadam being in hiding abroad out of fears for his safety) to become the candidate most likely to be palatable to all Togolese, and with a chance at unseating President Gnassingbé. Not content with inflated voter rolls and a divided opposition, Gnassingbé appears to have engineered an overwhelming (and thoroughly implausible) victory with 72 percent of the vote and a better than 50 percentage point gap between him Kodjo, who took just 18 percent in the official count. Turnout was likewise reportedly historic at almost 77 percent, and Fabre only registered 4 percent of the vote in distant third place. Given the years of protest against the very idea of unlimited incumbency leading up to the poll, these results suggest a return to strong-arm tactics and manipulated outcomes better associated with Eyadéma in the 1990s. The Constitutional Court issued national results in record time (just 24 hours after polls closed) and rejected all appeals, the National Assembly revoked Kodjo's parliamentary immunity, and Kodjo was arrested by security forces in April; all further signs of a coordinated government effort to thoroughly suppress any challenge.

In the aftermath of the 2020 elections, Togo's near-term future is likely to include more of the same dominance by one family and one political persuasion, and pragmatic economic policy focused on growth with the help of international investors and donors. However, the strategies of Gnassingbé's political opponents will continue to evolve as they contest his dominance, and the excessive (and probably unsustainable) manipulation of election victories may even prove to be the undoing of the Gnassingbé family dynasty.

A

ABAGLO, EUGENE ANTOINE (1937–). Director of Taxes. Born in **Tsévié** on 29 December 1937, Abaglo was educated locally and studied law in **France**. He obtained degrees from Aix-en-Provence (1961) and Paris (1965), returning to **Lomé** to become director of economics in the Ministry of Finance in January 1966. He served concurrently as a government administrator on the board of the **Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO)**. In 1967, he was reassigned to other duties in the same ministry, including director of taxes.

ABALO, ALFA. Briefly minister of defense from May 1994 in the coalition government that joined the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** and **Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** under Prime Minister **Edem Kodjo**.

ABALO, CELESTIN. Dramatologist whose only work, *Kalian*, met with critical acclaim when first presented in **Lomé** in 1964. Nothing is known of the author, whose name may indeed be a pseudonym.

ABALO, JOSEPH FIRMIN FENENOU (1918–1968). Former popular president of **Juvento** and cabinet minister. Born in 1918 in Okou in the **Plateaux** region, Abalo was educated in Togo and worked for a few years as a **Catholic** instructor (1934–1936) before becoming a customs official (1936–1952). A militant panafricanist supporting the pan-Ewe movement including Ewe in **Ghana**, Abalo was elected to the **Chambre de Députés** as the **Comité de l’Unité Togolaise (CUT)** delegate from the **Akposso** district shortly before **Juvento**—the CUT’s youth wing—broke off to become an independent party. He served in the **Chambre de Députés** between 1958 and 1961 and in the latter year was the assembly’s secretary. A top leader of **Juvento**, Abalo was imprisoned without trial in 1962 as President **Sylvanus Olympio** cracked down on opposition parties. Freed after the **1963 coup d’état**, Abalo became secretary general of his party and in 1964, its president. In that year, he was also brought into President **Nicolas Grunitzky**’s

four-cornered cabinet coalition as minister of rural economy. When the alliance foundered late in 1966, Abalo was dropped from the cabinet. He died a short time later in a car accident.

ABDOULAYE, SANI EL HADJI (1873–1970). The venerable Imam of the **Chokossi** of **Sansanne-Mango**, mostly responsible for the heavy **Islamic** proselytizing in the region in the 1930s and 1940s. Born in 1873, the son of Mama Sani, the tenth Imam of Sansanne-Mango, Abdoulaye was involved in his youth in trade in cattle between **Atakpamé**, **Kpalimé**, and Kumasi (**Ghana**). His breadth of Koranic knowledge spread far and wide, however, and when he was nominated Imam, he renounced trade to concentrate on his religious duties. After his death at age 97, his son, Al Haji Yaya, was invested Imam (in 1973), but he fell afoul of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** when he got involved in a political conflict and was deposed by Eyadéma.

ABDOULAYE, SOULEMANE (1947–). Economist and senior civil servant. Born in 1947 in North Togo and trained at home and in **France** in economics, Abdoulaye returned to **Lomé** to be appointed inspector of taxes. He was later promoted to director general of taxes of Togo and in 1981 director of personnel. From 1984, Abdoulaye was a technical advisor in the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance.

ABOTCHI, DEKOU. Journalist. The author of various articles in the cultural review *Timbo*, as well as a play, Abotchi worked as journalist for the Ministry of Press and Culture in **Lomé**.

ABOTCHI, KOFFI N'KOLEY. Former cabinet minister. A leader of the post-1990 **Parti des Démocrates pour l'Unité (PDU)** political party, Abotchi joined the **transitional government** of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** in September 1991 as minister of rural development and the environment. He retained his portfolio after the creation of a coalition with the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party but was dropped from the government in February 1993.

ABOULAYE, MASHOUDOU (1953–). Mathematician. Born in 1953 in North Togo, and trained in **France** in mathematics and statistics (1976) and in the United States in applied statistics, computer sciences (1982), and economics and econometrics (1983), Aboulaye returned to Togo to join the Ministry of the Plan to assume the post of Head of the Division of Scientific Studies and Research.

ACCORD POLITIQUE GLOBAL (APG). Agreement forged by the government and opposition in mid-2006 to help bring an end to the violent period following the **succession crisis** and **presidential election of 2005**. Five opposition political parties (**Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau [CAR]**, **Convention Démocratique Panafricain [CDPA]**, **Convergence Patriotique Panafricain [CPP]**, **Union des Forces de Changement [UFC]**, **Parti pour la Démocratie et le Renouveau [PDR]**) and the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** entered into a dialog mediated by Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré to set the conditions for a competitive legislative **election** to replace the RPT-dominated **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** elected in 2002. The opposition agreed to enter into a unity government to lend legitimacy to President **Faure Gnassingbé**, and in exchange Gnassingbé agreed to reign in security forces, promote national reconciliation, return to the principles of the **1992 constitution** (including term limits on the presidency), and conduct a “transparent, just, and democratic” election in 2007. The agreement led to full opposition participation in the **legislative elections of 2007** and the establishment of the **Commission Verité, Justice, et Reconciliation (CVJR)** in 2009. However, electoral reforms and **constitutional amendments** sought by the opposition did not materialize until unilaterally imposed by a **Union Pour La République (UNIR)**-majority legislature in 2019, and the content of those reforms heavily favored Gnassingbé’s continuation in office.

ADABA, KODZO PAIL (1941–). Electrical engineer and administrator. Born in 1941 and trained in electrical engineering, Adaba served between 1974 and 1975 as area maintenance supervisor and administrator with the **Compagnie Électrique de Benin (CEB)** in Lomé. He then served as regional engineer at the petroleum refinery in Lomé, before being tapped to become chief electrical engineer of CEB from 1977 to 1980. In 1982, Adaba, who has written several scientific publications, was appointed planning engineer of the corporation.

ADANI, IFE. Political leader who set up the **Alliance Togolaise pour la Démocratie (ATD)** party with the emergence of multipartyism in Togo in 1991. The party was basically aligned behind **Gilchrist Olympio**, though Adani pursued an independent line. Adani was one of only two candidates to run in the August **1993 presidential election** that most southern leaders boycotted. In the contest, won by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, Adani received only 1.87 percent of the popular vote.

ADDRA, TAMATA COMLAVI GREGOIRE (1938–). Economist. Born on 12 March 1938 and educated abroad, Addra worked as a civil administrator at the **Lomé Port** before obtaining degrees in economics (University of Dakar) and statistics (University of Warsaw) in the mid-1960s. He was then appointed head of a division in the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and the Plan and professor at the **Université du Bénin (UB)**. In 1982, he became head of development planning in the Ministry of the Plan and deputy director of the national plan of Togo.

ADEBAYOR, SHEYI EMMANUEL (1984–). Premier league soccer player and all-time top goal scorer from Togo. Adebayor began his soccer career in **Lomé**, moving to **France** at a young age for extra training. By 2006, he was playing for Arsenal, and in 2008, he was named African player of the year. He later moved to Manchester United, but it was as part of the Togolese national team that he survived the **Africa Cup of Nations attack of 2010**. Though the team did not play that year after the deadly attack, Adebayor continued to play in Europe and was part of the Togolese national team again in 2014.

ADELEYE, ADEKEKÉ GEORGES (1944–). Economist. Born in 1944 and educated abroad in economics (with a specialized diploma in customs economics), Adeleye returned home to work with Togo's Customs Division. In 1983, he was appointed department head in Customs headquarters in **Lomé**.

ADEWUI, COLONEL KIDJANDA ROBERT. Former commander of the Second Motorized Battalion. A member of the **Kotokoli** from **Bafilo**, Adewui was one of the sergeants in the **French** colonial armies demobilized in 1962. Promoted to lieutenant, and then captain, his control of the central arms depot in 1967 guaranteed the success of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's coup d'état of 1967**. Arrogant and ruthless in public and private life, Adewui was promoted to major of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** in January 1970 and lieutenant colonel in 1975. The regime's number two man, Adewui was planning to announce he had succeeded Eyadéma at the time of the **Sarakawa** air accident, when Eyadéma emerged unscathed from it. Possibly because of his alacrity, he was shortly to be stripped of operational command over the second battalion, though the official reason was that his private trucking and trading empires (**Lomé-Lama Kara**) were taking up most of his time. Supremely confident of his status in the military elite, Adewui was personally involved in the July 1975 murder of a political prisoner, Major **Paul Comlan**,

on the orders of General Eyadéma. Despite the furor aroused by this action, Adewui was retired from the army with full honors on 12 October 1976, and remained active in commerce after.

ADJA. Important ethnic group in southern Benin and Togo. According to tradition, the Adja are a **Yoruba** branch that migrated from Oyo (in Nigeria) in the 13th century, eventually settling in **Tado** and later in **Notsé**. Following the Notsi dispersal in 1720, one branch moved mainly southward (the “western” Adja) to become the **Ewe** of today, while other segments crossed from Tado and Notsé into areas currently in **Benin** to found the Allada kingdom. Figures for Togo’s Adja vary, since they are frequently lumped together with the Ewe or **Ouatchi**, but may number more than 200,000 (Appendix table 3). Togo’s Adja are found in the **Aného** and **Atakpamé** areas. The Adja **language** is the basis of all languages between the Volta and Ouémé Rivers and especially of the **Ouatchi**, **Evegbé**, **Kpessi**, Fongbe (spoken by the Fon and Mahi), and Guin (spoken among the **Mina** along the coast).

ADJAMAGBO-JOHNSON, BRIGITTE KAFUI. Women’s rights advocate and opposition leader. A popular teacher and lawyer by profession, Adjmagbo-Johnson was appointed minister of social welfare, national solidarity, and **human rights** in the **transition government** of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh**, serving for exactly three months from 26 September 1991. She was a founding member of the **Group de Réflexion et d’Action Femme, Démocratie et Développement (GF2D)** in 1992 and served as the secretary general until 1997. Adjmagbo has served in leadership positions of the **Convention Démocratique des Peuples Africains (CDPA)** from the early 1990s, and presided over the **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel** in 2013. She was the first woman to run for the Togolese presidency in **2010 elections**, though she won just 0.7 percent of the vote and came in fifth place, under the banner of the CDPA. In 2017, she was a coordinator of the **Coalition de 14 (C14)** alliance of parties, but the organization broke down in early 2019. A vocal supporter and sometime spokesperson for **2020 presidential** candidate **Agbéyomé Kodjo**, Adjmagbo-Johnson was threatened with arrest in April 2020 alongside Kodjo when the latter proclaimed himself president after losing to Gnassingbé, according to official election results.

ADJANGBA, MESSAH K. (1932–). University instructor. Born on 25 October 1932 and educated in the United States (MSc) and France obtaining a doctorate in physics, Adjangba taught physical chemistry at the **Université du Bénin (UB)** in Lomé.

ADJARALA. Location on the **Mono River** roughly 100 kilometers from **Nangbeto**, long viewed as a promising site for a dam to provide additional electricity for **Benin** and Togo. Feasibility studies commenced in 1988, but even in the 2010s the project had not made progress due to disagreements between the two countries, changing donor interests, and uncertain international funding. Togo's **Plan Nationale de Développement (PND)** estimates the dam could provide 147 MW of power at a cost of 450 million euros.

ADJOVI, METONOU DO KOKOU JACQUES. One of Togo's poets, and a history teacher by profession. Adjovi's work, which stresses legends and history, has appeared in several collections.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION. Until independence, Togo was administratively divided by the **French** into a number of **cercles**, which were in turn further subdivided. Just prior to independence, there were ten cercles: **Lomé**, **Anécho**, **Atakpamé**, **Bassari**, **Dapango**, **Lama Kara**, **Mango**, **Sokodé**, **Tsévié**, and **Kluoto**. Except for the latter, each cercle had its administrative capital in the town of the same name; Kluoto's capital was in **Palimé**. During the colonial period, many of the cercles had a **Conseil de Notables**; these were transformed in 1946 into **Conseils de Circonscriptions**, or district councils. The latter—whose range of authority changed over the years—included representatives of the most important families, clans, and ethnic groups in the district. The **Conseils de Circonscription** continued to exist after independence until banned following the **1967 coup d'état**. In the postindependence administrative reorganization, four regions were created, encompassing circonscriptions, or districts, each headed by a *chef de circonscription*. A fifth economic region (**La Kara**) was carved out of the **Centrale** and **Savanes** regions in the mid-1960s and subsequent creation of new districts raised the latter's number to 21. In 1973, the district councils reappeared under the name of **Délégations Spéciales**, with restricted powers. A 1981 reorganization divided the country into the current five regions, each with several prefectures. That reorganization also saw La Kara becoming a major political division at the expense of the Savanes region. Togo also had seven communes, or urban circonscriptions (districts) at the time. The push for democratization in the early 1990s was accompanied by demands for greater **decentralization**, in keeping with political trends across West Africa, and to provide a further check on the power of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. However, the ruling party dragged its feet and elections for the councils of the new communes (subdivisions of prefectures) were still delayed year after year, leaving the appointed, but increasingly irrelevant, **Délégations Spéciales** in

charge at the local level. The country's administrative breakdown as of the most recent 2018 reorganization included 39 prefectures and 117 communes within the existing five regions (Appendix table 1). *See also* GERMAN ADMINISTRATION; MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 2019.

ADODO, YAOVI (1942–). Former foreign minister and old crony of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. An **Ewe** born in **Lomé** in 1942 and educated in **France** and the United States (University of California—Los Angeles) in law, public administration, and political science, Adodo briefly taught at Bordeaux before returning to Togo with his American wife to become the principal private secretary of the presidential office and director of cooperation. In 1981, he was dispatched as ambassador to Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the **European Economic Community (EEC)**, to return to Togo in 1984 as minister of planning and industry. In 1987, he was shifted to the position of minister of foreign affairs, a post he held until the multiparty reforms when his overly close links to Eyadéma brought his eclipse and reassignment to diplomatic duties overseas.

ADOBOLI, KOFFI EUGENE (1934–). Prime minister of Togo. Adoboli began his civil service career working for the United Nations for over 40 years until being appointed prime minister in 1999. Accused of corruption, he lost a vote of no confidence in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** and resigned in 2000. Adoboli later moved to Switzerland in 2002. In 2011, he was sentenced to five years in jail in absentia for embezzlement on a construction project in **Lomé**. **Saibou Samarou** was implicated in the same scandal; Adoboli remains in exile and denies the accusations.

ADOSSA. Traditional annual **Kotokoli** celebrations. Their significance is that they unite all Kotokoli, **animists**, **Muslims**, and **Christians** at a time when religion has produced internal schisms in the community. Celebrated on the birth of the Prophet—and hence a religious feast as well to those who are Muslim—the Adossa is actually the continuation of the pre-Muslim animist Tchaoudjo festivities. Contemporarily, the Adossa is composed of both religious celebrations of the Prophet's birth and a series of violent and vivid dances (depicting decapitation of prisoners) in honor of the Semasse Kotokoli warriors of the past.

ADOSSAMA, PIERRE ADAM (1929–2010). Former cabinet minister and indirectly a precipitant of the **1967 coup d'état** that toppled the **Nicolas Grunitzky** regime. Born to a **Kabyé** family in **Lomé** on 12 September 1929, Adossama was educated locally (including at the Togolese **École Nationale**

d'Administration [ENA]) and abroad at the School of Meteorology in St. Cyr, France (1956–1957). Having worked originally as a teacher in a **Catholic** mission (1945–1949), Adossama spent the next nine years (to 1958) as radio operator, telegraphist, and meteorologist. An early member of **Sylvanus Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, Adossama became attaché (1958–1959) at the Ministry of **Education** and served as cabinet director of the minister of economic affairs after the Olympio regime's rise to power in 1958. Following Olympio's assassination in 1963, Adossama headed a wing of the CUT that urged cooperation with the successor Grunitzky administration. In the four-cornered coalition the latter established, Adossama served first as minister of education (May 1963–January 1966) and then as minister of labor and the civil service (January–November 1966). Increasingly disgruntled with the indecisiveness and malleability of Grunitzky and the perennial tug-of-war between the latter and Vice President **Antoine Méatchi**, Adossama resigned from the cabinet on 19 November 1966, precipitating the 21 November **1966 PUT upheaval in Lomé**. Following the **January 1967 coup d'état**, Adossama was appointed secretary general of the **Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN)** with special responsibilities in foreign affairs. After touring Francophone Africa to explain the causes of the military takeover and to gain international legitimacy for it, Adossama returned home to become minister of state in charge of rural economy in **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** regime (1967–1969). In 1969, Adossama left the cabinet to become technical expert with the International Labor Organization in Geneva. Upon his return to Lomé in 1971, he joined the Ministry of Economic Affairs as the minister's chef de cabinet while also being secretary of the Association of Togolese Cultural Exchanges, before his retirement.

ADOTEVI, ADOVI JOHN-BOSCO (1934–). Journalist and author. Adotevi was born in **Lomé** on 29 March 1934 and was educated at home and in **France**, obtaining advanced degrees in Public Law and in English Literature. He then joined the weekly *Afrique Nouvelle* in Dakar, Senegal, serving as its prime correspondent until the paper closed down in the 1970s. He was a journalist for Dakar's *Le Soleil* and the *Voix d'Afrique*, and taught in a Dakar school.

ADAWLATO, GRAND MARCHÉ D'. See ASSIGAMÉ.

ADZEVODU. Important term in **Ewe/Mina** society, referring to protective **vodun**, against sorcery.

ADZOMADA, KOFI JACQUES. Pastor of the **Ewe Evangelical Church (EEC)** and longtime president of the Académie de la Langue Ewe. In the

latter, he has been influential both in translating many works into the Ewe **language** and in popularizing the language as a major lingua franca with its own literature, journals, and newspapers.

AEROPORT INTERNATIONALE DE GNASSINGBÉ EYADÉMA (AIGE). *See* AIRPORTS.

AFAN, HUENUMADJI (1947–). Professor of Literature. Born in 1947 and holding a doctorate in letters and specialization in Black African Theatre, Afan taught literature at the **Université du Bénin (UB)** in **Lomé** from 1976 to 2002. He is also the author of several plays and has worked as a communication consultant since 2006.

AFANTCHAO, KOKOU LUCAS. Minister of tourism, crafts, and small- and medium-sized enterprises in the **transitional government** of **Joseph Koffigoh** between December 1991 and September 1992.

AFFO, ISSA. Minister of technical and professional training in the **transitional government** of **Joseph Koffigoh** between December 1991 and September 1992.

AFLAO. The **Ghanaian**-Togolese border checkpoint, at the village of the same name on the coastal road. Virtually a suburb of **Lomé**, barely two kilometers away, Aflao is both a center of **smuggling** between the two countries and of Togolese intelligence-gathering on subversive movements in **Ghana**.

AFOTCHE (also, AFOTCHEGNON). Legendary late 17th- and early 18th-centuries' **Ewe** leader who founded **Notsé** after the trek from **Tado** becoming the first king of the Notsé Dynasty. Afotche was the father of **Agokoli**.

AFRICA CUP OF NATIONS 2010 ATTACK. Traveling by land from training camp to Africa's premier football tournament hosted by Angola in 2010, Togo's national team came under heavy gunfire on 8 January by Cabinda separatists, apparently in a case of mistaken identity. Togo's top players, including **Emmanuel Adebeyor**, described a harrowing episode in which masked gunmen riddled their vehicles with bullets leaving three dead, including an assistant coach and driver, and several wounded. The team was ordered home, disqualified from the tournament, and even initially banned by the sport's governing authority from additional tournaments, though that decision was ultimately reversed.

AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANÇAISE (AOF). **French** West Africa—one of France’s two colonial African federations—that encompassed the territories of Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan, Guinea, and **Dahomey**. Established between 1895 and 1904, after World War II, the AOF was headed by a governor general in Dakar, Senegal, who was responsible to the minister of colonies in Paris. The governor general was assisted in Dakar by a Council of Government possessing consultative powers and composed of five delegates from each of the federated territories. Each colony also had its own **French governor** responsible to the governor general in Dakar and a territorial assembly with initially limited powers. Togo, being a Trusteeship Territory, was not part of France’s AOF (except for a brief period between the two world wars), though in many respects its evolution paralleled that of France’s colonial empire. In the constitution of the French Union, Togo was allocated the status of **associated territory**, which was different from the overseas territory status of most of France’s colonies. Togo did not send delegates to the AOF Council in Dakar, though it did elect delegates to the French National Assembly in Paris, as did France’s colonies. In 1955, the proclamation of the birth of the **Autonomous Republic** of Togo—under pressure from the United Nations Trusteeship Council—and the creation of a legislative assembly, the **Assemblée Legislative du Togo (ALT)**, with wide powers, was, however, a major deviation from standard AOF administrative evolution. *See also* GOVERNORS OF THE AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANÇAISE (AOF).

AFROBAROMETER. Offering a rare and welcome glimpse at Togolese popular opinion, this nonprofit research institution systematically surveys African populations on a variety of subjects of community debate, including political participation, perceptions of the economy, and corruption. Togo has been included in the survey since 2012, with data and analysis published at afrobarometer.org from surveys conducted that year, 2014, and 2018.

AGBA, BERTIN SOW. Togolese businessman accused of fraud. Agba was running a successful private security business in the late 2000s and early 2010s, but allegedly was involved in the drug trade as well. Agba and his cousin, the former government minister **Pascal Bodjona**, were both implicated by Abbas Al Yousef, an investment manager apparently tempted by a “Nigerian-style” scheme in which access to a US\$ 275 million fund supposedly left by deceased Ivoirian leader Robert Guéï could be unblocked by a cash infusion. Agba allegedly posed as the Togolese minister of interior as part of the scam, facilitated by Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, the former head of French oil company Elf who had been Yousef’s financial advisor. Yousef

lost US\$ 45 million in the affair, which was avidly followed by readers of the Togolese press, and which led to the 2011 arrest of Agba, followed shortly by Bodjona and Floch-Prigent, who was extradited from Ivory Coast. Agba was released on bail in 2013 and fled Togo for South Africa, where he now resides.

AGBA, KONDI CHARLES (1948–). Veterinarian and government minister. Born on 26 August 1948 and educated in **Lomé** and abroad in veterinary sciences, Agba served as head of the anatomical section of the Veterinary School in Dakar, Senegal. Agba then worked in the Togolese foreign service as ambassador to **France**, Senegal, Cape Verde, and the Order of Malta and as permanent representative to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). From 1999 until 2006, Agba served as minister of health, agriculture and research, higher **education** and research, and state for **agriculture**, animal husbandry, and fishing in Togo. After 2007 **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** election, he became the only ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** candidate to be elected in **Lomé**. He was named minister of health in 2011 until 2013.

AGBEKA, BENJAMIN KOMLAN MENSAH. Minister of communications. Agbeka joined the third **transitional government** of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** in September 1992 as minister of communications as a **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** appointee and was dismissed by Koffigoh the next month on the grounds of lack of solidarity with the government and refusal to follow government policy. He refused to leave his ministry, and under RPT pressure he retained his post and was reappointed in the fourth Koffigoh government in February 1993. In February 1994, his house in **Lomé** was bombed by militants sympathetic to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**.

AGBENON, ASSIONGBON (1937–). Diplomat. Born in 1937 and educated at the International Institute of Public Administration in Paris, Agbenon was posted in 1976 as ambassador to West **Germany**. He was later shifted to the United Kingdom to represent Togo and in 1989 became ambassador to Belgium and the **European Economic Community (EEC)**.

AGBENOU, KOMLAN EMMANUEL. **Trade union** leader. Elected head of the **Confederation Syndicale des Travailleurs du Togo (CSTT)** in 2017, rising through the ranks of the **transportation** union, where he was the secretary general for many years. He has also served as a workers' advocate on many international commissions, including those linked to the West Africa

region through the *Fédération Internationale des Ouvriers du Transport du Togo* (ITF-Togo).

AGBETIAFA, KOMLAN MICHEL (1930–2010). Former minister of the interior and General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** crony. Born in Baguida in northern Togo and a schoolteacher by profession, Agbetiafa taught for several years in Togo (including at **Pya** where he was Eyadéma's teacher in primary school, the sole reason for his subsequent political promotion) and Burkina Faso. He was also a school inspector and a soccer referee. Shortly after the **1963 coup d'état**, Agbetiafa became director of primary **education** (1965–1975) and in December 1979 was elected to the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)** where he quickly rose to become second vice president and a member of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** Politburo. In 1982, he was appointed minister of primary and secondary education by Eyadéma; in 1984, he was shifted to minister of national education, and in 1987, he was appointed minister of interior, serving in that post until 1989.

AGBETRA, AISSAH. Former minister of health, social affairs, and **women's** affairs. General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cousin, Dr. Agbetra joined the cabinet in 1982 as minister of higher **education** and scientific research, was reassigned in 1984, and left the cabinet in 1988.

AGBLEMAGNON, FERDINAND N'SOUGAN (1929–2008). Well-known sociologist and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) official. Born in Ahépé in the **Tsévié** area on 30 May 1929 to a family of **agricultural** cultivators, Agblemagnon left home at the age of ten to obtain an **education** in **Aného** and **Lomé**. A brilliant student, he was given the option of continuing his studies either at the prestigious **École William Ponty** in Dakar, Senegal, or at the École Technique Supérieure in Bamako, Mali. Agblemagnon chose the latter and later studied at Grenoble and the Sorbonne (1951–1956), obtaining degrees in philosophy, African studies, and ethnology. Agblemagnon published extensively on African ethnology and oral traditions and lectured in the United States, Canada, Scandinavia, Poland, and Lebanon. From 1964, Agblemagnon worked in Paris with UNESCO and lectured at the Sorbonne's École Pratique des Hautes Études. He served as the chairman of UNESCO's subgroup on education in Africa (1962–1964), visiting professor in several universities including those of Montreal and Mexico, vice chairman of UNESCO's Committee of Experts on Educational Planning, as well as Togo's representative to UNESCO. He received the Order of Mono for his service before passing away in 2008.

AGBO, TOSSOU AUGUSTIN (1908–1980). Early **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** militant and prominent **Mina** influential from **Aného**. Born in 1908 in Agouégan and a popular tailor by profession, Agbo descended from an influential **Brazilian** family. He was an early CUT militant and financial contributor and served as the party's deputy from Aného in the **Chambre de Députés** and the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)** between 1958 and 1963. He retired from party life after the **1963 coup**.

AGBO, YAO (1948–). Diplomat and cabinet minister. Born in Ahlon-Tinipe in the **Kloto** region on 19 August 1948 and educated at home and in **France**, Agbo worked with the ministry of the economy and finance and then the ministry of foreign affairs. In 1979, he was appointed ambassador to **China** and Japan, returning to **Lomé** in 1982 to join President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cabinet as secretary of state in charge of industry and parastatal companies, overseeing the **state sector**. In 1984, he was appointed minister of youth, sports, and culture but was dropped from the cabinet in 1987 and reappointed to his former ambassadorship to China and Korea until 1997. As of 2019, Agbo serves as chairman of the China-Togo Friendship Association.

AGBOBLI, FRANCIS. Leader of the Parti Socialiste Panafricain (PSP) that in late 1993 joined with two other small groups to form the **Groupe Social Panafricain (GSP)** to boycott the **1994 legislative elections** for the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**.

AGBOBLI, JOACHIM ATSUTSE (1941–2008). Minister of communications and culture from May 1994 in the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)—Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** coalition government of Prime Minister **Edem Kodjo**. A journalist by profession and columnist for the periodical *Jeune Afrique*, Agbobli, who is an **Ewe**, was in 1991 appointed head of the government's Commission de Defense et de Sécurité aimed at serving as a buffer between the aggressive marauding members of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** loyal to President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, and the opposing forces of the south. A close associate of Edem Kodjo, he served in Kodjo's cabinet from 1994 to 1996, and later went on to be head of the political party Mouvement pour la Développement Nationale (MODENA), founded in 2007, but died unexpectedly in 2008. His body was found on a **Lomé** beach, apparently drowned, in circumstances that were never satisfactorily explained.

AGBODJAN, GEORGES COMBEVI. Former member of the government and lawyer. Acting as an independent, Agbodjan entered the third

transitional government of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** in September 1992 as secretary of state in charge of elections and was retained in the next transitional government of February 1993 as minister of territorial administration and security. Agbodjan then served for almost a decade as president of the **Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication (HAAC)** until 2005, and was highly criticized for his crackdowns on the media. He passed away in 2017.

AGBODJAN, LABITE EYRAM (1947–). **Agricultural** economist. Born in **Lomé** in 1947, Agbodjan was educated in economics and agriculture at the University of Abidjan, in **France**, and at the Texas Technical University in Waco (MSc, 1982) before returning to Lomé. There he joined the Ministry of the Plan, focusing on various agrarian development projects.

AGBODRAFO. Original **Ewe** name of **Porto Seguro**, known to **tourists** for its lake and water sports, but to **Ewe** especially for its sacred forest—off-limits to tourists—where sacred stone ceremonies are practiced in September.

AGBOGBOME. Popular name for **Notsé**, meaning “within the gates” in **Evegbé**.

AGBOGBOME FESTIVAL. *See* **HOGBETSOTSO; NOTSÉ.**

AGBOYIBO, YAO (1943–2020). Leader of the moderate opposition, also written “Yawovi Agboyibor.” A lawyer by training, Agboyibo was picked by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in mid-1988 to head the semiofficial **Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme (CNDH)**, aimed solely at deflecting increasing global condemnation of Togo for its **human rights** violations, including torture of political prisoners. Elected to the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)** in 1990, he participated in the revolt that ushered in the **National Conference** that whittled down Eyadéma’s executive powers. He resigned from the CNDH in October 1990 after the latter took no concrete stand on that month’s killing of protesters by the **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, and became president of the **Comité d’Action Contre le Tribalisme et le Racisme**, which was formally set up in January 1991. On 1 May 1991, he inaugurated a new **political party**—the **Comité d’Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)**, which in the 1994 **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** election gained 36 of the 81 seats, becoming Togo’s largest single party in the legislative body. Notwithstanding this, Eyadéma—who brutally intimidated his opposition with his loyal army in order to be elected president—chose **Edem Kodjo** as his prime minister, an effort to split his southern opposition.

Agboyibo was a member of the Vatican's Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace from 1990 to 1995.

Agboyibo was jailed in 2001 for allegedly defaming then prime minister **Kodjo Agbéyomé** but was released on appeal several months later. He ran for the highest office in the **presidential election of 2003** and came third behind Eyadéma and **Emmanuel Akitani-Bob**, gaining about 5 percent of the national vote. After the **Accord Politique Global (APG)** in 2006 helped to normalize relations between President **Faure Gnassingbé's Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** government and his opponents, Agboyibo took the post of prime minister until the accord was implemented and the **2007 legislative elections** were held, at which point he said he had fulfilled his duty and resigned. He also stepped back from the leadership of the CAR in 2008, though he remained an honorary leading member, and ran for president again in the **2010 election**, coming third again with 3 percent of the vote. A split in the CAR party brought Agboyibo back to the head of the party in 2017, though a dispute with the ruling **Union Pour La République (UNIR; formerly RPT)** led the CAR to withdraw its participation in the **2020 presidential elections**, including in the **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)**. He died in Paris in May 2020 after a short illness.

AGBOYIBOR, YAWOVI. *See* AGBOYIBO, YAO.

AGENCE FRANÇAISE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT (AFD). *See* CAISSE CENTRALE DE COOPERATION ÉCONOMIQUE (CCCE).

AGENCE TOGOLAISE DU PRESSE (ATP or ATOP). **State sector** press agency set up in 1975 and attached to various ministries, most recently ministry of communication, culture, and sports. Headquartered in **Lomé** with six regional offices throughout the country, it is specifically charged with collecting information from localities and publicizing them directly or in partnership with international press outlets, as well as publishing state promotional documents. It has had six different directors since its founding, most recently Mme. Claudine Akakpo, from 2006.

AGOKOLI. Legendary king of **Notsé** whose excesses sparked the **Ewe** dispersal to the south. Agokoli was the second king of Notsé, succeeding his father **Afotche**, founder of the dynasty. He ruled during the first decades of the 18th century. During his reign, ritual sacrifices were made of **Akposso** children, leading to the migration of an important segment of the latter group to Savalou in **Benin**. Agokoli's brutal excesses, haughty mannerisms, and autocratic rule (including the insistence on the building of earthen walls around

Notsé) led to the **Adja**-Ewe dispersal in 1720, when an important part of the population deserted him. The painful memory of his rule contributed to the Ewe's future distaste of monarchical government; the Notsé dispersal is a major Ewe celebration annually commemorated in the **Hogbetsotso** festival.

AGOUE. Small coastal village across the border in **Benin** from which many of Togo's elite **Brazilians** trace their origins, including former president **Sylvanus Olympio**. Agoué was the site of the first chapel along the coast, built by the Brazilian Venessa de Jesus in 1835. Prior to independence, Agoué was the site of the proposed joint Togo-**Dahomey** deepwater port aimed at replacing the primitive facilities in Cotonou and **Lomé**. Benin's decision to modernize the port of Cotonou put to an end Agoué's developmental hopes and shortly after **German** funds were pledged for the modernization of Lomé. With the eclipse of the Brazilians' influence in both countries, Agoué lost importance: only during funerals is its original status visible, as thousands of mourners flock there from as far as Nigeria and **Ghana**.

AGRICULTURE. After the political turmoil of the 1990s, and the resulting dip in overall productive capacity of the country, the agricultural sector has rebounded enough to meaningfully diversify the economy away from **phosphates**. The 1994 **Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA)** franc devaluation helped the sector by correcting prices and bolstering incentives for individuals to make a living in agriculture, and the slow economic recovery since that time has been boosted by GDP contributions from this sector. Agricultural exports account for 25–40 percent of GDP in recent years, depending on weather and world market prices. However, lower yields in one crop often are offset by larger yields from other crops in a given year, making the sector—which employs 60 percent or more of the working population—less vulnerable to large-scale downturns. **Cotton** is the most important export crop, followed by **coffee** and **cocoa**. Sugarcane and **palm nuts** for oil are also grown and processed in Togo, as part of the strategy to grow and diversify the industrial sector. The government and international donors have invested considerably in this sector for the sake of GDP and employment, and as part of poverty reduction strategies. Yields in individual years are not always responsive to efforts of **parastatals** to adjust prices, and **smuggling** across borders as farmers search for better prices may skew annual totals, but the overall picture is of a sector that has responded to investments. Fertilizer use is high, and good food crop production (yams, cassava and rice, as well as fishing and livestock for domestic sale and consumption) makes Togo generally self-sufficient in food production in years when the weather is favorable.

The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and World Bank Agriculture and Food Security Program, among others, have supported increased production in food crops after international aid resumed in 2008. In Togo's **Plan Nationale de Développement (PND)** plank on agriculture, the regions of **Kara** and **Maritime** are both targets for investment in large-scale farming of foodstuffs like rice and corn, and the industrial capacity to transform them into commercial products. *See also* AKPOSSO-BENA RANCH; BENA DEVELOPMENT; CENTRE D'ÉLEVAGE D'AVETONOU.

AGRI-PME. A digital wallet, launched by minister of the digital economy **Cina Lawson** in 2016 with support from the Banque Africaine de Développement (BAD). Aimed at **agricultural** workers, the cellphone application facilitates farmers' access to government benefits like subsidized fertilizer. It boasts more than 250,000 Togolese users, and hopes to reach four million by 2030.

AGUESSY, KOSSI (1977–2017). Artist. Born in **Lomé** to a Togolese father and **Brazilian** mother, Aguessy was raised in New York, and began his art **education** in London at Central Saint Martin's against his mother's wishes. He gained notoriety with unusual materials and designs to make sculptures, stylistic chairs, and sleek interpretations of African masks, among other objects. He founded his own studio in Paris in 2008 and worked with Coca-Cola to develop designs with recycled materials. The Centre Pompidou in Paris and Museum of Art and Design in New York both have Aguessy pieces in their permanent collections. He was preparing to exhibit in the new **Palais de Lomé** when he succumbed to cancer at age 40. The Palais made a retrospective of his work one of their inaugural exhibits in 2019.

AGUIGAH, ANGÈLE DOLA. Government minister, one-time head of the **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)**. An architect by profession, and author of several published works on the subject, Aguigah was named minister delegate to the prime minister in charge of the private sector in 2000, under Prime Minister **Agbéyomé Kodjo**. She was renewed in that post in 2002 under **Koffi Sama**, and became minister of culture 2003–2006. Considered close to President **Faure Gnassingbé**, she served as an advisor to the **Convention des Femmes pour UNIR (CFU)** before being named head of the CENI supervising the **2013 legislative elections**. Despite her image as an iron **woman**, she was abruptly evacuated to Paris after that election for her health; she was later rumored to have suffered a cerebral hemorrhage.

AHLONKO, DOVI. Barrister at **Lomé's** Court of Appeals and successor to **Yao Agboyibo** as head of the **Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH)**. Ahlonko went into self-imposed exile in **Benin** after the political turmoil of the 1990s, but remained head of the **Mouvement d'Octobre 5 (MO-5)**, which returned to the country after President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** death in 2005. He also defended **Pascal Bodjona**, government minister in disgrace, in the mid-2010s.

AHOOMEY-ZUNU, SELEAGODJI KWESI (1958–). Prime Minister 2012–2015. Born near **Kloto** and educated in **Lomé**, Ahoomey-Zunu holds a master's degree in international relations. He served on the **Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH)** from 1988 to 1994. He was an early member of **Edem Kodjo's Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** party, serving in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** 1994–1999 until taking on the leadership of the **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)** 2000–2002. Though he stayed with Kodjo's party when it became the **Convergence Patriotique Panafricain (CPP)**, he was known to be close to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. He joined Edem Kodjo's cabinet from 2006 to 2007 as minister of territorial administration, then again under **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** leadership in 2010 as minister of trade and promotion of the private sector from 2011 to 2012 in **Gilbert Houngbo's** government, until being made named prime minister himself in 2012. He did not join the RPT (which later became **Union Pour La République [UNIR]**), however, while serving in the post, from which he stepped down in 2015.

AHMED, IDRISOU EL HADJ (1903–1973). One of Togo's leading theologians. Born in 1903 in **Kpalimé** to the first **Yoruba** family to settle in the local **zongo**, Ahmed studied the Koran and Arabic zealously and made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1948—the first from Kpalimé to do so. After his return to Togo, he acquired fame as a pious scholar and was in demand for various religious services. He was also very successful in private commerce. Utilizing a personal Yoruba network, he became the major cattle trader in the area. His death in 1973 opened a wide rift in the **Muslim** community, pitching the Yoruba and **Hausa** (his prime supporters) against the **Kotokoli** and **Chamba**, embittering inter-**Muslim** relations.

AHYI, PAUL (1930–2010). Well-known Togolese sculptor and artist in great demand. Ahyi was born to Togolese parents in **Benin**, where he was inspired by the art of Abomey. He studied art at the Paris École des Beaux Arts and was an art instructor at the Lycée de Tokoin in Lomé. From time to

time he was commissioned by the government, as when charged with designing the flag of the newly independent Togo. Ahyi was appointed UNESCO Artist for Peace in 2009. His art is displayed across the world including in the United States, Canada, South Korea, West Africa, and Western Europe. Toward the end of his life he financed a museum and workspace for artists in the Cacavelli quartier of **Lomé**, dubbed the **Musée Paul Ahyi**, which was finally inaugurated in 2011 by his widow, Charlotte Ahyi.

AÏDAM, GEORGES KWAO. Cabinet minister, party activist. A history professor from Anié, Aïdam began taking part in Togolese politics from 1991. He was a leading figure in the **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)** party, serving a number of political posts including prefect of Ogooué and secretary of state for security and territorial administration in charge of elections during the **transition governments** of December 1991 and September 1992. He was elected a deputy of the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** for the CAR 1994–1999, and was chief of staff for the government designated by the **Accord Politique Global (APG)** in 2006. Many observers were surprised to see Aïdam at the founding conference of President **Faure Gnassingbé's Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party in 2012, but he quickly became vice president of the new ruling party and was named to the cabinet post of delegate to the ministry of **education** in 2015 in the government of Prime Minister **Komi Klassou**.

AIR TOGO. Name used by two now-defunct **airlines** in Togo. The first, founded in **Lomé** in 1963, was Togo's small national airline that owned several small planes and had scheduled flights to **Sansanne-Mango, Sokodé, Dapaong**, and Lagos, the latter its only international link. For other foreign services Air Togo relied upon Air Afrique—Francophone Africa's regional airline—until it folded. The name Air Togo was revived again from 1998 to 2000 for a short-lived airline with flights to France and African capital cities.

AIRPORTS. For many years, Togo had only one international-class airfield, at **Lomé**, the original 3,000-meter runway (accommodating only small jets) of which was expanded in the 1980s. The airport was known as Lomé-Tokoin until 2005, when it was renamed Aéroport Internationale de **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** (AIGE) in honor of the late president. Total passenger traffic through the airport has been on the increase alongside the economic recovery, from a reported 219,000 in 2005 to 617,000 in 2014. In 2016, a new, US\$ 150 million modern terminal was built, with the help of **Chinese** interests, to accommodate **ASKY Airlines**, a subsidiary of Ethiopian Airlines. The new

terminal is advertised as having a two million passenger capacity, but passenger travel has not topped 900,000 per year according to recent statistics, and has recently leveled off to around 500,000 annually. AIGE's freight capacity has increased from 15,000 tons to 35,000 tons in the expansion.

The second largest airport is now Niamtougou International, established in 1981 and with a terminal inaugurated in 1997 and 2,500 meters of runway. It is undergoing improvements and could be a regional gateway to points further inland, but it is unclear whether demand—other than military exercises or official visits to the north—would be sufficient to warrant the additional capacity. Apart from these, there are three other airfields in the country, at **Sokodé**, **Sansanne-Mango**, and **Dapaong**, plus several other smaller strips that can accommodate small propeller planes.

AITHNARD, AHLONKOBA. President of the **Union Nationale des Femmes de Togo (UNFT)** through 2009, the powerful **women's** pressure group that includes much of the country's trading elite. In February 1990, Aithnard was brought into the cabinet as minister of social affairs with special responsibility for women's affairs.

AJAVON, AYIVI MAWUKO (1931–2015). Teacher, diplomat, and former cabinet minister. Born in Glèkové (**Kloto**) on 21 February 1931 and educated at home and in **France** as a teacher, Ajavon first taught and served as headmaster at the Lycée Tokoin in **Lomé** (1962–1971). He then moved to the ministry of **education** as its director (1972–1977) and in 1978 was appointed ambassador to Britain by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. He returned to Lomé in 1982 to join Eyadéma's cabinet as minister of justice and in 1986 was appointed minister of industry. It was Ajavon who suggested, and saw to fruition, **Lomé's Industrial Free Zone**, the first in Africa, that was inaugurated with great fanfare in 1989. Ajavon lost his position in the cabinet as soon as Eyadéma's grip over the country loosened, and he was reassigned as technical counsellor in his own ministry. Between 1991 and 1993, he was a member of the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)**.

AJAVON, HENRI (1906–1980). **Educator** and former administrator. Born in **Aného** on 25 September 1906, Ajavon was educated locally and at the prestigious **École William Ponty** in Senegal, returning home to engage in education. He served as a teacher and then a school director (authoring several books and plays) until **Sylvanus Olympio's** rise to power in 1958, when he was appointed cabinet director of the ministry of education, a position he held until the **1963 coup d'état**. After the coup he returned to teaching, retiring in 1970.

AJAVON, OSWALD AYIKOE. Former powerful secretary general of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** and director of information under both President **Nicolas Grunitzky** and General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Member of a prominent **Aného** family and a top leader of the CUT under **Sylvanus Olympio**, Ajavon did not renounce hopes of a CUT comeback after Olympio's assassination and the rise of the Grunitzky regime. On 21 November 1966—while serving as Grunitzky's director of information—Ajavon led a special civilian commando unit that invaded government installations and issued the call for the overthrow of the regime over the radio in the **attempted coup of 1966**. The attempt failed, and Ajavon was imprisoned for his role in it. He was freed in January 1967, when the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** seized power from Grunitzky, but was rearrested barely 11 months later for calling for another revolt in his subversive **Mina language** newsletter *Kurie*, which was promptly banned. Eventually making his peace with Eyadéma, Ajavon was reinstated as director of information (his old post), which he held until 1972, afterward engaging in commerce commercial printing activities before passing away in 2011.

AJAVON, ROBERT. Physician and politician. Born on 10 April 1910, in **Lomé**, Ajavon was educated locally and won one of the first six scholarships of Governor **Auguste Bonnacarrere** for medical studies in France. Combining a political career with his medical work, he was elected Togo's deputy to the French National Assembly in 1952. At the completion of his term (1956), Ajavon was elected to Togo's legislature, the **Assemblée Legislative du Togo (ALT)**, serving as its president between 1956 and 1958. A bitter and ambitious archrival of **Sylvanus Olympio**, the latter's comeback locked Ajavon out of public life until after the **1963 coup**, when Ajavon was reelected to the legislative body, now known as the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)**, where he served from 1963 to 1967 including a stint as president of the Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs (1963–1964). In August 1964, Dr. Ajavon was named Togo's ambassador to the United States and Canada and permanent representative to the United Nations, positions he held until June 1967. Retiring from public life, Ajavon opened a clinic in Ivory Coast and, in 1974, one in Lomé, where he practiced medicine until 1985. His continued political importance was attested to by the fact that in mid-1987 General Eyadéma met with him and other former **Parti Togolais du Progrès (PTP)** leaders as part of his drive to secure support from all segments of the country.

AKAKPO, ANDRE (1913–1967). Eminent biologist and Togo's first ambassador to the United States and the United Nations. Born on 21 June 1913

in **Aného**, Akakpo was educated locally and studied in **France** on one of the first six scholarships of Governor **Auguste Bonnacarrere**. Working and teaching locally and abroad, Dr. Akakpo built a name for himself. An important member of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, he entered political life in the 1950s and was elected to the **Chambre de Députés** in 1958, serving as his party's parliamentary head. In 1959, he was also elected deputy mayor of **Lomé**. Following independence, Akakpo was named ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, serving in these capacities until August 1964. He died a few years later.

AKAKPO, ASSIBA (1958–). Journalist and poet. Born on 16 November 1958, in **Lomé**, Akakpo proceeded to Yaounde, Cameroon, to study journalism after secondary schooling. While working for the Togolese broadcasting company, Akakpo wrote a number of poems, winning third prize in the 1986 International Poetry Festival and numerous other awards.

AKAKPO, AYAYI JUSTIN (1945–). Veterinarian. Born on 8 August 1945, Akakpo was trained in veterinary medicine at the University of Dakar Medical School (1976), the Institut Pasteur in Paris, and University of Claude Bernard (Lyon), obtaining his doctorate and specializing in microbiology. Akakpo returned to teach at the University of Dakar, becoming full professor in 1988. He is the author of some 32 scientific papers and has delivered 15 conference papers.

AKAKPO-AHIANYO, ANANI KUMA SAMUEL (1937–). Former minister of foreign affairs and **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** crony. An **Ewe** born on 12 December 1937, in **Tsévié**, Akakpo-Ahianyio was educated in **Lomé** and in 1960 proceeded to Paris to study **agricultural** economics and rural sociology, acquiring a degree in the latter in 1965. He subsequently earned a PhD in the same field (1971) and was appointed director general of the **Institut National de Recherches Scientifiques (INARES)**. An ambitious person seeking a political career, Akakpo-Ahianyio's fawning and praise for Eyadéma gained him appointment as permanent secretary of rural development in 1975. The same year he was also made **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** councilor from Lomé and member of the Central Committee of the party. In 1977, he was dispatched to Peking as ambassador to **China** and North Korea, but by July 1978, he was back in Lomé to take over the ministry of foreign affairs, replacing **Edem Kodjo** who had been appointed secretary general of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). One of Eyadéma's most ardent supporters in the 1980s, Akakpo-Ahianyio was dropped from the cabinet in September 1984 after six years as Togo's

foreign minister. In the 1980s, he wrote a number of poems inspired by the “glory” of North Korean Marxism.

AKAKPO-TYPAMM, PAUL (1916–2004). Poet. Born in Hlandé in the Lac prefecture on 14 October 1916, Akakpo-Typamm was educated in **Kpalimé** where he concluded primary studies and entered the civil administration working for the Togolese **railroads**. He completed his secondary **education** to become a teacher. Akakpo-Typamm is regarded as one of Togo’s foremost poets. His work has appeared in various publications, both at home and abroad, including a collection, *Rhymes et Cadences*, published in Paris.

AKAKPOVIE, KAGNI GABRIEL. Minister of justice briefly from May 1994 in the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**—**Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** coalition government headed by Prime Minister **Edem Kodjo**.

AKITANI-BOB, EMMANUEL (1930–2011). Two-time presidential candidate. Born on 18 July 1930, in **Aného**, Akitani (sometimes written “Akitani-Bob” or “Bob-Akitani”) was educated in **France** and obtained degrees in mathematics and engineering. He worked in Senegal before returning to Togo as deputy director of Geology and Mines in **Lomé** (1961–1962) and administrative head of the **Compagnie Togolaise des Mines de Benin (CTMB)** shortly after. Later in his career, he served as director general of the Bureau National de Recherches Minières du Togo and director of **Mines** and Geology in the ministry of public works. He came out of retirement as a partisan of **Gilchrist Olympio** once **political parties** were again permitted to form in 1991, and stood as the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)** candidate against both **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and **Faure Gnassingbé** (in **presidential elections of 2003 and 2005** respectively), when Olympio was unable to run himself. In 2003, Akitani took 33.7 percent of the official vote count against Eyadéma’s 57.8 percent. The UFC released its own estimated figures, however, giving Akitani just over 70 percent of the vote, and Eyadéma only 10 percent. After the **succession crisis of 2005**, Akitani faced Eyadéma’s son, whose campaign focused, in part, on whether the 39-year-old Gnassingbé was better suited to lead, by virtue of youth, compared to the 74-year-old Akitani. Unlike 2003, when multiple opposition candidates split the anti-Eyadéma vote between them, this time the opposition was united behind Akitani. The official results showed only a small bump for Akitani, however, to 38 percent, while Gnassingbé took 60 percent. The implausibility of this result led to protests that faced serious reprisals from the **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, during which **human rights** groups estimate more than 700 people

died and some 4,000 were injured, while another 38,000 Togolese **refugees** fled to neighboring countries to escape the violence. Akitani declared himself president after both elections.

AKOU, MARTIN (1913–1970). Togo's first deputy to the **French** National Assembly. Born on 25 September 1913, in **Lomé** to Pastor Akou, who had played an important role in developing the **Ewe Evangelical Church (EEC)**. After primary **education**, Akou accompanied Mission Inspector Stoevesandt to Germany where he continued his education in Westheim, in Basel (Switzerland), and in France, completing his medical studies after the end of World War II. In 1946, running as the candidate of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, Dr. Akou beat **Nicolas Grunitzky** and became Togo's first deputy to France's National Assembly. During this tenure in Paris (1946–1951), he was affiliated with the Independents d'Outre Mer parliamentary group, though less out of ideological sympathy than to conform to parliamentary practice of joining a recognized faction. An isolationist and conservative, Akou kept away from the various interterritorial groupings then developing both in the French National Assembly and in Africa, establishing the pattern of Togolese "noninvolvement" in Francophone Africa's affairs. Dr. Akou was defeated in his 1951 reelection bid by his old foe, Grunitzky, who benefited from the French administration's support. Following his defeat, Dr. Akou retired from political life and reestablished his medical practice in **Ghana** until his death in 1970.

AKOUEȚÉ, PAULIN (1907–1997). **Trade union** leader and key politician and cabinet minister in the Olympio era. Born in Grand Popo (**Benin**) in 1907, Akouet   was trained for a civil service career. He rapidly became absorbed in trade union affairs, rising to be secretary general of the Union des Syndicats Conf  d  r  s du Togo and later president of the **Union Nationale des Travailleurs Togolais (UNTT)**, Togo's biggest and most influential union movement. An important member of **Sylvanus Olympio's Comit   de l'Unit   Togolaise (CUT)** party by virtue of his control of the UNTT, Akouet   was deputy in the **Assembl   Territoriale du Togo (ATT)** from March 1952 to June 1955 and in the **Chambre de D  put  s** from April 1959 to April 1961. In May 1958, Akouet   became minister of labor, social affairs, and the civil service, and in May 1960, he was named minister of justice as well, holding both positions until 1963. A powerful prop for Olympio's increasingly heavy-handed administration, Akouet   fled into exile following the **1963 coup d'  tat** and did not return to Togo until April 1971. Ill-health prevented him from accepting an invitation to Togo's **National Conference** in 1991, and he passed away in Cotonou at the age of 96.

AKOUEÛ-AKUÛ, EDJENE (1947–). Administrator. Born in 1947 and educated at home and in France in law and public administration, on his return home Akouet  -Aku   joined the ministry of the plan and rose to become department head of its research division. He is the author of two books on Togo.

AKP  MA. Initiation ceremony of young (14–18 years old) **Kaby  ** girls, lasting a full week and symbolizing the attainment of maturity. Conducted on a sacred hill, the traditional ceremony—very prevalent in Kaby   society—prepares the girls for **womanhood** and motherhood. It takes place in mid-July. The male equivalent of this ceremony is **Evala**.

AKPOSSO. Mountain ethnic group found in the Akposso district of the **Plateaux** region, west of **Atakpam  **, and also across the border in **Ghana**. In **Evegb  **, their name means “equal to panthers” (Akpo = panthers; esso = equal). The Akposso were chased to their mountain region by Ashanti and **Ewe** raids. The Ashanti-Akposso wars of 1869–1873, in particular, resulted in fully one-third of the Akposso being either killed or driven into slavery to Kumasi (Ghana). After the Ashanti defeat at the hands of Sir Wolseley in 1874, the Akposso started descending from their mountain retreats to reoccupy their foothill villages, a process further encouraged by the pacification of the area by the **German administration** of Togo. The Akposso had also suffered during the reign of King **Agokoli** of **Nots  ** in the 18th century. More recently, the Akposso cultivated **coffee** and **cocoa** farms a considerable distance away from their mountain villages, descending to the plains only at harvest time and returning to the hills in March. Known as rebellious, the Akposso have no superior **chiefs** or king.

AKPOSSO-BENA RANCH. Joint **German**-Togolese experimental ranch involved in improving cattle, pig, and rabbit stock in the country. *See also* CENTRE D’  LEVAGE D’AVETONOU.

ALADJI, VICTOR (1941–). Author and poet. An **Ewe** born in Hangnigba near **Palim  **, Aladji completed his studies in journalism at the University of Lille in **France** and returned to **Lom  ** to join the staff of **Radio Togo**. He is the author of several published novels and served as a faculty member of the **Universit   du Benin** (later **Universit   de Lom  **).

ALASSANI, DJOBO MOHAMED. Imam based in **Sokod  **. Already a close advisor of **Tikpi Atchadam** and known to have expressed discontent with the ruling party, after Atchadam’s **Parti National Panafricain (PNP)** party

gained notoriety for protests in August 2017, Alassani came under increased scrutiny from security forces. Alassane was arrested after evening prayers on 17 October 2017, after allegedly advocating violence against the police. His arrest immediately set off riots in Sokodé where two protesters and two members of the security forces were killed, dozens wounded, and homes and businesses—including a bank and cellphone company—were burned. Other related incidents took place in nearby **Bafilo**, where the local imam **Alfa Abdoul Wahid** was also arrested, and in parts of **Lomé**. Alassani's arrest and the associated violence galvanized the other parties in the opposition to defy a government ban on weekday protests and continue demonstrating in favor of **constitutional amendments** to limit President **Faure Gnassingbé's** power, with the release of the imprisoned imams as a condition for entering into negotiations with government. Alassani and Wahid were released in early December 2017.

ALASSOUNOUMA, BOUMBERA. Foreign minister of Togo. A former ambassador to **France**, and close friend of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, Alassounouma was appointed foreign minister in May 1994 in the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**—**Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** coalition government headed by Prime Minister **Edem Kodjo**.

ALEDJO. *See* FAILLE D'ALEDJO.

ALIDOU DJAFALO, COLONEL MENVEYINOYU ALBERT. Former powerful head of Togo's **gendarmerie** (police), minister of public health, key officer in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, and Togo's number two man. Born in **Lama Kara** on 3 February 1922 to a **Kabyé** family, Alidou Djafalo joined the militia in 1942, serving in postings in Bassari, Atakpamé, and Aného. On 22 June 1956, he commanded the platoon that carried out the massacre of Kabyé in **Pya** that 15 years later would be commemorated by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. In 1961, he attended a police officers' school in Melun, France, having been promoted from the ranks by President **Sylvanus Olympio**. Following completion of the course, he was appointed commander of the Garde Togolaise units in the north (1962–1963). After taking part in the **1963 coup d'état**, Alidou Djafalo was promoted to captain and commander of the mobile police force. In 1965, he became a major and head of the **gendarmerie**. In 1970, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. One of General Eyadéma's closest friends and most trusted lieutenants, Alidou Djafalo became a key man in the new military regime set up after the **1967 coup d'état**. A member of the **Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN)** set up after the coup, Alidou Djafalo served as minister of public health, at the same

time also being a member of the Political Bureau of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** since the party was created. A strong and hard personality, Alidou Djafalo was the most important support of the Eyadéma regime and was literally the last military officer to be dropped from President Eyadéma's cabinet with the civilianization of that body in the 1970s. He was retired from the armed forces in 1982 and honored for his national service in 2013.

ALIPUI, KOMLAN (1936–). International administrator and former technocrat cabinet minister. An **Ewe** born in Anou Oblo near **Kpalimé** in 1936, Alipui was educated at home and in **France** where he obtained a doctorate in economics from the University of Rennes (1973). After his studies, he joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and later worked with the **Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO)**, the central bank of Francophone West Africa in Dakar. In 1984, he heeded General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** request to return home, take over the ministry of finance and the Economy, and help put Togo on the direction demanded by the **World Bank**. Though he brought a technocratic input to this effort, the massive corruption of the Eyadéma regime, including that of his ministers, neutralized his impact, and his tenure merged with the wave of democratization and violence that reached Togo in 1990. By 1991, Alipui, who had participated in the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS)** committee investigating corruption, had left the cabinet to return to Dakar, taking on roles at the IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank, among others.

ALL-EWE CONFERENCE (AEC). Organization set up in the Gold Coast (today **Ghana**) on 9 June 1946 to campaign for the unification of all segments of the **Ewe** population under British tutelage. A merger of several previous groups, including the Ewe Unionist Association (EUA) of **Daniel A. Chapman**, who was elected secretary general of the All-Ewe Conference (AEC), the organization—claiming to represent all Ewe clans—had only moderate support in **French Togoland**. There its most prominent members were the **Augustino De Souza**, a **Brazilian**, and some 20 customary **chiefs**. **Sylvanus Olympio**, the political leader of French Togo's Ewe, was campaigning for his own **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** party and had an ambivalent attitude toward the AEC and its goals. In late 1948 and early 1949, the AEC suffered major splits in its ranks as a result of incipient resentments against the organization's **Anlo**-Ewe leadership, resentments having their origins in the “treason” of the Anlo clan during the Ashanti-Ewe wars of 1868–1871. Though AEC has long since disappeared, its goals and concerns remained

alive on both sides of the Togo-Ghana border, complicating amicable relations between the two countries.

ALLASSOUNOUMA, BOUMBERA (1942–). Former minister of higher **education** and scientific research. Born in 1942 in Niamtougou and a **Lasso** (an affiliate **Kabyé** group), Allassounouma studied in schools in **Kara** and **Sokodé** before gaining a scholarship to travel to **France** and study psychology at the University of Caen. He later continued in labor studies in Paris. He returned to Togo in 1970 and worked with the National Pedagogical Institute. In 1973, he was appointed its director and five years later joined President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s cabinet as minister of labor and the civil service. Six months later, he was reassigned to the ministry of education. He was dropped from the cabinet in the September 1982 shuffle and reassigned to the ministry of education as senior technical consultant. In August 1983, he was appointed ambassador to **China**, and after that ambassador to France. He rose to the post of minister of foreign affairs 1994–1995.

ALLIANCE DE DÉMOCRATES POUR LE RENOUVEAU (ADR). **Zarifou Ayéva**'s political party in the 1990s. The party, especially strong in Ayéva's ethnic region, was joined by two other regional formations to create the **Groupe Social Panafricain (GSP)** that boycotted the **1994 legislative elections**. Zarifou's earlier political party was the Alliance Togolaise pour la Démocratie (ATD), established in 1990.

ALLIANCE NATIONALE POUR LE CHANGEMENT (ANC). Political party formed on 10 October 2010 with **Jean-Pierre Fabre** as head, after splitting with the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)** of **Gilchrist Olympio**. Fabre was the vice president of the UFC after **Emmanuel Akitani-Bob** retired, and served as Olympio's partisan stand-in for the **2010 presidential elections** held in March of that year. In each of the three presidential elections after 1998, in which Olympio did not run, it was understood that if the UFC candidate won, he would appoint Olympio to an important position in government and oversee the changes necessary to allow Olympio's full participation in future elections. However, Olympio appeared more comfortable with this arrangement with Akitani-Bob as compared to Fabre, who was younger and a more dynamic political figure, and who had collected a set of loyal partisan militants around him. An apparent rivalry between the Fabre and Olympio broke out into the open while Fabre and UFC partisans were still protesting the official results that showed Fabre with 34 percent of the vote to incumbent President **Faure Gnassingbé**'s 61 percent, but Olympio brokered his own separate deal with the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple**

Togolais (RPT) party at the end of May for seven UFC seats in a national unity government under Prime Minister **Gilbert Houngbo**. Many in the UFC were outraged by the capitulation, splitting the UFC along lines of loyalty to each of the top two officers in the party. Fabre rallied enough support in the political bureau of the UFC to expel Olympio from the party the following day, but many in the party remained loyal to the founder-president, setting up an irreconcilable split. Violence broke out between members of the two factions, and Fabre and his partisans moved quickly to organize the founding conference of the ANC on 10 October 2010. Olympio retaliated in November by demanding that the deputies in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** who had won seats in the **2007 legislative elections** on the UFC party list, but were now no longer members—including Fabre—be removed from their seats. The **Constitutional Court** sided with Olympio's faction, and nine ANC members lost their seats.

Demonstrating their strength in numbers and commitment, however, ANC supporters wearing the party's trademark orange marched and chanted in the streets of **Lomé** regularly from this period, calling for a change of leadership at the national level. By 2012, the protest had spread to cities in the interior as well, forcing the delay of the **legislative elections of 2013**, originally scheduled for 2012, through popular mobilization against election reforms that favored the ruling party, now renamed **Union Pour La République (UNIR)**. Collecting a number of other opposition groups together, Fabre and the ANC formed (in 2012) the **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)**, continued their persistent demonstrations in greater numbers, and triumphed over the UFC by winning 19 seats in the AN against the UFC's 3, though both lost overwhelmingly to the UNIR who took 62 seats out of 91, thanks to gerrymandering. So great was the threat of the CST's opposition that when Lomé's famous **Assigamé** market was burned in January 2013, some CST members were either arrested or fled the country to escape the security forces. As the **presidential election of 2015** approached, the protests continued unabated even as the government stepped up their tactics by banning or limiting the scope of demonstration and requiring permits. Fabre was the ANC's candidate against Gnassingbé again in the **presidential election of 2015** with much the same outcome in terms of vote totals. The ANC lost its place as the standard-bearer of the "radical" opposition when the **Parti National Panafricain (PNP)** burst on the scene in 2017, changing the opposition agenda from the (perennially losing) strategy of defeating the incumbent at the polls to one of fighting for a return of the **1992 constitutional** principles, such as term limits and two rounds of elections for the presidency. The ANC adopted the new stance, and joined an even larger coalition of opposition forces, the **Coalition de 14 (C14)**, and participated in even larger **street protests of 2017 and 2018**. The

ANC, as part of the C14, boycotted the **2018 legislative elections**, whereupon the UNIR capitalized on their legislative supermajority to unilaterally pass **constitutional amendments in 2019** along the lines of opposition demands, but exempting President Gnassingbé, undercutting the demands that had unified the ANC with other groups. In the aftermath, the ANC left the C14 coalition and contested **municipal elections in 2019** on their own, winning 134 seats and coming in second overall, though just three seats ahead of the group of candidates supported by the C14. Fabre ran again in the **presidential election of 2020**, but the opposition focus of hope had shifted to former RPT member and candidate **Agbéyomé Kodjo**, and though the official results were even more skewed in favor of the incumbent than Togolese have come to expect, Fabre's third-place finish with less than 5 percent of the official results was an indicator of how much popular support the ANC had lost from its strong position in 2013–2015.

ALLIANCE TOGOLAISE POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE (ATD). See ALLIANCE DE DÉMOCRATES POUR LE RENOUVEAU (ADR).

ALMEIDA, AYICOE-GHAN D' (1945–). Television producer and filmmaker. Born in Treichville (Côte d'Ivoire) on 4 November 1945, Ghan was educated in **Kpalimé**, following which he proceeded to **France** to obtain training in audiovisual technology at Bry-sur-Marne, as well as a degree in humanities. On his return to Togo, he assumed duties with **Télévision Togolaise (TVT)**, in charge of its production division. He is the author of numerous poems, and produced the noteworthy film *Azaïba* in 1993.

ALMEIDA, AYIVI GAMELE D'. Former high commissioner of **tourism**. Succeeding to the post in 1979 after a career within the department, d'Almeida acquired the distinction of being the longest lasting of such commissioners. Most of his predecessors had been purged for embezzlement or corruption while in office. He was dropped from the post in 1986 and left the civil service.

ALMEIDA-EKUÉ, SILIVI KOKOÉ D' (1950–). Historian and educator. Born in 1950 in Bobo-Dioulasso (Burkina Faso) to a prominent **Brazilian** family from Togo, d'Almeida is the author of *La revolte des Loméénés* (1992) and other well-received historical works about Togo. She studied at schools in **Benin** and Togo, and for her higher **education** she studied at the **University of Benin (UB)** in **Lomé**, obtaining a master's degree in history. She taught history and geography in a Lomé secondary school, College Saint Joseph, in the 1980s. After leaving her teaching post, she continued to consult

about education and has written a number of other books on the Togolese colonial administration.

ALOU, KPATCHA ALABA M. Educator. Born in 1949 in **Pyä-Kioude** in northern Togo and educated in **Lomé** and **Sokodé**, Alou traveled to Yaoundé where he studied **Protestant** theology, and to Bordeaux where he obtained his doctorate. He taught philosophy at the Protestant College of Lomé where he served as deputy director and chaplain. Author of multiple poem collections including *Un enfant pas comme les Autres* (1993), *Pots-Pourris Rythmos-Poétiques* (1987), and *Le métier de Jesus* (1987).

AMAÏZO, DOVI LOUIS (1939–). International civil servant and social scientist. Born in **Kpalimé** on 17 August 1939, Amaïzo was educated locally and proceeded to the universities in Rome and **Ghana** before finally arriving at the University of Wisconsin, and later Montreal, where he obtained a degree in African Studies. He served as information officer with the United Nations in New York and later in **Lomé** (1965–1966). Between 1966 and 1970, he was attached to the United Nations office in Addis Ababa, and in 1970, he became administrative officer for the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in Rome. In 1974, he shifted to Geneva, where he finished his career.

AMAKUÉ, GEORGES. See APEDO-AMAH, GEORGES AMAKUÉ DOHUE.

AMEDEGNATO, KOKOU VIGNITO FERDINAND (1930–2003). Former cabinet minister. Born in Agouégan on 30 May 1934, and a teacher by profession, Amedegnato served as **education** inspector and director of primary education between 1959 and 1965. In 1965, he was appointed director of youth and sports, and after the **1967 coup** he was shifted to head primary education in the **Kloto** District. He was the first director of the **Agence Togolaise du Presse (ATOP)** when it was created in 1975. In 1980, he was brought into President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cabinet as minister of information, later of education. He turned out to be one of Eyadéma's less successful choices and was soon dropped in 1981 and reassigned his old duties in the ministry of education. In 1990, he became secretary general of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, and served for a decade prior to his death in 2003.

AMEDOKPA, JOSEPH. Painter. Born in Togo in 1946, he was educated in Lagos, Nigeria. After returning to his hometown **Vogan**, he used local oil and

recycled materials to create canvases. He was selected in 2008 to be featured as part of Dell's Product RED initiative against AIDS.

AMEDOMÉ, ABRA. Former cabinet minister. Amedomé studied pharmacology at Lyon and Montpellier (1955–1960) and worked as a pharmacist in **Lomé** prior to her appointment to the cabinet. A vocal **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** militant, merchant/entrepreneur, **trade unionist**, and president (1975–1987) of the **Union Nationale des Femmes du Togo (UNFT)**, Amedomé became popular when brought into Eyadéma's cabinet as minister of social affairs in charge of **women's** interests, to attract support from the **Nana Benz** of Lomé. Of **Ewe** origin, she was dropped in September 1982 in favor of **Shefti Méatchi**, a northerner and wife of the former vice president under **Nicolas Grunitzky**—a fact that caused discontent in Lomé.

AMEDZOFÉ. "Place of origin" in **Ewe**. *See also* NOTSÉ.

AMEFIA, YAO JOSEPH. Former minister of equipment and **mines** in the **transitional government** between September 1991 and September 1992. Amefia was a victim of an attempted assassination in downtown **Lomé** on 17 August 1992.

AMEGA, ATSU-KOFFI LOUIS (1932–2015). Former minister of foreign affairs, international administrator, and long-term president of the **Supreme Court**. Born on 22 March 1932, in **Lomé**, Amega moved to Congo-Brazzaville with his family and was later educated there and in **France**, obtaining a law degree. Upon the completion of his studies, Amega returned to Brazzaville and held a number of positions in the judicial system culminating in president of Brazzaville's Court of Appeals in 1964. He returned permanently to his native Togo after Massemba-Debat's rise to power in Congo shifted the political climate to the left. In 1970, he was appointed to the **Cour de Sûreté de l'Etat** that tried the August 1970 plotters. In January 1972, Amega was brought into the cabinet as minister of rural economy, a position he occupied until August 1973. He was appointed to head the Supreme Court after he left the cabinet and held that post for nine years until his nomination on 24 December 1981, as Togo's ambassador to the United Nations. In September 1984, he was repatriated to Lomé and assumed the ministry of foreign affairs. He was a member of the Political Bureau of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, from the latter's inception. In the cabinet changes of March 1987, Amega was returned to his old post as president of the Supreme Court, where he strongly supported Eyadéma by rejecting various efforts in 1990 to challenge the single-party

system in Togo. Because of this, Amega's own position became untenable after multipartyism was ultimately institutionalized, there were calls for his replacement, and he was retired in 1992, passing away in 2015.

AMÉGANVI, CLAUDE. Radical **trade unionist** and member of the opposition, who set up his own independent trade union, the Trotskyite **Organisation Togolaise des Travailleurs Démocratique (OTTD)** that drew members away from the old union confederation set up by President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Améganvi was a member of the 1991–1993 **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)**; later forced into exile in **Benin** due to military repression against opponents of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. Upon his return to Togo in 1997, he became the national coordinator of the **Parti des Travailleurs** as a result of the fusion between OTTD and another union. In 2001, as one of the leaders of the movement “Quelle solution pour le Togo?” he ran afoul of Eyadéma and supporters by calling public attention to the tenth anniversary of **Tavio Amarin's** assassination, for which he was charged with defamation of character and served four months in prison.

AMEGBLÉAME, SIMON. Academic. Amegbléame completed his studies at Center for African Studies in Bordeaux, then returned to **Lomé** to teach at the **Université du Bénin (UB)**. In 1975, he compiled the most definitive bibliography of literature written in the **Eveghé** vernacular and extended it in a second publication in 1983. He also wrote two books on Togolese society, retiring in 2015.

AMEGBOH, GBEGNON JOSEPH. One-time eminence grise of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime. Born on 9 March 1937, at Zalive and educated in history, Amegboh joined the ministry of information in 1975 as a journalist and producer, later director, and still later its secretary general. There he wrote a number of laudatory studies of historical African leaders, ranging from Rabah (Chad) to Behanzin (**Benin**). In 1981, he came to the attention of **Kpotivi Laclé**, then the regime's second most powerful man, and was appointed minister of information, posts, and telecommunications. In 1984, he joined the presidential office as minister delegate to the president and as Laclé's deputy was secretary for the **Lomé** branch of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. It was in the latter capacity that he acquired his immense influence as the regime's prime tactician and aide, directing day-to-day government operations as General Eyadéma became more reclusive.

AMEGEE, LOUIS (1903–1976). Administrator. Born in **Lomé** on 28 March 1903, Amegee started off as an accountant before becoming head clerk of a

French firm. He was elected to Lomé's municipal council as a **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** member in 1954 and remained a councilor until the assassination of President **Sylvanus Olympio** and the collapse of the regime. After independence, Amegée was also appointed director of the Alokoegbe State Mills (1960–1965), and served on a variety of administrative boards, including those of the National Lottery, the Savings Bank, and the **Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT)**. From May 1959, Amegée was also treasurer of the **Chamber of Commerce**. He went into retirement in 1969.

AMEGEE, PAUL ANANI (1913–2002). Veterinarian, administrator, and former cabinet minister. Born in **Lomé** on 21 August 1913, Amegée was educated locally and abroad, specializing in veterinary medicine. He has occupied a variety of posts in Lomé (1937–1941), **Sansanne-Mango** (1941–1943), and **Sokodé** (1943–1951), becoming director of Stockbreeding Services in northern Togo (1951–1954) in 1951, and deputy head of the National Bureau (1954–1958). In June 1958, he was selected to head the ministerial cabinet of **Namoro Karamoko**, and in June 1959, Amegée was himself appointed minister of public works, transport and telecommunications in **Sylvanus Olympio's** government. He retained his ministry until the **coup d'état of 1963**, at which time he was shifted back to administrative-technical duties until his retirement in 1973. He practiced medicine in a veterinary clinic in Lomé until 1982.

AMEGIE, GENERAL MAWULIKPLIM YAO (1948–1993). President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** military right-hand man. Amegie came into prominence in August 1980, when with Colonel **Ayaovi Assila's** resignation on the grounds of ill-health, he assumed the post of deputy chief of staff of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**. Prior to that, Amegie had been Assila's deputy and commander of the elite Third Battalion, based in **Kara**. In December 1988, Amegie joined the cabinet as minister of interior, providing the steel fist blunting the first pressures for democratization. With the January 1989 disgrace of **Kpotivi Tevi Dzidzogbe Laclé**, Eyadéma's main civilian ally, Amegie temporarily took over the former's duties as minister of justice as well. The **National Conference** in 1990 stripped Eyadéma of much of his executive powers: Amegie, too powerful to be completely eliminated, inherited the defense portfolio which he used to issue diatribes against the new **transition government**, the illegality of its activities, and the possibility of civil war if the vilification and eclipse of Eyadéma continued. As the tug-of-war between Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** and President Eyadéma continued, Amegie assumed the role of Eyadéma's minister of defense, even as Koffigoh appointed another minister in charge of security to his cabinet.

General Amegie died in defense of Eyadéma in the 1993 assault on the latter's domicile **Lomé II** in the Tokoin barracks.

AMEGNINO, CAPTAIN PAUL. Former head of the **Brigades de Vigilance** of the **gendarmerie**, a unit set up by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in the late 1970s to monitor security in the **Lomé** area. Personally responsible to Eyadéma, Amegnino used to prepare weekly intelligence reports on the mood of the capital and potential sources of opposition. His quasi-absolute authority in a region adjacent to the **Ghanaian border** led him to engage in drug **trafficking** for which he was dismissed from the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** in 1984. Alternate reports suggest that his drug activities—common among officers along the frontier—were but the official excuse in an internal settling of accounts in the gendarmerie.

AMELA, HILLA-LAOBE (1947–2007). Academic and poet. Born in 1947 in **Aného** and educated locally and in **France**, Amela held a PhD in classics. He was appointed head of the Department of Modern Literature at the **Université du Bénin** (later **Université de Lomé**) and director general of culture for the Togolese ministry of **education**. He published several volumes of poetry before his death in 2007.

AMELA, YAO AMELAVI. Minister of **education** and scientific resources between May 1991 and 1993 and speaker during the **Conférence Nationale**. Created his own party the Front Nationale in 1991 considered as an ally of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. He went on to endorse **Faure Gnassingbé** for president in 2005, and passed away in 2007.

AMITIÉ 77. Joint **Franco-Togolese** military exercises held in the **Atakpamé** region from 24–25 November 1977. Touted at the time as reflecting France's military commitment to the survival of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime, the exercises were militarily viewed in French circles as a near disaster, attesting to the poor condition of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**.

AMORIN, AYAO TAVIO (1958–1992). Leader of the Parti Socialiste Pan-africain (PSP), assassinated by members of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** on 23 July 1992. Born on 20 November 1958, in **Lomé** and educated in **Catholic** schools, Amorin pursued his higher studies in mathematics and physics at the University of Poitiers, continuing his postgraduate studies in computer science. During his stay in **France**, he had contacts with the French Communist Party and thus developed his radical leanings. In 1989, he moved to Côte d'Ivoire as a computer consultant, but as soon as preparations for a

National Conference commenced in Togo, he returned home and was appointed to the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** and set up his radical PSP party. He was shot while walking in downtown **Lomé** in broad daylight and flown to Paris where he died. His death sparked massive riots in Lomé.

AMOUSSOU, COMLANVI LUE (1941–). International administrator. Born in 1941 and educated in journalism and postal law in **France**, on his return to **Lomé** Amoussou was appointed postal inspector with the ministry of posts. In 1978, he became chief inspector, and a few years later he was appointed as head of the Press and Public Relations section of a Francophonic organization based in Brazzaville.

AMOUZOU, JACQUES (1936–). Presidential candidate. One of only two candidates to declare their presidential candidacies in the August **1993 elections** when all the other opposition leaders pulled out in the contest against incumbent President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. In the election, Amouzou, running as an independent, received 1.64 percent of the popular vote. He ran as a presidential candidate again as a representative of the Union des Libéraux Independents (ULI) in 1998 and received 0.35 percent of the votes.

ANA. Small group—not to be confused with the Ané—living in **Atakpamé** (in the Gnagna and Djama quarters) midway between Atakpamé and **Sokodé** along the Togo-**Benin** border. The Ana are seen as the most western extension of the **Yoruba** group. They trace their origin to Ife (Nigeria) and speak an Ife Yoruba dialect. Their history has been one of perennial strife, warfare, and vassalage to the powerful Dahomey kingdom to the east.

ANAGOKOME. The **Yoruba** Muslim **zongo** quarter of **Lomé**, one of the oldest parts of the capital. Initially populated exclusively by **Brazilian** Yoruba from the **Benin** coastal town of Agoué, who came to join their Portuguese employer Octaviano Olympio. Erecting a small mosque in 1882 (Lomé's first), the area grew in size as newcomers flocked to the new center that also traded in slaves. Anagokome became the commercial hub of the growing capital of Togo. With independence, its prime “downtown” location attracted urban renewal efforts and in 1975–1977 it was razed to the ground and its population relocated to **Togblékopé** in the suburbs.

ANANI, JEAN KOUASSI. Interim minister of national **education** and scientific research in the second **transitional government** of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** between September 1991 and September 1992.

ANDJO, TCHAMDJA. Government minister. First named as minister of equipment in 1995 and renewed in the post in 1996 under Prime Minister **Kwassi Klutsé**, Andjo also served as minister of **mines**, energy, and telecommunications in 1999 under Prime Minister **Eugene Adoboli**, giving way to future president **Faure Gnassingbé** in the government reshuffle of 2003. He returned to government in 2010 in the unity government with the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)** as minister in charge of public works, and was the target of much criticism after so many years in which the roads remained in poor condition.

ANÉ. Founding ethnic group of **Aného**. Not to be confused with the Ana, the Ané founded Aného between the years 1663 and 1690, having migrated to the area from El Mina (**Ghana**) under the leadership of a Fanti prince named Quam Dessou. The Ané eventually adopted the **Ouatchi** dialect and are known, together with the nearby Ga, as **Mina**, a reference to their original home in El Mina. Together, the Ga and Ané number almost 275,000 and are found mainly in the coastal areas, especially in the vicinity of Aného.

ANÉHO. Lovely historic coastal town, former capital of both **German** and **French** Togo and intellectual center of Togo. Also known in the colonial era as Petit Popo (Little Popo) and as Anécho (until 1974). Aného is 27 miles east of **Lomé** near the **Benin** border. The town was an important slave port and commercial entrepôt, and, as Togo's intellectual center (i.e., hometown of a large percentage of the country's intellectuals and senior bureaucrats), it is directly comparable with Ouidah, further east along the coast in Benin. Founded by **Ané refugees** from El Mina (now in **Ghana**) who were escaping perennial Ashanti assaults, the name Aného means, in **Ouatchi** dialect, "the home [ho] of the Ané." The town was established around 1663–1690; just prior to this, in 1663 or 1687, a **Ga** group from the Accra region installed itself nearby at **Glidji** (a **zongo** village of considerable historical importance), and both ethnic groups have been referred to as **Mina**, an allusion to their point of origin. The two main clan-families in the area, the **Lawsons** and the **Adjigo**, have historically claimed original possession of the land and hence title of superior chief. The Adjigo clan's claims have usually been recognized; in 1961, however, the traditional "post" was abolished with the concurrence of both clans. The last "chief" of Aného was **Ata Quam-Dessou XIII** who reigned between 1922 and his death in 1977.

With the establishment of Glidji and the first communities of Aného, other families and clans from the Accra area gravitated to the quieter atmosphere of Aného, which also attracted **Brazilian** settlement, eventually becoming the

biggest coastal center in Togo. (The ancestors of the Ajavon, Tekoe, Wilson, Akoue, **Lawson**, de Silveira, d'Almeida, and Da Souza families settled in Aného during this period.) The town became a loosely held tributary of the Allada kingdom in Benin and a slave port, trading especially with the Danes, Dutch, and the British. The port never developed, however, into a major competitor to the bigger centers of the slave trade (such as Ouidah) because of the smaller volume of slaves available and the alleged sharp practices of the Mina middlemen. For some time, the Dutch were very active in Aného, building one of the first trading compounds in 1772, their influence radiating out of **Christianborg** (Accra). Control of much of the trade then gravitated into the hands of the Da Souza family and later French, German, and Portuguese companies established themselves in the area. The Aného area was also the scene of early missionary drives, including those of the **Moravian Brothers**, under **Jacob Protten**, and the **Methodists**, under Thomas Birch Freeman. Thus, at the time of the German occupation Aného had been in close contact with Europeans for over two centuries. Briefly the capital of the new German colony (1885–1887) and interim capital of the French segment of Togo prior to the definitive Anglo-French partition (1914–1920), Aného's importance rapidly declined with the onset of colonial rule. In 1937, for example, only nine ships called at this historic port, most trade gravitating to the new administrative capital, Lomé. Currently, the town is Togo's eighth largest urban center with 47,500 inhabitants, constantly losing ground to other expanding urban centers in the interior or to Lomé, barely a half-hour drive away. In 1972, for example, when Aného had less than today's population, it was Togo's fifth largest center, and in 1960—again with roughly the same population—it was Togo's second town after Lomé. Nevertheless, Aného remains one of Togo's intellectual centers, with a large percentage of the country's elite coming from families originating there.

Aného and the surrounding district are of great historic and **tourist** interest. Apart from the old colonial and precolonial relics in Aného proper and the town's delightful setting between the river and the ocean, the region boasts Porto Seguro on **Lac Togo** and the popular Le Lac hotel-restaurant. *See also* DA SOUZA, FRANCISCO FELIX.

ANIMISM. Animist beliefs are prevalent in Togo, with many people engaging in worship and cultural practices in line with polytheistic beliefs that have their roots in Togo's precolonial past. The number of adherents is difficult to calculate, as there are many different sects and practices tied to ethnic identity, and many **Christians** and some **Muslims** in Togo (as elsewhere in Africa) practice a blend of monotheistic and polytheistic beliefs in their daily lives and annual celebrations. The best estimates put the total of those

holding animist beliefs at around 37 percent of the population, the second largest group after Christians. Early missionary expeditions, including the **Moravian Brothers**, encountered animist beliefs among coastal populations, and northern Togolese groups including the **Kabyé** also regularly practice animism. See also FETISHISTS; TOGOVILLE; VODUN.

ANLO. Important **Ewe** clan residing along the coast between the Volta River (**Ghana**) and the Togo-Ghana border. Known to their neighbors as the Awuna, the Anlo trace their origins to the historic **Notsé** dispersal during which one of their chiefs, exhausted from the trek, could march no longer (“me nlo” = I am going to rest.) The clan’s capital is Anloga; they have attracted hostility and envy consequent to their prominent status among the other Ewe clans. Several Anlo Ewe were also prominent in the **All-Ewe Conference (AEC)** that collapsed because of anti-Anlo sentiments, which coalesced with residual resentments over the Anlo alliance with the Ashanti—perennial enemies of the Ewe—in the late 1800s, in opposition to the other Ewe clans.

ANNO (also, ANOUFOU). *See* CHOKOSSI.

ANTHONY, YAO SYLVANUS (1943–). Economist. Born in **Lomé** on 1 July 1943, Anthony was trained locally and at the University of Dijon (1963–1968) in development economics. He also obtained specialized training in **banking**. From 1969, he was credit director of the **Banque Togolaise de Développement (BTD)**, as well as served as trustee and government appointee on the board of several **parastatal** companies.

APALOO, JACQUES KOSSI. Fifth president of the **Supreme Court** of Togo, with a term beginning in 1991. Apaloo was a public prosecutor prior to serving on the court, and was a member of the **Parti Democratique de l’Unité (PDU)** party. His elevation was part of the political change of the early 1990s, but like many personnel of that era, he lasted less than two years in the post.

APEDO, EMMANUEL KOUAMI. Sixth president of the **Supreme Court**, serving 1993–1997, and moving to serve on the **Constitutional Court** afterward, as one of the justices named by the president.

APEDO-AMAH, AYAYI TOGOATA. Dramatologist. Born on 28 January 1952 and educated locally and abroad, Apedo-Amah specialized in fine arts (theater) in which he received his doctorate in 1979. He served between 1991 and 1993 on the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** and taught in the

Université du Benin (UB). He published multiple works including “Théâtres populaires en Afrique: l’exemple de la kantata et du concert-party togolaise: essai” and “Les trônes sacrés jumeaux: tragédie.”

APEDO-AMAH, GEORGES AMAKUÉ DOHUE (1914–1992). Former Speaker of Togo’s **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)**, ambassador to Nigeria, and minister of foreign affairs. Born to a prominent **Aného** family on 21 August 1914, Apedo-Amah was educated locally and abroad and joined the **French colonial administration** in the 1930s. He served in a variety of important positions including that of secretary to the French high commissioner in **Lomé**. In April 1946, he joined the pro-administration and conservative **Parti Togolais du Progrès (PTP)**, the party of **Nicolas Grunitzky** and Dr. **Pedro Olympio**, that was actively supported by the French administration. Following the establishment of the **Autonomous Republic of Togo**, Apedo-Amah was named councilor of **education**, youth, and sport and later minister of finance in Grunitzky’s 1956–1958 government. After the United Nations-supervised elections that turned out the Grunitzky regime and brought **Sylvanus Olympio** to power, Apedo-Amah left the country and worked first in France and then in Belgium with the **European Economic Community (EEC)**. He returned to Lomé after the **coup of 1963** to become foreign minister in Nicolas Grunitzky’s 1963–1967 government. His highly conservative policies proved to be unpopular among the urban population in the south, but Grunitzky was unwilling to lose his old ally and resisted efforts to displace Apedo-Amah. Rapidly, the latter came to be viewed as the epitome of the stolidness of the Grunitzky regime and one of the targets of both the November **1966 Lomé upheaval and attempted coup** and the **1967 military coup d’état**. After the 1967 coup, he lost his post and relocated to Côte d’Ivoire, where both he and Grunitzky had commercial interests. A few years after Grunitzky’s death in a car accident in Côte d’Ivoire, Apedo-Amah returned to Togo and in mid-1973 was appointed ambassador to Nigeria. After a number of other administrative appointments, he was elected deputy to the ANT II in the 1980 elections and Speaker of the House, posts he occupied until 1987.

APÉVON, DODJI PAUL. Lawyer and opposition party leader. He took over the leadership of the **Comité d’Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)** party after **Yao Agboyibo** stepped down in 2008. Apévon won an **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** seat in the **2007 election** and was reelected in the **2013 legislative election** under the CAR banner. He also helped to form **Coalition Arc-en-ciel** before splitting to form his own party, **Forces Démocratiques pour la République (FDR)**. The split developed in the aftermath of the **2015**

presidential election, and Apévon succeeded in taking dozens of CAR cadres with him in forming his new party. Apevon and the FDR were among the more visible party members of the **Coalition de 14 (C14)** from 2017.

AQUÉRÉBURU, SAMUEL (1905–1975). Educator, former cabinet minister, and former secretary general of the **Mouvement Populaire Togolais (MPT)**. Born in **Aného** on 17 October 1905, Aquéréburu was educated locally at **Benin**'s Ecole Victor Ballot and at the prestigious **École William Ponty** in Senegal. In 1930, he continued his **education** at the pedagogical academy of Aix-en-Provence, **France**, and returned to Togo where he worked as an educator and school inspector, eventually setting up his own school, of which he was principal until 1963. A founding member of the conservative, pro-French **Parti Togolais du Progrès (PTP)**, he was in the faction that rejected **Nicolas Grunitzky**'s leadership of the party and opted out in 1955 to form the MPT (under ousted leader Dr. **Pedro Olympio**) of which he became secretary general.

After **Sylvanus Olympio**'s assassination in 1963, Aquéréburu joined the four-cornered coalition of Nicolas Grunitzky and became MPT minister of labor, **transportation**, and the posts, a position he held until November 1966. Following the **1967 coup**, Aquéréburu retired from public life.

ARC-EN-CIEL. *See* COALITION ARC-EN-CIEL.

ARMED FORCES. *See* FORCES DES ARMÉES TOGOLAIS (FAT).

ASAFOHENE. Traditional nominal sovereign of the **Ewe dou**, who, together with the unit's **chiefs**, notables, and elders, possesses decision-making powers. The term comes from the Ashanti and means "military commander." In the absence of wide-scale wars among the Ewe, the Asafohene became territorial chiefs.

ASKY AIRLINES. Panafrikan airline based in **Lomé**; operated by Ethiopian Airlines. ASKY was created by a 2008 agreement of African states to fill the void left by the closing of Air Afrique, which had served as the main airline in the region until its 2002 bankruptcy. The airline's initial US\$ 120 million capital was 80 percent controlled by private investors and 20 percent by public financial institutions. As of 2016, ASKY had a fleet of eight planes with almost 900 seats, with flights to New York and Sao Paulo in addition to African capitals. As much as 60 percent of the passenger travel to and from Lomé's main **airport**, the Aeroport Internationale de Gnassingbé Eyadéma (AIGE) takes place on ASKY Airlines.

ASSEMBLÉE LEGISLATIVE DU TOGO (ALT). In 1955, a statute created the **Autonomous Republic of Togo**, changing the powers and name of the local assembly from **Assemblée Territoriale du Togo (ATT)** to **Assemblée Législative du Togo (ALT)**. The statute constituted a major deviation from **French** colonial and administrative precedent and gave the ALT much wider powers than then prevailing in the **Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF)** or **Afrique Équatoriale Française (AEF)** colonies. The two years of the Autonomous Republic and the ALT were marked by the executive and legislative control of **Nicolas Grunitzky**, who was strongly sustained in power by the local French administration. In 1958, power shifted dramatically to **Sylvanus Olympio** and his **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** party, and the assembly's name was changed to **Chambre de Députés**.

ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE (AN). Legislative branch of government, 1994–present. Togo's current legislative assembly, which emerged from the period of attempted democratic transition in hopes of balancing the power of the executive branch in Togo. Over the six National Assembly **elections** since 1994, the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party only lost the majority briefly in the first elections, and by dint of holding by-elections for a few key districts thanks to “irregularities,” the RPT was able to recapture control of the body against a divided opposition coalition. Since then, the RPT (later **Union Pour La République [UNIR]**) has dominated the body, sometimes earning a supermajority sufficient to **amend the constitution** on its own, and at other times recruiting help in this regard from smaller parties aligned with the ruling party, independents, or, after 2010, the former radical opposition party the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**. The **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** at first consisted of 81 members, and expanded to 91 members in 2013. Deputies serve five-year terms with no term limits, though the **constitutional amendments of 2019** changed the term to six years, with two-term limits. This change mirrors the term in office for senators according to the 2019 amendments; the 1992 constitution also provided for a **Senate**, but it has never been established, making Togo a de facto unicameral system, up to this point. Plans to install the Senate for the first time were underway, as of 2020.

From 1994 to 2007, the **electoral system** for legislative deputies consisted of 81 single-member districts and a two-round runoff **electoral system**. Because many candidates supported by the proliferation of **political parties** in the post-transition era might contest one seat, if no one candidate captured an absolute majority of the votes in the district, they would proceed to a runoff election with the second-place candidate. The runoff elections became far less relevant in the elections of 1999 and 2002, however, as the opposition boycotted both contests and the RPT would generally sweep elections in the

first round. The electoral system was changed as part of the **Accord Politique Global (APG)** agreement of 2006, and a system of proportional representation for deputies was introduced, with new electoral districts drawn and represented by two to four deputies each. The system might have appeared, at first, to favor opposition parties but in the end it did not because the very few seats in each district were allocated by a system of highest averages, meaning that many opposition votes were “wasted” on candidates who were not among the top vote-getters in the district. The UFC became the largest opposition party in the AN in 2007 under this system with 27 seats to the RPT’s 50, despite coming within 55,000 votes of the RPT’s total, nationwide. The distortions caused by this system are so stark that the government has stopped publishing detailed vote counts by district that highlight the discrepancy of how few votes can win a seat in sparsely populated areas that support President **Faure Gnassingbé**, versus how many it takes to win a seat in the densely populated areas that support his opponents. Expanding the size of the AN to 91 seats for the **2013 elections** and beyond did not resolve the problem, thanks to additional gerrymandering.

At times the RPT/UNIR-dominated AN has seemed more inclined to favor the status quo even than President Gnassingbé. Elections for the executive bureau of the AN, for example, were the subject of a “gentleman’s agreement” between Gnassingbé and **Gilchrist Olympio** in 2007, in which UFC candidates were scheduled to hold some important posts. When the time came, however, RPT deputies refused to honor the agreement, prompting the UFC candidates to withdraw, and a one-party executive of the AN was elected. In another case, in 2013, the AN accorded powers of censorship to the **Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication (HAAC)**, which oversees **media** activities in Togo, but parts of the law were actually overturned by the **Constitutional Court**, an organization not known as a staunch defender of individual freedoms. On the subject of **constitutional amendments**, the AN has accommodated Presidents **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and Gnassingbé by eliminating term limits on the presidency in 2002, facilitating Gnassingbé’s **succession in 2005**, and even by restoring term limits in 2019, but not retroactively. Few observers doubt that the AN will be willing to lift term limits yet again in ten years, if Faure Gnassingbé wishes to run for reelection again in 2030. The next AN (and Senate) elections are provisionally scheduled for December 2023, when the current five-year term of deputies will expire.

ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE DU TOGO (ANT), 1961–1967. The name of the legislative body established in April 1961 to replace the **Chambre de Députés** that functioned between 1958 and 1961 and had itself replaced

the previous **Assemblée Legislative du Togo (ALT)**. The ANT's membership was composed of 51 deputies, all supporters of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** of **Sylvanus Olympio** as a result of electoral manipulation and the intimidation of opposition parties. The president of the ANT was the old president of the *Chambre de Députés*, **Jonathan Savi de Tové**, with Fio Agbano II as vice president. The assembly was dissolved in the aftermath of the **1963 coup**, and the new assembly under **Nicolas Grunitzky's** leadership was composed of a four-cornered coalition of Togo's main parties (the **Parti de l'Unité Togolaise [PUT]**, **Juvento**, **Mouvement Populaire Togolais [MPT]**, and **Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais [UDPT]**), with each party having an equal number of deputies (14) under the presidency of **Barthelemy Lambony**. The assembly was dissolved following the **1967 coup d'état** of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, and new elections were promised for a new assembly. This promise was rescinded shortly thereafter, and Togo did not have a legislative body for 13 years, until the new **1980 Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)**. *See also* LISTE NATIONALE DE L'UNITÉ ET RECONCILIATION; POLITICAL PARTIES.

ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE DU TOGO (ANT II), 1980–1991. First national assembly of Togo after the **1967 coup d'état**. Installed on 13 January 1980, with 67 members elected on the single slate of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolaise (RPT)** party, the ANT II was convened for five years. Its first speaker (president) was **Georges Apedo-Amah**. New elections for an enlarged 77-seat assembly were held in 1985 and in 1990, during which time the presidents of the institution were **Valentin Vovor** (1985–1988) and **Messan Acouetey** (1988–1991). In 1991, the convening of a **National Conference** ushered in competitive multiparty politics and gave rise to the nonelected **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** that acted as interim legislature until a new **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** finally emerged after the much-postponed **legislative elections of February 1994**.

ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE SIÈGE. Togo's legislature, the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**, is currently housed in a new base (siège) in the north of **Lomé**, constructed by the **Chinese** and inaugurated in July 2018. The building cost an estimated 16.6 billion CFA, of which the Togolese state paid 5.2 billion. Critics of the cost and scale of the project noted that while the building contains many amenities, it provided microphones for 81 deputies, despite the fact that the AN had grown to 91 deputies five years earlier, in 2013.

ASSEMBLÉE REPRESENTATIVE DU TOGO (ART). Deliberative body established on 25 October 1946, with powers similar to those granted to

the Conseils Generaux set up by **France** in her African colonies. Composed of 30 members, six elected by the first electoral college and 24 by the second in the **double electoral college system**, the assembly had the authority to discuss taxation, customs duties, the organization of the public services, and similar matters. Meeting twice a year, the ART was highly politicized from the outset, with the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** of **Sylvanus Olympio** in a dominant position and with Olympio as its president. In 1952, the assembly's name was changed to **Assemblée Territoriale du Togo (ATT)**, and power shifted to **Nicolas Grunitzky**, who was strongly supported by the local French administration.

ASSEMBLÉE TERRITORIALE DU TOGO (ATT). Successor to the **Assemblée Représentative du Togo (ART)**, the Assemblée Territoriale du Togo was established in 1952 with enlarged powers and with delegates elected for the first time under a single electoral college. The enlarged electorate and active French support for northern and conservative political groupings shattered the former legislative supremacy of **Sylvanus Olympio** and his **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT) party**. In 1955, an **Autonomous Republic of Togo** was established and the ATT was transformed into the **Assemblée Législative du Togo (ALT)**. *See also* DOUBLE ELECTORAL COLLEGE.

ASSIGAMÉ. **Mina** name for **Lomé's** largest market, or Grand Marché, located in the Adawlato quartier of the capital, also referred to as Grand Marché d'Adawlato. Centrally located in Togo's capital, which is itself located along the busy east-west regional axis that includes other capital cities and trade hubs including Accra, Cotonou, and Lagos, Assigamé was for many years a vibrant location for trade and a prime shopping destination with stalls sprawling outward from the three-story concrete structure near the center. In the early years of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** regime, Togo's famous **Nana Benz** were dropped off at the market in their chauffeured Mercedes Benz cars to trade in colorful cloth (pagnes). With the downturn in the national economy in the 1980s and political liberalization of the 1990s, traders could no longer count on favorable import/export terms from government, and government could no longer count on their support. During periods of strikes or **street demonstrations**, few if any vendors would open their stalls, contributing to economic paralysis in the capital. Therefore, when the main market building caught fire in January 2013, rumors swirled as to whether supporters or opponents of the ruling **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party were behind it. Opponents of government were publicly accused of arson, though an official inquiry into the incident did not reach any definitive conclusion as to how and why the fire began. Though no one was killed,

more than 2,000 stalls were burned before the flames were doused, causing an estimated 6 billion FCFA in commercial losses. Though market activity has continued around the structure, reconstruction of a central market building (slated to begin in 2020) has likewise been plagued by suspicion that government will try to take control of market activity, or advance the interests of traders who are politically aligned with UNIR.

ASSIH, CAPTAIN AGOSSOYE. Former director of the **Gendarmerie Nationale** and the son of the **chief** of **Pya-bas**, the quarter in the northern village in which General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** was born. Assih was seen as ultra-loyal to Eyadéma and was rapidly promoted in the gendarmerie and was appointed colonel and head of the gendarmerie over the head of Major **Paul Comlan**. In early 1987, however, it was discovered that he was involved in the massive embezzlement at the **Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA)** for which he was reduced in rank to captain and dismissed from the gendarmerie in April 1987. His replacement was Major **Sizing Akawelou Walla**, General Eyadéma's brother-in-law. Assih was forced into exile but rumored to have never fully cut ties with the ruling family; he returned to Togo upon General Eyadéma's death in 2005.

ASSIH-AISSAH, ASHIRA (1952–). Ethnologist. Born in North Togo on 2 March 1952, Assih-Aissah was educated at home and abroad in ethnology. Between 1978 and 1986, she studied at the University of Bordeaux, where she obtained her doctorate. From 1987, she taught and researched at the **universities in Lomé and Kara**. She was appointed minister of social affairs for the promotion of **women** and protection of children between 1999 and 2002 (under Prime Ministers **Eugene Adoboli** and **Agbéyomé Kodjo**) and worked for the United Nations in Rome between 2003 and 2005. An orphan herself at age 11, she founded an organization in support of disadvantaged children, and has been internationally recognized for her work, including a National Merit award from the **French** government.

ASSILA, COLONEL DEDUM AYAОВI JAMES (1932–1982). Former chief of staff of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, member of the original "troika" that seized power in 1963, and former minister of interior. Born in **Notsé** in 1932 of **Ewe** origin, Assila joined the **French** armed forces in 1951, serving in Indochina (1954–1956) and Algeria (1956–1957). After military courses in France (until 1962), Assila was repatriated to Togo and was a member of the inner clique that sponsored the **1963 coup** that resulted in President **Sylvanus Olympio's** assassination. Promoted to captain in the aftermath of the coup, and to major in 1965, Assila was a key man in the

Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN) established in the aftermath of the **1967 coup**. Deputy chief of staff and commander of one of Togo's two infantry battalions, Assila was brought into General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** government as minister of interior, and in January 1970, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, becoming the second ranking officer in the Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT). Already suffering from a critical kidney ailment, Assila spent the next two years in a Paris sanatorium, though he was retained officially in both the government and army hierarchy. In February 1972, he was finally dropped from the government. Originally not expected to live much longer, Assila returned to Togo in 1972 (with a kidney machine) and slowly assumed his military (though not ministerial) duties. He was promoted and appointed chief of staff in 1975 but resigned from military duties in August 1980 due to inability to perform those duties. He died under mysterious conditions in 1982, according to some sources, poisoned on Eyadéma's orders.

ASSIMAIDOU, KOSSI. Government minister and International Monetary Fund (IMF) official. Assimaidou was tapped as minister of **tourism** and recreation in 2000 under Prime Minister **Agbéyomé Kodjo**, and briefly held the portfolio of minister of finance in 2002 in the government of **Koffi Sama**. After the death of Gnassingbé Eyadéma, he transitioned to IMF administrator in 2006–2014, before being awarded the Order of Mono and returning to Togo to advise the government. He served as minister delegate for development planning in successive governments in 2015 and 2016 under Prime Minister **Komi Klassou**, giving up his post and retiring in 2019.

ASSIMILATION POLICY. An underlying theoretical tenet of **French** colonial policy in Africa, which assumed the slow cultural assimilation of colonial populations. The status of *assimilé* (assimilated) or *evolué* (evolved) was granted to colonial subjects who acquired the accoutrements of French civilization—that is, **language**, dress, customs, **education**, **religion**,—or who had served with distinction either in the French colonial armies or in the colonial civil service. The status conferred the right to petition for French citizenship, a process so complex that in the entire **Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF)** only 2,000 Africans acquired it. Advantages of being classified as an *evolué* and attaining citizenship included voting rights, subjection to French civil and penal codes (instead of customary law), and freedom from the **indigénat** or **corvée labor**. The basic assumption of the assimilation policy was the unquestioned superiority of French culture and its suitability for all populations, an overt example of the racism and paternalism that characterized European colonialism. Over time, French colonial policy shifted to the concept of “association”—the development of close cultural, economic, and

political cooperation between France and her overseas territories. The assimilation policy was applied in Togo, as in France's other colonies in Africa, despite Togo's status as a trusteeship or **associated territory**.

ASSIMILÉ. *See* ASSIMILATION POLICY.

ASSOCIATED TERRITORY. Togo's status within the **French Union**, as specified in the French constitution of October 1946.

ASSOCIATION DE LA JEUNESSE MUSULMANE DU TOGO (AJMT). Precursor of the **Union Musulman du Togo (UMT)**. Formed in 1960 in **Lomé** by a very small number of individuals, many of whom were **Ewe** (among whom the **Muslim** faith is rare) and some **Yoruba** and **Kotokoli**. Among them were **Kassim Mensah** (Ewe), **Belly El Fouti** (a **Fulani** who was to become Togo's prime theologian), and **Fousseni Mama**. With the success of their efforts to expand the organizational base of Islam in Togo, the UMT was created to replace the AJMT.

ASSOCIATION DES CADRES MUSULMANS AU TOGO (ACMT). Created in 2006 as an alternative to the more pro-government **Union Musulmane du Togo (UMT)**. The ACMT is known to issue statements in favor of free and fair peaceful **elections** and express concern about disputed election results and possibility of election violence, while the UMT is more likely to echo the ruling party rhetoric. The ACMT nevertheless resists being an overtly political organization, and focuses instead on promoting the general interests of **Muslims** in Togo, resisting in particular any suggestion of ties to terrorist organizations. In 2019, **Issifou Abdoul Rafiou** became head of the organization for a four-year term, taking over for **Yaya Assadou Kolani**. Despite their differences, in April 2020, the ACMT and UMT joined together to support measures preventing the spread of the novel **coronavirus** that causes COVID-19, including closing the mosques and educating the populations on how best to mitigate the spread of the virus.

ASSOCIATION DES ÉLÈVES ET ÉTUDIANTS MUSULMANS AU TOGO (AEEMT). Reformist **student organization** founded in 1996 and based in **Lomé**, with membership open to any and all **Muslim** students living in Togo. In 2018, Bokoum Moubarak was elected head of the organization. Many in the leadership of the **Association des Cadres Musulmans au Togo (ACMT)** first belonged to the AEEMT, especially those where students at the **Université de Lomé (UL)**.

ASSOCIATION POUR LA PROMOTION DE L'ETAT DE DROIT.

Pressure group, linked with various international civil rights movements, set up in 1991 by the lawyer **Djovi Gally** to promote civil and **human rights** in Togo.

ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONELLE DES REVENDEUSES DE TISSUS (APRT).

Important organization of **women** cloth vendors, especially those who trade in **Lomé's Assigamé** market, founded in 1965 and still active. The early membership was dominated by the so-called **Nana Benz** traders, who banded together to better negotiate favorable terms of trade with government officials. The group experienced a boon after the **1967 coup d'état** and the installation of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, who supported the group's aims and earned their support in the early days of his regime. Many members of the early APRT went on to be core members of the women's wing of the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party, known as the **Union Nationale des Femmes du Togo (UNFT)**, founded in 1972. With the economic troubles of the 1980s and the decline of RPT popularity, the APRT lost clout, and though represented at the **National Conference** in 1991, moved away from close political ties with the ruling party and focused on professional activities instead.

ASSOR, MAURICE. Former highly influential business consultant and financial manager to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Of Moroccan origin but living in Paris where he had a major trading empire, Assor was the middleman in all trade instructions with Togo until 1990, due to his personal connection to Eyadéma. He was sought out by foreign businessmen for his ability to smooth out any problems and secure the necessary permits (from Paris, and in exchange for a kickback). Assor also had an unofficial monopoly over all Togolese imports and most non-ore exports. He was Togo's purchasing agent in Paris (in particular for the **Société Nationale de Commerce [SONACOM]**) and marketing agent for the **Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT)** and the **Office Togolais des Phosphates (OTP)**. He was the intermediary for many loans granted to Togo and handled Eyadéma's growing business investments, helping him spirit some 80 billion CFA francs out of the country. Assor's Paris organization was known as the **Groupe Assor**. With the opening up of political space in 1990, Assor's name was increasingly mentioned in the **National Conference** in connection with Eyadéma's shady deals and governmental corruption, and in March 1991 he fled the country, severing his link with Togo and Eyadéma.

ASSOUMA, ABDOUDOU. Former government minister and head of the **Constitutional Court**. One of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s closest associates, Assouma's appointment as **transitional** minister of defense was virtually forced upon hapless Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** on 30 December 1991 after the incidents between the government and the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** members still loyal to Eyadéma. At the time it was rationalized that having the defense portfolio controlled by "one of their own" would keep the military in check. In fact, Assouma very much acted to camouflage what was transpiring in the armed forces and to deflect criticisms against them. He was summarily dropped from his post in June 1992, when he left a cabinet meeting gruffly, having just criticized the FAT and Eyadéma for the attempted assassination of **Gilchrist Olympio**. He was retained as an Eyadéma assistant in the Presidential office until his nomination to the **Supreme Court**. From 2007, he took over the leadership of the **Constitutional Court**, and was renewed in that post as of 2019.

ATAKPAH, OGUKE (1914–1976). Former bishop of **Atakpamé** who attained a measure of notoriety by speaking out against President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s economic policies and the mismanagement of the **parastatal** sector. Equating nationalization (especially of the state **mining** company, **Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin [COTOMIB]**) with theft and rejecting as quasi-sacrilege the **authenticity** policy of doing away with **Christian** given names, Atakpah brought the wrath of the regime upon himself. Despite the fact that he came from the important **Yoruba** chiefly lineage that founded Atakpamé, Atakpah was arrested and removed from office—a fact that the church reluctantly had to accept.

ATAKPAMÉ. Important town in the **Plateaux** region originally settled by **Ewe** elements—still found in the Voudun quarter—in the 19th century and by a **Yoruba** clan that was chased there a few years later by **Dahomean** forces. (The town is named after the leader of the clan, Chief Atakpa.) The settlement rapidly grew as a commercial center as it straddled the traditional trade route from **Aného** to Paratao (the **Kotokoli** capital) that linked up in **Sokodé** with the east-west caravans connecting Salaga with Gomba Territory. *See* CARAVAN ROUTES.

Renowned also as a **refugee** town and a hotbed of anti-Dahomean sentiments, Atakpamé suffered from periodic heavy Dahomean assaults in the **Atakpamé Wars**. During the colonial era, the region witnessed a major immigration of **Kabyé** peasants from the north, encouraged by the **French administration**. Currently the town of Atakpamé is a vibrant center of 80,000 people and thus Togo's fourth-largest urban concentration, after **Lomé**,

Sokodé, and **Kpalimé**. The administrative capital of the relatively prosperous Plateaux region, Atakpamé is connected with the south by paved roads and formerly by the **railroad** (at the Agbonou juncture).

Near Atakpamé are such centers as **Blitta** (a truck transshipment center for the north-south axis and site of a planned 30MW solar power plant announced in 2019 and supported by the World Bank), Dadja (where the **Industrie Textile Togolaise [ITT]** factory is located), and Anié (from 2010 site of a **Chinese**-backed sugar production complex).

ATAKPAMÉ WARS. Series of assaults against the town and region of **Atakpamé** by invading armies from the kingdom of **Dahomey** to the east. The first major attack took place during the reign of Dahomey's King Adandozan (1797–1818) and was repulsed. The second attack, under King Ghezo, was spearheaded by Dahomey's dreaded Amazon units and resulted in the total destruction of Atakpamé (1840) and the dispersal of its population. Populated by refugees from Dahomey (**Yoruba**, **Adja**, Mahi, Fon, etc.) who made the town a hotbed of anti-Dahomean rebellion, Atakpamé was again invaded during the reign of King Glélé (1859–1889), when some of the biggest assaults took place (in 1860, 1877, and 1880). In the latter instance, the town was again completely razed prior to the withdrawal of Dahomean troops. *See also* BENIN, RELATIONS WITH.

ATAYI, SOLOMON (1891–1970). Educator, former cabinet minister and secretary general of the **Mouvement Populaire Togolaise (MPT)**. Born in **Aného** on 12 February 1891, Atayi was educated locally and in Dakar, Senegal (1910–1913). He worked most of his life as a teacher, first in **Benin** (Porto Novo, Ouidah, Save, Abomey, Ketou, and Djougou) and then in Togo in **Sokodé**, **Kpalimé** and **Lomé** (1920–1951). A member of the conservative **Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP)** founded by **Nicolas Grunitzky** and Dr. **Pedro Olympio**, Atayi joined Dr. Olympio when the latter was expelled from the PTP in 1955, and helped set up the new MPT party of which he became secretary general. Following the **1963 coup d'état**, Atayi joined President Grunitzky's four-cornered coalition and became MPT minister of rural economy (January–May 1963) and later minister of information (1963–1966). After being dropped from the cabinet late in 1966, Atayi went into retirement.

ATCHA-DEDJI, AFFOH (1959–). Former head of **Togocel**, government minister. Born in Kri-Kri in the **Centrale** region of Togo in 1959, Atcha-Dedji was trained in management and earned advanced degrees at the **Université du Benin** (now **Université de Lomé**), and later in Poitiers, France.

Atcha-Dedji joined the **Office des Postes et Télécommunications du Togo (OPTT)** in 1994, just prior to structural changes in the state's management of fixed and mobile telecommunications. He became director general of Togocel in 2008, and head of **Togocom** when that entity was formed by the merger of Togocel with **Togo Telecom** in 2018. Also vice president of the **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party, Atcha-Dedji was named minister of primary and secondary **education** in December 2019, after the government sold a 51 percent stake in Togocom to a **private** company, naming a new director general.

ATCHADAM, TIKPI (1967–). Head of the **Panafrican National Party (PNP)**. Born in Kparato in 1967 and trained as a lawyer, Atchadam served as secretary general of the prefecture of Tchaoudjo 1995–1996 under President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, then was a member of the **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)** in the early 2000s. After working internationally later in the decade, including for CARE International, Atchadam formed the PNP in April 2014 to oppose the system in place, which he says is not representative of the Togolese people. Using primarily the message service WhatsApp, he proved to be a remarkably effective mobilizer by rallying thousands to protest in multiple cities in Togo in August 2017. Supported by many young people in the Togolese **Muslim** community in and around **Sokodé**, he has cultivated an air of mystery by living abroad and taking strategic breaks from communication with supporters. However, President **Faure Gnassingbé's** government has sought to cast doubt on his motives (and win international support for their crackdown on his supporters) by suggesting foreign, and even terrorist, financing for his operations. His party announced a boycott of the 2018 **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** elections alongside the rest of the opposition, but was the only major party to boycott **2019's municipal elections**.

ATIKPO, YAO TETE SAMUEL MAWUSSEY. Leader of the small post-1991 Parti Sociale-Libérale du Togo (SOLITO) political party and minister of equipment and **mines**. Atikpo joined the third **transitional government**, a coalition with General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party, on 14 September 1992 and was retained in the same ministry on 14 February 1993.

ATIPEDÉ, MARC (1912–1970). Physician, politician, and former critic of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** regime. Born in Kpadape on 12 March 1912, Atipedé was educated locally and at the prestigious **École William Ponty** in Dakar, following which he completed medical studies at Dakar's School of Medicine. A popular doctor in the south, Atipedé joined **Sylvanus**

Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT) party and in 1961 was elected to the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)** from the Kluoto (later **Kloto**) region. Following the assassination of Olympio, Atipedé withdrew from political life. In August 1970, he was arrested for alleged complicity in a **coup attempt** against President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, his death while in prison was announced shortly after. It was widely assumed in **Lomé** at the time, and confirmed in 1990, that his death had not been due to natural causes.

ATIVON, KODJO LOL (1944–). Rural water resources administrator. Born in **Aného** in 1944 and educated in water engineering in France, Ativon worked for several years (1975–1977) with the Department of Hydrology and Energy in **Lomé**, and was head of its southern subdivision, before moving to Burkina Faso where he served as Head of the Department of Urban Water Services. He was also dispatched on consultantships to several other African states, notably to Mali, **Benin**, Côte d'Ivoire, and Congo.

ATOHOUN, CELESTIN. Prominent southern politician. Atohoun served during the **Sylvanus Olympio** years as the powerful director of the cabinet of the minister of labor and civil service. Shunted aside during the **Nicolas Grunitzky** era, he was one of a number of southern leaders who strenuously opposed the **1967 takeover** by **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, and he was arrested after the **coup**. Released only two years later in 1970, Atohoun made his peace with the regime and was retained in the civil service until his retirement.

ATSOU, JULIEN. Young poet-playwright, widely acclaimed for his first two works: *Agakoli: Cruoute'ou Devoir* (questioning the negative image of King **Agokoli**) and *L'Abomination de la Desolation*.

ATTI, ABI. Commander of the **gendarmérie** and compatriot of **Kpatcha Gnassingbé**, Atti was implicated in the **coup attempt of 2009** and sentenced to 20 years in prison.

ATTIGNON, HERMANN (1933–2003). Educator and administrator. Born in 1933 in the **Aného** region and educated locally and abroad, Attignon was a longtime instructor of geography and history at **Lomé's** Tokoin Lycée. Highly recognized author of several standard texts on Togolese history and geography as well as numerous articles. One-time secretary general of the ministry of national **education**, he served as director of the Bilingual Multinational Training Institute at the **Village du Benin** in Lomé. He retired in the 1990s.

AUTHENTICITY. A series of policies aimed at the indigenization of Togo's social, cultural, and economic life. Cautiously introduced in 1972 and codified in 1974 as official policy by the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. Influenced by Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, the policy included the renaming of streets and towns (e.g., Anécho to **Aného**), the declaration of new national holidays (Journée Commemorative des Martyrs de **Pya**), marginally more nationalist economic and foreign policies, and the rejection of **Christian** first names in favor of indigenous ones. The policy was implemented remarkably smoothly and was quite popular with most elements of the educated elites (the prime target, after all, of the "indigenization" of names). There were clashes, however, quite sharp, with the **Catholic Church** that chose to regard as quasi-sacrilege the de-Christianization of given names. In recent decades, a greater global sensitivity to anti-colonial sentiments has helped to standardize name changes in reference works and maps of Togo, though in some cases common usage still differs from the official record. *See also* PERSONALITY CULT.

AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF TOGO. The two-year period (1956–1958) of full internal autonomy of the administration of **Nicolas Grunitzky**. The Autonomous Republic was declared following the **referendum of 1956** boycotted by the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** of **Sylvanus Olympio** and resulted in the dominance of Olympio's rival Grunitzky, who had been strongly supported by the **French administration**. At the time, none of France's colonial territories possessed the internal autonomy and legislative powers granted to Togo.

AVETONOU. Experimental **German-Togolese** breeding cooperative center established in 1964 and covering some 682 hectares of land, most of which is pasture. Research on cattle, goats, and sheep by the Centre de Recherche et d'Élevage Avetonou (CREAT) was featured in a number of international publications in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The town of Avenonou is some 100 kilometers from **Lomé**, in the northern part of the **Maritime** region.

AWESSO, ALPHONSE (1937–). Journalist. Born in 1937 in Bohou, Awesso was educated at home and in Lille, **France**, where he studied journalism. Upon his return to Togo, he worked as a teacher, journalist, and consultant to the ministry of information. In July 1967, he was appointed director of information, reverting to his previous consultantship duties and journalism in 1974.

AWUME, PASTOR AGBI. Pastor of the **Église Évangélique Presbytérienne Du Togo (EEPT)**, elected as its new moderator in 1990 but denied the

post by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** who forced the election of his own brother-in-law. *See* TOULÉASSI, KOKOU.

AWUNA. *See* ANLO.

AWUTÉ, DODZI KWASI PASCAL (1937–). **Agricultural** engineer. Born on 16 May 1937, in **Kpalimé**, Awuté was educated at home and then proceeded to **France** to continue his higher **education**. In 1963, he was also at Utah State University, University of Wisconsin, and the University of Puerto Rico, returning to Montpellier and Toulouse for the conclusion of his studies. On his return to Togo he assumed a variety of key posts including director of the East **Mono** modernization project (1962–1963), and head of the **Lama Kara** Agricultural District (1964–1965). In April 1967, he was appointed deputy director of Togo's Agricultural Services in **Lomé**, and in 1970 he was appointed director of studies at the National School of Agriculture at Tore Kpalimé. From 1975, he was director of the Agronomic Research Center at Lomé.

AYAKOU, MAJOR MADJI KODJO. **Gendarmerie** officer and former prefect of **Tchamba**. Following the series of **bomb explosions in Lomé** in August–September 1985, Ayakou was appointed head of the **gendarmerie**.

AYASSOR, ADJI OTÈTH. Longtime minister of economy and finance. Ayassor earned a public law degree from the University of Bordeaux and was trained in conflict resolution at the University of Wisconsin and in law from Harvard University. He was serving as President **Faure Gnassingbé's** chief of staff in 2007 when he was unexpectedly elevated to the position of minister of finance, budget and privatization in the government of **Komlan Mally**. He held the post—under various titles—in governments between 2007 and 2016, overseeing the cancellation of large percentages of Togo's debt and bringing greater discipline to state finances. This did not always make him popular with fellow cabinet ministers, including minister of public works **Tchamja Andjo**, and their clashes were reported in the Togolese press. By 2015, it was rumored that Ayassor was on his way out—with opposition outlets speculating that he had unduly profited from his post—and in 2016 one of his two delegate ministers, Sani Yaya, replaced him. He thereafter went on to serve as interim director general of the Société Africaine des Biocarburants et des Énergies Renouvelables (Saber), a regional organization promoting renewable energy sources among the 15 member states.

AYÉVA, DERMAN. Health official and former **Kotokoli** political leader. Born in **Sokodé** to a branch of the royal family (and brother of **Uro Issifou**

Ayéva, superior chief of the Sokodé Kotokoli), Ayéva worked as a health official in the north before entering politics. A founding member of the northern **Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN)**, he was instrumental in organizing the superior **chiefs** and notables in central and northern Togo against the predominance of coastal political parties and politicians in local political life. Elected deputy to the **Assemblée Territoriale du Togo (ATT)**, Ayéva became president of the ATT after the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** boycott of the 1952 elections. He made a tactical alliance with the conservative pro-administration **Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP)** and sided with **Nicolas Grunitzky** at the time of the internal PTP schism that led to the establishment of the **Mouvement Populaire Togolais (MPT)** in 1955. Following the CUT's rise to power in 1958, Ayéva's fortunes declined and his party crumbled. In 1961, a one-party system was established and all opposition parties were banned. Ayéva made a brief comeback following the **1963 coup d'état** but was not a key figure in Togolese politics afterward. He retired to Sokodé.

AYÉVA, ISSIFOU, URO OF THE KOTOKOLI (1904–1980). One of the longest-serving leaders of the **Kotokoli**. Appointed **Uro** in 1949 despite his origins from Koma and not Paratao, the traditional village from which Kotokoli Uro are chosen. Well-versed in **French** and a **transporter** by occupation, Ayéva's brother **Derman Ayéva** had been president of the **Assemblée Territoriale du Togo (ATT)**. His time as Uro was volatile, and he was exiled 1959–1963, before returning and serving as Uro a second time 1963–1980, until his death.

AYÉVA, ZAKARI. One of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** last ministers prior to the liberalizations of 1991. A member of the **Sokodé** royal family, Ayéva joined Eyadéma's cabinet in 1988 as minister of telecommunications, leaving it in February 1990.

AYÉVA, ZARIFOU (1942–). Economist, former cabinet minister and political leader of the **Kotokoli**. Born in **Sokodé** in 1942, of the Kotokoli royal family as his name attests, Ayéva was educated locally and in **Atakpamé** before proceeding to Mons (Belgium) to study economics. He majored in industrial economics and returned to Togo in 1969. He originally joined a private company (Société Générale du Golfe du Guinée) as sales manager and director of accounting and in 1975 moved to head the **parastatal** steel company **Société Nationale de Sidérurgie (SNS)** as deputy director general. From this post, he rapidly moved into the cabinet as minister of commerce and **transport** (January 1978). He was shifted to head the ministry of

Information in November 1978 and dropped from the cabinet altogether in March 1979, allegedly on the grounds of excess corruption. With the onset of multipartyism in 1991, Ayéva founded his own party. Because of his “deserting” Eyadéma after for so long benefiting from high office under him, one of his houses in Sokodé was destroyed on 9 January 1992, by members of the **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)**. A member of the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** between 1991 and 1993, in late 1993 his **Alliance des Démocrates pour le Renouveau (ADR)** joined with two other parties to form the **Groupe Sociale Panafricain (GSP)** to boycott the elections. He ran for **president in 1998** and earned 3 percent of the national vote. He served as minister of state for foreign affairs and African Integration from 2005 to 2007 in the unity government formed with **Edem Kodjo** as prime minister. Declining health and the declining fortunes of his party have sidelined Ayéva in recent years.

AYIGBE. Pejorative term used in **Ghana** and among non-**Ewe** elements to refer to the Ewe, **Mina**, and **Fon**. The term translates as “Ayi refused” and refers to leaders of the **Ga** and **Ané** clans—who founded **Glidji** and **Aného**—who refused to return a stool (symbol of authority) that they brought with them (stole?) from the Accra region in the late 17th century at the time of the establishment of the two Togolese centers. The stool was for many years jealously guarded in a hut near Glidji.

AYIVOR, SIMON. Former director of **tourism**. A top administrator of the **Société Togolaise de l’Hôtellerie (STH)**, Ayivor was selected to head the Division of Tourism in 1972, a post with a very high turnover. A year later, in October 1972, he too was arrested and sentenced to eight years in prison for corruption and mismanagement. He was paroled before the end of his term and then moved onto private commercial activities.

AYIZAN. The bean festival among the **Ewe** of the **Tsévié** area, celebrating the harvest in August.

AYOKO, REBECCA. Former model. Born to Togolese parents in Agogo, **Ghana**, she moved to **France** in 1980. Once discovered, she joined the Glamor Model Agency and became one of the first black models to walk the catwalk. She published an autobiography, *Quand les étoiles deviennent noires*, in 2012.

B

BABA, BAMOUNI SOMOLOU STANISLAS. Leader of the **Alliance de Démocrates pour le Renouveau (ADR)** party. Stanislas joined the third **transition government** of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** in September 1992 as minister of technical **education** and professional training and was retained in the same spot in the fourth interim cabinet of 1993.

BADOU. Important **Kotokoli** commercial center, 80 kilometers west of **Atakpamé** near the **Ghana** border and home to some 24,000 farmers and traders. Situated in a **coffee/cocoa** growing region, it is also a major center of **smuggling** of produce from **Ghana** into Togo, with a very large nonindigenous resident trading minority established to cater to the needs of smugglers. The nearby Aklowa waterfalls have brought to Badou a measure of **tourist** traffic as well.

BAFILO. **Kotokoli** town of 22,000 people in the mountainous region of northern Togo, 53 kilometers from **Sokodé**, and a center of important weaving of kente cloth on handcarved looms. The town's name comes from the European corruption of K'Gbafoulou, the name of a **fetishist**, and was founded three centuries ago at the time of religious wars along the border with Burkina Faso and the arrival into Togo of the Temba. The town was annually raided toward the end of the 18th century by **Chokossi** armies.

BAGNAH, OGAMO JOSEPH. Former cabinet minister. A civil administrator by profession, Bagnah served in a variety of senior positions until 1973. In September of that year, he was brought into **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cabinet as minister of interior. Though highly regarded prior to his appointment, he did not survive long in that key post and was shunted aside to head the ministry of rural development in March 1975. Appointed director general of the **Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT)** in 1977, he was also shifted to head the new ministry of state-run companies. The new post was created consequent to increasing concern about the huge deficits piled up by

potentially profitable **state sector** entities. Bagnah's views on how to solve the problem clashed, however, with vested interests in the regime, and those of Eyadéma, and he was eased out of the cabinet via a terminal two-year appointment as minister of **tourism** in March 1980. He was reassigned to the ministry of interior as senior technical consultant in September 1982, a sinecure post.

BAHRI, MOHAMMED. Tunisian national, intermittently resident in **Lomé**, and until 1990 the de facto intermediary between the government of Togo (and General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** specifically) and Arab risk capital in the Gulf area. He was instrumental in bringing Arab money into the Togolese economy.

BAKOBOSSE, NORBERT. A **gendarme**, relative of **Major Emmanuel Bodjollé**, who attained notoriety on 24 April 1967, when his shot at General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** from point-blank range was deflected by a notebook in the latter's shirt pocket. The attempted assassination was part of the Bodjollé-Eyadéma tug-of-war of the early years of military rule in Togo. Sentenced to death, Bakobosso was paroled a few years later.

BALA, ISSIFU EL HADJ. Important trader in the northern town of **Dapa-ong**. A devout **Muslim** who made the pilgrimage to Mecca in the 1950s, Bala is of **Hausa** origins. Born locally, he utilized his ethnic contacts to establish a commercial network reaching into neighboring **Benin**, **Ghana**, and Burkina Faso. He owned a small fleet of trucks serving the entire north and one of the two oil stations in town.

BANKS. Until the pro-democracy disturbances of 1990 and the violence and political and economic decay attending General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s refusal to sanction his eclipse, Togo had developed into a budding regional banking center, as especially attested to by the 1988 opening in **Lomé** of the Head Office of the **ECOBank**, now the largest commercial bank in the region. By the 2000s, the economic situation had restabilized, and the quest to reestablish Togo as a financial hub resumed, but many of the banks were carrying heavy loads of debt, much of it lent to the public sector. With the endorsement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Togolese government bought up many loans and sought to restructure and further **privatize** banks. By 2017, this restructuring was to be completed by merging the **Union Togolese du Banque (UTB)** and the **Banque Togolaise pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (BTIC)**, which had failed to find buyers. However, in 2018,

the merger was suspended and the banks continued to operate independently amid ongoing negotiations with the IMF about their fate.

Bank buildings in Togo—as with other parts of Africa—are often some of the tallest in town, and strive for a unique African architecture, such as the curved **Banque d'Investissement et de Développement de la CEDEAO (BIDC)** headquarters in Lomé with an inverted arch and a distinctive golden dome. In addition to those banks mentioned here, others that currently operate in Togo include the head office of the Union économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), as well as the **Société Interafricaine de Banque (SIAB)**, **Banque Centrale des Etats De l'Afrique De l'Ouest (BCEAO)**, **Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique du Togo (BIA Togo)**, and the **Banque Togolaise de Développement (BTD)**.

BANQUE ARABE-LIBYENNE TOGOLAISE DU COMMERCE EXTERIEUR (BALTEX). See SOCIÉTÉ INTERAFRICAIN DE BANQUE (SIAB).

BANQUE CENTRALE DES ETATS DE L'AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST (BCEAO). Francophone Africa's central **bank** for the former **Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF)** colonies and Togo. (There is a separate structure for French Equatorial Africa and Cameroon, formerly the **Afrique Équatoriale Française [AEF]**.) The bank has branches in all member states and was established in its current form in 1958. The BCEAO had its headquarters in Paris, though in response to African pressures (spearheaded inter alia by Togo), it relocated to Dakar, Senegal, late in 1974.

BANQUE D'INVESTISSEMENT ET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE LA CEDEAO (BIDC). Brought on line in 2007, the BIDC was envisioned in 1999 to replace the former Fonds de Cooperation. The financial arm of the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**, the **bank** supports projects across the region in member countries, and the curved design of the headquarters in **Lomé** is one of the more striking architectural features of the city.

BANQUE INTERNATIONALE POUR L'AFRIQUE AU TOGO (BIA TOGO). The oldest financial institution in Togo, tracing its history back to colonial times and the Bank of West Africa (BAO). Later known as **Banque Internationale de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BIAO)**, part of a **French** network, but the company let go of their holdings in Africa in 1991. The formerly BIAO-Togo integrated with the Meridien group to form the popularly called

“Meridien-BIAO.” The Meridien group owned 60 percent of equity and private Togolese interests 40 percent. In 2013, the Moroccan Attijariwafa Bank acquired a controlling 55 percent share of the bank from the Togolese government as part of the drive to **privatize** the **banking** sector.

BANQUE TOGOLAISE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT (BTD). State **bank** created on 12 December 1966, to succeed the former **Credit du Togo** that had been in existence since 1957. The earlier bank’s **agricultural** loan operations (which constituted the bulk of its activities) were transferred to the newly created **Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA)**, while the BTD was charged with the development and encouragement of small- and medium-size enterprises of a nonagricultural nature through the grant of low interest loans. The BTD was set up with 400 million CFA francs (later increased to 1,000 million) of capital under the directorship of Sandani Bawa Mankoubi. By September 1990, the total amount of loans made was just over two billion CFA francs. The state’s original 60 percent share of equity was spread across several other banks including the **Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO)** and Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD). In 2012, it was sold to Ora Group as part of the 2008 drive to **privatize** and realign the commercial banking sector.

BANQUE TOGOLAISE POUR LE COMMERCE ET L’INDUSTRIE (BTCD). Commercial **bank** set up with Togolese state capital in 1974. Capitalized at 450 million CFA francs and with headquarters in **Lomé**, the government’s original 35 percent share in its operations was later passed on to **parastatals** such as the **Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT)**, the **Office Togolais des Phosphates (OTP)**, the **Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS)**, and **Société Nationale d’Investissement et Fond Annexes du Togo (SNIT)**. Offered for **privatization** as one of the undercapitalized banks targeted in the 2008 International Monetary Fund (IMF) restructuring, it found no buyer and was slated to merge with the **Union Togolaise de Banque (UTB)** in 2017 to address the debt problems of both. However, the merger was put on hold in late 2018 and the bank continued to operate independently while negotiations with the IMF continued.

BARIBA. Northern ethnic group found predominantly in **Benin**, elements of which also reside in Togo. The remnants of a cavalry expeditionary force sent from Kouande and Nikki (in Benin) in the 19th century, Togo’s Bariba are found mostly in the Cambole (**Dapaong**) area.

BARANDO, JEAN-MARIE (1937–). Diplomat. Born in 1937 in Siou-Birou, Namtougou, and educated in **Benin** (at the Ouidah Seminary) and

Togo, Barando joined the Togolese Statistical Office in 1962. With the rise of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime in 1967, Barando's fortunes suddenly improved. He was appointed interim director of the ministry of finance cabinet and between 1967 and 1969 served as prefect of **Bafilo** and **Aného**. In 1969, he was appointed ambassador to **France**, returning to Togo in 1974 to finish his career in the civil administration.

BARNABO, NANGBOB RAPHAEL (1943–). Until the 1990 upheavals, secretary general of Togo's **trade union** movement, the **Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo (CNTT)**, and vice president of the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)**. Born in Nano on 20 April 1943, Barnabo worked as a **bank** clerk while improving his **education**. Already an energetic young trade union leader, he was nominated in 1968 to represent labor on the **Conseil Economique et Social (CES)**. In 1973, he was President Eyadéma's choice to head the newly formed CNTT, the national trade union. Signifying satisfaction with his able leadership in keeping Togo's labor under tight control, Barnabo—a member of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) Lomé** Committee—was nominated as the party's choice for one of the Lomé seats at the 1979 national **elections** for the legislature, was reelected in the subsequent elections to chair two of the ANT II's committees, and was elected vice president of the body. In December 1988, it came to light that he had been receiving two salaries all along, one from the **Union Togolaise de Banque (UTB)**, eroding his hold over the rank-and-file unionists.

BARQUÉ, BARRY-MOUSSA. Former minister. Long the able manager of the **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)**, Barqué was appointed minister of public works, mines, and energy in March 1979. A **Kotokoli Muslim**, he joined the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** Politburo a few years later. Barqué remained in these posts until the 1990 liberalizations, steadily acquiring power and influence. By the early 1980s, he was widely regarded as the "brains" behind the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** presidency. With power came temptation, and at the time of the 1991 **National Conference**, he was implicated in massive corruption scandals in his ministry. Notwithstanding this, he served as president of the **Société Interafricaine de Banques (SIAB)**, and periodically as special advisor to Presidents **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and **Faure Gnassingbé** since the 1990s. He was minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation from 1995 to 1996 and minister of state for finance and **privatization** from 1996 to 1999 in the government of **Kwassi Klutsé**. As a member of the "old guard" of the RPT, Barqué advocated for Gnassingbé as his father's successor in the presidency in 2005, and remains a sometime counselor to the president.

BASSAR. The former circonscription of Bassari, until 1981 part of the **Centrale** region, now one of the prefectures in the region of **Kara**. The prefecture remains headquartered in the town of Bassar (ex Bassari). It was in this district that new **phosphate** reserves were discovered in 1983, and it is also celebrated for its yams and for the history of metalworking, still visible in the earthen forges around town. *See also* BASSARI.

BASSARI. Ethnic group found mostly northwest of **Sokodé** and in neighboring **Ghana**. Also, name of a town and a district formerly in the **Centrale** region. The Bassari inhabit the area around Mount Bassari and get their name from the deity Bassar that resides on the mountain. Some of the population also calls itself Bi-Tchambe (“the metal-workers”), though this is an example of identification with their prime occupation in the precolonial era. (They are often lumped together with **Chamba** and are not to be confused with similarly named groups in Cameroon, nor with the Bassari along the Guinea-Senegal border.) The Bassari speak a **language** which, together with **Konkomba**, **Moba**, and **Gurma**, is grouped in the paragurma language family. In their villages live large numbers of assimilated non-Bassari elements, especially Guang, **Mossi**, and **Gurma**, as well as Ashanti. Historically, they did not have a centralized state or internal cohesion, if only because of their intense heterogeneity. In the precolonial era, the Bassari were renowned metallurgists, and both their weapons and their alliance were highly prized. The Bassari suffered from repeated Dagomba attacks late in the 19th century, the last one occurring in 1873. Many escaped from Ghana into Togo to avoid these persecutions. The colonial intrusion broke the Bassari’s quasi-monopoly over metallurgy, forcing them to shift to **agricultural** work on their poor soils or to join the **German** police force.

The town of Bassari (in 1981 renamed Bassar) is 61 kilometers from Sokodé and is the main Bassari concentration. It has grown since the 1990s to become Togo’s sixth largest town. Its estimated population is subject to controversy, with numbers as high as 60,000 being cited.

BATA-TOGO. One of a series of shoe factories found throughout Africa. Capitalized with 180 million Communaute Financière Africaine francs (CFAF), of which 25 percent is state money and the rest from the BATA parent group, the company was active in **Lomé** from 1968. Employing over 120 workers, the general prosperity of Togo in the 1970s boosted sales to 1.1 million pairs of shoes in 1978, worth 938 million CFAF. The company had the capacity of producing 1,000 pairs daily and with modest adjustments, up to 6,000 daily—much more than the Togolese economy could ever absorb. In the 1980s, reflecting Togo’s moribund economy, the company encountered a decline in sales and closed down.

BATAMMARIBA. *See* TAMBERMA; SOMBA.

BAWARA, GILBERT BADIJLEMBAYENA (1968–). Government minister and spokesperson. Born in Siou in the north of Togo, Bawara was educated in Switzerland in law and diplomacy. From 1994, he worked for the United Nations in Geneva, supporting **human rights** missions in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Barawa was among the technocrats who returned to Togo shortly after President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s death and began working in President **Faure Gnassingbé**'s administrations. He began as minister delegate in the ministry of foreign affairs in 2005, before moving to minister of cooperation in 2006 with an expanded portfolio to include development and territorial administration 2007–2010. He became special counselor to President Gnassingbé 2010–2012, then taking on the role of minister of territorial administration and **decentralization** 2012–2015 in the government of **Kwesi Ahoomey-Zunu**, and most recently minister of public works from 2015 under Prime Minister **Komi Klassou**. Because of his experience and close ties to the president, he serves as government spokesperson and fierce defender of the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)/Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party, including famously calling the **street demonstrations of 2017–2018** against the regime a “campaign of terror.”

BE (Ewe clan). *See* NOTSÉ.

BÈ. Eastern side of downtown **Lomé**, home to a large number of **Ewe** fetish priests who use the surrounding wooded areas for worship. The market near the now-closed **tourist** Hotel de la Paix is essentially a fetish supplies market. The quartier is also known as a location for opposition to the ruling party, having been the site of multiple protests—violent and nonviolent—a number of bloody crackdowns by security forces, including the **Bè Lagoon massacres**. Neighborhoods in this section of the capital often have “Bè-” as a prefix to avoid confusion with similarly named neighborhoods in other parts of town. *See also* ANIMISM.

BÈ LAGOON MASSACRES. An April 1991 brutal massacre of at least 28 civilian **Ewe** youth by elite units of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, allegedly led by **Colonel Donou Toyi Gnassingbé**. The bodies were dumped into the Lagoon in the **Bè** neighborhood of **Lomé**. The killings took place shortly after General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** had conceded multipartyism and ushered in a prolonged period (1990–1993) of nonstop pressure in southern districts to eliminate his dictatorship in the country. **Political party** and civil

society leaders of the political opposition commemorated the 20-year anniversary of the massacre in 2011 with a vigil.

BÉDOU, BENOIT. Administrator, key **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** militant, and former cabinet minister. Born in Porto Novo, **Benin**, of Togolese parents on 2 April 1920, Bédou was educated in Benin and at the prestigious **École William Ponty** in Dakar, Senegal, graduating in 1940. For the next 20 years, he served with the **French** colonial administration in Senegal, eventually becoming head of the **Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF)** federation's Finance Services. Bédou returned permanently to Togo and was appointed director of finances in the **Sylvanus Olympio** administration. He held this position, despite the **1963 coup d'état**, until December 1966, at which time he was promoted to head the Finance and Economics Ministry, and following the establishment of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime in April 1967 was reassigned his old position of director of finances. He served on the Political Bureau of the RPT until the mid-1980s.

BELLOW, BELLA (1945–1973). Togolese singer. Born Georgette Nafiatou Adjoavi in **Tsévié**, she studied design at the Lycée de **Sokodé** under painter **Paul Ahyi**, who later helped her be discovered as a singer. Her breakout moment came in Dakar in 1966 at the Festival mondial des arts negres, after which she gained notoriety as a blueswoman and began recording and touring with other African musicians under the name Bella Bellow. While preparing for an American concert tour at age 27, she was killed in a car accident not far from Tsévié, cutting short a very promising career. She has been honored with her picture on **Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA)** franc bills and postage stamps, and has inspired contemporary African musicians such as **Benin's** Angélique Kidjo. Togo's Bella Bellow Prize for "tradi-modern" music supports artists who carry on African musical traditions.

BELLY EL FOUTI, MOHAMED. One of Togo's most renowned **Muslim** theologians, popularly known in the **Lomé zongo** where he resided as Mallam Bello. A **Fulani** born in Accra, **Ghana**, on 6 December 1920, to Senegalese grandparent émigrés to Nigeria, Belly El Fouti erred politically by starting a religious party aligned to Kwame Nkrumah's opposition and had to flee Ghana, settling down in Lomé in October 1958. Vowing never again to mix religion with politics, he first set up a school for adults in Lomé in 1959 and worked on propagating the faith and on writing religious treatises. Mallam Bello was a founding member of the **Union Musulmane du Togo (UMT)** and served as its treasurer. Ousted from the body, together with its president, after prolonged allegations of autocratic internal rule, he ultimately made

peace with the rank and file of the Muslim community and was accorded a leadership role in 1976 through membership in the UMT's Research Council. Mallam Bello made the pilgrimage to Mecca over a dozen times.

BENA DEVELOPMENT. Experimental cattle-rearing farm in the tsetse fly-free **Badou** plateau, supplying the Marox-Afrique butchery in **Lomé**. The ranch was under joint **German**-Togolese management.

BENGALI. Site, in North Togo, of major iron ore deposits intermittently considered for possible exploitation. Estimates of the deposits range around 1,000 million tons. The high costs of exploitation and evacuation of the ore, or concentrate, have worked against the exploitation of these reserves.

BENIN, RELATIONS WITH. Though better by far than Togo's relations with **Ghana** to the west, Togo's relations with her neighbor to the east have also experienced highs and lows. **Smuggling** and political troubles mean that the shared border is periodically closed, and **refugees** from Togo's political crises have fled to Benin for safety by the tens of thousands, particularly in 1993 and 2005. However, the two countries depend on one another, especially in the realms of trade and energy. Togo's access to lucrative trade with the Nigeria takes place through Benin (as does illicit trade), and the two countries share power from the **Nangbeto** dam on their shared border, and manage the shared resources together in the **Compagnie Électrique du Bénin (CEB)**. Togo and Benin have successfully negotiated access to energy, including natural gas, from Nigeria after tripartite talks in 2007, though the negotiations about a promising dam project in **Adjarala** have been stymied for decades. *See also* **TRAFFICKING**.

BENIN INSTITUTE OF HIGHER EDUCATION. *See* **INSTITUT D'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR DU BENIN**.

BESSERUNGSIEDLUNGEN. **German**-sponsored "improvement" villages, set up in southern Togo, especially in the vicinity of **Notsé** and **Atakpamé**, in order to alleviate acute land pressure in the northern (mostly **Kabyé**) areas, while developing virgin lands in the south for **agriculture**. After the surrender of the colony to **French** forces, the policy of resettling Kabyé youth in the south continued. Often, the new settlements were nothing more than penal colonies, though they did provide an answer to the need of land-starved peasants from the north. Today, largely as a result of these colonial policies, there are over 100,000 Kabyé outside the core **La Kara** region, with more migrating southward yearly.

BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE. Togo's national library, which is the repository of government publications and pre- and postindependence documentation. Created in 1969 in **Lomé**, the library possesses some 18,000 publications.

BINUMBA. *See* GURMA.

BISMARCKBURG. Established by Dr. Wolf, the explorer, in 1888, the post, in the Adele Mountains in the **Centrale** region, was an important jumping-off point for explorations of the region during the **German colonial administration**.

BLITTA. Small but important village and prefecture in the **Central** region, just south of the town of **Sotouboua**. Apart from being a marketing center, Blitta was the terminus of the **railroad** from the south and a major transshipment center for goods going on to **Burkina Faso** and Niger. Blitta is also home to a 30 MW solar farm, the first of several scheduled to for construction in Togo as part of the broader **development plan** envisioned by President **Faure Gnassingbé**. Supported by both public and private financing, and backed by a CFA 7 billion loan from the Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD) in 2019, the farm is scheduled to begin contributing to the local electrical grid by the middle of 2020.

BODJOLLÉ, EMMANUEL. Retired former chief of staff of the Togolese armed forces during part of **Nicolas Grunitzky's** presidency. Born in 1928 in Koumea of **Kabyé-Moba** origins, Bodjollé enlisted in the **French** colonial army in 1948 and served in Indochina and North Africa. Demobilized and repatriated to Togo in 1962 with the rank of sergeant, Bodjollé was the leader of the ex-soldiers who petitioned President **Sylvanus Olympio** to be integrated into an expanded Togolese army. At the time of the **1963 coup d'état**, Bodjollé played an ambiguous role, unwilling to join the mutiny, but was chairman of the **Insurrection Committee** for a few days and therefore briefly head of state. After the coup, he was sought by the putschists and was promoted to officer rank (captain) to become commander of the new battalion formed from the ex-veterans. Briefly chief of staff under Grunitzky (and again promoted to major), Bodjollé was eased out of his position in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** in 1964 by **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, by then confident enough to assume the leadership of the armed forces. In August 1965, he was arrested for plotting a comeback, storing arms, and building up a personal following loyal only to him in the army. (Most of the personnel involved were **Moba**.) After Eyadéma's rise to power in 1967, Bodjollé was again arrested and sentenced to 26 months in prison for illegal

possession of a gun. While awaiting sentencing, one of his relatives (**Norbert Bakobosso**) tried to assassinate Eyadéma. In November 1967, Bodjollé was released from prison following petitions from Koumea village elders who guaranteed that he would be under their personal surveillance in Koumea and would never leave the village confines.

BODJONA, HODABALO (1940–). Former minister of public health and social affairs. Born in Kodjone-Haut in the **La Kara** region, Bodjona was educated at the Lycée **Bonnecarrere** in **Lomé** before proceeding to the University of Dakar to study medicine and pharmacology. On his return to Togo in 1961, he became chief pharmacist at the **Sokodé** Hospital (1966–1967) and at the University Hospital Center in Lomé (1967–1970). For seven years director general of Togopharma, in January 1977, he was appointed Eyadéma's minister of public health. He was retained in that post until 1984 when he returned to medical practice in Lomé.

BODJONA, PASCAL AKOUSOULÉLOU (1966–). Former minister. Born in Kéao, he attended school at home and abroad at Harvard University. He was appointed in 1994 as special advisor to the ministry of foreign affairs and cooperation until his appointment to the embassy of Togo in the United States in 1995 first as an attaché then as an ambassador in 1998. Following **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** death, he became President **Faure Gnassingbé's** spokesperson then cabinet director in 2005, a position he held until he became government spokesman and minister of state for territorial, **decentralization**, and local collectivities from 2007 (under Prime Minister **Komlan Mally**) until suddenly ousted in 2012. Shortly after leaving the government, he was arrested by Togolese police after he and his cousin, businessman **Sow Agba**, were implicated in defrauding an Emirati businessman. Though supporters of Bodjona protested his arrest, he stayed in jail until his temporary release in 2013, but returned to jail until 2016. Bodjona continues to claim his innocence.

One of his legacies is the so-called **loi Bodjona** voted by the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in 2011, in which public demonstrations could take place if government were informed, even though a prior authorization was not required. This more liberal code earned Bodjona some support among members of the opposition, including pro-democracy lawyers willing to defend his case, and contributed to the increased number of **street demonstrations** of the 2010s, including the mobilizations of 2017–2018.

BOKO, FRANCOIS (1965–). Lawyer and politician. Educated in the prestigious St-Cyr Military School in **France**, he joined the Togolese **Gendarmerie** from 1988 to 1993. He then returned to France to earn a DEA from

Paris University and became a lawyer in 1998. Upon his return to Togo, he joined the ministry of justice as an advisor until his appointment as minister of the interior, security and **decentralization** in 2002 in the government of **Koffi Sama**. Following Eyadéma's death, Boko resigned due to his opposition to the **2005 presidential succession**. From that time living in exile in France, he has worked for the European Union as representative in African countries including in Tchad in 2009, Cameroon from 2010 to 2014, and in Morocco since 2017 and worked on various international **donor**-funded development projects on the African continent. He has showed support for opposition presidential candidates, including **Jean-Pierre Fabre** in 2010.

BOKO, MENSAVI. Dramatologist who won second place in the Harmattan literary competition for his *Isabebelle* in 1969.

BOKONOU. Diviner of the **Fa** in southern Togo. Among the northern ethnic groups, the corresponding title is Teo (**Kabyé**), Djiba (**Moba**), Ouboua (**Bassari**, **Konkomba**). Sorcery, witchcraft, and magic are still extremely prevalent in Togo. *See also* ANIMISM.

BOLLORÉ SCANDAL. In 2018, **French** billionaire Vincent Bolloré was arrested in Paris for interfering in **elections** in Togo and Gabon for the sake of lucrative contracts associated with the operation of state-owned commercial ports in both countries. In the case of Togo, President **Faure Gnassingbé** allegedly received 2010 campaign help from one company in the Bolloré Group, the consultant firm Havas, in exchange for favorable terms to access to the **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)** by another company in the Bolloré Group, Bolloré Africa Logistics. Both sides denied wrongdoing, but the affair was widely reported in the Togolese **media** and helped contribute to the impression on the part of his detractors that President Gnassingbé is enjoying kickbacks from increased international investment in Togo since taking office, in the tradition of his late father, **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**.

BOMB EXPLOSIONS OF 1985. Series of mysterious bomb explosions in downtown **Lomé** a month after the liquidation of Colonel **Koffi Kongo** and some others in August 1985. A wave of arrests followed, including several university professors, intellectuals, and engineers, though most were released in due course. A second series of bombings later exploded at the building best symbolic of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** reign, the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party headquarters, as well as at the headquarters of the **Société Nationale de Commerce (SONACOM)**, the **state sector** trading company (plundered by the regime) and the **Hotel du 2 Février**. Later

more bombs exploded at the main market, **Assigamé**, and at the headquarters of the Social Security Fund, and a bomb was found at the **airport**.

BONFOH, ABBAS EL HADJ (1948–). Interim president in 2005. Born in Kabou in 1948, Abbas Bonfoh taught physical **education** before being trained as an administrator and posted as director of education planning in **Kara** and **Kpalimé**. Elected a deputy of the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in 1999 as a member of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, he became vice president of that body in 2002, while **Fambre Natchaba** served as AN President. The sudden death of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in early 2005 prompted a **succession crisis** in which Natchaba, as the head of the AN, had the **constitutional** responsibility to take over as president until a new election could be organized. With Natchaba kept out of the country and the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** in full support of Eyadéma's son and preferred successor **Faure Gnassingbé**, Bonfoh found himself leading the AN through a late-night session in which they elected Gnassingbé president of the AN, and **amended** the constitution to let Gnassingbé serve out his father's term. After a domestic and international outcry over these extra-constitutional machinations, Gnassingbé stepped down as head of the AN to run for the presidency, and the Bonfoh took his place as president of the AN and interim president of the Republic for two months, with the tacit support of the armed forces and the stalwarts of the RPT. He was the first **Muslim** president of Togo.

BONFOH, GENERAL BASSABI. Chief of staff of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, formerly commander of the Second Battalion. A **Kabyé** from Pagouda, Bonfoh was steadily promoted by President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, being regarded as trustworthy. He was appointed general and chief of staff in 1991, and has continued to serve as an important FAT general under President **Faure Gnassingbé**.

BONIN, ANDOCH NUTÉPÉ (1939–2014). One of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s sharpest critics. Born on 12 October 1939, in **Sansanne-Mango** to a distinguished teacher from the South, Bonin served as an interpreter at various international conferences. He remained in Accra, **Ghana**, until 1975 due to the repression in Togo, returning to **Lomé** that year to set up a translation agency. Between 1979 and 1982, he joined the Eyadéma regime as the latter's aide and interpreter but resigned to flee to Paris. There he wrote the highly critical book *Le Togo du Sergeant au General*, published in 1983. Because it underscored the ludicrous brutality of the Eyadéma regime, exposing some of Eyadéma's personal vagaries and idiosyncrasies and reminding readers of the lengthy early liquidations that can be laid at Eyadéma's door

(starting with the 1963 murder of **Sylvanus Olympio**), Bonin became one of Eyadéma's most hated enemies. Bonin risked liquidation himself by returning to **Lomé** at the time of the liberalizations in 1990 to join the **National Conference**. Though promptly arrested, he was released at the insistence of that body. As Eyadéma slowly won in his tug-of-war with the political opposition, Bonin returned to Paris, aware he was a marked man.

BONNECARRÈRE, AUGUSTE FRANCOIS NARCISSE DOMINIQUE PAUL (1875–1966). Former colonial governor of Togo. Born in Tarbes, France (in the Pyrénées) on 29 October 1875, and educated in law at the University of Paris, Bonnacarrère served for ten years as **governor** of Togo as part of the **French administration** of the territory. He was governor of Togo between 30 January 1922 and 27 December 1931 and later also served in Cameroon. A number of Togolese structures and even scholarships are named after him.

BONNEY, ITADI K. (1948–2013). Musician. Bonney had a successful musical career in Togo in the 1970s and 1980s, playing guitar and singing Afro-funk. He married a Peace Corps volunteer from Washington, DC, and divided his time between the United States and Togo. However, in the early 1990s, he released an album “Mayi Africa” which was critical of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, and was unable to return to Togo and his career suffered as a result. He collaborated on a single with his son **Tabi Bonney** in 2011, before passing away in 2013.

BONNEY, TABI (1977–). Musician. Son of **Itadi Bonney**, Tabi Bonney was born in Togo and divided his childhood years between Washington, DC and Togo. Bonney attended Florida A&M University as a premed major, but began rapping in the evenings. After trying a career as a high school science teacher, Bonney shifted to a recording career and hit local radio stations in 2006 with a single, “The Pocket.” Now based in Los Angeles, Tabbey has collaborated with other artists such as Wiz Khalifa. In 2019, he developed a line of unisex skin care products named ITADI Body (named after his father) that use **coffee** and **cocoa** ingredients from his family's farmland in Togo.

BOUKPESSI, PAYADOWA. Cabinet minister. BoukpeSSI joined the first **transition government** of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** in September 1991 as minister of commerce and transport and was retained through the next two governments, though in the third he was shifted to the ministry of industry and state companies. He served as leader of the **Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** party. On his return from France after obtaining a DEA in 2001, he was appointed minister of economy, finance, and

privatization from 2005 to 2007. He served as minister of territorial administration, **decentralization** and local authorities from 2015 in **Komi Klassou's** government.

BOUKPETI, BENJAMIN (1981–). Slalom canoeist and Togo's only Olympic medalist. Boukpeti made his Olympic debut in Athens 2004 Olympics and placed fifteenth. Victorious at the 2008 African Championships, he made history by becoming the first Togolese to win an Olympic medal by taking bronze at the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. He finished tenth at the 2012 Summer Olympics. He currently lives in Toulouse, **France**, where he studies management.

BOURAÏMA, INOUSSA TRAORE (1945–). Former minister of the environment and **tourism**. Born on 10 February 1945, and educated in the natural sciences (agronomy) at the University of Dakar (1971) and Marseilles (1973) where he obtained a degree in ecology, Bouraïma returned to Togo to teach zoology and ecology at the **Université du Bénin** in **Lomé**. Active politically, during the post-1990 liberalization in Togo, he was integrated into the **transition government** (May 1991) as the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** minister of defense and was reappointed in the following interim government of February 1993. He accepted a leadership position in the **Union Musulmane du Togo (UMT)** in 1997, rising to the post of vice president of the organization until the untimely death of then president **Ahmed Tétou** in 2007. Since then, Bouraïma has led the UMT in an interim capacity, resisting calls for a new leadership election that might risk weakening the ties between the UMT and the **Union Pour La République (UNIR, formerly RPT)** party.

BRASSERIE BB LOMÉ. Highly successful beverage company set up in **Lomé** in 1964 as Brasserie du Bénin, today boasting 1,200 local employees. Originally capitalized at 375 million CFAF (increased to 1 billion by 1984 and 2.5 billion in 1988) with a 25 percent state participation (increased to 40%), the bulk of the original investment capital came from Hamburg, **Germany**. With the **privatization** drive of the 1990s, the state equity was reduced back to 25 percent and the company renamed Brasserie BB Lomé. The company produces an array of beverages, including highly popular local beers. As the company grew, it opened up a second plant, in **Kara** in 1982, and acquired a mineral water bottling facility in Anfoin in 2009. *See also* BRASSERIE DE LA KARA.

BRASSERIE DE LA KARA. Beverage manufacturing and bottling plant, inaugurated in January 1982 after the investment of 2,300 million CFAF. From the start owned and operated by the **Lomé-based** Brasserie du Bénin,

privatized and renamed **Brasserie BB de Lomé**, the **Kara**-based plant was widely heralded as attesting to the economic coming of age of the former neglected north.

BRASSERIE DU BENIN. *See* BRASSERIE BB LOMÉ.

BRAZILIANS. Collective name for Togolese and **Beninois** of mixed Euro-African parentage, formerly exiled or deported Africans, or slaves taken to Brazil who went back to the coastal areas in the 19th century. Among the first and most prominent of these families were those of **Da Souza**, **Olympio**, **Santos**, and **d'Almeida**. Most settled in communities such as **Aného** or **Agoué**, engaging in trade or other middleman activities. Other elements referred to as “Brazilians” include Sierra Leoneans or Nigerians who settled in Aného, such as the ancestors of the **Lawsons** of Togo. Most of them were already **Christian**, Europeanized, and relatively well **educated**, factors that enabled them to play an important early role in the evolution of political life in Togo, a role disproportionate to their actual numbers. With the extension of the vote to greater numbers of Togolese over time, their political importance rapidly declined, though they long remained in the highest echelons of the civil service and the liberal professions.

BREMEN MISSIONARY SOCIETY. More correctly known as the Nord-deutsche Missionsgesellschaft, the Bremen Missionary Society was engaged in proselytizing in southern Togo and played an important role in the formation and **education** of the early coastal elite. One of their main bases was **Aného** (in the 1850s), and their strong concentration along the coast has resulted in the paradox that, despite a much longer period of **Catholic** missionary effort, especially under the **French** mandate, around 50 percent of Togo's southern elite is **Protestant**. After World War I and **Germany's** loss of Togo, the Bremen Missionary Society had to cease operations in the territory. The fact that no major missionary order moved into the vacuum gave birth to the early autonomy of the **Ewe Evangelical Church (EEC)**.

BRENNER, JACQUES. Former head of the Foreign Commerce section of the ministry of commerce in **Lomé** and administrator on the board of the **Brasserie du Benin** between October 1968 and its **privatization** in 1990. The Brenner family is of mixed **German** and Togolese origin.

BRENNER, YVES. Brenner served as **Kpalimé's** deputy to the **Assemblée Legislative du Togo (ALT)** during **Nicolas Grunitzky's** pre-independence

administration (1955–1958). With **Sylvanus Olympio**'s rise to power, Brenner became press attaché at the ministry of information, press, and Radio and between 1967 and 1969, technical consultant in the same ministry. From 1969, he occupied a number of similar posts, including government representative for **Ciments du Togo (CIMTOGO)**, before his retirement.

BRIGADE DE RECHERCHE ET D'INVESTIGATION. Part of the security apparatus established by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, the Brigade gathers information on both crime and potential sources of political opposition to the regime both at home and abroad. It works very closely with the **Brigade de Vigilance**.

BRIGADE DE VIGILANCE. State security organization in charge of monitoring potential subversive activities, specifically in the capital, **Lomé**. It duplicates some of the work done by the **Sûreté Nationale** (an organization distrusted by President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**) and maintains a network of informants in Lomé, at the **Aflao** border crossing village, and in **Ghana**. The Brigades have conducted covert activities (in Ghana and Nigeria) as well.

BRUCE, LAURA DOE. Important textile merchant, dominating the retail trade in **Lomé**. Doe Bruce was also president of the **Association Professionnelle des Revendeuses de Tissus (APRT)** and member of the local **Conseil Economique et Social (CES)**. *See also* NANA BENZ.

BUND DER DEUTSCHEN TOGOLANDER (BUND). Pro-German quasi-covert organization set up in 1929 and aided by the German firm Togo Gesellschaft. The organization was set up to agitate against **French colonial administration** in Togo and to press for the return of the territory to Germany. Encompassing mostly southern elites brought up and educated under the previous German administration and displaced in the civil service by **Dahomeans** (because of their lack of linguistic abilities and unfamiliarity with French administrative practice), the Bund petitioned the League of Nations against the abuses carried out by the French in Togo. In 1939, Governor Montagne expelled known members or sympathizers from the territory; these were either promptly interned in Accra by the British authorities or made their way back to Togo and hid out the duration of the war in the **Akposso** district. The pro-French **Cercle des Amitiés Françaises** was created in 1936 in **Lomé** as a counterorganization to the Bund. Paradoxically, after the end of World War II, the Cercle became—under its new name, **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**—a militant nationalist organization.

C

CABRAIS. *See* KABYÉ.

CADRE PERMANENT DE DIALOGUE ET DE CONCERTATION (CPDC). Established in 2009, several years after the 2006 **Accord Politique Global (APG)** mandated a means of “permanent dialog” between parties represented in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** and those on the outside. Since the formation of the CPDC, the **political party** landscape has changed with the split in the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)** and the creation of a number of new opposition alliances between parties and civil society groups, rendering the CPDC less relevant.

CAISSE CENTRALE DE COOPERATION ÉCONOMIQUE (CCCE). Official **French** agency through which French governmental aid to Franco-phone Africa is channeled, banked, and administered. Successor to the Caisse Centrale de la France d’Outre Mer (CCFOM). In October 1989, in the latest such move, the CCCE canceled 98 percent of Togo’s debt—a total of 42 billion CFAF—and agreed to finance several new projects for Togo at interest rates of 1.5–2 percent for 30 years with 10 years’ interest grace. The organization became the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) in 1998.

CAISSE CENTRALE DE LA FRANCE D’OUTRE MER (CCFOM). *See* CAISSE CENTRALE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE (CCCE).

CAISSE NATIONALE DE CREDIT AGRICOLE (CNCA). Defunct credit union established in October 1967, the CNCA provided **agricultural** credits to farmers and cooperatives implementing projects of agrarian development approved by the regional **Sociétés Regionales de Développement et d’Amenagement (SORAD)**. During its first year of operations, the CNCA distributed 190 million CFA francs in loans. The successor of **Credit du Togo**, by 1980 it had expanded tremendously and, with 16 branches, offered 27,200 loans to the value of 3.7 billion CFAF. The CNCA was the target of

several major embezzlements over the years, the largest two in 1981 and in 1987. In the latter instance a total of between 2.7 and 4 billion CFAF were absconded, with **Donou Hometowou**, the directing manager, sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment and several other employees for lesser periods. Then Colonel **Agossoye Assih** (at the time the second ranking officer) also lost his position in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** in connection with the embezzlement. Since the liquidation of the **bank**, creditors have struggled to recover their funds, and opposition press outlets regularly print stories about the victims and their woes, as evidence of ongoing corruption by the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)/Union Pour La République (UNIR)** governments.

CAISSE NATIONALE DE SECURITÉ SOCIALE (CNSS). State-run voluntary pension or disability insurance organization. Created in 2011, among its early directors was **Koffi Walla**. In 2017, Walla was accused of corruption and misdirecting 6 billion FCFA from CNSS through his own construction company, SEGIM.

CAMPOS, BONIFACE DE. Former secretary general of Togo's **Chambre de Commerce**, administrator of the **Société Togolaise de l'Hotellerie (STH)**, and vice president of the **Conseil Economique et Social (CES)**. Campos comes from an old **Brazilian** family.

CARAVAN ROUTES. In the precolonial era, several important caravan routes crossed through Togo. The most important of these were the salt trade route to Adda and the kola nut route to Salaga. The principal stops on the east-west caravan routes were: (1) Gomba via Dahomey (Nikki, Parakou, Bassila) to **Sokodé** and Fasao in Togo and then to Salaga (**Ghana**); (2) Gomba via Dahomey (Nikki, Djougou) to Sokodé; (3) Gomba via Dahomey (Nikki, Djougou, Birni, Kouande) to **Sansanne-Mango** in Togo and on to **Gurma** country; and (4) Gomba via Dahomey (Nikki, Bouay) to Sansanne-Mango in Togo and on to Salaga. The major north-south route went from **Aného** on the coast via **Atakpamé** to Sokodé (which developed into a major transshipment center) and on to Sansanne-Mango. *See also* BENIN.

CATHOLICISM. The first permanent Catholic influences in Togo were through contact with returning **Brazilian** families and the religious services that sprang up to accommodate them. Thus, in 1835, a chapel was built in **Agoué** (just across the current border in **Benin**) by the Brazilian Venossa de Jesus to cater to the needs of a small but thriving Catholic population, most of whom were Brazilians. In 1842, the Catholic proselytizing in the coastal

region was centralized in the hands of the missionaries of the Sacred Heart of Mary, with headquarters in Libreville, Gabon. In 1860, a major reorganization created the apostolic vicariate of Dahomey (with headquarters in the **fetishist** center of Ouidah), but the Togolese segment always remained an unimportant appendage to the much more important effort in Dahomey. Throughout much of the early colonial period (**German** as well as **French**), the civil administration resisted opening the north to either missionaries or to European influences. Only in 1912 were Catholic missionaries allowed to establish themselves in **Sokodé**. In the south, the Divine Word order established schools, built **Lomé's** neo-gothic cathedral (1902), and expanded into the coastal hinterland. Following the World War I, the African Missions Society took over from the German order. Togo was declared a separate vicariate in 1914 under the names Lower Volta (1924–1938) and Lomé (1938–1955). The Catholic Church in Togo in the postindependence period has had many influential adherents, and has spoken out at strategic moments against religious persecution, or also in defense of the right of the Togolese people to express their views, notably in the early 1990s. The **Archbishop Phillipe Kpozdro** presided over the **National Conference** in an effort to lend neutral weight to the proceedings. Today, approximately 26 percent of Togolese identify as Catholic, the largest single group in the estimated 42 percent who identify as **Christian**. *See also* RELIGION.

CAVE PAINTINGS. Missionaries stumbled on prehistoric cave paintings in northern Togo in 1990, which are now considered an important **tourist** attraction. Located in the mountains of Sodjoul and Namoudjoa near **Dapaong**, multiple groupings of paintings include both abstract and representative figures.

CENTRALE. One of Togo's original administrative regions at independence, the region was later greatly truncated to create the new region of **La Kara**. Today Centrale has its headquarters in the second largest town of **Sokodé** (with an urban population of at least 100,000). The region, inhabited by a variety of ethnic groups, including **Bassari**, **Kotokoli**, **Konkomba**, and **Kabyé** is heavily **Muslim**, and grows extensive crops of **cotton** and peanuts.

CENTRE D'ÉLEVAGE D'AVETONOU. *See* AVENTONOU.

CENTRE D'ÉTUDES ET DE RECHERCHES DE KARA (CERK). Research organization set up in 1967 at **Pyä** (President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** home village) in the **La Kara** region for the purpose of conducting studies on the culture, history, and socioeconomic potentials of the **Kabyé** regions.

The center published several important collections of articles on these topics in the 1960s and 1970s.

CERCLE. **French colonial** Africa's basic administrative units. Just prior to independence, Togo had ten cercles: **Lomé**, **Anecho**, **Atakpamé**, **Bassari**, **Dapango**, **Lama Kara**, **Mango**, **Sokodé**, **Tsévié**, and **Kluoto**, the latter with headquarters in **Kpalimé**, and the other nine with administrative centers in the towns of the same name. Each cercle had in turn several smaller subdivisions. *See also* ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION.

CERCLE DES AMITIÉS FRANÇAISE. Pro-French sociocultural organization inaugurated in **Lomé** on 5 September 1936 to counter residual pro-German sentiments among the coastal elites, including the **Bund der Deutschen Togolander (BUND)** organization. The Cercles des Amitiés Française tried to enlist all Europeans and African **assimilés** and was under the presidency of local French procurer, with **Sylvanus Olympio** as vice president. Several years later, Olympio was to transform the Cercle into the nationalist **pan-Ewe** party, the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**.

CFA FRANC. *See* COMMUNAUTÉ FINANCIERE AFRICAINE (CFA) FRANC.

CHAMBA. *See* TCHAMBA.

CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE, D'AGRICULTURE ET D'INDUSTRIE DU TOGO. Founded in 1921 as the Chambre de Commerce de **Lomé**, the organization first reflected the concentration of economic activity surrounding **Lomé's port**. In 1957, the name changed to reflect the importance of **agriculture** and industry in the economy. From the 1970s, the organization added important members like the Lomé-Tokoin **airport** and **ECObank**, to name just two. During the troubled early 1990s, the group suspended activity as executives moved out of Togo and business slowed to a crawl. In 1995, a separate agricultural organ was created, but the remainder of the grouping continued as the Chambre de Commerce d'Industrie (CCI).

CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE DE LOMÉ. *See* CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE, D'AGRICULTURE ET D'INDUSTRIE DU TOGO.

CHAMBRE DE DÉPUTÉS. Legislative body established in 1958 to replace the **Assemblée Législative du Togo (ALT)**, which itself had replaced the

Assemblée Territoriale du Togo (ATT). In 1961, the *Chambre de Députés* changed its name to **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)**. The *Chambre de Députés* had 46 members, 34 of whom were delegates of **Sylvanus Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**; the assembly's president was **Jonathan Savi de Tové**. By 1961, Togo was a de facto one-party state and in 1962 opposition parties were banned. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

CHANGO, COLONEL JANVIER. Police commander and former minister of justice. One of the **Kabyé** personnel demobilized from **France's** colonial armies in 1963 (as sergeant), Chango did not squander his severance pay, as most of the other former troops (including **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**), but instead used it to set up a lucrative **Lama Kara-Lomé** trucking enterprise. After the **1963 coup**, he was integrated into the police to become commander of the First Group of the National Police, and later deputy chief of staff of Togo's **gendarmerie**. In August 1969, he was brought into the cabinet as minister of justice, serving in that position until February 1974 when, in a cabinet reshuffle, he was returned to military duties.

CHAPMAN NYAHO, DANIEL AHMLING (1909–2001). Ghanaian educator, diplomat, and early promoter of the **pan-Ewe unification** movement. Born in Keta, principal town of the Anlo Ewe in the **Gold Coast**, on 5 July 1909, Chapman was educated at a **Bremen Missionary Society** school in **Lomé**, at the Gold Coast's Achimota College, and later at Oxford, Columbia, and New York universities. In 1930, he was appointed instructor at the prestigious Achimota College (1930–1933), becoming senior geography master in 1933 (to 1946). In May 1945, Chapman started issuing the *Ewe Newsletter* which urged the unification of all Ewe territories under British rule. He developed close contacts with other Ewe leaders, including **Sylvanus Olympio** in French Togo. Under Chapman's leadership, the **All-Ewe Conference (AEC)** was formed, an organization that was a merger of Chapman's own Ewe Unionist Association (EUA) and other pan-Ewe groups. The AEC, with Chapman as secretary general, claimed to represent all the Ewe clans on both sides of the Gold Coast-Togo border, though support for the association was meager in French Togo and restricted to a few top leaders and a handful of customary **chiefs**. The movement collapsed from within as a result of personality differences, interclan jealousies, and divergent policy preferences of its various leaders. Late in 1946, Chapman himself left the Gold Coast to become an area specialist with the UN Secretariat (1946–1954), following which he was appointed secretary to Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah. He was honored with a Ghanaian state funeral in 2001.

CHEMIN DE FER DU TOGO (CFT). Togo's first **railroad** system. The network was built during the **German** colonial era and was expanded by the **French** (1929–1933) to reach **Blitta**, northwest of **Atakpamé**. The system had three lines: **Lomé-Aného**: a total of 45 kilometers, opened to traffic in 1905 to cater to **palm** oil exports; **Lomé-Kpalimé**: a total of 119 kilometers, opened in 1907 (the “**cocoa** line”); and **Lomé-Tsévié-Notsé-Blitta**: a total of 277 kilometers. The section up to Agbonou was opened in 1911, the line reached Atakpamé (via a spur) in 1913, and following French construction work between 1929 and 1933, reached Blitta, the final terminus. During the 1970s, the line carried less traffic than in the 1950s and 1960s, though passenger traffic at the high point could reach as many as 2.2 million passengers per year. By the 1990s there was no passenger rail at all, and in 1995 the CFT was replaced by the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Togo (SNCT). The existing rail lines in strategic areas were converted to industrial use, primarily for **mining**. *See also* TRANSPORTATION SECTOR.

CHIEFS. With few exceptions, most of Togo's chiefs are of the village or clan variety and, especially in the south, have few real powers. Traditional chiefs often preside over civil matters in their jurisdictions, such as inheritance claims and land disputes, so may be more or less influential depending on the location and the issue. On the national stage, traditional chiefs have been much less prominent in Togo than in other countries in the region, thanks to the historical absence in Togo of large kingdoms, or powerful chiefs. This is to a considerable extent a consequence of the negative consequences on state-building as a result of the constant military pressures from the kingdom of Dahomey to the East and the Ashanti Federation in the West, who periodically sent assaults at each other that fought it out in Togo.

The government's relations with the chiefs have vacillated over time. Under **Sylvanus Olympio** (1960–1963), chiefs were regarded as a modern-day anachronism; they were discriminated against (with a few prominent exceptions) and their official subsidies were drastically curtailed. The **Nicolas Grunitzky** administration (1963–1967) reversed somewhat Olympio's fiscal harshness toward the chiefs and half-heartedly tried to engage the chiefs in periodic consultations. Under **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** (1967–2005), chiefly subsidies were significantly augmented, and the concept of periodic consultations was fully institutionalized in the form of annual conferences. The first such meeting took place on 12 May 1968, in **Atakpamé** and others have been held since in various towns, including **Sokodé**, **Notsé**, and **Kara**. Not surprisingly, these highly pragmatic policies garnered the Eyadéma regime considerable support from Togo's traditional elements, including from **Ewe**

chiefs in the south. *See also* UNION DES CHEFS TRADITIONNELS DU TOGO (UNCTT).

In 2007, the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** passed a law relative to the traditional chiefs, at the same time as the law on **decentralization**. This law gives government approval of chieftaincy appointments, and authorities—prefects and the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization of Territorial Collectivities (MATDCL)—the right to suspend traditional chiefs for up to six months, though it also formalizes some consultation with chiefs as part of the process of local governance. These moves have undermined the authority of some traditional chiefs, especially in parts of Togo dominated by the opposition.

CHINA, RELATIONS WITH. Togo, like many African states, has welcomed China's interest in the continent and the investment that has flowed from it, and President **Faure Gnassingbé** enjoyed a state visit to China in May 2016, and more recently in September 2019. China's main interest in Togo is the deepwater port, the **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)**, through which many goods from the subregion flow. In 2018, the Chinese-supported construction of a bypass road connecting the PAL directly to the **Ghanaian** border, and the next year the group China Merchants purchased a 50 percent stake in the company that operates the PAL. Prior to that, Chinese investors have taken an interest in sugar and textile production in Togo, and have built a football stadium and new **presidential palace** in Lomé.

CHOKOSSI. Northern ethnic group found both in **Ghana** and in the **Sansanne-Mango** and **Dapaong** areas of Togo. Prior to the **German** occupation of Togo, the Chokossi had a small kingdom with its capital in Sansanne-Mango. Of Manding origins, the Chokossi came to northern Togo during the latter part of the 18th century, traveling from Côte d'Ivoire via **Ghana** and Burkina Faso and moving south to Togo as a consequence of internal struggles between the **Gurma** and the Mamprusi. A warrior clan led by a branch of the royal family of Kong (Côte d'Ivoire), the Chokossi speak the Anoufou (or Tsekohale) **language**, which is a Baoulé language with many Mande expressions, very similar to the Anyi dialect still spoken in Abengourou in Côte d'Ivoire. The Chokossi (in **French**, Tyokossi or Tchokossi) obtained their name from neighboring groups (especially the Mamprusi, Dagomba, and Konkombo) and among themselves are known as Anoufou. Their former kingdom's capital (Sansanne-Mango) means in **Hausa** and Mande "the Anno's warcamp" and attests to the Chokossi's principal occupation in the pre-colonial era—territorial expansion and warfare on their own behalf or serving as mercenary troops for neighboring ethnic groups. (They themselves call

their kingdom and principal town, which was renamed from its original name Kundyuku, N'zara.) At the height of their kingdom, the Chokossi dominated the **Moba**, **Gurma**, and Guang (and some **Konkomba**) and exerted control over Fada N'Gurma (currently in Burkina Faso), all the way south to **Sokodé**. Their state included the Mande royal clans, Akan subjects (from Ghana), and Muslim Dioula itinerant merchants. Though the Chokossi resisted the German advance into their territory, after being vanquished—and despite sporadic revolts—they joined the German military columns in the subjugation of other areas. The Chokossi's social organization was historically marked by sharply defined social classes and stratification, and an estimated 40 percent are **Muslim**.

CHRISTIANBORG. Danish fort (in what is now Accra, **Ghana**) established in 1659. From Christianborg, Danish influence radiated along the coast to Anecho (now **Aného**) in Togo. The Danes were very active in this area until forced out by other European companies, especially after Denmark abolished the slave trade in 1803.

CHRISTIANITY. Estimates suggest that, as of 2020, just over three million Togolese or about 42 percent of the population, identify as Christian. Christians form the largest single religious group in Togo, with those holding animist beliefs at around 37 percent, and **Muslims** estimated at 14 percent. More Christians—an estimated 26 percent of the population—identify as **Catholic**, and about 17 percent of Togolese identify as **Protestant**. *See also* RELIGION.

CIMENTS DE L'AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST (CIMAO). One of West Africa's largest and costliest white elephants, the former perennially financially troubled multinational cement and clinker complex. West Africa's largest regional industrial venture, CIMAO tapped rich calcium deposits in several areas, including at Aveta and Tabligbo. The establishment of CIMAO was a prolonged process, though the company ambitiously planned to satisfy the cement needs of most states in the region from Côte d'Ivoire to Nigeria. Paradoxically, despite the participation and initial cooperation in the CIMAO project of most Francophone states in West Africa, each and every one of them was to set up its own national cement plants, undermining the basic rationale behind CIMAO. The company was created in 1968 with one billion CFAF capitalization, though actual construction of the industrial complex only commenced in 1976. Sited in Tabligbo, some 80 kilometers northeast of **Lomé**, CIMAO included a whole township for its workers, an electricity grid, a port terminal, and a port-to-rail link. Phase one of CIMAO's construction

cost US\$ 316.7 million, nearly half the sum coming from the **World Bank**. The partners in the venture were Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, France, and Ghana. The plant—that at no time operated at full capacity—was capable of processing 1.2 million tons of cement and could double that figure easily in case of strong international demand.

Massive cost overruns, utter lack of control over expenditures, total administrative mismanagement, high salaries and allowances (for its 567 staff including 12 expatriates), poor accounting practices, and free-for-all embezzlement by all and sundry, brought operations to a standstill in 1981, less than one year after the plant had been inaugurated with great fanfare. CIMAO was at that time officially bankrupt and owed between 5 and 6 billion CFAF to various creditors. Since the project had been highly touted as an example of regional (and Anglo-Francophone African) cooperation, each of the state partners felt compelled, reluctantly, to funnel in an additional two billion CFAF to allow the plant to recommence operations. There had always been considerable controversy regarding the merits of the project, especially whether CIMAO could ever be profitable. Most of these criticisms, however, came from abroad and were viewed in Africa as reflecting the chagrin of Western cement makers at the loss of lucrative African markets. The actual problems encountered were not anticipated.

CIMAO all along sold its products to member states at a price higher than locally available imports (despite customs duties on these) and was still unable to make ends meet, recording losses due to high operating costs. (Cost of production was more than six times that originally projected; the cost of building the complex was three times higher than anticipated.) Running losses were “distributed” among the member states so that never-ending infusions of capital were envisaged. Such new infusions were made in 1982 and 1983, but the drain upon the scarce resources of the states capitalizing it resulted in CIMAO being closed down again in 1984, for an anticipated 29 months—this time to allow a fundamental review of possible cost-cutting measures and due to the acute shortage of electricity consequent to low levels of the Volta dam, supplying Togo with much of its power needs. CIMAO's accumulated debts at that date were estimated at US\$ 66.25 million. CIMAO never reopened: in early 1989, it went into liquidation, with its debt split among the various partner-states, and production eventually taken over by **CIMENTS DU TOGO (CIMTOGO)**. *See also* MINING.

CIMENTS DU TOGO (CIMTOGO). Currently owned by a **German** company, CIMTOGO was founded in 1969 as a mixed Franco-Togolese company half owned by Togo and the rest originally invested by Lambert Frères et CIE. In 1988, the private holdings were transferred to the Norwegian SCANCEM

International. The company steadily increased its profitable operations from the initial 120,000 tons to 300,000 tons (1978), with a turnover of 4,000 million CFAF that year, and again up to 9,700 million CFAF in 1991. CIMTOGO ultimately took over production from **Ciments de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CIMA O)** when it was forced to liquidate, and in 1994 Togo sold its remaining holdings to SCANCEM, which later became Heidleberg Cement. They operate a facility in **Lomé**, updated to meet European environmental standards in the early 2000s, and which produces 750,000 tons per year and employs almost 140 people. *See also* MINING.

CIRCONSCRIPTION. Administrative districts that replaced the colonial **cercles** and were themselves replaced by prefectures in the June 1981 **administrative reorganization** of Togo. Until that date, Togo's circonscriptions had been grouped into four (after 1967, five) regions, though their number had slowly been augmented with the carving up of more cohesive "ethnic" districts. Just prior to the 1981 reorganization, there were 21 circonscriptions and seven urban (or municipal) circonscriptions, called communes. Each circonscription was headed by an appointed chef de circonscription (now prefect) assisted by elected bodies whose names have varied over the years but which included local influentials. These bodies were abolished between 1967 and 1973. When reestablished, they were renamed **Délégations Spéciales**. *See also* CONSEIL DE NOTABLES; CONSEILS DE CIRCONSCRIPTION.

COALITION ARC-EN-CIEL. Opposition coalition that translates to "Rainbow Alliance," formed in August 2012 with the goal of defeating **Faure Gnassingbé** in the **2015 elections** and restoring the institutions laid out in the **1992 constitution**, including two-term limits on the presidency. Led by the **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)**, the Arc-en-Ciel also included the **Convention Démocratique Panafricain (CDPA)**, **Mouvement Citoyen pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MCD)**, **Nouvel Engagement Togolais (NET)**, **Parti Démocratique Panafricain (PDP)**, and **Union pour la Démocratie Sociale (UDS-Togo)**. These parties formed a more moderate political grouping compared to the contemporaneous **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)** formed around the same time. The coalition was headed by CAR's leader, **Paul Apevon Dodji**, and vice president **Brigitte Adjagbo-Johnson** gained greater national recognition by appearing frequently in the **media** as the group's spokesperson. Both the Coalition and the CST expressed concern about the organization of the upcoming **legislative elections of 2013**, though members of the CST were more likely to take to the **streets in protests** that would sometimes turn violent. The opposition succeeded in having the legislative elections postponed from October 2012 to July 2013.

In the 2013 legislative elections, the Coalition won 11 percent of the vote and 6 seats in the newly expanded 91-seat **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**. Arc-en-Ciel formed the second largest opposition bloc after the CST with 19 seats, but ahead of the formerly largest opposition party, the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**, which only won 3 seats. In October 2014, the coalition joined with the CST to form the **Combat pour l'Alternance Politique en 2015 (CAP 15)**, which chose **Jean-Pierre Fabre** as their presidential candidate. However, several member parties, including the CAR, refused to endorse this choice, weakening the new alliance and signaling the beginning of the end of the Rainbow Alliance. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

COALITION DE 14 (C14). Coalition of 14 opposition parties that formed in October 2017, in part a response to the energy generated by the **Parti National Panafricain (PNP)** protests of August 2017. The opposition had previously attempted to join the rival coalitions **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)** and the **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel** into one organization to contest the **2015 presidential elections, Combat pour l'alternance politique en 2015 (CAP 2015)**, and the C14 was a renewed effort at opposition unity. Like CAP 2015, the C14 was led by **Bridgitte Adjagabo-Johnson** of the **Convention Démocratique Panafricain (CDPA)**, but rather than promoting one candidate for an election, the new group united the opposition under the banner of demand for constitutional reforms and term limits. Both the **Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC)** of **Jean-Pierre Fabre**, who had anchored the CST, and the **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)**, which had balked at supporting Fabre as the sole candidate of the opposition as part of CAP 2015, joined the C14 and worked together throughout the period of sustained **street protests in 2017 and 2018**. By March 2019, however, members began to leave the coalition, including the ANC. Enough of the C14 remained together and contested the **municipal elections of June 2019**, where the C14 in third behind **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** and the ANC, and winning 131 of the more than 1,500 local council seats across 117 communes. By the time of the **2020 presidential elections** (February) against incumbent President **Faure Gnassingbé**, the opposition found itself again unable to unify behind one candidate, and the C14 was effectively over. *See also* CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS; POLITICAL PARTIES.

COCO, DOMINIQUE HOSPICE (1902–1995). Leader of a section of the **Ewe** and former minister of finance and one of **Sylvanus Olympio's** earlier allies in the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**. Born in Cotonou, **Benin**, in 1902, Coco obtained a medical degree and specialized in surgery. For a number of years, he headed the Surgery Department of **Lomé** hospital. Coco

entered political life in the early 1950s and was elected to the **Assemblée Legislative du Togo (ALT)** in 1956, chairing the latter's permanent committee. Following Olympio's rise to power (1958), Coco was appointed minister of commerce, industry, economy and planning. In 1960, he was shifted to head the ministry of finance and economic affairs and remained in that position until the **1963 coup d'état**. Following the coup, Coco returned to medical practice, retiring in 1988. In mid-1987, he was one of the former politicians visited by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** as part of the latter's attempt to appease the former civilian leaders of Togo. With the advent of multipartyism Coco, his advanced age notwithstanding, felt obliged as the only member of Olympio's CUT executive still alive, to set up a **political party**—the **Union Togolaise pour la Rénouveau (UTR)**—aligned behind **Olympio's son, Gilchrist**.

COCOA. One of Togo's principal export crops. Since cocoa grows well only in rich, humid soil with adequate shelter from the sun, the crop is limited in Togo to the **Kpalimé, Akposso, Adele, and Akebou** areas. **Coffee** plantations are also found in these areas; the two plants are usually found intermixed. Togo's cocoa is of a high grade, and exports reached their peak production levels of around 25,000 tons in the early 1970s. In the 2010s, production levels were closer to 10,000 tons annually, though that represented a rebound from much lower levels in earlier years. The total crop figures in a given year, however, may reflect illicitly **smuggled** cocoa from **Ghana** if low purchase prices or import regulations do not encourage farmers to sell their harvests in Ghana. This means that government and international aid agency efforts to boost production are difficult to evaluate, as productivity figures are responsive to factors well out of domestic control. Of all the local coffee/cocoa growing areas, the Kpalimé region is one of the lushest and hence richer in terms of per capita incomes. The crop is usually grown on small family farms.

COFFEE. One of Togo's principal export crops, a focus of the **French administration** during the colonial era and still an important **agricultural** sector. Togo's coffee growing region largely coincides with that where **cocoa** is grown; the two crops are usually found intermixed, since the leaves of one provide the shade needed by the other, and both need the same kind of rich, humid soil. Coffee is also grown in the **Tsévié** and **Tabligbo** districts. It is estimated that Togo has a peak coffee production capacity of 35,000 tons, though in recent years output has been just over 10,000 tons. Government and aid agency efforts have focused on replanting older trees (it takes several years for a coffee plant to produce beans, making cultivation in this crop a large investment for poor farmers) and adjusting price incentives. However,

a significant percentage of Togo's coffee exports originate from neighboring countries, as farmers search for the best prices and seek to avoid duties and other restrictions. The patrol of the border with **Ghana** due in part to connivance of **Ewe** on both sides—police and **smugglers** alike—to evade the dragnets, and **Lomé's** turning a blind eye to the traffic that contributes so much to its prosperity, has been a prime source of international friction between the two states.

COLLECTIF D'ASSOCIATIONS DES FEMMES (CAF). Women's association set up in 1990, based predominantly in the South, in opposition to both the regime of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and the monopoly exerted by the latter's official women's associations, particularly the **Union Nationale des Femmes du Togo (UNFT)**. It rapidly became the largest women's organization in Togo, eventually replaced by the **Group de Reflexion et d'Action Femme, Démocratie et Développement (GF2D)**.

COLLECTIF DES ASSOCIATIONS ISLAMIQUES DU TOGO (CAIT). Grouping of Togolese **Muslim** organizations, including the council of Imams and the **Association des Cadres Musulmans au Togo (ACMT)**, formed in 2013. In October 2017, they made a public appeal to President **Faure Gnassingbé** to release the arrested imams **Alpha Alassane Mohamed Djobo** from **Sokodé** and **Alpha Abdoul Wahid Babayi** from **Bafilo**, and end the "state of siege" of the towns of **Sokodé**, **Bafilo**, and **Mango**.

COLLECTIF D'OPPOSITION DÉMOCRATIQUE (COD). Caucusing group led by **Edem Kodjo** and **Leopold Gnininvi** that on 8 June 1991 initialed an agreement with General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** for the convening of a **National Conference** and respect for the latter's decisions after the massive strikes in southern Togo. COD was quickly challenged as not being representative of all opposition groups in Togo.

COLLECTIF D'OPPOSITION DÉMOCRATIQUE 2 (COD 2). United front of 25 opposition groups formed in July 1992 in response to the continued assaults on southern political leaders by units of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** acting on behest of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**.

COLLECTIF SAUVONS LE TOGO (CST). Alliance of **political parties** and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that contested the **legislative elections of 2013**, winning 29 percent of the vote and 19 of the 91 seats (expanded from 81 seats in previous years). The two main parties were the **Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC)** of **Jean-Pierre Fabre**

and the Alliance des Démocrates pour un Développement Integral (ADDI). Formed after the ANC split with the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**, and showing the ANC power of mobilization in the year leading up to the 2013 legislative elections, the alliance picked up many of the 24 seats that the UFC lost from the previous **2007 legislative election**. The CST later joined with the more moderate **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel** to form **Combat pour l'Alternance Politique en 2015 (CAP 2015)**, with Fabre as the candidate of a united opposition to contest the 2015 presidential election against incumbent President **Faure Gnassingbé**. The CST then joined the **Coalition de 14 (C14)** in 2017.

COLLECTIF SYNDICALE INDEPENDANT (CSI). Organization grouping all labor unions that had broken with the official government **trade union** after liberalization in the 1990s. In November 1992, the CSI called for an unlimited general strike to resolve the impasse between General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh**. The strike ultimately lasted nine months at the cost of some 42 billion CFAF to the economy, and failed to dislodge Eyadéma. The CSI comprised ten former **Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo (CNTT)** affiliates and was later reorganized as the Union Nationale des Syndicats Independants du Togo.

COMBAT POUR L'ALTERNANCE POLITIQUE EN 2015 (CAP 2015). Short-lived alliance of opposition **political parties** and civil society organizations formed in October 2014 to contest incumbent President **Faure Gnassingbé** in the **presidential elections of April 2015**. It represented a joining of forces of the more radical opposition in the **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)** led by **Jean-Pierre Fabre's Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC)** and the more moderate **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel** led by **Paul Apevon Dodji's Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)**. **Brigitte Adjamagbo-Johnson** of the **Convention Démocratique Panafricain (CDPA)** was selected as the president of the new organization, and Fabre was endorsed as the single opposition candidate to contest the election. However, the CAR and several other parties refused to endorse Fabre, and CAP 2015 proved to be an ineffective vehicle for opposition party unity or electoral success, as Fabre lost the election.

The group did successfully organize a protest march in November 2014 attended by thousands, despite an official ban and a crackdown on protesters with tear gas and water cannons. By August 2017, CAP 2015 consisted of only five parties (less than half its original membership), and announced a joint demonstration with **Tikpi Atchadam's Parti National Panafricain (PNP)** to memorialize the deadly crackdown on the latter's mobilizations of

19 and 20 August 2017. By October 2017, the CAP 2015 was laid down in favor of the **Coalition de 14 (C14)**, also headed by Adjamagbo-Johnson, with a focus on **constitutional amendments** with a broader base of support than any one candidate for election.

COMITÉ D'ACTION CONTRE LE TRIBALISME ET LE RACISME (CATR). Opposition organ set up by **Yao Agboyibo** on 1 January 1991, including a number of lawyers, civil servants, and teachers, aimed at combating ethnic discrimination in Togo.

COMITÉ D'ACTION POUR LE RENOUVEAU (CAR). **Political party** set up on 1 May 1991, by **Yao Agboyibo**. In September 1992, the CAR joined **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** in a national coalition, receiving three seats in the cabinet. Vigorously competing in the **1994 legislative elections**, the first free multiparty elections since Eyadéma's seizure of power in 1967, and assisted by an electoral alliance of several smaller groups, the CAR emerged with 36 seats in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** and stood as Togo's largest political formation. Notwithstanding this, Eyadéma—having succeeded to be reelected president fraudulently—did not appoint Agboyibo as prime minister but rather, in an attempt to divide his opposition, appointed **Edem Kodjo** whose party had obtained only a minority of the seats. The outrage prompted by this maneuver, as well as the loss of several seats in by-elections, prevented the CAR from being an effective opposition bloc in the AN.

Agboyibo ran as the CAR candidate for **president in 1998**, gaining 9.5 percent of the national vote in the official results, but the party boycotted the **1999 legislative elections** because of the gross mismanagement of the vote count in 1998. The CAR did not contest legislative elections again until after it signed the **Accord Politique Global (APG)** in 2006; as part of that deal, Agboyibo took the position of prime minister leading up to the **2007 legislative elections**, in which the party won four seats to be the third largest party in the AN, after the RPT and **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**. After that election, Agboyibo stepped back from the CAR in 2008, and **Dodji Apevon** took over the party leadership. CAR was one of the parties of the **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel** that contested the **2013 legislative elections** as a bloc, winning six seats against the other opposition coalition **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)**, which won 19 (while the governing **Union Pour La République [UNIR]** party won 62). By 2017, Agboyibo had returned to the head of the party when Apevon formed his own party, taking a number of CAR cadres with him. CAR became a member of the **C14 Coalition** which boycotted the **2018 legislative elections**, but the coalition broke down in 2019.

COMITÉ DE L'UNITÉ TOGOLAISE (CUT). One of Africa's first nationalist movements and Togo's foremost **political party** until 1963. The Comité' de l'Unité Togolaise evolved from the sociocultural **Cercle des Amitiés Française**, set up by **French** Commissioner Montagne to counter the pro-German propaganda of the **Bund der Deutschen Togolander (BUND)** in the years just before World War II. The statutes of the CUT were drawn up in 1941, and the movement included a large number of representatives of Togo's various ethnic groups as well as the paramount chiefs of the **Kotokoli**, **Chokossi**, and **Kabyé**. After the war, the CUT rapidly came under the total control of the southern **Mina** and **Ewe** elements and was converted into a militantly nationalist **pan-Ewe** movement and a critic of the French administration in Togo. The party's first president was **Augustino de Souza**, with **Sylvanus Olympio** as vice president and **Jonathan Savi de Tové** as secretary general. In 1946, the CUT succeeded in electing **Martin Akou** to the French National Assembly in a race in which **Nicolas Grunitzky** was the other candidate. The party cooperated with **Daniel Chapman** and his **All-Ewe Conference (AEC)** in the **Gold Coast** in the drive to reunify all segments of the Ewe living under different colonial administrations. Within the CUT, a more militant panafricanist group coalesced around **Anani Santos** and **Firmin Abalo**, leaders of the CUT's youth wing, **Juvento**, that split from the parent party in 1959. Because of its links with the Gold Coast, pan-Ewe positions, and anti-French petitions to the United Nations, the CUT came to be viewed by the French administration as a pro-British secessionist movement and, accordingly, was administratively discriminated against. The French also encouraged and supported the creation of other political parties, especially the conservative **Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP)** of **Pedro Olympio** and **Nicolas Grunitzky** (Sylvanus Olympio's cousin and brother-in-law, respectively) and later the **Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN)**. This anti-CUT policy and the expansion of the electorate in the early 1950s broke the CUT's political ascendancy and ushered in the administrations of **Nicolas Grunitzky** (1952–1958). Only after the United Nations-supervised elections of 1958 was the CUT to reemerge as the dominant political party in Togo.

Following independence, the CUT began cracking down on sources of opposition, first through administrative regulations and finally through mass arrests of non-CUT politicians. In 1962, Togo was officially declared a one-party state. In the aftermath of the **1963 coup d'état**, a four-cornered coalition of the existing parties emerged under the presidency of **Nicolas Grunitzky**. Only one wing of the CUT, now renamed the **Parti de l'Unité Togolaise (PUT)**, participated in Grunitzky's administration, the more militant and rigid leaders unwilling to accept Grunitzky's rule or the integration and promotion in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** of Olympio's

assassins. The latter group was led by **Nœ Kutuklui**, **Theophile Mally**, and **Oswald Ajavon**, among others. The two wings of the PUT found themselves united following a series of clashes between Grunitzky and his ambitious vice president, **Antoine Méatchi**, a process that led to the **November 1966 uprising in Lomé**. The latter event inevitably paved the way for the **military coup two months later in 1967**. After the coup, all parties (and political activity) were banned, except for the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, set up in 1969 by the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime. Most die-hard PUT loyalists scattered into self-imposed exile (the Eyadéma regime offered full amnesty a number of times), as did Kutuklui, or contented themselves sufficiently with the Eyadéma regime not to oppose it actively. Periodically, anti-Eyadéma plots have been revealed where the core of the conspiracy was members of the ancient **Brazilian** families that were both at the fulcrum of the CUT and the nationalist movement prior to independence and the prime losers (often in exile) consequent to the Eyadéma **coup d'état**. *See also MÉATCHI-MAMA CRISIS.*

COMITÉ DE RECONCILIATION NATIONALE (CRN). Temporary eight-man committee set up after the **coup d'état of 1967** under the chairmanship of Colonel **Kleber Dadjo**. The CRN was disbanded on 14 April 1967, when Colonel **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** took over political power. From the point of view of ethnic or political affiliation, the CRN was composed of three southerners and five northerners or one military officer, five **Parti de l'Unité Togolaise (PUT)** members, one independent, and one **Juvento** member.

COMLAN, MAJOR PAUL (1940–1975). **Gendarmerie** officer arrested in July 1975 for plotting against the regime of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Of **Mina** origins, Comlan was arrested due to an alleged connection to a de Souza family conspiracy and liquidated in his cell by Colonel **Kidjanda Adewui**, allegedly on Eyadéma's orders. Comlan had been director of National Security (with the rank of Lieutenant) until 1970, at which point he was promoted to captain and given command of the second group of the gendarmerie. He was promoted again in 1975, just prior to his arrest.

COMMISSION NATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (CNDH). Created by the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)** at General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s suggestion in October 1987, in order to deflect international complaints about violations of civic and **human rights** and political prisoners that had brought in the unwelcome attention of the global press and pressures from external bodies such as Amnesty International. Within the

Togolese political context of 1987, the CNDH was supposed to be a lackey of the regime, allegedly assuring no violations of human rights transpired. Composed of 13 eminent members, 2 magistrates, 1 military police officer, 2 lawyers, 1 doctor, 1 law professor, and a member each of the Red Cross, traditional **chiefs**, youth, **women**, and **trade unions**, the CNDH was in theory elected by its corporate constituents but in reality appointed by Eyadéma. Its first chairperson was **Yao Agboyibo**. Until the pressures for liberalization, the CNDH was indeed window dressing and lacked power; after 1990, it assumed greater credibility on behalf of human rights. After 1994, however, its function was completely superseded by the resurgent legislature, now the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**. Agboyibo resigned as its president in 1990 to create the **Comité d'Action contre le Tribalisme et le Racisme (CATR)** and later his own **political party**, while campaigning for a return to multi-partyism. The leadership of the CNDH soon passed to partisans of the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, and the organization undermined any remaining credibility by siding with the government to condemn Amnesty International's 1999 "Togo: Rule of Terror" report.

COMMISSION VERITÉ, JUSTICE ET RECONCILIATION (CVJR). Established in 2009 in partial fulfillment of the **Accord Politique Global (APG)** of 2006, the body's 11 members consisted of representatives from civil society, higher **education**, traditional **chiefs** and **religious** leaders. The commission collected a full account of political violence in Togo for the years 1958–2005 (but not beyond), submitting its final report to President **Faure Gnassingbé** in 2012. In 2015, the government created the **Haut-Commissariat à la Réconciliation et au Renforcement de l'Unité Nationale (HCRRUN)** to implement the scores of recommendations from the CVJR. While the work of the commission received praise, successive governments under President **Faure Gnassingbé** have been slow to put the findings to meaningful use.

COMMISSION ÉLECTORALE NATIONALE INDEPENDANTE (CENI). The idea of an independent national **election** commission was established by the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS)** in 1991, but early efforts to make the institution work effectively were not successful. Though the early versions of the CENI contained representatives from government and opposition, the organization faced its most difficult challenge in the **presidential elections of 1998**, in which **Gilchrist Olympio** faced off against President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. In that election, the interference of members of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** and the pressure on members to endorse the incumbent was so strong that **Awa Nana**, then head

of the CENI, resigned, and the ministry of the interior took over the organization and vote count and ultimately declared Eyadéma the winner by a narrow margin. The current configuration of the CENI was put in place in 2000 (and has since been modified slightly) and has organized elections in Togo from that period much more smoothly, but every election is accompanied by accusations of fraud, whether or not members of the opposition take part in the CENI, lending credibility to the idea that the organization is less than independent of government, and operates in an electoral context in which the military still plays a powerful role in shaping outcomes.

COMMUNAUTÉ ÉCONOMIQUE DES ÉTATS DE L'AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST (CEDEAO). *See* ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS).

COMMUNAUTÉ FINANCIERE AFRICAINE (CFA) FRANC. Common currency of the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA), that is, all former colonial territories of the **Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF)** and the **Afrique Équatoriale Française (AEF)** from 1946. A number of CFA member states have expressed discontent off and on with the control from Paris (later Dakar) of basic fiscal policy and the mandatory 50 percent of foreign currency reserves that must be held in **France** as a condition for membership in the currency union. As of 2020, Togo and other member states plan to replace the CFA franc with a new currency with the proposed name **Eco**, in continued cooperation with France. The new Eco could include other **Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS)** member states in a common currency union with strong (and anglophone) economies like **Ghana** and Nigeria that have never enjoyed common currencies with francophone countries since before the colonial era. These anglophone African countries, however, are wary of any French control that may accompany the new arrangement.

From a historical perspective, the adoption of French currency in Togo officially occurred in 1921, but the local population continued using a variety of other currencies into the 1930s. Until 1921 the **German** mark was the common currency, with British silver shillings extremely popular as well, because of the strength of the pound. Austrian silver Maria Theresa dollars were also used for some time, and it was only after strenuous efforts that the French franc became the common currency in Togo. The CFA franc was established in 1946 as the Colonies Française d'Afrique Franc, the currency's name was changed in 1962. Fully guaranteed by France, the CFA franc was monetarily pegged to the French franc (and from 1999 to the euro) into which it is fully convertible, giving it quasi-hard currency status, which is very valuable to member states. By the same token, any devaluations of

the French franc translated into an automatic devaluation in all CFAF states, something that rankled many francophone governments, especially in light of the multiple devaluations of the 1980s. Long artificially pegged at 50 CFA francs to a French franc—and arguably grossly overvalued at that ratio—in 1993 the CFAF was devalued by fully 50 percent, causing massive havoc in most francophone countries. The proposed Eco provides an opportunity to renegotiate the terms of this monetary cooperation in favor of African states, though the full terms have not yet been agreed.

COMPAGNIE ÉLECTRIQUE DU BENIN (CEB). Joint electricity consortium created in 1968 by **Benin** and Togo. It is charged with promoting the development of electric power in the two neighboring countries. The CEB tries to develop local power and to diversify the sources of supply of the two countries. For decades, Togo and Benin acquired the bulk of their needs from **Ghana's** Volta River Hydroelectric Authority at Akossomba. The CEB is headquartered in **Lomé** and operates several local electricity-producing plants. In 1988, the **Nangbeto** dam and hydroelectric complex (35 kilometers from **Atakpamé**) came on line, having been built during the preceding three years with **Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (CCCE)** aid and with the capacity of producing 147 million kilowatts of electricity, or fully 30 percent of CEB's needs, and providing irrigation for crops. Feasibility studies of another dam, at **Adjarala**, capable of boosting local production to 58 percent of CEB's have been completed, but the two countries have been unable to reach a cooperative agreement on moving forward with the expansion.

COMPAGNIE ENERGIE ÉLECTRIQUE DU TOGO (CEET). Togo's retail electric company, set up as a **state sector** enterprise in 1963, after taking over the colonial installations of the Union Électrique Coloniale (UNELCO) at **Kpémé**, at the time the sole hydroelectric station in the country. CEET cooperates with its **Beninois** counterpart within the joint CEB; it purchased its electricity from the latter and is involved essentially in its redistribution, repair, maintenance, and billing operations. CEET has also set up several local generators for the exclusive use of the Togolese economy, including a thermal center of 120 million kilowatts set up in 1976. Though the two countries share power from the **Nangbeto** dam, another promising dam project at **Adjarala** has been under discussion since the 1980s, and more recently has attracted the attention of **Chinese** financiers, but continues to languish as the sides are unable to agree on terms. Instead, Togo and Benin have turned to Nigeria for access to energy, including natural gas, which comes to Togo via

Benin. The three countries held talks in 2007 about shared energy needs and concerns, and in October a new 100 MW plant opened in **Lomé**, supplied with fuel from the West African Gas Pipeline. Though critics express concern about relying on indirect sources of energy to meet domestic needs, Togo's manufacturing and other sectors experienced a boost after the new plant was brought online, and Togo's energy needs continue to be only partially met by the available means.

COMPAGNIE TOGOLAISE DES MINES DU BENIN (COTOMIB or CTMB). **State sector** industrial complex engaged in the extraction and export of **phosphates** from Togo's coastal deposits. Originally COTOMIB was founded in 1954 as a mixed economy expatriate-controlled company with capitalization of three billion CFA francs. The Togolese government first acquired a 20 percent interest in COTOMIB in 1957, the other shareholders being a French consortium (42.7%) and a U.S. group (37.3%). In 1973 Togo increased its share in the company to 35 percent, and on 24 January 1974, COTOMIB was fully nationalized following President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** allegations that company officials had conspired to assassinate him. In its heyday, COTOMIB employed over 2,500 employees, including some 50 expatriates and was by far Togo's largest company and employer. The company extracts ore in Hahotoe and other nearby locations for processing at its **Kpéme** phosphate factory and harbor, which is situated approximately 35 kilometers east of **Lomé** and near **Aného**. *See also* EYADÉMA'S PLANE CRASHES.

The spurt in revenues in the 1970s was both a boon for the regime and a curse. Assuming that the era of high phosphate prices had arrived to stay, Eyadéma embarked on highly ambitious development plans that had to be scrapped only a year later as phosphate prices plunged to near their original levels in 1975. The over expenditures of 1974 and 1975 and the state companies erected or nationalized at that time were at the root of Togo's economic woes in the 1980s. Prices fell in 1975 and remained depressed, and thanks to greater wastage, mismanagement, and embezzlement in COTOMIB, costs of production went up and profitability down from that period. Despite the discovery of new reserves, the constant unrest in the south during the period 1990 to 1994, and especially the nine-month general strike that attempted to dislodge Eyadéma, was especially ruinous to the company which managed to produce only half its normal mineral output. The locus of decision-making about phosphate production moved to the **Office Togolaise des Phosphates (OTP)** after its creation in 1974, making COTOMIB more of a subsidiary than the main engine of production. *See also* MINING.

COMPAGNIE TOGOLAISE DES TEXTILES (TOGOTEX). Textile complex, founded in **Kara** in 1978 with 1,800 million CFAF in capital, partly (25%) state-owned, as part of the drive to industrialize the north. The company soon became deficitary and was closed down for several years. Efforts to sell it as part of Togo's **privatization** drive met several snags as first Spanish-Korean, then American, bids collapsed. In 1989 the company, together with the **Industrie Textile Togolaise (ITT)** in the south, were sold at a bargain price to a Hong Kong **Chinese** entrepreneur and are now known as Togotex International.

COMPAGNIE TOGOLAISE MARITIME (CTM). *See* SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE MARITIME.

COMPLEX PETROLEUM DU LOMÉ (COMPEL). Company set up in 1990 by Shell International and the Togolese government to **privatize** the **Lomé** petroleum company administered jointly since 1984 but in liquidation in 1989. Until recently, Shell was the majority shareholder, having invested over three billion CFAF in the project. COMPEL was nationalized in 2017 when Shell ended operations in Togo, alongside the **Société Togolaise de Stockage de Lomé (STSL)** and the rest of **Shell-Togo**.

CONFEDERATION AFRICAINE DES TRAVAILLEURS CROYANTS (CATC). Catholic interterritorial **trade union** federation that had branches in most of Francophone Africa. Until the January 1973 forced merger of all Togolese unions into the **Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo (CNTT)**, the CATC branch in Togo was the 600-member Confederation Syndicale des Travailleurs du Togo. The latter was often referred to as "the CATC" though such usage was incorrect.

CONFEDERATION NATIONALE DES TRAVAILLEURS DU TOGO (CNTT). Former unified **trade union** organization established in January 1973 under Secretary General **Nangbob (Raphael) Barnabo** following the December 1972 government-sponsored dissolution of all existing trade unions. The two major Togolese unions which merged into the CNTT were the **Union Nationale des Travailleurs Togolais (UNTT)** and the **Confederation Syndicale des Travailleurs du Togo (CSTT)**. The confederation held its first congress in 1976. Its membership in the late 1980s stood at 70,000, organized in three divisions: **state sector** workers, **parastatal** workers, and private sector workers. The 1991 drive for multipartyism saw the collapse of the CNTT monopoly and the secession of the **Collectif des Syndicalistes Indépendants (CSI)** that shortly renamed itself Union Nationale des Syndicats

Independants du Togo (UNSI). The CNTT managed, however, to retain 105,000 members of 33 affiliated unions. Today the CNTT appears aligned with UNIR more than any other **political party**.

CONFEDERATION SYNDICALE DES TRAVAILLEURS DU TOGO (CSTT). One of Togo's largest pre-1973 **trade unions**, though small compared to the front-ranking **Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo (UNTT)**. Affiliated with the **Catholic interterritorial Confederation Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants (CATC)**, the CSTT had 600 members and was led by President Bernard Akakpo. In January 1973, the CSTT was dissolved, as were all other unions, and merged into the unified **Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo (CNTT)**. In 1991, with political liberalization, the organization was reformed and began recruiting new members. Today the organization is a member of the **Confederation Syndical Internationale (CSI)**, and held its most recent extraordinary congress in March 2019.

CONFÉRENCE NATIONALE. *See* CONFÉRENCE NATIONALE SOUVERAINE (CNS).

CONFÉRENCE NATIONALE SOUVERAINE (CNS). Togo's Sovereign National Conference (often referred to as simply the "Conférence Nationale") that led to the liberalization of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime and multipartyism, though most of the key planks of the Conference have not been actualized. In March 1990, shortly after student riots, **political parties** were legalized and the convening of a Conference of National Dialogue was pledged. In April 1991 came the **Bè Lagoon massacres** and after the massive demonstrations of June 1991 (triggered by Eyadéma's appearing to backtrack on the issue of a conference) the conference finally took place.

Lasting 52 tumultuous days (8 July–26 August 1991) with its proceedings relayed by radio and television, during the conference there were many confessions of wrongdoing and revelations of murder, torture, and corruption by former minions of the Eyadéma regime. (Eyadéma himself was accused of the theft or misappropriation of 900,000 million CFAF [US\$ 3 billion], or three times the then-Togolese national debt.) The **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** delegation never participated beyond the first day, which was telling, and an attempt was made by the regime to suspend the proceedings on 23 August, when the conference finally declared itself "sovereign" after debating the question for weeks. (Many former delegates insist on including "Souveraine" in the title of Togo's National Conference, as a reflection of the importance of the term.) Ultimately, the delegates flouted Eyadéma's wishes and elected a nine-month interim **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)**

as a legislative body encompassing “all political persuasions” and an interim prime minister, **Joseph Kokou Koffigoh**, who was supposed to usher in a new political system.

CONGRÈS DES CHEFS TRADITIONNELS DU TOGO (CCTT). *See* CHIEFS; UNION NATIONALE DES CHEFS TRADITIONNELS DU TOGO (UNCTT).

CONSEIL DE L'ENTENTE. The Council of the Entente is a West African regional organization encompassing Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, and Togo. Created on 29 May 1959, under the auspices of Côte d'Ivoire as President Houphouët-Boigny's countermove to the projected Mali Federation. The Council of the Entente provided for freedom of movement across state boundaries, coordination of policies in the fields of judicial, communications, developmental, and economic matters, and a Solidarity Fund aimed at fiscal redistribution of accumulated funds in favor of the weaker member states. Togo joined the Entente only in June 1966, having kept out of it at first (1960–1963) because of President **Sylvanus Olympio**'s desire to avoid international alliances, especially indirect ones, with **France**. Later (1963–1966), Togo was kept out by Vice President **Antoine Méatchi**'s vehement opposition to joining an essentially conservative grouping. Méatchi's opposition was overridden in the final months of the **Nicolas Grunitzky** administration, but Togo began to play a serious role in the Entente only in the 1970s. Most of the goals of the Entente went unfulfilled up until the political upheavals of the 1990s, due to the lack of serious interest or total commitment on the part of the member states and the economic inequality between Côte d'Ivoire and the other states. The organization underwent a reform in 2011, reenvisioned to eliminate redundancies with the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** and other regional organizations, and to create a committee of experts to supplement the meetings of heads of state and ministerial council. The seat of the executive secretary of the Conseil de l'Entent is in Abidjan.

CONSEIL ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL (CES). Advisory council on social and economic matters created in Togo in May 1967 but active since March 1968. At the time, the council was composed of 25 members, divided equally among representatives of the **trade unions**, industry and commerce, and **agriculture** with five technocrats and five sociologists/economists representing the academic and administrative branches. Its membership included key figures from Togo's social, economic, and political life. From the 1990s, the idea of a CES was revived, and enshrined in the 1992 constitution. Only

in 2011 did the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** formalize a law laying out the terms of the organization, composed of 70 members and charged to advise the president, and it took a further eight years before the organization was actually launched in December 2019.

CONSEIL ÉPISCOPAL JUSTICE ET PAIX (CEJP). Civil society organization that has twice applied and been rejected an **election** observer in Togo, for both the **municipal elections of 2019** and the **presidential election of 2020**. Minister of territorial administration **Payadowa Boukpassi** justified the decision by saying the Episcopal Conference of Togo had made explicitly partisan public statements, and had not revealed the source of their finances. The Bishops of Togo released an angry denial of the charge of partisanship.

CONSEIL NATIONAL DE PATRONAT (CNP). Togo's major employers' association, founded in 1963, and renamed CNP in 1990. The CNP joined in the call for an unlimited strike against the Eyadéma regime in 1993. Today it is comprised of 21 professional associations, including owners of hotels, **transportation** companies, and the successor to the **Nana Benz**, the **Association Professionnelle des Revendeuses de Tissus (APRT)**.

CONSEILS DE CIRCONSCRIPTIONS. Local advisory councils that in 1946 replaced the **Conseils de Notables**. The Conseils de Circonscriptions were composed of representatives of the most important clans, ethnic groups, and villages in each circonscription, or district. Largely moribund until July 1951, they were then fully institutionalized and given slightly wider powers than the previous Conseils de Notables, including the authority to discuss local budgets and developmental priorities. Some of the councils became highly politicized and those of **Lomé** and **Kpalimé** fell under the political control of **Sylvanus Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, becoming sounding boards for the party. After independence, the reorganized councils continued functioning until the **1967 coup d'état**, when they were dissolved. They were resurrected in June 1973 under the name **Délégations Spéciales**, under tighter central control and with fewer powers. *See also* ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION.

CONSEILS DE NOTABLES. Former local councils assembled at the administrative headquarters of most of Togo's **cercles**. First established by decree on 17 February 1922, and reorganized in 1924 and 1933, the Conseils de Notables were operative in **Lomé**, **Aného**, **Atakpamé**, **Kpalimé**, **Sokodé**, **Bassar**, **Kara**, and **Mango**. They were composed of ethnic and village notables elected by two electoral colleges: one of **chiefs** of cantons and

villages and the second of chiefs of urban quarters and clan heads in urban centers. The councils convened at the request of the cercle administration, or every three months, to discuss government activities in the fields of taxation, public works, and the local budget. In 1946, the *Conseils de Notables* were supplanted by **Conseils de Circonscriptions**. *See also* ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION.

CONSTITUTIONS. Togo's current constitution was adopted by referendum on 27 September 1992, ushering in the current **Fourth Republic** as a more open and competitive political system than the previous, adopted in December 1979. The latter had been the country's first since the **1967 coup** that toppled the regime of President **Nicolas Grunitzky**. Prior to 1979, the country had three constitutions: (1) a provisional constitution of 23 April 1960, providing an interim parliamentary system; (2) the Constitution of 14 April 1961, providing a strong presidential system with most powers in an executive president, elected for seven years (re-electable), and a weak legislature, elected for five years. Several specific issues could be brought to the population for decision via referenda, and, under specific conditions, the executive could acquire vast emergency powers; (3) the Constitution of 5 May 1963, establishing an executive composed of a president elected for five years and a vice president, a parliament with weak powers, and (for the first time) a **Supreme Court**.

The 30 December 1979 constitution stipulated a uniparty state (under the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais [RPT]**) led by an executive president elected for seven years by universal suffrage on the recommendation of the RPT Congress. Re-electable, the president could dissolve the newly created **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)**, elected for five years from a list of deputies approved by the RPT. The constitution was easily modifiable by either the president or the ANT II, after approval by the party. The constitution was promulgated on 9 January 1980, after being ratified by 99.9 percent of the population.

The current constitution is based on a July 1991 draft from a 109-member Constitutional Commission set up in October 1990 to prepare a document anticipating a democratic multiparty system. The commission completed its work on 28 December 1990, and submitted a Constitution of 110 articles organized under 16 chapters, setting up a dual executive with the prime minister accountable to the presidency and National Assembly, and a Constitutional Council as the ultimate arbiter between the three branches of government. Neither President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** nor interim prime minister **Joseph Koffigoh** was entitled to seek the presidency under this version. The constitution was approved by the **Conference Nationale Souveraine (CNS)** in

July 1991; to further assure that Koffigoh (aged 44) was barred from seeking election, in mid-April 1992, the government changed the minimum age for the presidency from 40 to 45. A modified version of this draft, however, was actually submitted for ratification at the **referendum of 27 September 1992**, and approved by 98.11 percent of the vote. The main difference between the drafts was that various restrictions on who might run (including the need for candidates to resign from the military) were lifted. This constitution has undergone several important rounds of **amendments**, generally in favor of keeping either Eyadéma or his son, **Faure Gnassingbé**, in power.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. There are two possible ways to amend Togo's 1992 constitution: either the proposed change could pass the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** by a four-fifths majority, or, if only a two-thirds majority can be secured in favor, the proposed amendment can then be put to a popular referendum, which must be approved by a majority of the electorate. The most notable moments of constitutional amendment were (1) in 2002, when presidential term limits were removed, and the eligibility qualifications for office were altered; (2) at the time of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** death in 2005 for facilitate the **succession** of his son **Faure Gnassingbé**; and (3) in 2019 when many of the 1992 stipulations for presidential elections were restored, but did not apply to those currently in power.

Constitutional Amendments of 2002. Having a supermajority of seats after the March 1999 legislative elections, the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party changed 46 provisions of the constitution. Among the most consequential was removing term limits from the presidency, stipulating that only a plurality of the vote in one round of election would determine the winner, lowering the age of eligibility for the highest office from 45 to 35 years of age, and specifying that a candidate must live in Togo for the 12 months preceding the election. Each of these changes either addressed ruling party concerns from the 1998 presidential election (that **Gilchrist Olympio**, who lived many months of the year outside Togo, could have forced a runoff, if not won outright in 1998, had the ministry of the interior not taken over the vote count) or paved the way for a continuation of the Gnassingbé dynasty in **Faure Gnassingbé** (eliminating term limits and lowering the age of eligibility so that the then-36-year-old son of the president could run).

Constitutional Amendments of 2005. See **SUCCESSION CRISIS**.

Constitutional Amendments of 2019. Having a supermajority in the AN from the December **2018 legislative elections** (boycotted by most of the opposition), the ruling **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party was able to pass amendments on 29 provisions of the constitution on 8 May 2019, with a

four-fifths majority. Many of the changes were ones demanded by the opposition during **street demonstrations in 2017–2018**, including limiting the presidency to two terms, and changing the presidential **electoral system** to two rounds of voting, with a runoff election between the top two vote-getters if no candidate secured a majority in the first round. The term limits, however, do not apply retroactively to President Gnassingbé, meaning that he is eligible to serve as president at least until 2030, or five terms in office. Other important changes were limiting AN deputies to two terms but lengthening terms from five to six years, and endorsing the creation of a second legislative chamber, the **Senate**, with the same limitations. The Senate, moreover, will automatically include any ex-presidents with a term of a remainder of their lives, who will also have full immunity for any offense committed as president. Given that the party in power has enjoyed legislative majorities uninterrupted since 1994, these changes seem to reinforce the existing dominance by one party, even though they address important opposition demands for constitutional limits on power. In other provisions, the president, AN, and Senate will each have the power to name two justices of the nine on the **Constitutional Court**, and the president designates the president of the high court from among the members for a six-year term, setting up very favorable terms for court approval of any decisions by the executive or legislative branches in the future.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. *See* COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE.

CONVENTION DÉMOCRATIQUE PANAFRICAIN (CDPA). **Political party**, vehicle of the presidential aspirant Professor **Leopold Messan Gnininvi** who in 1991 lost in his bid as interim prime minister to **Joseph Koffigoh** by 388 votes to 312. Gnininvi, as secretary general of the party charted a course different from that of the other long-standing opposition parties, namely the **Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** and **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)**. For example, he campaigned as a presidential candidate for the CDPA in 1998 and 2003, but withdrew his candidacy for both elections in favor of the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)** candidates, in a show of unity. Gnininvi was also one of the few members of the opposition to attend the funeral of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in 2005. The CDPA was at the forefront of forging the common alliance of political parties, the **Coalition De 14 (C14)**, from two previous rival alliances, the **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)** and the **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel** in 2017. **Brigitte Adjamagbo-Johnson** of the CDPA was the charismatic spokesperson of the organization throughout the remarkable run of **street protests in 2017 and 2018** in Togo, though the C14 began to fall apart in early 2019 and was unable to unite behind one candidate to oppose President **Faure Gnassingbé** in the **2020 presidential elections**.

CONVENTION DES FEMMES POUR UNIR (CFU). Women's association established 2012, alongside the change of the ruling **political party** from the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** to the **Union Pour La République (UNIR)**. CFU replaced the **Union Nationale des Femmes du Togo (UNFT)** as an organization supportive of the ruling party and President **Faure Gnassingbé**, as well as supporting local social development. It was "renewed" under the name **Mouvement des Femmes pour UNIR (MFU)** in late 2017, alongside the **youth movement** of the party.

CORNEVIN, ROBERT (1919–1988). Former colonial administrator and foremost scholar of Togolese history. Born in **France**, Cornevin was educated at the elitist **École Nationale de la France Outre-Mer (ENFOM)** and graduated in 1941. He then served in the army until 1947 and as a colonial administrator in the Togolese **cercles** of **Atakpamé** (1948–1953), **Bassari** (1953), **Dapango** (1954–1955), and **Lomé** (1955–1956). Cornevin completed his PhD in African history at the University of Paris, and from 1961 to 1985 he served as head of the **Centre d'Études et de Documentation sur l'Afrique et l'Outre Mer**. He wrote over 400 articles on Africa and several books on African history, including Togo's (see Bibliography).

CORONAVIRUS. In March 2020, Togo reported its first case of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, commonly known as "the" coronavirus, which the World Health Organization (WHO) had recently declared a pandemic. The virus spreads easily and causes the disease COVID-19, which can be fatal. Lacking treatment, cure, or vaccine for the disease, like many of its neighbors the Togolese government moved quickly to close international borders in March 2020 and impose a curfew in major cities. The curfew was extended to the entire country in April, and President **Faure Gnassingbé's** government also moved to limit large gatherings of people and increase the number of security personnel patrolling to enforce these measures. Additional **health** information and advice for mitigation, including a website with a dashboard reporting cases and tests, a hotline number to call, and a "chatbot" named **Dokita** for information via text, were all coordinated by government in response. To help the most vulnerable who were unable to work, the government also established a system of periodic monetary transfers called **Novissi** for those who qualify, which as of May 2020 had over half a million beneficiaries and had dispersed over 8 billion FCFA.

CORVÉE. Forced labor for purposes of infrastructure building and portering. The corvée was exacted in Francophone Africa until the end of World War II as part of the **indigénat** code applied to the non-assimilé population.

Corvée labor also existed under the preceding **German administration** when, for example, every Togolese male was liable to be called up for 12 days a year. Under both the Germans and the **French**, the imposition of corvée—frequently arbitrary, beyond the official limits, or by unpopular traditional **chiefs**—caused civil unrest in sections of the country. *See also* ASSIMILATION POLICY.

COTOCOLI. *See* KOTOKOLI.

COTTON. Togo's primary cash crop export. In the colonial era, the Togo Sea Island variety of cotton was successfully introduced by the **Germans** with the help of Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute (see Bibliography for recent historical reexaminations of this experiment), and Togo became West Africa's top cotton producer in 1959 with 9,200 tons. Originally, cultivation was centered in the central east part of the country among the **Ewe**, but **Kabiyé** migrations south have changed the ethnic makeup of cotton farmers, and cultivation of the crop has spread throughout the territory. Farmers are adept at rotating cotton and food crops in succession to take advantage of subsidized cotton fertilizer remaining in the soil, but as a result yields are often uneven year to year. Moreover, Togolese cotton farmers face tough competition from subsidized cotton production in the United States and from Asia. Production levels were high even during the political turmoil of the mid- to late 1990s, with output as high as 180,000 tons in 1998. Cotton suffered a serious downturn in the mid- to late 2000s (hitting a low of less than 30,000 tons in the 2009–2010 growing year), in part because of failures of the cotton parastatal **Société Togolaise du Coton (SOTOCO)** to make timely payments to farmers, and prompting the 2008 dissolution of that agency and replacing it with the **Nouvelle Société Cotonnaire du Togo (NSCT)** cooperative, which is 40 percent grower-owned. After a lag, the new organization and investments in the sector have produced steady growth in outputs in the 2010s, though not yet back to the 1990s peak. *See also* AGRICULTURE.

COUCHORO, FELIX (1900–1968). Author. Born in Ouidah, **Benin** on 30 January 1900, in 1939 he settled in **Aného** as a commercial agent while at the same time commencing his career as an author in earnest. Couchoro's first novel (*l'Esclave*) was published in 1930, and 14 more books appeared before his death in 1968. His work marked him as one of Africa's foremost regional writers and Togo's most prolific author. His novels were always written in simple everyday language, understandable to a general audience, and dealt with commonplace life and were set in either Benin or Togo.

COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 1966. Popular uprising in **Lomé** on 21 November 1966, aimed at unseating the increasingly unpopular and unstable regime of **Nicolas Grunitzky** and bringing back to power the lieutenants of former President **Sylvanus Olympio** and his **Parti de l'Unité Togolaise (PUT)**, successor to the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**. The uprising commenced early in the morning with the seizure of the **radio** station and other public buildings in the city and the appeal over the airwaves for massive demonstrations and a march to the presidential house. The uprising took place against the background of the resignation of the last PUT members from Grunitzky's cabinet. Estimates of the crowds that obeyed the appeal for an uprising are unreliable, ranging from 5,000 to 50,000, but the crowds were undoubtedly large and the appeal popular. The reaction of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** was muted and ambiguous at first, though they ultimately sided with Grunitzky because to allow the coup to succeed would have strengthened the PUT and facilitated their demands that Olympio's assassins (i.e., **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and other ranking officers of the army) be brought to trial. Following the army's belated entry on Grunitzky's side, the latter drastically reshuffled the cabinet, purged and downgraded Vice President **Antoine Méatchi**, and tried to provide a more assertive leadership. These efforts were to no avail, since the officer corps had already decided that the Grunitzky regime was a liability and would be overthrown on the next anniversary of Olympio's demise. *See also* COUP OF 1967; MÉATCHI-MAMA CRISIS.

COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 1970. A conspiracy and alleged attempted coup planned by **Nöe Kutuklui**, self-styled political heir to **Sylvanus Olympio**, the plot entailed seizure of government installations and a mobilization of the coastal regions against the regime of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. The plotters were arrested during the night of 8 August, allegedly as they broke up their meeting prior to the actual assault. A total of 27 defendants were brought to trial on 25 November, among them a large number of non-Togolese (**Beninois** and **Ghanaians**) as well as Police Commissioner **Jean-Alexandre Osseyi**, who was in charge of the military aspects of the attempted coup, and former **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)** deputies Dr. **Marc Atipedé** and **Clement Kolor**, the latter killed when he tried to escape.

Despite open hearings, controversy remained regarding the facts and the true role of the agent provocateur (**Lole Mamiyable**), since the defense convincingly argued that he had incited the conspiracy. A few of the arrested were later liquidated while in prison, though the rest, sentenced to long prison terms, were amnestied in 1972. Kutuklui, who allegedly masterminded the plot from his refuge in Benin, received a 20-year sentence in absentia. *See also* COUR DE SÛRETÉ DE L'ÉTAT.

COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 1977. An October 1977 conspiracy aimed at a takeover of state power. Planned and financed from abroad (including donations from a mysterious Canadian arms dealer) and linked to the “**Brazilian**” families in **Lomé**, including the ever-frustrated **Olympio** family. The plot was thwarted by the British government (that had infiltrated the mercenary group being put together) forewarning President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** via the U.S. embassy in Lomé. The 20-odd mercenaries, who had already secreted weapons in Lomé and **Aného**, consequently aborted the plot due to the increased vigilance of the local security forces. The full dimensions of the plot did not become clear until much later. At the time, only a few Togolese intellectuals were arrested, seemingly only for the sake of appearances. But by 23 November 1978—over a year later—a number of senior **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)** officers were directly implicated in the 1977 plot that was now seen as a major conspiracy hatched by Olympio-De Souza family members. In August 1979, after a number of political kidnappings in Accra and Lagos by the Togolese secret service, the trial of the 1977 conspirators commenced. Several death in absentia sentences were passed, including on **Sylvanus Olympio**’s sons, who were in self-exile abroad. *See also* COUR DE SÛRETÉ DE L’ÉTAT.

COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 1986. An alleged 23 September 1986, assault from **Ghana** (with support of the Ghanaian, Burkina Faso, and **Libyan** authorities) on several installations in **Lomé**, including General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**’s domicile in the Tokoin barracks (**Lomé II**), the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** headquarters and the **radio** station, allegedly to assassinate Eyadéma and set up a new government under the interim leadership of Captain Francisco **Lawson** and **Gilchrist Olympio**. Thirteen people were killed in the assault, and 19 of the raiders (including Ghanaians) were captured. Because of inconsistencies in the official account of the conspiracy, the event was shrouded by mystery and has been the subject of many rumors. On 20 December 1986, 13 people were sentenced to death for their role, including Gilchrist Olympio in absentia.

COUPS (ATTEMPTED) OF OCTOBER 1991. Two separate incidents on 1 and 8 October 1991 in which **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)** elements tried, crudely, to reverse the tide of democratization in Togo. In the first, apparently concerned that a reformer had taken the post of defense minister, troops seized **Lomé**’s **radio** station and broadcast Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh**’s resignation, following which they withdrew, killing several civilians. In the second incident, members of the **Presidential Guard** attempted to kidnap Koffigoh, allegedly to force him to change his policies

vis-à-vis General Gnassingbé Eyadéma. Following each of these incidents, the youth demonstrators known as **Ekpemog** took to the streets in support of Koffigoh, and members of the transition **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** denounced the rumored involvement of the president's relatives which heightened tensions, but no one was ever brought to account. *See also* TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENTS, 1990–1993.

COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF DECEMBER 1991. A series of events in December apparently in a backlash to the attempted dissolution of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party by the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)**, which angered many in the military who were members of the party. Ultimately, Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** was kidnapped in the dawn of 3 December 1991. The military had first cordoned off **Lomé**, declared Koffigoh ousted, and called upon General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** to appoint a new prime minister. Koffigoh called on help from **France**, who sent 300 troops to neighboring **Benin** but declined to take further action. When Koffigoh refused the demand to resign, the military bombarded his residence and after dozens of soldiers were killed, kidnapped the prime minister and brought him to Eyadéma. Koffigoh was released the next day, following which he announced the formation of a new government “of national union” more amenable to Eyadéma. The latter act was seen as capitulation by many in the HCR, irretrievably eroding whatever support Koffigoh still retained in that body. *See also* TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENTS, 1990–1993.

COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 1993. Bloody commando attack on the Tokoin military barracks outside **Lomé** during the night of 25 March 1993. Two senior officers who died protecting President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** were General **Mawulikplim Amegie** (the force commander) and Colonel Gnandi Akpo. The assault was masterminded by Colonel **Koffi Tépé**, deputy commander of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, who was summarily killed after the **coup** failed. The casualties within the ranks of the FAT reflected an internal split in the officer corps about Eyadéma's running again for the presidency in the **1993 elections**. After the assault failed, remnants of the 120-man force fled across the border to **Benin** and **Ghana**. Amnesty International reported at least an additional 20 summary executions took place.

COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 1994. A commando raid, involving a force of 100 men, bazookas, and rockets, on several military installations and on General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s motorcade. The force, organized by **Gilchrist Olympio** as a response to Eyadéma's earlier attempt (in like manner) to liquidate him during his political campaigns in the country, infiltrated Togo from

Ghana. Separate units attacked the elite **Régiment Inter-Arme Togolais (RIAT)** Adidogome barracks and Eyadéma's motorcade as it pulled up to his residence. Eyadéma's car was peppered by bullets and fully penetrated by rockets (and his driver was hit), though Eyadéma himself miraculously survived the assault. There was gunfire in **Lomé** for four days; some 30 soldiers of the assaulting force were killed and an additional 40 arrested.

COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 2005. *See* SUCCESSION CRISIS 2005.

COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 2009. Alleged plot by **Kpatcha Gnassingbé** to unseat his half-brother President **Faure Gnassingbé** while the latter was scheduled to be in **China** on an official visit. Kpatcha had supported his brother's **succession in 2005**, but lost his coveted cabinet position as minister of defense in 2008. The planned coup was thwarted by a preemptive strike by an elite military unit on Kpatcha's home, dubbed by the official government news outlet the *Fusillade des Paques* or "Easter Barrage" of 13 April 2009. Security forces were not able to apprehend Kpatcha until three days later, in a sign that he still had some support in higher ranks of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**. This suspicion was confirmed when retired General **Assani Tidjani** and Commandant **Abi Atti** were arrested in the following months for complicity in the plot. The government displayed a cache of weapons they had seized from Kpatcha's home, and another brother, **Es-solizam Gnassingbé**, was also arrested. This did not prevent rumors from circulating in Togo that Kpatcha was the victim of a political purge, rather than an active threat to the security of the Republic. Ultimately 32 were prosecuted for the plot in 2011, but Kpatcha, Tidjani and Atti were each given the harshest sentences of 20 years in prison.

COUP OF 1963. The **coup d'état** of 13 January 1963 was staged by a clique of demobilized noncommissioned officers (NCOs) allegedly acting in the name of several hundred veterans of **France's** colonial armies who had been repatriated to Togo earlier in 1962. The veterans, most of whom were northerners led by **Etienne Eyadéma** and **Emmanuel Bodjolle**, had petitioned President **Sylvanus Olympio** to be integrated into the small Togolese army. When Olympio vetoed a much scaled-down petition asking that only 60 of the best-qualified veterans be recruited, a clique (specifically excluding Bodjolle) retaliated by assaulting Olympio's residence. Confronted by the putschists in the unguarded presidential residence in the middle of the night, Olympio was shot in cold blood by Eyadéma (who allegedly panicked), with the story propagated (to project a more "professional" account) that Olympio had been shot while scaling the U.S. embassy gates, seeking asylum.

Following the coup, all former political exiles were invited to return to Togo and power was handed over to **Nicolas Grunitzky** (as president) and **Antoine Méatchi** (as vice president). In reality, the putschists preferred to give Méatchi, also a northerner, the top position, but Grunitzky's refusal to serve under his former minister and French opposition to the abrasive and militant Méatchi tipped the scale in favor of a Grunitzky presidency. Shortly after, the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**'s size was tripled with the integration of the unemployed veterans, and several of the ring-leaders of the coup were promoted to officer rank. Bodjolle, official head of the clique but one who allegedly had played a double role on the night of the coup, was soon purged from the army, which fell under the control of Eyadéma. The fact that the coup resulted in the assassination of Olympio had major repercussions for Togo's political evolution; it meant that the key officer clique headed by Eyadéma (directly responsible for Olympio's death) could never afford to allow an **Ewe**-led regime to come to power for fear of retribution.

COUP OF 1967. The **coup d'état** of 1967 came on the fourth anniversary of the 1963 coup (January 13), though its stimulus was the **Méatchi-Mama Crisis** and the **Lomé upheavals of 1966**. Already weakened, the absence of any suitable civilian alternatives sealed **Nicolas Grunitzky**'s fate and resulted in the decision—as early as November 1966—that a full military takeover would be consummated on the anniversary of the first coup. Following the coup, Grunitzky left the country together with some of his closest political allies (e.g., **Georges Apedo-Amah**, the former foreign minister), and a **Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CNR)** was set up under the chairmanship of Colonel **Kleber Dadjo**, the most senior officer in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, though not a core member of the 1963 veterans' clique. Prompt elections were promised as well as a new constitution. In April 1967, these promises were rescinded by **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, who gathered all executive powers into his hands and set up a mixed military-civilian administration that lasted until he was forced by the demonstrations of 1990 to concede some power.

COUPS. From the French “**coup d'état**,” generally understood to be a military takeover of civilian government in contravention of the existing **constitutional** order. Togo holds the dubious distinction of the first military coup in sub-Saharan Africa after independence. In the **coup of January 1963**, a group of veterans of the **French** colonial army led by **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** killed President **Sylvanus Olympio** and set in motion the events that would, a few years later, lead to a military takeover of civilian government and

Eyadéma's own 36-year tenure as president. As was the case for many of Togo's neighbors, the first military coup demonstrated problems of governance could be addressed by force of arms, and gave rise to additional coups and attempted coups particularly during the rule of President Eyadéma, sometimes against him and sometimes in support of him. After the first, Togo endured another **coup in 1967** and at least nine attempted coups thereafter, through 2009. The extra-constitutional transfer of presidential power to **Faure Gnassingbé** in 2005 was also justifiably referred to as a "coup" at the time, most notably by the African Union (AU). There is no doubt that the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** exerted pressure on political elites at that moment, and the military got their desired outcome, but because it took place under such different circumstances than Togo's other coups and attempted coups—no shots fired, involving the legislature and **constitutional amendments**, and taking place over a series of months—the term **succession crisis** better fits those events.

Most of Togo's coups and attempted coups have involved a faction of the military making an armed assault on a residence or strategic location, and often taking over the national **radio** or **television** broadcasts. Because **Lomé** is the political as well as commercial capital of the country, most of the strategic action of coups and attempted coups takes place there, and because the city abuts the **Ghanaian** boarder, coup attempts against Eyadéma were sometimes launched from Ghana, often with the rumored endorsement of the **Olympio** family. The period since the troubled early 1990s has seen fewer coup attempts, and Faure Gnassingbé has worked to consolidate power through economic legitimacy rather than military might, diminishing the likelihood that internal military disputes could spill over into national politics. With the exception of the **coup plot of 2009**—which may have served to neutralize a political rival as much as protect the constitutional order—the frequency of coup attempts in Togo has diminished, though any political leader would be foolish to think the risk of military intervention in domestic politics has definitively ended.

COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE. Established in 1997 to take cases of constitutionality in government actions while the **Cour Suprême** (Supreme Court) handles criminal cases and appeals. Originally, the court was to be made up of members serving nonrenewable seven-year terms who would be named by a variety of groups, including the university and the organization of jurists. However, through a series of reforms the current court is made up of six members named by the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** and three named by the president, and some, including the current president **Abdou Assouma**, have served more than one term. Given the dominance of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)/Union Pour La République (UNIR)** in

the executive and legislative branches of government, the court has never been deemed particularly independent. On some occasions, the court has tried to assert itself, including protesting against the extra-constitutional **succession** of **Faure Gnassingbé** to the presidency in 2005, or annulling some of the very harsh restrictions on press freedom imposed by the AN through the **Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication (HAAC)** in 2013. However, the court is viewed by many in Togo as either toothless or co-opted by the ruling party. **Constitutional amendments** in 2019 mean six of the nine jurists on the high court will be named (two each) by the president, AN, and the new **Senate**, appearing to favor the UNIR as the party in power even more. The most recent court was invested in late 2019 with only seven members, as the newly created (but not yet operational) Senate of Togo will have the power to name the remaining two members.

COUR DE SÛRETÉ DE L'ETAT. Special State Security Court set up in September 1970 to try crimes against the internal and external security of the state, starting with the defendants **attempted coup in August 1970**. In the original trial, the court—convening in November—was composed of two military officers, the ministers of interior under the preceding **Sylvanus Olympio** and **Nicolas Grunitzky** administrations (**Theophile Mally** and **Fousseni Mama**, respectively) and presided over by the president of **Lomé's** Court of Appeal, **Atsu-Koffi Amega**. The court was reconvened on 24 and 25 August 1979 to try 15 individuals accused of plotting against President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**.

COUR SUPRÊME. Togo's Supreme Court, officially established in 1961, though not fully operative until the onset of the **Nicolas Grunitzky** administration. The court was revamped by the 1992 constitution, and today consists of two chambers, one administrative and one judiciary, each with four members named by the cabinet.

COURIER DU GOLFE. Independent weekly established after freedom of the press was specifically recognized in 1990. Notwithstanding this, its journalists were harassed, intimidated, and arrested on several occasions for writing unsavory articles about General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Its editor, **Koffi Homawoo**, was hauled to court on one occasion and the newspaper threatened with the closure of electricity and water service unless it ceased publishing lies about Eyadéma. The Courier managed to outsell the official government newspaper, **La Nouvelle Marche**, though unsubsidized by the state its issues cost 10 times more.

COVID-19. *See* CORONAVIRUS.

CREDIT DU TOGO. **State sector** organ created in 1957 to offer credit services to Togo's **agricultural** cooperatives and farmers and to support, through loans, the creation of small new firms. The **bank** gave out a total of eight billion CFA francs in loans until its activities were curtailed in December 1966. At that time, two state banks were created to replace the Credit du Togo. The **Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA)** inherited the agricultural loans operations of Credit du Togo (which constituted the bulk of that organ's operations) and a new **Banque Togolaise de Developpement (BTD)** was created to encourage more forcefully the creation of new, small, and medium-sized enterprises in Togo.

CULT OF PERSONALITY. *See* PERSONALITY CULT.

CURRENCY. *See* COMMUNAUTÉ FINANCIERE AFRICAINE (CFA) FRANC.

D

DABLA, EMMANUEL ADAMBOUNOU. Painter and designer. Born in the village of **Togoville** and educated there and in the former British Togoland, Dabla received the professional encouragement and assistance of **Jacob Ohin**, a prominent Togolese painter. Dabla exhibited his works domestically (winning first prize at Togo's 1960 Independence Exposition) and abroad (taking the silver medal at the Tenth Expo-Paris in 1961). He has a salon in **Lomé** and has, in turn, encouraged other budding Togolese artists, including a joint exhibit with his elder son, Ayaovi Sessofia.

DADJO, COLONEL KLEBER (1914–1979). Former head of the Garde Togolaise, minister of justice, and until his death, Chef de Canton in the north. A Nawde (ethnically close to the **Kabyé**) born in central Togo on 12 August 1914, Dadjo was educated locally and joined the Togolese police in 1933. In August 1948, he was posted to Paris and later fought with the **French** forces in Indochina until 1955. Repatriated to **Lomé**, Dadjo rose up the ranks to captain (1957) and to major and commander of the Garde Togolaise in 1960. In 1963, he supported the demands of the recently demobilized Togolese veterans for integration into the Garde and assisted in the armed confrontation that resulted in **Sylvanus Olympio's** assassination. Following the **1963 coup**, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and, in a reorganization of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** command in 1965, appointed head of President **Nicolas Grunitzky's** military cabinet, a position he held until the **coup of 1967**. By virtue of his rank and seniority, Dadjo became chairman of the interim **Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN)**, set up after the 1967 coup and, after General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** assumption of executive power in April 1967, Dadjo was brought into the cabinet as minister of justice. In 1969, Dadjo was retired from the armed forces and from the cabinet and was appointed chef de canton in a northern district, a position he held until his death. In 2006, Dadjo was posthumously recognized when the government of President **Faure Gnassingbé** renamed the Avenue de la **Nouvelle Marche** in **Lomé** after him: Avenue Kleber Dadjo.

DADZIE, EMILE. Minister of economy and finance 1994–1996 in the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**—**Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** coalition government under Prime Minister **Edem Kodjo**. He also worked for the improvement of his home district of **Bè** in **Lomé**, notably by organizing the festival *Dunenyo Zan*, bringing together multiple quarters of the capital (and members of both government and opposition) in annual celebration 2017–2019.

DAGADZI, BARNABE. Civil administrator. Trained overseas in engineering, Dagadzi returned to Togo to work with the Department of Public Works, rapidly becoming its principal engineer. In 1967, he was appointed deputy director of Public Works and director in 1970. In that year he was nominated **president of the Banque Togolaise de Developpement (BTD)** by the government, serving in that capacity until his retirement in 1980.

DAHOMEY. Name of a precolonial **Adja** kingdom in the country now known as **Benin**, with a history dating back to the early 17th century. The colonial name for what is today Benin was Republic of Dahomey from 1960 to 1975.

DAPAONG. Largest town in the northernmost **Savanes** region, Dapaong is home to over 50,000 people, including members of the **Moba** ethnic group, and is situated within 30 miles of the borders of both **Ghana** and Burkina Faso.

DA SILVA, FRANCISCO OLYMPIO (1883–1907). President **Sylvanus Olympio**'s grandfather and founder of the Olympio family in Togo. Of mixed parentage, Da Silva emigrated from Brazil to West Africa in the middle of the 19th century. He settled in **Agoué** where there was already a bustling **Brazilian** community and a **Catholic** chapel, dropping the Da Silva part of his name, under which he had been a slave in Brazil. He worked in commerce, including the slave trade until 1860 when it became illegal.

DA SOUZA, FRANCISCO FELIX (1760?–1849). Portuguese immigrant who became an important trader in the **Aného** area and later official governor of Ouidah under the aegis of the king of **Dahomey**. Of humble origins, Da Souza commenced his West African career as a minor trader in a variety of commodities, including slaves and guns. He first installed himself in Aného around 1788, establishing the Ajuda quarter, precursor of the current Adjido quarter. After a dispute over a debt owed to him by Dahomey's King Adandozan, Da Souza was imprisoned in Abomey (Dahomey's capital) and was

released only after the intervention of Ghezo, the future king of Dahomey who rose to power with Da Souza's assistance. Elevated to the position of Chacha (chief customs collector, effectively Governor) of Ouidah, the biggest slave port on the coast, Da Souza exercised a monopoly over all trade in the region and became enormously wealthy. Fully involved with his duties in Ouidah, Da Souza relegated his authority in Aného to his lieutenant, Akouété Zanklibossou, and his commercial enterprises to his sons. After the slave trade was abolished, the Da Souza interests shifted to **palm** oil. Francisco Da Souza died in Ouidah in 1849 and received a regal funeral including, according to some sources, human sacrifices.

DECENTRALIZATION. During the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS)** and in conversations about the new **constitution**, the opposition and representatives of rural populations pushed for true decentralization of power in Togo, giving regions and localities autonomy in hopes of checking the power of the central government. One result of this push was Article 141 in the 1992 constitution, establishing that regions, prefectures, and communes would all represent levels of "territorial collectivities," administered by elected councils. However, the true devolution of power was low on the list of priorities for President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, as struggles for power in presidential and legislative **elections** took center stage in the years immediately following the National Conference transition. In 1998, the first comprehensive decentralization legislation was passed and responsibility for implementing reforms was delegated to the ministry of the interior, but the law was never fully implemented. Under **Faure Gnassingbé's** leadership from 2005, the idea of decentralization was revived, and a more independent—though not well-funded—Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization of Territorial Collectivities (MATDCL) created. A new decentralization law in 2007 established a framework for subsequent reforms designed to support locally elected councils and mayors, but implementation was slow and **donors** and partners consider the legal framework patchy rather than unified, further contributing to limited devolution of power. On paper, the communes (which may be urban or rural) have a wide range of "competencies" that overlap with both government and private enterprise from regional planning, infrastructure, communications and environmental protection at one end of the spectrum, to vocational training, crafts, sports and **tourism** on the other end. In practice, though, where the prefectures' responsibility leaves off and the communes' begins is unclear, and the communes control very little of their own revenue or expenditure. Local elections for the commune-level councils (which in turn designate mayors from among their number) were still delayed year after year, leaving

the appointed, but increasingly irrelevant, **Délégations Spéciales** in charge at the local level. The country's administrative breakdown as of 2018 included 39 prefectures and 117 communes within the existing five regions (Appendix table 1), was in place for the **municipal elections of 2019**, the first such local elections since 1987. However, the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** passed a law just prior to the elections indicating that the prefectures were no longer "territorial collectivities" in their own right, and leaving only the regional and commune-level administrative units to be subject to the process of decentralization. This move could reflect a desire to eliminate a source of patronage and a layer of bureaucracy at the intermediate (prefecture) level which is in favor of true decentralization, but if over time power settles more in the hands of regional governments than commune-level elected officials, who as before have the power to determine the legality of moves by the communal governments, it will amount to greater centralization of power, instead. *See also* ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION.

DEDAURE. The **zongo** quarter of **Sokodé** and one of the original settlements of the **Kotokoli** in Togo. Dedaure includes the residence of the **Uro** of the Kotokoli.

DEGOUNE, JEAN YAOVI. Briefly minister delegate to the presidency in charge of relations with the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** and head of the **Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)**, Degoune was appointed to his post in December 1991 by President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh**.

DÉLÉGATIONS SPÉCIALES. District-level, appointed government bodies that replaced the old **Conseils des Circonscriptions** in 1973. To limit politicization at the local level at a time when the central government maintained tight control under President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party, the **Délégations Spéciales** had few powers. After liberalization in the early 1990s, the process of **decentralization** was supposed to replace the **Délégations Spéciales** with elected local governments. However, the implementation of reforms was delayed for years, leaving the ineffective **Délégations Spéciales** nominally in charge at the local level until the **municipal elections of 2019**. *See also* ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION.

DENDI. Found in larger concentrations in neighboring **Benin**, the Dendi are nonindigenous Mende merchants from Songhai (Niger) who migrated through the Niger River valley and settled along the principal precolonial

caravan routes offering middleman services to long distance traders. The Dendi speak their own **language**, a Songhai dialect, and many are **Muslim**. As they are intermarried with the local Muslim population, the size of Togo's Dendi population cannot be estimated.

DERMANE, ALI FREDERIC (1933–). Former cabinet minister and ambassador to **France**. Born of **Kotokoli** parents in **Bafilo** in 1933, Dermane, a **Catholic**, was educated in Aledjo, Yade, and **Lomé**, becoming a teacher in 1955. In 1959, he won a scholarship for administrative studies and in 1962 was appointed head of the Division of Price Controls in the ministry of commerce. Between 1963 and 1965 he was sent abroad (to Paris) for further training. On his return, he was integrated into President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s cabinet as interim minister of interior (during Major **Dedum Assila**'s convalescence) and of information between 1969 and 1973. In 1973, he was reassigned to the ministry of interior where he served as secretary general. In 1978 he commenced his diplomatic career through an appointment as ambassador to Brazil, and in 1980 he was given Togo's top posting, ambassador to France, a post held until 1985 when he returned to the Foreign Ministry in Lomé.

DE SOUZA, AUGUSTINO (1877–1960). Powerful early supporter, founder, and first president of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**. Born to an important **Mina, Brazilian** family in **Porto Seguro** in 1877, De Souza pursued a commercial and entrepreneurial career most of his life. In 1903, he joined the Deutsche Togo Gesellschaft and, following the latter's expulsion from Togo in 1914, he set up his own import-export firm. Later, he branched off into the production of **palm** oil and coconuts, purchasing large tracts near **Aného** for this purpose. Throughout the years, he prospered and was considered Togo's richest merchant in the pre-independence era. After World War II, De Souza became involved in the various movements aiming to unify all **Ewe** under one colonial administration. Toward this end, he was a liberal contributor to the nascent CUT, which he had helped found and of which he was first president (with **Sylvanus Olympio** at that time serving as vice president). Indeed, it was in De Souza's extensive plantations that the CUT leadership met to map out strategy and tactics. Too old to assume an active role in the CUT struggle vis-à-vis the **French administration** in Togo, De Souza's support for the movement in its early days was nevertheless invaluable. The De Souza family remains extremely powerful in Togo.

DE SOUZA, EMMANUEL KODJOVI. Entrepreneur and alleged mastermind behind the **1977 attempted coup** against the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**

regime. A very prosperous timber merchant from the illustrious De Souza **Brazilian** family, related by blood and marriage to the **Olympios** and also owner of a fleet of taxis in **Lomé**, De Souza allegedly was also the one who bankrolled the mercenary assault. When the plot failed, De Souza fled to Accra in **Ghana** but was kidnapped by Togolese agents and brought home to stand trial. Sentenced to death, he was released from prison in 1980 as part of Eyadéma's clemency on the eve of the **constitutionalization** of his regime.

DEVELOPMENT PLAN (FOURTH), 1981–1985. Originally dubbed the plan of “Grandes Realisations,” because of scheduled massive uplifting of the economy, the plan was in shambles and completely outdated even before it was printed. Scheduled investments were cut by one-third barely six months into the plan, due to massive shortfalls in anticipated revenues and the reluctance of both private and public capital to invest in Togo. Originally targeting investments at 368.5 billion CFAF (vs. 251 billion in the earlier plan, 145 billion for the second, and merely 75 for the first), the plan had a minimum priority segment of 251 billion in investments (that was not met) and an optional segment of 117.5 billion, most of which was chopped off almost immediately. As the plan originally stood, the **agricultural** sector would have benefited most with investments of 116 billion CFAF, followed by industrial, artisanal, and commercial projects (98 billion) and infrastructure, urban and transit facilities, and **tourist** outlays (100.7 billion).

DEVELOPMENT PLAN (SIXTH), 1991–1995. Completely moribund development plan, originally drawn (as was the fifth) in accord with World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) maxims stressing agrarian self-sufficiency, giving the private sector a major role, and diminishing the **state sector**. As with the case of the Fifth Development Plan (1985–1990), the projected revenues were not forthcoming; more importantly, the ongoing political turmoil in Togo from 1990 meant that few of the targeted projects could even commence. *See also* DONORS, RELATIONS WITH.

DEVELOPMENT PLAN (THIRD), 1976–1980. Conceived of as a bridge between the preceding two largely groundbreaking and researched development plans and the following (fourth) full-fledged development plan. Total investments were targeted at 251 billion CFAF, of which some 66 percent were to come from internal resources (public 57%, private 9%) and 34 percent from external donors (33% public, 2% private). Industrial projects (70 billion CFAF), rural development (56 billion), and infrastructure works (40 billion) were the prime sectors of the economy to benefit. The plan had to be

scaled down due to falling state revenues, and only some 70 percent of the plan was realized.

DISTRICT. *See* CIRCONSCRIPTION.

DJAFALO, ALBERT ALIDOU. *See* ALIDOU DJAFALO, COLONEL MENVEYINOYU.

DJAGBA, LAURENT (1926–1971). Former deputy to the **Chambre de Députés** from **Dapaong** and Speaker of the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)** during **Sylvanus Olympio**'s presidency. Born in 1926 in Bantamboare (Dapaong), Djagba was educated locally and joined the colonial administration in the far north. A member and later secretary general of the civil service **trade union** that was affiliated with the interterritorial **Confédération Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants (CATC)**, Djagba joined the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** and was elected as the latter's deputy from Dapaong in 1958. He played a prominent role in the legislative assembly, becoming its Speaker [Questor] and serving on the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, the assembly's Central Bureau, and the National Hospital's administrative commission. After the **coup d'état of 1963**, Djagba lost his assembly seat and was largely shunted aside. He was allegedly involved in the pro-CUT **attempted coup of 1970** and died during torture while in prison early in 1971. Further details about his death came to light during the debates at the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS)** in 1991.

DJITRI. *See* LOMÉ.

DJOBO, BOUKARI (1936–1997). Former minister of finance and president of the **Union Togolaise du Banque (UTB)**. Born in **Sokodé** in the north in 1936, Djobo traces his descent from the superior chief of the **Kotokoli** at the time of the **German conquest**. He was educated locally and studied law in Dakar, Senegal, and in Bordeaux and Paris. In 1960, he returned to Togo and was appointed director of the International Aid section of the Planning Department in the ministry of finance. Following **Sylvanus Olympio**'s assassination in 1963, Djobo—who though a northerner had joined the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**—was appointed head of the Togolese delegation to the 18th session of the United Nations General Assembly. In June 1964, he was brought back by President **Nicolas Grunitzky** to continue serving in the Planning Department and to become chairman of the UTB. In January 1966, he was promoted into the cabinet as minister of finance and

economics. He was briefly dropped from the cabinet on 23 December 1966, in the aftermath of a major cabinet reshuffle, occasioned by the ongoing tug-of-war between Grunitzky and **Antoine Méatchi**, but was reinstated after the **1967 coup d'état** as a member of the **Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN)**, with responsibility over finance. Following General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** military takeover in April of the same year, Djobo became minister of finance again and held the position until early 1969. Also a former director of the **Office de Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT)**, Djobo continued to serve as president of the UTB and a noncabinet advisor on economic affairs until retirement.

DJONDO, KOFFI GERVAIS (1937–). Former minister of state companies, banker, influential member of the Political Bureau of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, and a founder of **Ecobank**. Born in **Aného** on 4 July 1937, and educated at the University of Paris, Djondo started his career as a labor inspector and eventually became director of Togo's Caisse de Compensation, des Prestations Familiales et des Accidents du Travail. In 1968 he was named President of the **Conseil Economique et Social (CES)**. An early member of Togo's single party, the RPT, Djondo was an influential leader in the latter's Political Bureau (in charge of social affairs). Djondo was president of Togo's **Chamber of Commerce** from 1977 and secretary general of the Société Commerciale de l'Afrique Occidentale. In September 1984, he was brought into President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cabinet as minister of state companies, charged with **privatizing the state sector**, a position he held until May 1991.

DJOUA, MAJOR YOMA NARCISSE. A **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** relative and staunchly loyal commander of the **Forces d'Intervention Rapide (FIR)**, essentially a political police. A **Kabyé** from Eyadéma's home area, Djoua was rapidly promoted and in 1980 assigned administrative duties as prefect of Oti. There for six long years he ruled supreme and with a harsh hand, triggering numerous complaints about his arrogant behavior. He was particularly attacked for brutally enforcing the ban keeping the local population out of the newly created Oti Hunting Preserve that was frequented by General Eyadéma himself. After 1986, he joined the **Presidential Guard** where he was notorious for his zeal in interrogating political prisoners. It was Djoua and his units that seized the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** in October 1992 in support of Eyadéma during the tug-of-war between Eyadéma and interim prime minister **Joseph Koffigoh**. His tactics finally fell out of favor as Togo tried to recover from the upheavals of the 1990s; he spent ten years in prison from 1995 for murder of a Togolese citizen abroad, and died in 2007.

DOGBÉ, GODWIN KOUASSI (1910–1978). Senior administrative officer. Born in **Lomé** on 23 August 1910, Dogbé joined the civil service in 1928 and remained in it until his death in 1978. On 23 May 1958, he was appointed director of the cabinet of **Anani Santos**, the minister of justice. When Santos was purged, Dogbé was reappointed to serve in a similar role in the cabinet of **Paul Anani Amegée**, the minister of public health (June 1959). He remained in a senior capacity in the administration until his retirement and death.

DOGBÉ, YVES-EMMANUEL (1939–2004). Educator and Togo's foremost poet. Born in **Lomé** on 10 May 1939, Dogbé studied locally and in **Ghana**, after which he taught in several **Beninois** schools while publishing articles, poems, and fables in local newspapers. During the 1970s, Dogbé resided mostly in Paris and soon started publishing volumes of fables and poems through his own publishing company (Akpagnon). In 1977, while in **Lomé**, he was arrested for criticizing **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** economic policies and returned to Paris where he resided until 1991, when with most exiles he returned to Togo. His stature as Togo's greatest living writer remains unchallenged, even after his death in 2004.

DOGBEH, RICHARD (1932–2003). Educator, poet, and author, of **Beninois** origin but established in Togo. Born in Cotonou, Benin, on 31 December 1932, Dogbeh was educated locally, in Côte d'Ivoire, and in Senegal. His brilliant school record enabled him in 1954 to continue his studies in several **French** universities where he was also involved in the militant students' movement the Federation des Étudiants de l'Afrique Noire en France, a branch of which he headed. After his return to Benin he became cabinet director of the minister of national **education** (until 1966) and later head of the National Pedagogic Institute in Porto Novo. He has served briefly as head of the French section of the **Ghanaian** Academy of Sciences' Africa Encyclopedia project and from 1968 was associated with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In 1969, he established himself in Togo, teaching in a high school in **Atakpamé** and at the **Université de Benin** in **Lomé**. He published several novels and collections of poems that received international acclaim and wrote articles for local and French newspapers.

DOGO KOUDJOLOU, MEGBEMEWE HENRI (1938–). Former extremely influential minister of planning, trade and industry and former assistant secretary general of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. Of **Kabyé** origins, Dogo was born in Pagouda in the north in 1938 and entered the civil service after obtaining a law degree abroad. He served as an

administrator with the **Banque Togolaise de Développement (BTD)**, Togo's representative to the Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD), and director of Research on the Plan at the ministry of commerce, industry and **tourism**. In 1969, Dogo was a founding member of the RPT party and was named assistant secretary general under **Edem Kodjo**. When the party was reorganized a year later and the position of secretary general was abolished, Dogo became a member of the party's Political Bureau. Considered one of the key northern technocrats in **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** regime and a personal crony of the president, Dogo joined the cabinet in 1972 as secretary of state for Trade, Planning and Industry and in February 1974 was promoted to full ministerial rank. He has also been director of the **Société Togolaise de Marbrerie et de Matériaux (SOTOMA)**, Togo's state **marble** corporation, and served on numerous other **parastatal** boards. One of the longest-tenured of Eyadéma's cabinet ministers, Dogo was finally summarily dismissed in September 1982 under intense pressure from international financial circles demanding an end to corruption and inefficiency in Togo's **state sector** prior to any further financing so urgently requested by the regime. In January, Dogo was also purged from the RPT on the grounds of corruption and inefficiency, especially during his tenure at the head of the **Banque Arabe-Libyenne Togolaise du Commerce Extérieur (BALTEX)**. Briefly advisor to Eyadéma, Dogo was appointed deputy managing director of Air Afrique in 1985. Immensely rich by now, Dogo briefly bounced back into the cabinet in February 1990 as minister of rural development before the multiparty liberalization swept him out. He reemerged in 2009 as a member of President Faure Gnassingbé's **Cadre permanent de dialogue et de concertation (CPDC)**, alongside other former ministers and members of the opposition.

DOH, ALBERT (1908–1988). Former **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** deputy to the **Chambre de Députés** and Treasurer of the CUT parliamentary group. Born in 1908 in Agbouve in the south, Doh was educated locally and was engaged in commercial activities until the late 1940s when he joined the CUT. With the rise of the **Sylvanus Olympio** regime, Doh was elected to the **Chambre de Députés** from Notsé (1958) and remained a deputy until the **1963 coup d'état**. The parliamentary party's Treasurer and member of the legislature's Finance and Economics Committee until the demise of the Olympio regime, Doh became engaged in commercial activities after 1963.

DOKITA. Government-sponsored chatbot for **coronavirus** information launched in 2020, designed to give rapid and widely accessible information via mobile technology to help Togolese prevent the spread of the disease.

Dokita offers a self-assessment of symptoms, precautions to take, and information about nearby pharmacies.

DO KOKOU, JACQUES METONOU (1949–). Cinematographer. Born in **Lomé** in 1949 and educated both at home and in **France**, Do Kokou produced the acclaimed film *Kouami*, and founded l'Association pour la Promotion de la Culture des Arts et des Loisirs for the promotion of photography and film. In 2002, he created the Cinéma Itinérant du Togo to give the public the opportunity to watch and appreciate African films, with the support of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie.

DONORS, RELATIONS WITH. Togo's struggles with creditors and donor countries and agencies began in earnest with the political troubles of the 1990s. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank had applied pressure on Togo in the 1980s to reform some of the most bloated and corrupt **state-run sectors** of the economy when debt had reached a peak at 95 percent of GDP. The good relationship established by this early cooperation, as well as a relatively liberal approach to international trade and a surprisingly good relationship with **France**, helped President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** renegotiate debt and weather the violent and long-lasting opposition to his regime from 1991 to 1994. Compared to neighboring **Benin**, where the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of the outgoing regime was indicative of very poor relations with international donors, Togo was in a much stronger position to withstand the economic pressure to democratize. Still, the bloody events of the transition period, including members of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** taking Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** hostage, were too much for many international partners, including the United States, which suspended aid to Togo in 1992. A gathering including visiting dignitaries from France and **Germany** was fired upon in January 1993, leaving at least 22 Togolese dead, and France opted to suspend cooperation the next month. However, the election of a center-right coalition in France later in 1993 was seen as a positive sign for Eyadéma, and the influence of the French on European and other Western partners, in addition to the calming of political tensions, meant that most cooperation was restored by 1995, though it was quickly suspended again after the government and military interference in Togo's **1998 presidential election**.

In the aftermath of that election, the French worked closely with Togo to establish more inclusive political system. Though **Gilchrist Olympio** refused to meet with him, French President Jacques Chirac extracted a promise from Eyadéma not to run for reelection in 2003 as part of the **Lomé Framework Agreement**. This agreement broke down when electoral code changes

prompted an opposition boycott of the **2002 elections** for the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**, and Eyadéma no longer felt beholden to his promise not to run in 2003. Still, Chirac argued for the resumption of European Union (EU) aid to Togo based on the relative calm of the **2003 presidential contest**, and while he condemned the extra-constitutional ascension of **Faure Gnassingbé** to the presidency in 2005, he endorsed the results of the **election** two months later. Gnassingbé courted French cooperation from the start, visiting France, and wooing successive French presidents, regularly. By 2006, both France and the EU were prepared to support legislative **elections**, and when those elections were contested by the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**, which had resisted full participation for so many years, full economic cooperation with all of Togo's main donor partners, including the World Bank and IMF, was restored in 2007.

From that point, the focus on donor relations shifted to debt relief for Togo. Having been accepted into the IMF and World Bank framework for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), Togo set about complying with the terms for debt relief, meeting its goals by 2011 and prompting France cancel Togo's debt as well. By 2011, Togo's debt was only 12.9 percent of GDP, down from 52 percent in 2006. Gnassingbé was invited to **China** for a state visit in 2013 where financing for infrastructure was secured, and visited France and Germany that year as well. Though Togo took on additional debt to fund infrastructure projects including **phosphate** extraction and cement production, it did not harm its reputation with creditors and donors. The IMF signed a new agreement with Togo in 2017, and Gnassingbé continued to have good relationships with the African Development Bank and the European Development Fund. Appendix figure 1 shows both the reason and reward for Gnassingbé's good relations with donor countries and organizations: after years of fluctuating growth rates, Togo's economy has settled into a pattern of steadier growth.

DONOU, CAPTAIN AYI. One of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** half-brothers and commander of the **presidential guard**, the key unit assuring the personal safety of the president. During Eyadéma's tenure, the 1,200-man North Korean-trained unit was assisted by two intelligence services both of which were also headed by trusted Eyadéma relatives. Captain Donou himself was much feared in **Lomé** as a ruthless, swaggering officer. *See also* BRIGADE DE RECHERCHE ET D'INVESTIGATION; BRIGADE DE VIGILANCE.

DOSSEH, DAVID. Doctor and civil society leader. Trained as a medical doctor and university professor, David Dosseh joined the Syndicat des

Praticiens Hospitaliers du Togo (SYNPHOT) and rose to become president of the organization. He stepped down from that post in order to join the **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)**, which formed in advance of the **2013 legislative elections** in Togo. An accomplished surgeon, Dosseh was offered the director generalship of the main state-run hospital in Togo, but declined in favor of his civil society work, which many took as a sign that he would not be co-opted by the party in power. He instead formed the nongovernmental organization **Front Citoyen Togo Debout** as president, and was the subject of some speculation as a candidate for the presidency in 2015, though in the end he did not run. He was named Chevalier de l'Ordre des Palmes Academiques Françaises in July 2017.

DOSSEH-ANYRON, ROBERT CASIMIR. Former archbishop of **Lomé**. Appointed archbishop in 1962, replacing **Joseph Strebler**, Dosseh-Anyron became the first indigenous Togolese to occupy that post, serving until 1992. Previously, he had served in Lomé's archdiocese.

DOU. Term designating the specific **Ewe** clan of origin and its traditional territory. A dou may encompass several thousand people and has its own particular mythology of origin, history, and leadership.

DOUBLE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. Electoral system that existed for some time in the **French administration** of colonial territories under which representatives were elected by two separate electoral colleges. One college was composed of metropolitan citizens and local assimilés or évolués, while the second was composed of African subjects satisfying certain lower criteria for membership. The system drastically overrepresented the French community in each colony and, among the native population, restricted the franchise to local elites. Used also in territories placed under France's mandate, in Togo the first electoral college included only 1,500 voters who elected 20 percent of the deputies in the first postwar territorial assembly (6 of the 30 members). The double electoral college was abolished in Togo in February 1952, earlier than in France's other African territories.

DOUMEGAWO. An assembly of all the representatives of the noble families that, together with the **fiohawo**, exercises power among the **Ewe**.

DOUNYAH, PAUL KOUASSI. Former minister. Dounyah joined the September 1991 **transition government** as minister of labor and the civil service as a representative of the **Parti d'Action pour le Développement (PAD)** party. He was retained in the subsequent 1992 coalition government with

the opposition and the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, but was dropped from the cabinet in February 1993.

DOVI, AHLONKO. Lawyer and **human rights** advocate. Former head of the **Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH)**, in 1991 he supervised the publication of a report accusing the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** of causing thousands of deaths in the 1980s. He fled Togo in 1992 during the political upheaval, returning only in 2006, after the death of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. He opened a legal office and helped to defend **Pascal Bondja**, former minister accused of corruption, in 2014.

DZO. Symbol of fire in **Ewe** magic rituals. *See also* ANIMISM.

E

ECO. Proposed currency to revamp and replace the existing **Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc** from 2020. While **France** would like the currency to hail a new era of cooperation with the francophonie in Africa, many African leaders would prefer to see a common currency built around **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** membership, and include anglophone countries with large markets like **Ghana** and Nigeria. Negotiations over the terms of the new currency are ongoing.

ECOBANK-TOGO. West Africa's first non-European, non-state **bank**, bankrolled with \$45 million by the 16-member **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** and established in mid-1988 with headquarters in **Lomé**. The bulk of the bank's equity comes from its parent company (Ecobank Transnational) that is privately held. Only 5 percent is local money from private investors. **Koffi Djondo**, former cabinet minister to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and former head of the Togo's **Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI)**, is credited as one of the founders of Ecobank.

ECOLE NATIONALE D'ADMINISTRATION (ENA). Advanced School of Administration for middle-echelon officials and candidates for administrative careers. Students take normal courses as well as participate in internships. Once they complete their course of studies, they are, in principle, ready for senior administrative duty.

ÉCOLE WILLIAM PONTY. Prestigious Lycée on Goree island just off Dakar, Senegal (after 1938 at Sebikotane, a suburb of Rufisque), to which the cream of Francophone Africa's elite were usually admitted, to be practically guaranteed a high-level civil service appointment upon completion of studies or entrance to **French** universities. Among prominent Togolese educated at the École William Ponty were **Henri Ajavon**, **Samuel Aquereburu**, **Dr. Marc Atipedé**, **Bedou Benoit**, **Fousseni Mama**, and **Bruno Savi de Tové**.

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICA (ECOWAS). International community of sixteen French- and English-speaking states (*Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* or CEDEAO in French) aimed at creating a vast common market stretching from Mauritania to Nigeria and estimated to include almost 350 million people. The headquarters of the organization is in Lagos. Officially founded in 1978 but traces its origins to the Niamey Economic Community of Africa meeting of 1965 and the 1975 ECOWAS treaty. Togo is a full member of ECOWAS; President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** served as the organization's president in 1980 and 1981, and again in 1998). ECOWAS has been influential in Togolese politics by helping to foster better relations between Togo and **Ghana** in the mid-1990s after the cross-border tensions associated with the failed democratic transition, and by joining the pressure campaign to force elections during the **succession crisis of 2005**. President **Faure Gnassingbé** served as head of the organization 2017–2018, though ongoing **street demonstrations** prevented Togo from hosting a high-level ECOWAS meeting in **Lomé** during his tenure.

EDE, GASTON. Deputy of the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**, elected on the **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)** party list in the February **1994 elections**, shortly after which he was murdered by the members of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**.

EDITOGO. *See* ÉTABLISSEMENT NATIONAL DES ÉDITIONS DU TOGO.

EDOH, KOFFI (1939–2012). Former minister of technical **education**. Born in 1939 in Amou-Oblo and educated in Togo, **France**, and in the United States (University of Arizona) in physics, Edoh first joined the **Université de Benin** teaching physics, concurrently director of Studies at the **Lomé Protestant College**. In September 1984, he was appointed minister of technical education by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, a post he held until 1988.

EDUCATION. Togo is one of Africa's most highly educated states, in part because of avid interest in education fostered among southern groups (**Ewe**, **Mina**, and, to a lesser extent, the **Ouatchi**) and partly because of the early presence of missionary schools along the coast. Since most early educational drives (private or public) were concentrated in the south, school enrollment figures were until recently decades unevenly spread throughout the country. Only with the rise of the northern **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime was a serious effort mounted to bridge the educational gap between the north and the

south. In the 1971–1972 school year, for example, 99 percent of school-age children in **Lomé** attended school, compared to 18 percent in **Sansanne-Mango** in the far north. Though the imbalance still remains, by the late 1980s the latter percentage had gone up to 36 percent, a major achievement. Togo is reportedly on track to meet the international community’s Sustainable Development Goal of full primary school enrollment by 2025.

Missionary schools were at the forefront in promoting rapid educational advances in the south. Only in 1956 did public education surpass private education in enrollment, with more of the latter in the south and public education concentrated in the north, but, even in 1982 mission schools continued to educate fully 50 percent of Togo’s pupils. In the 1980s, technical schools received major new financial assistance, greatly increasing student attendance, though by the late 1980s financial conditions caused a slow-down in the projected quadrupling of this sector of public education. Student registration at the local **Université du Bénin (UB)** also zoomed up in the 1980s, in part as the regime gave more scholarships for (cheaper) study at home than in France. In the 1990–1991 school year (just before the massive unrest that was to distort statistics for two years) there were over 8,250 students at the UB. The 1990–1991 budget for education consumed 13,911 billion CFAF, though the percentage of the budget going for education halved from 23 percent to 12 percent as resources were shifted to other more pressing areas.

As of 2008, school fees for primary school students were abolished in a cooperative project between the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Togolese government, enabling greater enrollment. As many as 90 percent of primary school-age children attend school, making it a success story in the region. Secondary school enrollment is lower, however, at about 41 percent, and teachers in Togo have been on strike frequently since 2013 for better pay and working conditions. There are an estimated 40,000 students enrolled in the **Université de Lomé** (formerly Université du Bénin), including technical schools affiliated with the university, though **student organizations** often strike to protest poor or unfair conditions.

EDUCATIONAL REFORM OF 1975. A restructuring of school curriculum and introduction of two “national” languages, **Kabyé** in **La Kara** and **Ewe** in **Notsé**. The original plan, already modified, was that eventually **French** language instruction (though not French language) would be completely phased out of the Togolese school system. The **educational** reform also provided for universal free education for children between the ages of two and 15, programs of continuing education, and automatic class promotion of all children irrespective of school performance.

EFOUI, KOSSI (1962–). Playwright and novelist. Currently living in **France**, Efoui was born in Anfoin and educated at the **Université du Bénin** before leaving in the turbulent 1990s. He has published many plays, and his first novel, *La Polka*, was published in 1998. More recently, his *Cantique de l'acacia* (2017) envisions a political future for Togo in dystopian, fabled terms.

ÉGLISE ÉVANGÉLIQUE PRESBYTÉRIENNE DU TOGO (EEPT). The only major completely indigenously staffed church in West Africa, the EEPT has existed since the 1920s. The roots of the Evangelical Church of Togo are imbedded in the 1847 entry into West Africa (via Accra) of the **Bremen Missionary Society** that eventually made the **Ewe** the prime focus of their activities. After the Ashanti wars in the **Gold Coast** (1865–1974), the Society greatly expanded its efforts among the Ewe, though it was expelled from Togo with **Germany's** loss of the colony. The United Free Church of Scotland was invited by the British administration to British Togoland to replace the activities of the Bremen Society. Shortage of staff, however, resulted in a policy stressing the utilization of indigenous staff as much as possible, leading eventually to the autonomous spirit of the local church. In 1927, the church opted for the name Ewe Presbyterian Church. In the French mandate of Togo, the Ewe church proclaimed its independence after the end of World War I, and it has been autonomous since, despite the entry into the territory of the Société des Missions de Paris in 1929. In 1954, the church in British Togo changed its name to the Evangelical Presbyterian Church (to satisfy non-Ewe elements) while in 1957 the French Togo branch changed its name to Église Évangélique du Togo. Today the EEPT claims 180,000 members (up from 20,000 in 1960) in 590 parishes, and manages over 100 primary schools and a hospital in Agou. *See also* PROTESTANTS; RELIGION.

EHE, N'SOUWODJI KAO. Executive director of the **Union Togolaise de Banque (UTB)** and briefly minister of trade and **transport**. Ehe joined **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cabinet in March 1987 but was dismissed on 21 December 1988 for fiscal impropriety when it was discovered he had continued to receive two salaries, one from his former employer. He then rejoined the UTB.

EHOUE. Small ethnic group, part of the Agni-Tchi constellation, found exclusively in the Mono region in the vicinity of **Atakpamé-Notsé-Tchoum**.

EKLO, YAO KUNALE MICHEL. Former minister of interior and representative to the United Nations. Director of the Political Affairs Department at

Togo's ministry of foreign affairs between August 1968 and 1970, Eklo was dispatched in mid-1970 to become economic counselor at Togo's embassy in Paris. In August 1971, he was appointed Togo's permanent representative to the United Nations, and two years later he was repatriated and brought into the cabinet as secretary of state in charge of information. In February 1974, he was promoted to full ministerial rank, and in March 1975 he was shifted to the key position as minister of interior, though he was dropped from the cabinet altogether in February 1977. Eklo continued to serve the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, being the latter's administrative secretary for nearly two decades. Eklo was one of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** prime cronies, passing away in 2008.

EKLOU, PAULIN (1928–2016). Economist and former cabinet minister. Born on 19 February 1928 to an **Ewe** family in the **Kpalimé** area, Eklou was educated locally and in **France** where, after secondary schooling, he continued his studies at the University of Montpellier (1950–1952) and at the National Institute of Economic and Financial Studies, graduating in 1957. He continued his practical training at the Central Bank in Paris and then in Brazzaville (Congo), Cotonou (**Benin**), and at the United Nations. Upon his return to Togo in 1962, he was appointed director of Togo's Economic Planning Department by President **Sylvanus Olympio**. He continued serving in this capacity under the successor regime of **Nicolas Grunitzky** until November 1966. A former prominent member of Olympio's **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, Eklou was involved in the November 1966 attempted coup to topple Grunitzky and was consequently arrested and imprisoned in **Sansanne-Mango** in the far north until the 1967 coup d'état. In the aftermath of the coup, he was brought into the interim **Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN)** with responsibilities in the fields of commerce and industry. Following General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** assumption of full powers in April 1967, Eklou was brought into the latter's cabinet as minister of commerce and industry and became a key member of the newly formed **Conseil Economique et Social (CES)**. In 1969, he was shifted to head the ministry of rural economy, holding this position until January 1972. At that date Eklou was dropped from the cabinet and reassigned as technical counselor attached to ministry of economics and finance. He then served for several years as president of **Ciments du Togo (CIMTOGO)** before entering retirement.

EKOI, FRANCIS. Deputy chairman of the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)**, and head of the **Parti d'Action pour démocratie (PAD)** in the 1990s. The party merged with **Edem Kodjo's Union Togolaise pour la**

Démocratie (UTD) and two others in 1999 to form the **Convergence Patriotique Panafricaine (CPP)**.

EKPEMOG. Colloquial **Ewe** word referring to the unruly irregular southern pro-civilian government militia that sprang up to support Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh**'s government in August 1991 against intimidation and/or assault by the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** supportive of the continued dictatorship of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. The word comes from "Ekpe" which is "stone" (their sole weapons) in Ewe and "mog" from the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** peacekeeping force, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), then active in Liberia. *See also* TRANSITION GOVERNMENTS 1991–1993.

ELECTIONS OF APRIL 1958. The elections of April 1958 to the **Chambre de Députés** were crucial for two reasons. First, being United Nations-supervised, they ended the era of active gerrymandering, intimidation, and discrimination by the local **French administration** against the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** and in favor of northern and conservative political formations and thus allowed for a true reflection of the balance of political power in the territory. Secondly, the outcome of the elections shattered the complacent and pro-French **Autonomous Republic** administration of **Nicolas Grunitzky** and his **Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP)**, brought about the CUT government of **Sylvanus Olympio**, and paved the way for independence. The elections were under the supervision of a Haitian administrator and a team of United Nations-appointed personnel. The various parties competed for 46 seats equally apportioned between the north and the south of the country. The PTP hardly campaigned before the elections, being overly confident of its electoral power. Yet the results were a clear-cut victory for the southern CUT (29 of 46 seats), which had been in the political wilderness since 1952.

ELECTIONS OF DECEMBER 1979. The elections of December 1979 were the first since independence and were held under the constitution that set up the **Third Republic**. There were in essence three votes: for the presidency, the uniparty **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)**, and a referendum on the constitution itself. The official turnout was 98 percent, of which 99.9 percent ratified the constitution, the Assembly list, and the choice of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** as president.

ELECTIONS OF 1985. The elections for the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)** of 24 March 1985, the second under the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime, were marked by a high (79%) turnout and greater competition

for the 66 seats. Though all candidates ran under the banner of the single party, the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, multiple candidacies were allowed and a total 131 individuals contested the available seats. Only 22 incumbents were reelected, and the new Assembly had a lower average age than the previous one.

ELECTIONS OF 1990. The elections of March 1990 for the 77 seats in the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)** took place against the rising tide for multipartyism. In the first round on 4 March, 69 seats were filled, the remaining being filled in the second round on 18 March. A total of 1.3 million voters participated in the elections and 188 candidates (with as many as 6 in some constituencies) ran for office.

ELECTIONS BETWEEN 1993 AND 2003. Elections in this period, before the 2005 death of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, reflect a rocky transition to multipartyism, and a ruler unsure of how to allow enough competition to please the international community, but not so much that he might have to actually share power with opponents. Divisions within the opposition also prevented a unified electoral front to oppose him, and when any candidate came close, the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** and **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** members of government closed ranks to help ensure victory for incumbents.

Presidential 1993. In the presidential elections of 25 August 1993, General Eyadéma ran against himself, as international observers pulled out of the country in order not to provide any legitimation to a nonevent. All but two minor independent candidates (**Ife Adani** who got 1.87% of the vote and **Jacques Amouzou** who obtained 1.64%) boycotted the election after Eyadéma engineered the disqualification of **Gilchrist Olympio**. The turnout was just 39.5 percent of the electorate.

Legislative 1994. Despite a measure of intimidation and irregularities in several districts, the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** elections were seen by most foreign monitors and observers as basically fair. The largest number of seats (36) was won by the southern **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)** party of **Yao Agboyibo**, followed by Eyadéma's RPT with 35 seats (all in the North), both trailed by the **Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** with 7 and the **Union pour la Justice et la Démocratie (UJD)** with 2. The much-discredited interim prime minister **Jospeh Koffigoh** did not align himself with any party and won his own seat in the second round. After the resignation of Koffigoh's **transitional government** of national unity, Eyadéma appointed **Edem Kodjo** of the minority UTD as his new prime minister in an effort to further split the southern vote, deeply divided by Kodjo's being unwilling to form an electoral alliance with the **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)**.

Presidential 1998. The first and only electoral contest to pit Eyadéma and Gilchrist Olympio (son of former president **Sylvanus Olympio**) against one another. Turnout was high at 69.8 percent, but in **Lomé** polling places were set upon by military forces who took ballot boxes and obstructed the relaying of vote counts from southern areas. Members of the **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)**, including **Nana Awa**, resigned in protest, and the ministry of the interior took over the vote count, ultimately declaring Eyadéma the winner with 52 percent of the vote, avoiding a second-round runoff. International observers, opposition members, and voters were outraged, and the demonstrations and subsequent military crackdown saw some of the worst **human rights** violence in Togo's history, including a flood of **refugees** to neighboring **Ghana** and **Benin**.

Legislative 1999. Still asserting that the 1998 presidential election results were inconclusive, the opposition parties in Togo refused to participate in the legislative elections held nine months later, and their call for a boycott was well followed by supporters, especially in the south. Only the RPT and two aligned parties, plus independents, contested the election, and the RPT won 79 of the 81 seats, with the remaining two going to independents.

Legislative 2002. Held early, per the **Lomé Framework Agreement** between the RPT and opposition parties to overcome the bitter divisions left from the 1998 contest. However, in advance of the poll, the AN modified the electoral code and CENI composition, prompting the opposition to boycott again. Smaller opposition parties did participate, and observers called the poll reasonably free and fair, though the European Union (EU) withdrew funding for it in response to the legal changes. The RPT won 72 seats and smaller parties or independents won nine.

Presidential 2003. **Electoral system** changes from 2002 (see above) affected the presidential election of 2003, in which Eyadéma was no longer subject to a two-term limit, and could win in one round with a plurality of the vote, rather than a two-round runoff. He ran against **Emmanuel Akitani-Bob**, the vice president of Olympio's **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**, as well as other opposition candidates like Yao Agboyibo and Edem Kodjo. Though there were many irregularities in the poll, Eyadéma's victory with 58 percent of the vote was plausible, with so many opponents; Akitani-Bob reportedly earned 33.7 percent, Agboyibo 5 percent, and others less than 4 percent combined.

ELECTIONS BETWEEN 2005 AND 2020. After President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** died in 2005, there was hope in the country that the patterns of electoral competition could change for the better. But the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** and **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** made

sure to install Eyadéma's son **Faure Gnassingbé** in office by any means necessary, and over time redistricting, **electoral system** reforms, and **constitutional amendments** have served to further entrench the new president in power. President Gnassingbé won a fourth term in office in the elections of 2020 by a margin that raised eyebrows, even from those accustomed to doubting the accuracy of Togo's official election results.

Presidential 2005. After the **succession crisis of 2005** in which the FAT attempted to install Gnassingbé to serve out his father's term, international outcry forced the hasty organization of a new presidential contest. Despite irregularities, the opposition saw a meaningful opportunity, and this time united around the main opposition candidate, 74-year-old **Emmanuel Akitani-Bob** of the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**. Reported irregularities on election day prompted early protests, and the official results showed Akitani with just 38 percent of the vote with a reported 63 percent turnout, little better than in 2003 when he had more competition. The European Union refused to endorse the poll, Akitani-Bob declared himself president, and in the ensuing **human rights** violations hundreds were killed and tens of thousands of **refugees** fled the country.

Legislative 2007. In response to the bloody events of 2005, the government and opposition hammered out the **Accord Politique Global (APG)** in Ouagadougou the following year, allowing for the creation of a unity government, reforms to the election process and eligibility, and an end to the **Kabyé** monopoly of the FAT. Under these terms, the main opposition groups, including the UFC, agreed to participate in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** election, turnout was high at 85 percent, and the results deemed generally free and fair. However, the skewed nature of the new, redistricted proportional representation system became clear only with the results—the north was significantly overrepresented and the RPT won 50 seats to the UFC's 27, though the RPT won 923,000 votes nationally to the UFC's 867,500. The **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)** won the remaining four seats, and the RPT dominated the AN executive body, as well as the cabinet, after the elections.

Presidential 2010. Widely expected to be a contest between the sons of **Sylvanus Olympio** and Gnassingbé Eyadéma, instead incumbent president Faure Gnassingbé faced off against a new UFC vice president, **Jean-Pierre Fabre**, taking the place of the party president, **Gilchrist Olympio**. Organizational problems caused conflict in the **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)**, and voter rolls which had satisfied all parties in 2007 were now inflated with more names from the north. Six opposition candidates ran against Gnassingbé, who took 60 percent of the official vote count, with Fabre in second with 34 percent and **Yao Agboyibo** of the CAR with just under 3 percent. While UFC members were protesting in support of Fabre,

Gilchrist Olympio struck a surprise deal with Gnassingbé for a joint RPT-UFC cabinet, in a move that ultimately split the UFC party in two. *See also* BOLLORÉ SCANDAL.

Legislative 2013. A newly energized opposition found itself able to carry out more regular protests under the dynamic leadership of Jean-Pierre Fabre, and there was plenty to protest in the legislative elections now that the overrepresentation of the north in the electoral system was clear, and only made worse by the new expanded AN with 91 seats instead of 81. The ruling party, now renamed **Union Pour La République (UNIR)**, won more than two-thirds (62) of the seats in the delayed poll, even though the party took less than half the overall national vote. Two opposition coalitions were the next largest: **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)** with 19 and **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel** with six seats. The compromised UFC won only 3 seats, down from 27 in the previous legislature.

Presidential 2015. Hailed as the most peaceful election in Togo to date, the 2015 contest saw President Gnassingbé resist calls for presidential term limits and defeat all rivals with 59 percent of the vote and 61 percent turnout, according to official results. In yet another contest between the incumbent and Jean-Pierre Fabre of the ANC (who won 35% of the vote), three other candidates pulled in the remaining 6 percent. This election was not marked by the level of protest seen in other recent elections, though it reaffirmed the desire on the part of a majority of Togolese to secure term limits and prevent another Gnassingbé victory in 2020.

Legislative 2018. Held in the context of new and exceptional opposition mobilization, the main opposition parties boycotted the 2018 AN elections, leaving the way clear for the ruling UNIR party to win 59 seats and the UFC to pick up seven. Smaller parties made up the rest of the 91 seats, though several were allied with UNIR, giving them a comfortable supermajority. In addition to concerns about irregularities and the demand for term limits on the presidency, the opposition also protested the violent crackdown on a **Parti National Panafricain (PNP)** demonstration a few months before. Just a few months after this election, the AN did vote to institute term limits on the presidency through a **constitutional amendment**, though the limits do not apply retroactively to President Gnassingbé, laying a path for him to remain in office at least until 2030. *See also* MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 2019.

Presidential 2020. Incumbent President Faure Gnassingbé dominated the field in his fourth presidential victory, at least according to official results. He reportedly won 72.36 percent of the vote in 2020, over 13 percent more than in 2015, with turnout likewise significantly higher than the previous election (+15 points) at 76.63 percent. These results raised significant skepticism, even among those used to questioning official election results in Togo. In 2018,

Afrobarometer reported that 70 percent of Togolese wanted term limits on the presidency, and wished Gnassingbé would not run again, and the opposition to his government was strong in the intervening years, as evidenced by the **street demonstrations of 2017 and 2018**. A new challenger from **Sokodé**, **Agbéyomé Kodjo**, had been expected to cut into Gnassingbé's vote in the central and northern parts of the country, and when the vote counting was underway his house was surrounded by security forces, leading observers to expect he would perform better than his eventual 18.37 percent, second-place finish. Jean-Pierre Fabre, who had come in second with at least one-third of the vote in the previous two presidential elections was relegated to a distant third with 4.35 percent, and four additional challengers split the remaining 5 percent of the vote. It would have been more likely that turnout would be lower in 2020 than previous elections, given the disappointment generated by the fractured opposition and the **constitutional** changes that foreshadow Gnassingbé remaining in power until 2030. Finally, observers pointed to the announcement of provisional results in record time—only 24 hours after the polls closed—as further evidence of manipulation. Even months after the poll, the CENI refused to release the election figures by precinct or even by prefecture, and Kodjo's legal challenges were dismissed without being examined by the courts. After declaring himself the rightful president, Kodjo was arrested at his home on 21 April, and conditionally released on 24 April, pending judgment on his claim of immunity from having previously been a deputy of the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM—EXECUTIVE. The electoral system for Togo's most powerful office has changed numerous times, often as a reaction to a past election or in anticipation of a significant upcoming election. Though electoral law can often be modified through ordinary legislation, as with redistricting, for example, some important elements of the electoral system in Togo have been laid out in the **1992 constitution**, and therefore need a **constitutional amendment** to change. From the beginning of the **Fourth Republic**, members of the political opposition wanted two rounds of election for the president enshrined in the constitution, such that if no candidate won an outright majority in the first round, the top two candidates would face each other in a second-round runoff. This suited the fragmented nature of the opposition, suggesting several candidates could compete against the incumbent in the first round, and then try to unite their voters to support the second-place candidate and defeat the (presumed) incumbent. It appears that this scenario was likely after the preliminary vote count in the **1998 presidential election** that pitted **Gilchrist Olympio** against **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, for which reason the **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)** came

under intense pressure to issue different results, and the ministry of the interior ultimately took over the process of vote counting, declaring Eyadéma the winner. In 2002, constitutional amendments changed the electoral system to remove both term limits (that would have applied to Eyadéma in 2003) and the two-round voting system, such that any candidate who won a plurality of the vote would become president. After losing the next several presidential elections under this system, a return to the 1992 version of the presidential electoral system became a rallying point for the political opposition, and especially the **demonstrators** who took to the **streets 2017–2018**. In **2019, the constitution was again amended** to restore term limits, but that provision does not apply retroactively to President **Faure Gnassingbé**, meaning that he is currently eligible to serve another two terms from 2020 to 2030 (having already served three terms in office since 2005). The two-round system of elections was restored for the 2020 presidential election, but rendered moot by Gnassingbé's overwhelming vote share (72%) according to official results. Moreover, the malleability of the electoral system to this point suggests that another round of constitutional amendments in the late 2020s could pave the way for the incumbent to remain in office.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM—LEGISLATURE. As of 2007, Togo's electoral system for members of the legislative branch, the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**, has been one of closed-list proportional representation. Prior to that, in the **Fourth Republic** each of the 81 seats in the legislature were contested by a two-round majority system, in which any candidate who failed to receive 50 percent of the vote would face a runoff election against the second-place candidate for that seat. This system was similar to the two-round system used for the Togolese presidency for the first few years of the Fourth Republic, and modeled on **French** practice. However, the opposition were concerned about the enduring dominance of the AN by the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, including the **1994 elections** in which the opposition majority was thwarted by annulling the results of several runoff elections in swing electoral districts. As part of the **Accord Politique Global (APG)** of 2006, the opposition secured a promise to change the electoral system, while leaving the specific parameters to be decided by the unity government subsequently led by **Yao Agboyibo**. In 2007, the compromise decision was a proportional representation system, in which party lists would be presented and seats allocated in multimember constituencies (overlapping with the then 30 prefectures and the city of **Lomé**), with two to four seats each. Seats are allocated according to a highest averages system, and there is no threshold percentage of the vote required. On paper, this system appears to favor the entrance of smaller parties into the legislature by lowering the barriers to

entry compared to a plurality or majority system. However, when it came to distributing seats across electoral districts, many very populous prefectures in the south of the country were allocated very few AN seats, such as the prefecture of Golfe (which includes some exurbs of Lomé), with 450,000 inhabitants and only 2 seats, while much smaller prefectures in the north of the country also had two seats for 50,000 (or fewer) inhabitants. (The only exception is greater Lomé, with ten seats.) This led to significant distortions in the **2007 legislative election results** in which the RPT won many more seats than their proportion of the national vote would suggest they should. In 2012, the ruling party redrew electoral boundaries and expanded the size of the legislature from 81 to 91 seats, moves also protested by the opposition as further diminishing the competitiveness of legislative elections.

EL LOKO (1950–). Well-known Togolese sculptor, living in **Germany**. Born in 1950 in Pedakondji, El Loko studied textile design in Accra, **Ghana**, before entering the German State Academy of Art at Dusseldorf to study under Joseph Beuys. He has had major exhibitions (since 1972) in galleries in Germany, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States, as well as across Africa.

EPE EKPE. New Year festival among the **Mina** and affiliated ethnic groups, during which seers perceive whether or not the coming year will be a good one. The festival includes costumed demonstrations. Occurring in September, the pageant also symbolically purifies all Mina in honor of the new year. *See also* ANIMISM, RELIGION.

ESPOIR DE LA NATION TOGOLAISE. Quasi-monthly sociocultural publication formerly issued by Togo's official publishing house, the **Établissement National des Éditions du Togo (EDITOGO)**, under the auspices of the ministry of information and under the directorship of **Alphonse Awesso**. At its peak in the 1970s, the journal's circulation was around 5,000.

ESSO, SOLITOKI. Government minister and secretary general of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. Esso served as general director of **Télévision Togolaise (TVT)** and as legislative deputy in 1985 under General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. He returned to politics in 1995 in a cabinet position as minister of communication. Esso returned to the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in 2002, later representing Togo in the Panafrikan Parliament of the African Union and the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** Parliament. After Eyadéma's death, Esso was elected secretary

general of the RPT 2006–2009, then joined the cabinet of President **Faure Gnassingbé** as minister of public service, primary and secondary **education**, and minister of state for presidential affairs in succession.

ETABLISSEMENT NATIONAL DES EDITIONS DU TOGO (EDITOGO). Established in 1961 as a public corporation to prepare and issue the publication needs of the ministry of **education**, the Information Services, and other government agencies. One of EDITOGO's prime responsibilities since 1962 has been the publication of Togo's daily newspaper, Togo-Presse (renamed La **Nouvelle Marche**), and subsequently a variety of government-sponsored monthlies, including the *Journal Officiel* that publishes official government acts. Known to operate at a significant deficit, EDITOGO receives sizable government subsidies.

ÉTUDES TOGOLAISES. Very valuable academic series of reports, studies, and collections of oral history and linguistics, by the Institut Togolais des Sciences Humaines (INTSHU). The Institute was established in 1960, and the first issue of *Études Togolaises* was published in December 1965.

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (EDF). *See* FONDS EUROPEEN DE DÉVELOPPEMENT.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC). Consequent to the Yaoundé convention of 1963 and 1969, Togo was an associate member of the EEC, receiving preferential tariff treatment for her commodity exports and partaking of the community's technical assistance fund, the **Fonds Européen de Développement (FED)**. The EEC was folded into other institutions of European cooperation in 1993.

EUROPEAN UNION, RELATIONS WITH. *See* DONORS, RELATIONS WITH.

EVALA. Traditional wrestling bouts and other exhibitions of martial arts and prowess practiced among the **Kabyé** of northern Togo. The custom is aimed at inculcating young men into a fighting spirit and testing their physical and moral strength. The bouts are divided according to age, from 8 to 30 years, but the main festivities center around those coming of age, or the 18-year-olds. There is an equivalent ceremony for young women, the Akema. In recent decades, the Evala has been further built up by ethnic elders as a force to keep Kabyé youth united. General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** elevated the Evala ceremonies to the status of a quasi-public holiday: annually going

to his native village, **Pya**, for two weeks, usually accompanied by virtually all the influential Kabyé politicians in **Lomé**, and bringing government and administration to a standstill.

EVEGBÉ. The **Ewe language**, as called by the Ewe. The language has many dialects: three are the Anlo, spoken by the **Anlo Ewe** of **Ghana**; the **Mina** (or Ge) spoken by Togo's Mina in Aného; and **Ouatchi**, the dialect of the Ouatchi along the coast and in **Atakpamé**. There is a considerable amount of vernacular literature (especially in the Anlo dialect) including **religious** tracts, translations of the Bible, and **educational** material. Many important scholars have analyzed Evegbé, including the noted linguist Dr. **Diedrich Westermann** who compiled the seminal *Die Ewe-Stamme*. The language is spoken by over one million people in southern Togo, southwest **Benin**, and southeast Ghana and is understood by considerably more, being part of the Kwa language family of which the closely related Fon and **Adja** (of Benin) are also members.

EVOLUÉ. See ASSIMILATION POLICY; INDIGÉNAT.

EWE. A group of **Adja** clans living in southeastern **Ghana**, southwest **Benin**, and southern Togo and speaking a variety of dialects of the **Evegbé** languages. The total number of Ewe in was estimated at over 1,300,000 in 2016. As do some other neighboring ethnic groups, the Ewe trace their origins to Oyo (in Nigeria), from which they migrated in the 13th century via Ketou (**Benin**) to **Tado** and then to **Notsé**. Early in the 17th century, the Ewe dispersed from Notsé as a consequence of the brutalities of their king, **Agokoli**, several groups swinging back to Benin to found the Allada kingdom (and later that of **Dahomey**), the others moving mostly to the south. The latter never developed a centralized state structure, supposedly because of their experience with authoritarian rule under Agokoli. The Ewe remained a series of clans of origin, or **dou**, and subclans (approximately 120) bound to each other by temporary alliances. **Chiefly** authority has usually been weak and mostly ceremonial with popular councils or assemblies, **fiohawo**, playing a more important role. Referring to this decentralized form of authority along the Togolese coast, early European charts carried the designation “**Mina Republics**” for the area between the **Gold Coast**'s Ashanti and Dahomey (now Benin). Today, Togo's Ewe are concentrated mostly in the **Tsévié** and **Kloto** regions, near the very closely related **Ouatchi**, **Adja**, and other coastal groups. Most Ewe are **Christian** or **animist** in their beliefs.

Attempts to bring about the unification of all Ewe clans under one colonial administration sparked the creation of several **pan-Ewe movements** in both

the Gold Coast and in **French** Togo. The Ewe “problem” (referring to the division of the Ewe among several colonial administrations in British Togo, French Togo, and the Gold Coast with small minorities also in Dahomey) preoccupied the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations in the 1940s and 1950s; the issue was not resolved as the Ewe are still divided by the Ghana-Togo border. The Ewe were quick to profit from the various avenues of upward mobility that presented themselves with the advent of colonial rule, especially **education**. During the **German Musterkolonie** era, the Ewe were regarded as the future administrators of German Africa; the subsequent French administration also heavily utilized skilled and educated Ewe personnel at all levels of the colonial civil service, both in Togo and in other French colonies. The gross disparity between all social indicators in the south and those of the north contributed to interethnic strife in Togo and the grudges harbored in the north against the more domineering coastal elements. The **Comité de l’Unité Togolaise (CUT)**’s political dominance between 1958 and 1963 further exacerbated these tensions, which the subsequent **Nicolas Grunitzky** administration (1963–1967) did little to alleviate. Only with the rise of the regime of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** has the pro-southern bias been corrected, though the top echelons of Eyadéma’s pre-1990 **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party, administration, and civil service were heavily staffed with Ewe, Mina, and other coastal elements. *See also* ALL-EWE CONFERENCE (AEC).

EWE EVANGELICAL CHURCH (EPC). *See* ÉGLISE ÉVANGÉLIQUE PRESBYTÉRIENNE DU TOGO (EEPT).

EWE UNIONIST ASSOCIATION (EUA). *See* ALL-EWE CONFERENCE (AEC); CHAPMAN, DANIEL.

EWOMSAN, KOKOU MAWUENA DIEUDONNE (1954–). Educator. Born in Agome-Koutoukpa on 30 July 1954, Ewomsan was educated in **Atakpamé** and **Lomé** and then studied philosophy and social science at the **Université de Benin**. A founding member of the Togolese Society of Men of Letters, Ewomsan is the author of numerous poems and taught philosophy in a Lomé school until the early 1990s, when he was named director of the Promotion of **Human Rights** in the Togolese ministry of human rights, working also with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Committee Against Racial Discrimination.

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE. *See* ZONE FRANCHE DE TRANSFORMATION POUR L’EXPLOITATION (ZFTE).

EYADÉMA, GENERAL GNASSINGBÉ ETIENNE (1937–2005). One of the longest-serving African heads of state at 38 years, Gnassingbé Eyadéma served in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** and held executive power continuously from 1967, and remained a military officer until the 1990s. Born in **Pyä** (near **Kara**) on 26 December 1937 to **Kabyé** parents, Eyadéma (whose real name is Gnassingbé, “Eyadéma” being a Kabyé term self-chosen after he killed President **Sylvanus Olympio**, connoting “courage”) barely completed six years of primary schooling before enlisting in the **French** colonial forces at the age of 16. He saw action in Indochina (1953–1955) and Algeria (1956–1961), following which he was stationed in **Dahomey** and Niger before being repatriated to **Lomé** in 1962 with a noncommissioned (NCO) rank. A member of the core group of veterans that petitioned President Olympio for their integration into an enlarged Togolese army, Eyadéma assumed the mantle of leadership on the eve of the **1963 coup d'état** when his compatriot **Emmanuel Bodjollé**, the official leader, refused to mount the assault against Olympio. Rumors and legends abound about the events surrounding the assassination, but most agree it took place on the grounds of the American embassy in **Lomé**, and that Eyadéma was responsible.

After the **coup d'état** all the key NCO veterans joined the FAT and were promoted to the officer corps. Eyadéma became a First Lieutenant in 1963 and moved up the ranks under the **Nicolas Grunitzky** administration to captain (1963), major (1964), and lieutenant colonel (1965), becoming a general after his **coup d'état of 1967**. In the November **1966 popular uprising** against Grunitzky, Eyadéma supported the incumbent administration out of apprehensions that any new regime would be dominated by **Parti de l'Unité Togolaise (PUT)** militants that would demand his purge and trial for Olympio's assassination. Grunitzky's unpopularity and increasingly unstable hold over the country, however, indicated that a change of leadership was imminent, and in the absence of any suitable alternative candidates, the decision was taken by the officer corps (as early as November 1966) that the army would assume power on the anniversary of the first coup d'état, shortly after which Eyadéma took over executive power and set up his first cabinet.

General Eyadéma's success at the helm of the nation during his early years in office was due to his total command of the largely northern armed forces, a very liberal import-export code (that resulted in profitable **smuggling** activities to/from **Ghana** and cheap prices domestically), increased governmental revenues for the expanding civil service, and development projects (flowing into the treasury from the progressively nationalized **phosphate** industry), as well as to his own open administration, pragmatic leadership, and astute top echelon appointments to the cabinet and civil service. Surrounded by innovative technocrats and intellectuals with relative autonomy in their spheres

of competence, Togo moved out of its previous isolationism while forging ahead for the first time in the modernization of its northern regions. From 1972, the country pursued a more aggressive domestic and foreign policy, both of which proved relatively popular to the more militant coastal elites. From the outside, at least, the armed forces appeared relatively unobtrusive (though always vigilant) in daily life and only moderately involved in either politics or administration. On the other hand, the FAT's corporate needs were the first to be satisfied, averting the gripes and grudges that developed in many other armies on the continent. In 1980, Eyadéma engineered the adoption of a new **constitution** and holding of **elections**—the country's first in 16 years, following this up by other **elections in 1985 and 1990**.

Much of the early favorable image of the Eyadéma reign changed in the late 1970s as public finances decayed due to the mounting of fiscal corruption and the massive splurges in the **state sector** around 1974 resting on erroneous assessments that global prices for phosphates would remain high. The regime had mounted a large number of very costly projects—some of which had to be scrapped altogether, many in midstream—that began piling up debts and deficits that could not be met. Eyadéma tarried before calling an end to public spending, again assuming phosphate prices would rebound. By the mid-1970s, corruption had seeped in, having previously been held at bay. Early astute cabinet and administrative appointments gave way to the nomination of opportunistic and corrupt “yes men,” cronies, relatives, and friends who were neither reined in nor disciplined, leading in 1984 to a World Bank decision not to help Togo with structural adjustment unless several key individuals were removed from positions where they had access to fiscal infusions. Eyadéma persisted thanks to an extremely oppressive **cult of personality**, reminiscent of Stalinist Russia: references to Eyadéma became more laudatory; statues in his likeness began to permeate all parts of Togo; his “collected speeches” were published in a three-volume collection; and there were even leaks that he was hoping to be nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize. *See also* AUTHENTICITY.

All of these problems progressively disenchanted the **Ewe** South, which suffered more from the country's economic problems and, never fully granting Eyadéma legitimacy, began to be drawn behind opposition candidates, including Sylvanus Olympio's self-exiled sons in Paris, notably **Gilchrist Olympio**. Eyadéma's response to his loss of legitimacy was an increased reliance on brute force. What began as a string of arrests of political opponents and military officers in the mid- to late 1970s ushered in routine reliance on torture and other extrajudicial treatment of anyone who opposed the regime or conspired against it, a process accelerating as conditions in Togo worsened and opposition mounted. By the late 1980s, the regime was reeling from

mismanagement and corruption, and was fiscally bankrupt to boot, when the pro-democracy movement suddenly reached Togo, forcing a much rattled Eyadéma to concede the convening of a **National Conference** in 1991 that proceeded to strip him of all powers, called for his demise, decreed the dissolution of his **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party, and documented the civic and economic abuses of his reign, including his ill-gotten wealth (80 billion CFAF) and brutalization of aides who annoyed him.

Eyadéma was not to be dislodged from power easily, however. Entrenched in his residence at **Lomé II**, he retaliated through his command of the armed forces throughout the protracted “transition” period—though claiming they were acting outside his control on behalf of the nation. Numerous individual killings, several crass massacres, attempted assassinations on important political opposition figures (who returned to Togo to campaign in the now officially “open” political system), assaults on the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)**, and **Radio Togo** (forced to broadcast Northern demands), and even the kidnap of interim prime minister **Joseph Koffigoh** indicated Eyadéma did not intend to resign. Indeed, a nine-month near-total strike in southern towns (that devastated the economy and has been likened to civil war without weapons) failed to dislodge the dictator.

The remainder of the 1990s saw Eyadéma adjusting and adapting to a new, liberalized political reality in which opposition parties operated in the open and the press enjoyed greater freedom. Eyadéma won reelection handily in the **presidential contest of 1993** thanks to an opposition boycott, and even when an opposition coalition won a majority in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in 1994, he managed to neuter their power by selecting **Edem Kodjo**, the head of the smaller of the two opposition parties, as prime minister, rather than **Yao Agboyibo**, head of the larger, causing a rift between them. Eyadéma appeared to think his position was secure enough to permit his highest profile opponent, Gilchrist Olympio, to run against him in the **presidential election of 1998**. However, when early returns showed Olympio might actually win, ballot counting was abruptly shifted to the ministry of the interior from the electoral commission, and Eyadéma again secured victory. The outrage among RPT opponents to this outcome prompted a brutal crackdown and **human rights** abuses by security forces in which bodies of victims washed up on beaches after being dumped from aircraft. Togo’s relations with international **donors** were further soured by these authoritarian tactics though Eyadéma took on the chairmanship of **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** from 1998 and earned some goodwill by mediating conflicts in Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. Eyadéma was unmoved to reform domestically, however, and oversaw **constitutional amendments in 2002** eliminating term limits on the presidency and the second-round runoff

in a case in which no candidate achieved an absolute majority, further insulating himself from meaningful electoral competition.

Though Eyadéma won against Olympio's stand-in, **Emmanuel Akitani-Bob**, in the **presidential election of 2003**, he was also clearly turning his thoughts toward political succession and establishing a dynasty. The 2002 constitutional changes included a provision lowering the age of presidential eligibility from 45 years to 35, a move widely seen as positioning his son **Faure Gnassingbé** (then 36) to take over. Eyadéma had many children to choose from in making his decision, as it is widely accepted that he fathered scores of descendants with many different women. His first official wife and Togo's first lady during his presidency was **Hubertine Badagnaki Eyadéma**, but neither of the two sons most widely seen as the "dauphin" by the time of his demise—Faure and half-brother **Kpatcha Gnassingbé**—were hers. All three were reportedly by his side when his health declined rapidly in late 2004 and early 2005, and on the aircraft when his heart failed en route to Tel Aviv for medical treatment in early February 2005. Though surprisingly few of Eyadéma's children pursued a military career, the ties of the family to military might and the Kabyé ethnic group are powerful legacies of one of the longest-serving African leaders. Eulogized as the "Grand Baobab," Eyadéma's burial in his home village of Pya was attended only by regional heads of state, thanks to the **succession crisis** that brought Faure to power and prompted an international outcry. A consummate political survivor, Eyadéma passed the baton to a young successor versed in international economics to carry on the legacy, supported by a military loyal to Eyadéma's memory.

EYADÉMA FOUNDATION. *See* FONDATION GNASSINGBÉ EYADÉMA POUR L'ÉDUCATION ET LA SANTÉ (FOGEES).

EYADÉMA'S PLANE CRASHES. Two of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** planes crashed within the space of one year, allegedly in assassination attempts by disgruntled French officials of the **Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin (COTOMIB)**. The first crash involved Eyadéma's DC-3 plane that force-landed on 24 January 1974, in the **Kara** area, resulting in Eyadéma's injury and the death of the **French** pilot and three passengers. The second crash occurred in January 1975, shortly after Eyadéma took possession of a new jet. The plane crashed after flying Niger's President Kouantche back to Niamey following Eyadéma's mediation efforts in the border crisis between Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Mali. Killed were its American pilot and two crew members. Shortly after the 1974 crash, the French officials of COTOMIB were denounced for their role in the affair, and it was revealed that the company had earlier tried to bribe Eyadéma with 1.5 million CFA

francs to prevent the nationalization of Togo's **phosphate** industry. COT-OMIB was then nationalized with a great deal of fanfare and the date (24 January) was declared a national holiday. The site of the first crash (**Sarakawa**) was kept intact, improved, and became a veritable national shrine, part of the Eyadéma **personality cult** to which youth (mostly **Kabyé**) came in droves to "re-dedicate" themselves to selfless service to Togo's development. *See also* JOURNÉE NATIONALE DE LIBÉRATION ÉCONOMIQUE.

F

FA. Ewe word referring to destiny as dictated by the spirits and gods. Fa can be foreseen by the bekonou, who are still highly respected in the southern and central Togolese villages. There are a large number of ways to divine fate, one common way being through the manipulation and examination of 16 **palm** kernels on a rectangular board. Different divination procedures also exist in non-Ewe areas. *See also* ANIMISM; FETISHISTS.

FABRE, JEAN-PIERRE (1952–). Opposition leader and presidential candidate. Born in **Lomé** to a **French** father and Togolese mother, Fabre studied in Lille, France, as an economist and enterprise administrator. He returned to Togo in 1979 and worked as a professor at the **Université de Benin** in Togo. He was a founding member of the **Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)**, created in 1980, and when liberty of the press was granted in 1990, he became editor and director of publication of the weekly *Tribune des Démocrates*, one of Togo's first free newspapers. At the **Conference Nationale Souverain (CNS)**, he was selected as spokesperson for the body, and joined the **Union of Forces for Change (UFC)** moving on to be the organization's secretary general. He won a seat in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** for the UFC in 2007, and due to his longtime loyalty to UFC founder **Gilchrist Olympio**, Fabre replaced him as UFC candidate for the **2010 presidential election** and came in second place with almost 34 percent of the vote (this was similar to the percentage won by the previous UFC candidate, **Emmanuel Akitani-Bob**, in **presidential elections of 2003 and 2005**). When Olympio surprised many in his own party by giving the UFC's allegiance to a unity government with the majority **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** shortly after this 2010 contest, it brought about a bitter split in the party with Olympio at the head of the UFC and Fabre creating his own rival party, the **National Alliance for Change (ANC)**. While Olympio's reasons remain opaque, concern about competition from a younger Fabre may have played a role. Moreover, Fabre proved to be an adept mobilizer, rallying political support in regular **street protests** in the first half of the 2010s, and pulling a number of the fractured opposition parties into the **Collective Sauvons**

le Togo (CST) to contest the **2013 legislative elections**. Capitalizing on popular displeasure with Olympio's UFC, the CST won 19 seats, contributing more than any other party to the UFC's loss of 24 seats compared to the 2007 contest. Building on this momentum, Fabre ran as the ANC presidential candidate in 2015, coming in second with just over 35 percent of the official results, though he contested the results as not representative of the will of the people. Fabre was recognized as head of the opposition from 2016, but when **Tikpi Atchadam** and his **Parti National Panafricain (PNP)** party burst on the scene in 2017 the new party seized a great deal of Fabre's momentum. Fabre responded by linking the ANC to the new, broader **Coalition de 14 (C14)**, and supporting the **street protests of 2017–2018**. However, the C14 succumbed to some of the infighting that has been a chronic condition of the Togolese opposition, and began to fall apart in 2019. The ANC participated in the **2019 municipal elections**, and Fabre was elected mayor of Amoutiévé, one of Lomé's seven districts. He opted to run for **president again in 2020** but the official results seemed to show a dramatic dip in his popularity when he was awarded just 4.35 percent of the national vote, coming in third behind **Agbéyomé Kodjo** who drew just over 18 percent and **Faure Gnassingbé** with just over 72 percent. While it was true that the inability of Fabre to maintain the momentum of the protests beyond 2017–2018, as well as the inability of the opposition as a whole to unite around a single presidential candidate, would have hurt Fabre's popularity, such a low number of votes for him is one of several reasons the official results of the 2020 election strain credulity.

FAILLE D'ALÉDJO. A narrow cut through solid rock cliffs through which Togo's main north-south highway passes in the northern part of the country. Actually a minor curiosity, the cut is touted as a major Togolese **tourist** attraction.

FARE, KPANDA GINGUITCHA. Former cabinet minister. Fare was appointed minister of the environment in the interim December 1992 cabinet as a **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** delegate balancing a largely southern cabinet after Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh**'s concessions to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** following the former's kidnapping. Fare resigned on orders from Eyadéma in July 1992 in protest over the cabinet's linking Eyadéma's son with the attempted assassination of **Gilchrist Olympio**, then campaigning in central Togo.

FAZAO-MALAFAKASSA NATIONAL PARK. Created in 1975 by joining the Forest de Fazao and the Malafakassa hunting preserve, this park is

now the largest of three national parks in Togo at almost 2,000 square kilometers. Home to a herd of some 50 elephants, the park is found in the **Plateaux** region west of **Sokodé**, and is of significant **tourist** interest.

FETISHISTS. Priests of the various fetish cults, bokonou of the **fa**, and venerated of spirits and other deities. Still very prevalent in Togo (where two-thirds of the population have **animist religious** beliefs) in the non-**Muslim** areas of the south and center, where an association of fetishists meets annually in a quasi-convention. Two of the most important fetish ritual shrines are in Doume (**Benin**) and Shiari (**Ghana**). Every seven years there is a pilgrimage to the latter site where the chief fetishist of **Atakpamé** is invested.

FIO AGBANO II (1898–1973). Former superior chief of **Glidji** and important early political supporter of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**. Born in Glidji on 24 June 1898 to a **chiefly** family, Fio Agbano's support for the CUT was an important aid to the party's rapid assumption of political leadership in the south and part of the traditional network of allegiances hammered out by **Sylvanus Olympio**. With the rise of the latter's government in 1958, Fio Agbano was elected to the **Chambre de Députés** and served there until the **coup d'état of 1963**. The permanent vice president of the Assembly, Fio Agbano was also vice president of the Committee on Justice, Legislation, Institutional, and Administrative Affairs. Largely shunted aside after the coup, Fio Agbano was a member of Togo's **Chamber of Commerce** before his death in 1973.

FIOHAWO. Assembly of **chiefs** and notables of an **Ewe dou** that, together with the nominal sovereign the **Asafohene**, exercises traditional authority over the dou.

FISHING. *See* OFFICE NATIONAL DES PÊCHES (ONP).

FOLI-BAZI, KATARI. Government minister. Best known as president of one of Togo's most popular football clubs, Semassi de **Sokodé**, Foli-Bazi also served as a member of the second Committee of Normalization of the Togolese Federation de Football, in an attempt to sort out administrative troubles in the national sport. Foli-Bazi was named to a series of ministerial posts between 2002 and 2006, including minister of justice, minister of territorial administration and minister labor, employment and public works. After a hiatus of several years he was returned to the cabinet as minister of sports and communication in January 2019.

FOLI BEBE (c. 1694–1733). King of **Glidji**. Data on the legendary founder of the Glidji kingdom is very contradictory, but he succeeded Ofori around 1694 (hence being the second king of the dynasty) and is regarded as the true founder of the small kingdom. *See also* ANÉHO.

FOLLY, ANNE-LAURE. Documentary filmmaker from Togo. Her films showcase **women** across the African continent. Her documentary *Femmes aux Yeux Ouverts* won her a Silver Medal at the Monte Carlo Television Festival In 1994.

FOLKA 80. Major cultural festival held in **Lomé** in April 1980. The program gathered the various ethnic groups of the country in a pageant of dance and folklore throughout the streets of the capital. The richness and diversity of the Togolese ethnic fabric and culture was dramatically visible in the carnival-style festivities.

FON. Neighboring **Benin**'s major ethnic group, founding core of the ancient **Dahomey** kingdom that periodically ravaged the **Atakpamé** area in Togo. They live and farm along the southern border areas of Togo. *See also* ATAKPAMÉ WARS.

FON-MAHI. Collective name in Togo for two separate ethnic groups found mostly in **Benin**, elements of which were chased into Togo and settled in the **Atakpamé** region that became a place of refuge for anti-Dahomean forces. Small groups of the **Fon** (the actual dominant group in the former **Dahomey** kingdom) and the Mahi (traditionally raided for slaves by the latter) settled in southern Togo around the year 1854 after migrating from the Allada and Savalou regions respectively. They have conserved their **language**, customs, and beliefs, the Mahi also retaining traditional allegiance to the Savalou royal family.

FONDATION GNASSINGBÉ EYADÉMA POUR L'EDUCATION ET LA SANTÉ (FOGEES). Formally established on 3 March 1977 as the Eya-déma Foundation, it began with the financial backing of the **German** Hans Seidel Foundation and the personal support of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s friend Franz Joseph Strauss. Keeping a focus on philanthropy in rural areas, the foundation has shifted from job training and adult literacy to meeting equipment and training needs in underserved schools and medical centers.

FONDS AFRICAINE DE SOLIDARITE (FAS). The African Solidarity Fund was set up in 1976 by **France** and 15 former colonies in Africa, aimed

at alleviating fiscal pressures upon member states caused by the oil crisis, while also deepening Franco-African economic ties.

FONDS D'AIDE ET DE COOPERATION (FAC). French development fund dispensing financial and technical assistance to former colonial territories. The FAC is the successor, after the decolonization of the French empire, of the **Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social des Territoires d'Outre Mer (FIDES)**. The fund has allocated to Togo an average of 660 million CFA francs per year since its creation in 1959, a total of 10 billion CFA francs between 1959 and 1973, and 16 billion CFA francs since. It was under FAC auspices that French development volunteers, *coopérantes*, came to Togo. Before the rioting of 1990–1993 there were a total of 318 such personnel in Togo, fully 161 of whom were teachers, and 50 technicians in various Togolese ministries.

FONDS D'INVESTISSEMENT POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL DES TERRITOIRES D'OUTRE MER (FIDES). Precursor of the **Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC)**. French development fund that dispensed financial and technical assistance to overseas colonies and associated territories. In the ten years from 1947 to 1957, over \$750 million were allocated to French West Africa, though only a small proportion of this reached Togo.

FONDS EUROPEEN DE DÉVELOPPEMENT (FED). The European Development Fund was an agency of the **European Economic Community (EEC)** with which most of Africa was linked via the Yaoundé treaties of 1963 and 1969. The FED allocated the community's financial and technical assistance to member and associated states. Togo received important credits from the FED for a variety of projects, including the paving of its entire north-south road axis.

FORCE DE SÉCURITÉ ÉLECTION PRÉSIDENTIELLE (FOSEP). Under its first formation as the Force de Réconciliation et Sécurité, the so-called FORS 93 was a special security force of **gendarmes**, police, and prefectural guards—but not military troops—set up in February 1993 to assure peace during the **1993 elections** in Togo, demanded by the various opposition candidates (feeling threatened by elements of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises [FAT]** loyal to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**) as a precondition for participating in the election. The force grew to 3,500 troops by June 1993, part of its budget picked up by various foreign **donors**. However, in subsequent years the FOSEP has been a tool of intimidation and manipulation

of elections, as security personnel cast their votes days in advance of the citizenry in order to be fully deployed on election day. For the **2020 presidential election**, the FOSEP deployed 10,000 gendarmes and police throughout the country to “secure” the election, won decisively by the incumbent.

FORCES DES ARMÉES TOGOLAIS (FAT). Togo’s armed forces, dominated by **Kabyé** from the North and many from General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**’s home village, **Pya**, have long played a role in maintaining Eyadéma, and now his son **Faure Gnassingbé**, in power. Disproportionately large for such a small country with few external threats, since the onset of the multiparty era (1991) they have also been the main force destabilizing the country, murdering individual political leaders, carrying out massacres and other atrocities, and wielding considerable influence over ordinary civilians and civilian leadership.

After the **coup of 1963**, many noncommissioned officer (NCO) veterans of **France**’s colonial armies were integrated into the Togolese army into senior officer ranks. From the time of the first **coup**, the size of the armed forces increased nearly tenfold but both the rank and file and the officer corps have remained heavily dominated (80%) by northerners, especially **Kabyé**. Today’s FAT contains at least 10,000 personnel, though actual data on the size is closely guarded by the government. Their number includes many specialized divisions such as the **Presidential Guard** and the **Force de Sécurité Election Présidentielle (FOSEP)**.

The dominance of Kabyé in the armed forces was due to in part to the fact that these groups were attracted by the career possibilities inherent in military life during the colonial era. Since Togo was not a French colony but a **Trusteeship Territory**, France was prohibited from active recruitment within its confines. This presented no problem to northern youth wishing to enlist; they merely crossed the border into **Dahomey** and (usually) presented themselves at the Djougou recruitment center as Dahomeans. During the **German colonial era**, northerners had also joined the German *Polizeitruppe* in large numbers and hence there was an established tradition in the north of participation in European security forces. On the eve of World War I, for example, there were over 1,500 indigenous personnel in the *Polizeitruppe*, the majority being Kabyé, **Bassari**, **Kotokoli**, and Dagomba. Under French rule, the local militia, the *Garde Cercle*, was also heavily staffed by Northerners, who after independence became the nucleus for the *Garde Nationale*.

After the 1963 coup d’état—sparked by the desire of demobilized northern veterans to be integrated into an expanded Togolese army—the armed forces were tripled in size with the integration of the veterans, and selective recruitment drives were mounted to assure the continued northern composition of

the armed forces. Togo's main recruitment and training camp is in the Kabyé heartland, at **Kara** (ex-**Lama Kara**), which is also the base of the powerful Third Battalion. Army Headquarters are at the Tokoin base in the suburbs of **Lomé**, where General Eyadéma maintained his residence, **Lomé II**, shunning the more vulnerable Presidential Palace (**Palais de la Présidence**) at night.

The Togolese armed forces saw three periods of rapid expansion. Right after the 1963 coup d'état, there was an immediate doubling (and eventual tripling) of the force: between 1963 and 1967, defense expenditures increased by 350 percent, an increase surpassing that of all African countries save Uganda. During a second period of growth in the 1970s, Third and Fourth Battalions were added thanks to the boom in **phosphate** revenues (defense expenditures for 1975, for example, were 60% higher than those in 1974). Though state revenues fell as the phosphate boom collapsed, defense expenditures were not cut, and the inability of the regime to provide adequate "perks" of office to its military cohorts led to the immersion of many officers in various commercial enterprises, at times in direct competition with civilians. The third phase of increase took place in the late 1980s, as Eyadéma augmented the force in face of mounting pressures to depose him.

The Togolese armed forces remained, until the 1980s, largely cohesive and immune to the internal unrest afflicting their compatriots in neighboring **Benin**, because of their ethnic unity (most troops are from the North) and the tight control exercised over the force by their commanders. The latter were keenly aware that they sustained one of their own in office in a country where the center of gravity was in the South. Moreover, the army was pampered, officers were allowed to develop personal commercial empires, corruption was tolerated, and a military life was a lucrative option for northerners without employment prospects elsewhere in the economy.

Notwithstanding this, there has been some unrest and a number of upheavals within the armed forces. The early instances of unrest can be traced to a continuation of the **Bodjolle**-Eyadéma tug-of-war and to intra-northern gripes about the Kabyé monopoly over military careers which was the root of the 1969 mutiny of **Moba** officers, news of which only leaked out in 1972. In all instances the regime dealt harshly with unrest and increased recruitment of Kabyé personnel specifically from Pya and Kara, deemed more loyal than Kabyé and/or **Moba** from Bodjolle's Koumea district. Starting in the late 1970s, however, more serious instances of unrest began to rock the Togolese military, as pockets of southern officers started plotting the overthrow of Eyadéma. An early example of this was the **1977 plot of Brazilians**. Eyadéma's reaction to these signs of opposition was to strengthen his personal control apparatus—the **Presidential Guard**, recruited from one quarter of his home village, Pya and in 1986 commanded by his own son, Lt. **Ernest**

Gnassingbé (estimated at between 800 to 1,600 men), and after 1992 by his second cousin Colonel **Donou T. Gnassingbé**. Another presidential relative, Major **Yoma Djoua**, was appointed commander of the Brigade Pigeon, the Political Police, and later implicated in a variety of atrocities on behest of the regime. Two parallel intelligence-gathering hierarchies of spies competed in ferreting out opposition in the army or society at large, including at the **Aflao** border with **Ghana**. *See also* BRIGADE DE VIGILANCE; BRIGADE DE RECHERCHE.

Starting in 1990 and following his humiliation by the **National Conference**, moreover, Eyadéma moved on a counter-offensive: using relatives in command of segments of the armed forces, and especially the Presidential Guard, he brutalized and terrorized the various budding political movements that sought to supplant him and his **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party, until by 1993 he was firmly back in power. There is little doubt that Togo's armed forces regarded themselves solely loyal to General Eyadéma, and even to his memory after he died in 2005, and acted so as to maintain the status quo power structure. However, the extent to which Eyadéma's son **Faure Gnassingbé** would be able to command the same loyalty was an open question for the first few months and years of his presidency. Gnassingbé appeared to have placated these interests by maintaining some of the privileges of the military, continuing to recruit from northern populations, and retaining members of the RPT "old guard" in key positions. In 2006, in the context of the **Accord Politique Global (APG)**, Gnassingbé promised to tackle impunity for military personnel involved in **human rights** abuses, and to restore a more "republican" character to the military so that members are not drawn primarily from the Kabyé ethnic group. Critics argued Gnassingbé was slow to implement such reforms, though he announced an organizational overhaul of the armed forces in 2014.

The military confrontation with Gnassingbé that many observers were expecting ultimately took place in **2009, when an attempted coup** led by his half-brother **Kpacha Gnassingbé** was thwarted, and in the aftermath other members of the military, including **Alassani Tidjani**, were arrested as accomplices. Once Gnassingbé's opponents were neutralized, the new president was able to carry out his plan of laying down the RPT party in favor of the new **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** without risking a military backlash. Currently, recruiting for basic training in the FAT appears to be steady with 1,000 new recruits (10% of them women) in 2019, but there were unconfirmed reports of many military desertions in 2017 and 2018.

FORCES D'INTERVENTION RAPIDE (FIR). Elite mostly Northern paracommando force with high mobility and superior fire power that was one

of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s main military props vis-à-vis society. The FIR under the command of Major **Yoma Narcisse Djoua** was behind much of the societal repression and brutalities of 1991–1993.

FORCES VIVES 'ESPÉRANCE POUR LE TOGO'. Grouping of civil society and **religious** groups, formed in September 2018, committed to liberty and justice through nonviolent means. The organization's spokesperson is **Maryse Quashie**.

FORS 93. *See* FORCE DE SECURITE ELECTION PRESIDENTIELLE (FOSEP).

FORUM HEBDO. Independent weekly that emerged after the 1990 relaxation of freedom of the press. The paper, that had a pressrun of around 3,000 at its height, has reported a variety of murderous government acts that might otherwise have gone unreported: a good example being the casual mowing down of protesting villagers by troops from the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** at Bena, 250 kilometers north of **Lomé**. The paper's entire pressrun of January 1991 was confiscated by President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** for daring to print pictures of that atrocity, the regime claiming this was an attempt to incite rebellion in Togo.

FOURTH REPUBLIC (1992–). The current political system in Togo, dating from the **constitution of 1992**. Though nominally distinct from the previous single-party **Third Republic** (1979–1991) and the product of an attempted democratic transition, for many in Togo the Fourth Republic did not represent meaningful change because President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** remained in power until his death in 2005, when his son **Faure Gnassingbé** took over. However, the Fourth Republic represents greater political liberalization in the form of multiple **political parties** and interest groups operating openly, and a much freer **media** landscape. Despite ongoing struggles for political turnover and **human rights** violations by security forces, the original provisions of the 1992 constitution limiting presidential power had, and still have, wide support among the Togolese people, and a call to return to those principles was an effective rallying cry for the opposition during the **street demonstrations of 2017–2018**.

FRANC ZONE. Monetary transaction association formed by most of the territories previously ruled by **France**, including the **Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA)**. National or regional currencies (such as the CFA franc) are pegged to the French franc and are freely convertible and transferable within

the Franc Zone, which is under French fiscal control. However, in 2019, France and the African member states announced their intention to abandon the CFA franc in favor of the new **Eco**, with better terms for the African members, and in hopes of luring their anglophone neighbors into the currency union, especially Nigeria and **Ghana**.

FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH. Relations between France and Togo are more than a century old, and the French influence is seen today by the use of French as Togo's official **language**, and Togo's membership in the **Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA)** and **Franc Zone** and the Organisation International de la Francophonie (OIF). The end of the formal colonial relationship in the late 1950s and early 1960s was marked by French concerns about **pan-Ewe unification**, leading them to tacitly endorse the **coup of 1963**, and support President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** stated agenda of ethnic unification in Togo from the late 1960s. France has been, and remains, an important trade and financial partner to Togo, and France often takes the diplomatic lead in signaling **donor** cooperation (or lack thereof) with Togo depending on the political climate. Eyadéma enjoyed a good relationship with France for most of the 1970s and 1980s, receiving help and support through national financial difficulties, and the good foundation of these relations helped Eyadéma weather the political storm of the early 1990s. After the disastrous **presidential elections of 1998**, French President Jacques Chirac extracted a promise from Eyadéma not to run for the presidency again, allowing a pretense for continued relations, though much of the aid from France (and the European Union) was suspended 1993–2007. Chirac joined in the universal condemnation of Togo's **succession crisis of 2005**, but was quick to endorse President **Faure Gnassingbé's** election victory a few months later, despite violence and irregularities. The **2007 legislative elections**, in which the opposition participated, helped to further restore aid and good cooperation, and France worked closely with Togo on a program of debt relief, eventually cancelling over 100m euros worth of sovereign French debt in 2011. President Gnassingbé has assiduously courted good relations with France, and these efforts have paid off in closer economic cooperation and support, even when Gnassingbé faced sustained **street protests in 2017–2018**, and through the **Bolloré scandal** in which the French company is accused of helping Gnassingbé win reelection in exchange for lucrative Togolese state concessions. The transition from the CFA franc to the new **Eco** in 2020 will be the next test of their relationship.

FREITAS, HORATIO GBENON. Former cabinet minister. A leader of the post-1990 **Union Togolaise pour la Rénouveau (UTR)** party, Freitas (who

comes from an important **Brazilian Aného** family) was brought into interim Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh**'s government on 7 September 1991, as minister of youth, sports and leisure and was retained in the third **transitional government**, an alliance with the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. He was dropped from the cabinet of the next government in February 1993. In 2015, he was elected president of the new Comité de normalization de la Fédération Togolaise de Football (FTF), to help the organization recover from several years of crisis.

FREITAS, PAULIN JACINTO (1909–1989). Educator, administrator, and former minister of foreign affairs. Born in **Lomé** on 3 December 1909 to an important **Aného** family of **Brazilian** origins, Freitas was educated in Senegal and returned to Togo to work as a teacher. An active member and leader of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** from its inception, Freitas was dismissed from his teaching post by the **French administration** for his political involvements. In 1946, he was elected on the CUT ticket as deputy to the **Assemblée Représentative du Togo (ART)**, and he served on the various Assemblies between 1946 and 1955 and again between 1958 and 1961. With the rise of **Sylvanus Olympio**'s government in 1958, Freitas moved into the cabinet, first as minister of state in charge of interior, press and information (1958–1960) and then as minister of foreign affairs (1960–1963). From 1963, he was not active politically, serving with the World Health Organization (WHO) in Brazzaville until his retirement in 1974. In 1987 General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, seeking partial reconciliation with southern leaders, met with the aging Freitas in a much-publicized visit.

FRENCH ADMINISTRATION. On 8 August 1914, French troops moved into Togo from Dahomey (now **Benin**) and occupied **Aného**, **Porto Seguro**, and **Togoville**. **Lomé** was occupied the next day, and the **German** colonial presence in the territory was essentially ended 18 days later. Simultaneously with the French assault, British troops were brought in by sea from the **Gold Coast**. The colony was subsequently divided into British and French spheres of occupation, with the former smaller in size but containing **Lomé**, the rich **cocoa/coffee** producing areas, and the larger segment of Togo's **railroads**. Following the end of the war, the Allies redrew their spheres of occupation (with France assuming control of **Lomé** and the railroads) and were granted mandates over what were called British and French Togoland. In actual fact, the administration of the two (class B) mandates was no different from that of the other colonial possessions of the two metropolitan powers. Freedom of religion was guaranteed, but military recruitment was prohibited. *See also* FORCES D'ARMÉES TOGOLAISES (FAT).

Except for a brief period between the two world wars, French Togo was not part of the French West Africa federation. The territory's **governor** was directly responsible to the minister of overseas France in Paris and not to the **Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF)** governor general in Dakar, Senegal. Administratively, France's rule over Togo falls into four periods: (a) between 1914 and 1922 the era of direct military occupation during and following World War I; (b) from 1922 to 1934, a period of autonomy of the French administration in Togo from the AOF administration in Senegal; (c) between 1934 and 1936, the "personal union" of French Togo with the neighboring French colony of Dahomey, for reasons of budgetary austerity; and (d) from 1936 to 1945, the gradual de facto assimilation of French Togo into the AOF federation for administrative reasons.

During the entire period of French rule, the local administration was markedly stable, governors or high commissioners remained in office for longer tenures than in the neighboring French colonies, and the Africanization of the civil service was rapid. In 1932, for example, fully 599 of the 863 colonial officials were Togolese, and a ratio of over 73 percent indigenous staff was the norm. With the end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations, Togo's status was changed to that of a Trusteeship Territory with France and Britain entrusted with the socioeconomic and political development of their charges. In 1945 also, the French Union was created, and Togo was given representation in the French National Assembly. (Originally Dahomey and Togo shared one deputy, but in 1946 each territory was allocated a separate representative.) Within the Union, Togo was classified as an **associated territory** to distinguish her from France's colonies.

Under the Trusteeship Council's provisions, petitions could be heard against the administering powers, and much of the Council's time was spent on various petitions regarding the "**Ewe question**" (i.e., the **pan-Ewe unification** movement), France's maladministration of her Trusteeship Territory (presented by various **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise [CUT]** leaders, including **Sylvanus Olympio**), and the very slow progress toward self-government. In 1955, France accelerated the move toward autonomy in French Togo by passing statutes that created the **Autonomous Republic** of Togo. Though the degree of internal autonomy granted to the resultant administration of **Nicolas Grunitzky** was unequalled at the time in any of France's overseas possessions, the statute was sharply criticized for its arbitrariness, continuation of the pro-French and unrepresentative regime of Grunitzky, and reflection of a lack of coordination of French policy with that of British Togo. Indeed, from the mid-1940s when the previously favored CUT had become a militant pan-Ewe movement with links with Ewe leaders in British Togo and the Gold Coast, the French administration had fostered the rise of alternate political

formations in Togo. The CUT was viewed not so much as pan-Ewe as anti-French, a Trojan horse for British influences, and the eventual annex of the weaker French Togo into the Gold Coast (together with British Togo). The latter view seemed substantiated when the **1956 plebiscite** in British Togo resulted in a three-to-two vote in favor of merger with the Gold Coast. Hence the French resistance to a similar plebiscite in French Togo and the separate evolution of the French Trusteeship territory. Two years later France was forced to accede to UN-supervised elections that shattered the political control of the pro-French conservative puppet-parties and led to the rise of the CUT and Olympio administration. Political differences between the latter and the new government of **Ghana** assured that pan-Ewe unification aspirations could not be realized upon independence in 1960.

FRENCH UNION. Structure established under the French constitution of October 1946, allowing a measure of representation in the decision-making process to **French colonial administration** of territories in Paris. The French Union was composed of metropolitan France and her overseas territories, which were classified as Overseas Territories, Overseas Departments, Associated Territories, Protectorates, and Associated States. The mainland African colonies fell under the Overseas Territories heading, while Togo was classified as an **associated territory**.

The union had a president (the president of France), a High Council, and an assembly in which deputies from the various territories participated. The new provisions also provided for African representation in the two houses of the French Parliament and in the Economic Council. In 1945, one deputy was allocated to Togo and **Dahomey** together (Dahomey's Sourou Migan Apithy was elected); in 1946, each territory received a separate deputy.

FRENCH WEST AFRICA. *See* AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANÇAISE (AOF).

FRONT CITOYEN TOGO DEBOUT (FCTD). Civil society organization. Headed by **David Dosseh**, the FCTD was officially founded 22 September 2017, at the initiative of members of the Togolese diaspora based in Europe. Dosseh wanted civil society groups to work alongside **political party** coalitions like the contemporaneous **Coalition de 14 (C14)** in supporting the **street demonstrations of 2017–2018**. The FCTD wanted liberty and democracy, and a peaceful handover of power by President **Faure Gnassingbé**. The FCTD spawned the popular social **media** hashtag **#TogoDebout** as part of their mobilizations, and refused to stop their protests in February 2018 for the sake of negotiations with the **Union Pour La République (UNIR)**

government, facilitated by representatives of **Ghana** and Guinea. As with the **Parti National Panafricain (PNP)**, Gnassingbé's government accused the FCTD of being financed by foreign interests, rather than a grassroots movement.

FRONT DES ASSOCIATIONS POUR LE RENOUVEAU (FAR).

Broadly based southern political front set up on 15 March 1991, in opposition to **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** regime, calling inter alia for the demise of Eyadéma, dismissal of brutal minister of interior and security general **Yao Mawlikplimi**, political amnesty, and competitive free elections. The FAR was headed by **Yao Agboyibo** as president of the group and **Joseph Kokou Koffigoh** as vice president. It dissolved itself on 12 April 1991, when five of its 12 constituent groups set up **political parties** following their legalization that month. In due course the structural successor to the FAR was the **Front d'Opposition Démocratique (FOD)**.

FRONT D'OPPOSITION DÉMOCRATIQUE (FOD). Successor to the former **Front des Associations pour le Renouveau (FAR)**. A broad front of ten **political parties** (now legalized) set up in May 1991 to form a common front against **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** regime. The FOD negotiated the convening of a **National Conference** in June and was subsequently transformed to the **Collective d'Opposition Démocratique (COD)**.

FRONT NATIONAL DE LIBERATION DU TOGO (FNLТ). Opposition group that sprang up in the 1970s, representing an alleged military approach to General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** usurpation of power and supported by the exiled Colonel **Merlaud Lawson**, of the **Brazilian** Lawson family, after he fled the country. The FNLТ was based in Paris, though with nuclei in various parts of West Africa where it had supporters. As a party it was essentially moribund, or its activities were coordinated with the **Mouvement Togolaise Démocratique (MTD)**, though from time to time it did issue bulletins calling for the overthrow of Eyadéma or reporting on conditions in Togo.

FRONT PATRIOTIQUE (FP). October 1992 electoral pact between eight southern political parties, headed by **Yao Agboyibo** of the **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)** party and **Edem Kodjo** of the **Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)**, in preparation for the 1993 legislative elections, postponed to 1994. Despite the agreement stipulating a united front to assure **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** strength be kept at bay, the opportunistic Kodjo bolted the alliance after the elections (in which he gained only seven seats) when offered the post of prime minister by President

Gnassingbé Eyadéma, thus joining the RPT in an (coalition) alliance against the CAR.

FULANI. A mostly **Muslim** people numbering over 20 million, scattered throughout West Africa and found especially in northern Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Guinea, and Cameroon. Comparatively few Fulani made their way into Togo, and the majority there (estimated at 100,000) are to be found in northern urban and rural districts where they are frequently called Similsi. Most of Togo's Fulani (also known in French as Fulbe or Peul) are concentrated in the **Dapaong** and **Sansanne-Mango** areas. Over 80 percent of them live in the **Savanes** and central regions where they are involved in herding of cattle; they arrived in Togo from Mossi areas, now Burkina Faso in the north. Other groups came to Togo from **Benin** (to **Sokodé** and then south to **Atakpamé** or north to Dapaong). The lamido (**chief**) of the latter branch is of direct descent from Othman Dan Fodio, the great 19th-century Fulani leader. Togo's Fulani are, as elsewhere, mostly Muslim and pastoralists. Their religion is less proselytizing than elsewhere, however, and Togo was only minimally affected by the great religious battles and Fulani wars of conquest in the 19th century.

"FUSILLADE DES PAQUES." *See* COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 2009.

G

GA. Small segment of a **Gold Coast** ethnic group found in the **Aného** area. Led by two brothers, **Foli Bebe** and Hemazro, the migrating clan left the Accra area in 1663 (or 1687) and founded **Glidji**. They brought with them a stool (which allegedly they had stolen) that was zealously guarded in the neighboring village of Zowla. The alleged theft of the stool resulted in the use of the pejorative name **Ayigbe** for the **Ewe**, **Mina**, and Ga, an epithet still used in the Accra region. Shortly after the foundation of Glidji, Ané **refugees** from the Gold Coast also migrated to the same area and founded Aného. The Ané and Ga are collectively known as Mina, a reference to their specific point of origin, El Mina in the Gold Coast. They have adopted the **Ouatchi Evegbé** dialect of their new home and added Ga words to it. Together the two groups number around 270,000 people. The Ga in Togo are also often referred to as Guin; as such they should not be confused with the Gun or Goun of neighboring **Benin**, of completely different origin. *See also* ANE.

GABA, KWADJO ZOKHEVO LAURENT. Former cabinet minister and director of Togo's Societe Nationale d'Investissement du Togo (SNIT). A civil administrator by profession, Gaba became deputy director of Togo's Office of the National Budget in 1968. In 1972, he was brought into President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cabinet as secretary of state for Public Works but held this position for only 16 months. In August 1973, he was shifted to head the SNIT. Accused, together with some other officials, of corruption and embezzlement during his tenure as head of SNIT, he was tried and imprisoned.

GADO, SOULEYMANE. Served as prefect in multiple locations, including Vo and Yoto, before briefly holding the post of minister of telecommunications in February 1990 before the onset of the several **transitional governments**. He later served eight years as director of an African credit cooperative before retiring.

GAGLI, KODJO EMMANUEL. Physician, **Juvento** leader, and former cabinet minister. Born in **Atakpamé** on 22 December 1915, Gagli was

educated locally and at the elitist **École William Ponty** in Senegal. He returned to Togo in 1938 and for the next 15 years worked in various clinics, completing his medical **education** between 1954 and 1956 at Dakar's Hospital, Bordeaux, and Paris. In 1960, he again returned to Togo and was appointed (by **Sylvanus Olympio**) administrator of the country's health services and later (1962) chief medical officer in **Dapaong**. An active member of Juvento (and the party's vice president in the mid-1960s), Dr. Gagli was elected to the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)** in May 1963, after the rise of the **Nicolas Grunitzky** administration. He served as the assembly's deputy vice president (1965), vice president (1966), president of the Institutional Committee (1963–1964), and vice president of the Assembly's Bureau (1965–1966). In 1965 and 1966, he was also municipal councilor of **Kpalimé** and, following the **Méatchi-Mama clash**, he was briefly brought into the cabinet as minister of health and justice (November–December 1966) and then minister of health (December 1966–January 1967). He was a member of the **Comité Constitutionnel** that was set up after the **1967 coup d'état**. Between 1968 and 1984 (when he went into retirement), Gagli was co-director of Togo's National Hygienic Institute and chief medical officer of the Traumatology Clinic.

GALLY, DJOVI. Lawyer and civic leader. Formerly an **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** member and close to General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, Gally changed sides in 1991 and set up a pro-democracy movement, the Association pour la Promotion de l'Etat de Droit. He played a role in drafting the 1992 constitution and joined **Gilchrist Olympio's Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**. He was awarded the French Legion of Honor in 2016.

GAM, H. BENOIT (1931–). Former director of the civil service. Born in Grand Popo on 18 September 1931, and trained for an administrative career in Paris, Gam joined the ministry of labor, social affairs, and civil service in 1960 as deputy director of the civil service. In 1968, he was promoted to the headship and was in charge of all the country's civil servants until his retirement in 1990.

GARDE TOGOLAISE. *See* ARMED FORCES.

GASSOU, ERNEST ANANI (1931–). Former minister of rural development, former director of the Société Nationale pour le Développement de la Palmeraie et les Huileries (SONAPH), and former deputy secretary general of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** parliamentary party. An **Ewe** born in Bobo-Ahlon on 21 October 1931, Gassou was trained as an agricultural

engineer. A CUT militant in his youth, Gassou was elected to the **Chambre de Députés** (from Kloto) in 1958 and remained a deputy until the **1963 coup d'état**. In the legislature, he rose to be deputy secretary general of the CUT parliamentary party. Following the coup, Gassou was involved in several plots against the **Nicolas Grunitzky** regime. In 1967, he was appointed deputy director of the Agricultural Services; in 1968, director of the **palm** plantations section of the ministry of agriculture; and a few years later, director of SONAPH. In 1978, Gassou was again brought into the cabinet as minister of rural development, a post he held until 1984.

GAYIBOR, NICOUE L. Prolific author and important professor of history at the **Université de Benin** in Lomé (later **Université de Lomé [UL]**). Gayibor has written several books on the history of various parts, mostly in the south, of Togo (e.g., **Glidji/Aného**), based upon oral history that is fast disappearing in the country. He served as president of the UL 2003–2006.

GAZARO, WERE. Former cabinet minister. Gazaro served as prefect of Kozah before she joined the **transition government** of **Joseph Koffigoh** as minister of social welfare and national solidarity in December 1991 and was reappointed through the third interim government of 1993.

GBATI, KOMLAN. Briefly minister of labor and civil service (March–June 1980), Gbati was arrested while in office in connection with the sale of examination answers to civil service and school tests. It was later revealed that this practice had been going on for four years. He was released from prison in mid-1981, having served one year of his three-year sentence.

GBEDEMAH, SATI YAWO G. (1942–). Educator. Born in 1942 at the Tove Mission in Zio where he completed primary studies, attended other schools in Lomé and **Sokodé**. He then proceeded to the University of Aix-en-Provence obtaining degrees in history in 1971. He taught at several secondary schools in Togo, serving also as director of the **Protestant** schools of **Kpalimé** (1972–1974) and of **Lomé** (1974–1979).

GBEGBENI, NANAMALE ROBERT (1933–). Former minister of labor, civil service, and justice. Born in 1933 of **Bassari/Konkomba** origins in Koudjudjou, Gbegbeni was educated locally and worked as an educator in northern Togo before entering political life. One of the earlier members of the northern and conservative **Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN)** and later its vice president, Gbegbeni switched allegiances in the mid-1950s, joined the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** and in 1955 was

elected CUT deputy from Bassar (1955–1961). He was reelected on the CUT ticket again in 1961 and participated in the electoral coalition forged after **Sylvanus Olympio**'s assassination. Following the **1967 coup d'état** Gbegbeni was appointed cabinet director of the minister of labor, social affairs, and civil service and, in August 1969, he was brought into **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s cabinet as minister of commerce, industry, and tourism. In January 1972, Gbegbeni was reassigned to head the ministry of labor and the civil service, adding the Justice portfolio in February 1974. A hardworking and able administrator, Gbegbeni's responsibilities in the Eyadéma regime steadily grew. He was a member of the Political Bureau of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** from 1971. In 1979, he was dropped from the cabinet to provide space for new blood but was retained as a senior administrator in the ministry.

GENDARMERIE NATIONALE. In Togo, as in most of Francophone Africa, the gendarmerie (police force) is an integral part of the country's armed forces, though maintaining a separate command hierarchy, facilities, recruitment policies, and duties. For a long time, the top hierarchy of the gendarmerie included General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s most trusted lieutenants. In 1988, it was estimated that roughly 60 percent of the rank and file were **Kotokoli** and **Kabyé**. *See also* FORCES D'ARMÉES TOGOLAISES (FAT).

GENERALE DES MATIERES COLORANTES (GMC). *See* LOMÉ INDUSTRIAL FREE ZONE.

GEOMANCY. A form of divination through the study of signs traced on the ground, part of the **Fa** cult so prevalent in Togo and **Benin**. It is in particular linked to the **Yoruba** of the region.

GERMAN ADMINISTRATION. The German administration of Togo lasted a total of 31 years, from July 1884 until the end of August 1914, when Anglo-French troops occupied the territory. Germany's official penetration of the area began in 1882, when German traders established themselves in **Aného** with a guarantee of freedom of trade. (German religious and commercial contacts had, of course, been in existence for at least 75 years prior to this.) An imbroglio involving the ambitious pro-British **Lawson** family—a member of whom had declared himself sovereign and appealed for British military assistance from Lagos, Nigeria—resulted in the dispatch of the German ship *Sophie* to protect German interests in Aného. Following a classic show of force, the 1882 freedom of trade treaty was reaffirmed, but further incidents resulted in the arrest of William Lawson (at the time a British

subject), whose ambitions had sparked the unrest, and his transportation to Germany. The abducted Togolese returned to Aného in July 1884 aboard the *Mowe* that was bringing **Gustav Nachtigal** to Africa to establish the formal colonial presence of Germany in the area. (At the time it was essentially Nachtigal and domestic public opinion that expanded the German colonial empire, since Bismarck was very lukewarm on the issue, preferring to see **France** enmeshed abroad and in the process forget Alsace-Lorraine.)

On 4 July 1884, a treaty was signed with the chief of the minute coastal village of Togo and, on the basis of this, the German flag was raised over the area, it was renamed the German colony of Togo, and the German penetration-occupation of the coastal and hinterland areas commenced. Competing French claims on parts of Togo (especially the areas around Aného) were resolved by the Convention of Berlin (24 December 1885), when Germany renounced territory east of a line between Petit Popo and **Agoué**—that became part of French Dahomey (now Benin)—in exchange for French recognition of German Togo, including Porto Seguro where France had had important commercial interests. The western borders were negotiated with Britain and resolved on 14 and 28 July 1886, and signed in the Treaty of Zanzibar in 1890, with the definitive borders sanctified in the Treaty of Paris, 1897. Though both France and Britain were blocked in their northward expansion from their coastal enclaves (by the Dahomey kingdom and the Ashanti, respectively), Germany, encountering only sparse opposition in the absence of strong local kingdoms, did not exploit this advantage and never reached the Niger River, a prime colonial goal.

The German era in Togo falls into two periods: (1) the years of pacification and occupation, to 1900, and (2) the **Musterkolonie** period of intense development until Germany's loss of the colony with the start of World War I. Togo's capital was originally Bagida; in 1887, it was shifted to Sebe (an Aného suburb), and in 1897 **Lomé**, a small village, became the capital. The concerted push into the hinterland began only in 1893, though by 1899 the entire territory was fully occupied. The extension of German control in the north was relatively smooth, with only a few sporadic **insurrections in 1897 and 1898**. Despite scattered opposition to German rule by their own clans, northern elements, especially **Kotokoli**, **Chokossi**, and Djerma, joined as auxiliary troops in the conquest of the north and quelled disturbances among the **Somba**, **Moba**, and **Konkomba**. Thirty-five police columns were dispatched on punitive and/or pacification missions between 1897 and 1901, though none of the disturbances was considered very threatening. In the south, physical occupation was not a problem either, though the German administration was faced with the problem of imposing their mastery over **Mina**, **Ewe**, and **Ouatchi** populations accustomed to dealing

with Europeans as equals. The latter problem was resolved with the decision to grant the southern elements a privileged status within the German administration and to train them for similar second echelon duty in Germany's other colonial territories in Africa.

During the second part of the German era in Togo, the country was divided into five administrative units in the south (called *Bezirksämter*) and three northern *Stationsbezirke*, which were in turn subdivided into *Unterbezirken*. (There was little real difference administratively between the *Bezirksämter* and the *Stationsbezirke*.) The northern units were virtually closed to all Europeans in order to "protect the natives" (ordinances of 20 September 1907 and 5 October 1907) and a strong pro-**Muslim** bias was practiced. Only, in 1912, were **Christian** missions granted privileges in the north (**Protestant** in Yendi, currently in Ghana; **Catholic** in **Sokodé**). In the south, the beginnings of a well-developed economic and administrative infrastructure were laid in the years prior to World War I in an effort to transform Togo into a model colony (*Musterkolonie*). The German administration even boasted a powerful radio station in Kamina, which could communicate directly with Berlin and with German cruisers in the Atlantic Ocean.

Germany's special affinity for Togo had all along been a function of the fact that the territory had been the only colony that had been self-sufficient from the outset and did not require any special fiscal outlays. Also, being unsuitable for settler colonization, it avoided the native-settler friction that developed elsewhere, embittering race relations. With the beginning of World War I, an effort was made by the German **governor** to keep the region a neutral one so as to prevent Africans from observing Europeans fighting each other; in any event, German forces in the colony were minimal. The proposal was rejected by the Allies and on 8 August 1914, French troops moved into Togo from Dahomey while British troops were ferried over from Accra. On 26 August, the Kamina radio station fell, and with it collapsed the German administration in the territory. The conquest of Togo was the first allied success in the war. Paradoxically, despite many harsh aspects of German colonial rule and indeed, its brevity, many Togolese fondly remembered this era and in the interwar years petitioned the League of Nations for the return of Togo to Germany, and, during World War II, there was considerable pro-German sentiment in the colony, especially after the early collapse of France in 1940. The **French administration** had major difficulties in imposing her **currency** in her new mandate with the German mark and the Austrian Maria Theresa dollar circulating freely until the mid-1930s. German nostalgia for their former *Musterkolonie* did not fail after World War II either; West Germany allocated the independent Togo significant credits, especially for the **Lomé port**, and remained a major source of technical

assistance for Togo until reunification. Many Germans have worked in Togo, joint companies are not uncommon, and Togolese students routinely go to German universities. The sentimental links between the former metropole and the former colony were attested to when Germany's last colonial governor, Adolf Friedrich zu Mecklenburg attended the 1960 independence celebrations. *See also* BREMEN MISSIONARY SOCIETY; BUND DER DEUTSCHEN TOGOLANDER.

GHANA, RELATIONS WITH. The state of relations between Togo and Ghana during the 1950s and 1960s vacillated from overt hostility to cool aloofness, until the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and the rise of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in Togo ushered in a new era. At the root of this early friction were the differential forms of reaction of the various **Ewe** clans to the pan-Ewe unification movement during the colonial era. After the issue was "settled" in British Togoland consequent to the **plebiscite of 1956** that resulted in the merger of the latter with Ghana, the residual ethnic pull of Togo upon Ghana's Ewe constituted a threat to the panafrican aspirations of Nkrumah. Relations between the two countries further deteriorated as a result of President **Sylvanus Olympio's** statement that part of the former British Togoland (now in Ghana) should be reunited with Togo, the 1956 referendum notwithstanding, and by Nkrumah's threatening speech in which he stated that Togo would soon become just another region in an expanded Ghana. Between 1960 and 1963 a number of border skirmishes erupted between the two states, and Nkrumah gave refuge in Accra to dissident Togolese elements aiming at the overthrow of Olympio. In July 1965, the border was reopened, although relations between the two countries did not seriously improve until the late 1960s.

In the 1970s, relations once again plummeted as continued massive **smuggling** along the joint Ghana-Togo border hurt Ghana's economy. In 1977, **Lomé** even declared the need to reexamine the results of the 1956 plebiscite with a view to reunifying the various populations on both sides of the border within an expanded Togolese state. Several years later, in 1981, a series of other incidents again enflamed tensions between the two countries. Togolese **Konkomba** crossed into Ghana to join their brethren there who were on a rampage against the Nanumba, never forgiven for their 1956 vote to integrate northern Togo with Ghana. Some 1,500 casualties resulted from this orgy of ethnic fighting and the border was soon closed.

On at least five occasions (including in the 1990s) armed groups are known to have crossed to Togo from Ghana to plot or to actually assault President Eyadéma. Though Ghana has on numerous occasions stated that it did not sanction such activities, directly or indirectly Togolese opposition

elements have used Ghana as safe haven en route to missions against Eya-déma. Ghana has also been a safe haven for **refugee** populations fleeing unrest at home. During the period of the southern total strike against Eyadéma in 1991 and 1992 fully one-third of the population of Lomé fled across the border to Ghana, as did many inhabitants of central and north Togo prior to the **1993 parliamentary elections** when the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** and **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** thugs hounded all potential sources of opposition. Ghana and Togo managed to cooperate through the difficulties of 1998, including a cross-border bombardment of the western part of Lomé, but Ghanaian president John Kufuor's 2001 visit to Togo during the **Liberation Day** celebration (nominally a celebration of the **1967 coup**) offended Ewe on both sides of the border who see it as actually celebrating the **1963 coup** against Olympio, as both coups took place on the same day and month.

Though not part of **Faure Gnassingbé's** official biography, the Togolese president apparently married daughter of Ghanaian president Kufuor, Nana Ama Kufuor, in 2005 and they have at least one child together. After the **presidential elections of 2005** that brought **Faure Gnassingbé** to power, as many as 14,000 Togolese fled to Ghana to escape the violence. In 2010, 3,600 Ghanaians had fled to Togo to escape a violent land dispute north of both capitals. By 2015, there were an estimated 18,000 Ghanaians in Togo seeking refuge, after which the numbers began to decline. In 2017 Ghana and Togo revived the Togo-Ghana Joint Commission for high-level meetings on common issues, signaling a willingness to further normalize relations.

GLIDJI. Very important historical suburban village four kilometers from **Aného**, north of the lagoon, of much greater traditional import than its small size and decrepit setting might indicate. Never much larger than a few thousand inhabitants, Glidji was founded in the latter part of the 17th century (possibly as early as 1663) by **Ga** elements from the **Gold Coast** coastal areas shortly before **Ané** refugees settled Aného. (But the precise history, which would give primacy to one group over another, is hotly disputed by both groups.) Glidji is regarded as both the **zongo** of Aného and a venerated ancient quarter of the historic town. Many influential southern leaders and families (Ajavons; **Lawsons**) trace their descent from Glidji and/or Aného. Glidji has a sizable **Hausa** minority. Glidji is spiritual home to the Guin, housing sanctuaries and a sacred forest home to revered pythons, and hosting the annual **Epe Ekpe** festival. In 2000, the Togolese government proposed both Aného-Glidji (2000) and the former house of slaves "Woold Home" (2002) to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for consideration as World Heritage sites.

GLIME. “In the Walls” in *Ewe*. Popular name for **Notsé**.

GLOBAL POLITICAL ACCORD. *See* ACCORD POLITIQUE GLOBAL (APG).

GNAMEY, BENOIT MENSAH (1938–). Journalist and poet. Born in Lomé on 6 April 1938, Gnamey moved into journalism after a brief stint as a teacher. He was well known, working for **Radio Lomé**, specializing in literature and sports, but equally known for his two novels, serialized by **Togo-Presse**, and for his poetry, some of which has been published at home and abroad.

GNASSINGBÉ, AMAH. Doctor and government minister. Amah Gnassingbé is a biochemical engineer who has helped to develop medications for hypertension and malaria. He was awarded the Hassan II prize in 2007 for his work. Also active in politics, in 2006 when Gnassingbé was second vice president of the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**, he flouted his party’s decision not to take part in **Yao Agboyibo**’s government, taking on a minister of state position. The UFC declared that he could only do so in a personal capacity, and suspended him from the party, though they did not expel him immediately. Rumors circulated that he would cause a split in the UFC, but the party remained united until **Gilchrist Olympio**’s decision to join the government in 2010. More recently he has been named as a presidential counselor, and is rumored to have the confidence of President **Faure Gnassingbé**.

GNASSINGBÉ, COLONEL DONOU TOYI ERNEST. Gnassingbé Eyadéma’s half-brother and commander of the **Presidential Guard**. Both he and his guard were implicated in a variety of **human rights** abuses and massacres such as the bloody **Bè Lagoon massacre** and in liquidations, assaults on government buildings, etc., including on the motorcade of **Gilchrist Olympio** in 1992. He was killed during one of these sorties in December 1992.

GNASSINGBÉ, LIEUTENANT ERNEST. Head of a much-feared elite commando unit based in **Kara** and son of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and older brother of **Faure Gnassingbé**. For many years considered a likely successor to Eyadéma, Ernest Gnassingbé led various elite military units in the 1990s known for their brutal crackdowns on political opposition. He was credibly accused of leading the 1992 attack on **Gilchrist Olympio**’s campaign which left Eyadéma’s primary political opponent severely wounded and killed a dozen others, but he was never held accountable. Ernest was rumored to have suffered from a brain hemorrhage that forced him to withdraw from his

role as his father's enforcer around the turn of the millennium, and he died in 2009.

GNASSINGBÉ, ETIENNE. Actual name of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, who took on the **Kabyé** term "Eyadéma," that signifies bravery, after his murder of President **Sylvanus Olympio** in 1963.

GNASSINGBÉ, ESSOLIZAM. Businessman and brother of **Kpatcha Gnassingbé** and President **Faure Gnassingbé**. He was accused of complicity in the **attempted coup of 2009**, but was ultimately acquitted of wrongdoing.

GNASSINGBÉ, FAURE ESSOZIMNA (1966–). Current president of Togo, and son of the former president **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Gnassingbé (popularly known as "Faure") studied in Togo before his father Eyadéma enrolled him in a military high school (Saint-Cyr) in **France**, from where he graduated in 1985. Having an aptitude for finance, Gnassingbé studied economics and international relations at the Sorbonne in Paris, and later earned an MBA from George Washington University in the United States. Upon his return to Togo, he served as a financial advisor to his father Eyadéma, managing his family's business affairs, and in 2003 he was appointed minister of mines. Seen as a quiet and calm figure, Gnassingbé was among many sons of Eyadéma who may have held the highest political aspirations, but from 2002 it began to be clear that he was the one favored by the president to take over. **Constitutional amendments** passed by the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**-controlled **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in that year lowered the age of eligibility of the president from 45 to 35, and Gnassingbé was at the time 36. Moreover, he seemed to have the confidence of most elements of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** upon his father's death, when he was thrust into the position of president during the **succession crisis of 2005**. Though he was forced to submit to an **election in April 2005** rather than finish out his father's term as the military would have clearly preferred, Faure's performance at the ballot box mirrored that of his father in securing most of the vote from supporters of Eyadéma and the RPT in the north, and securing at least the appearance of sufficient support from opponents in the south, through either fraud or intimidation. He was inaugurated president of Togo on 4 May 2005 but needed to consolidate power after the violence surrounding the election by finding a way to work with political opponents who saw him as little more than a puppet of the military, or a shadow of his father. By August 2006, Gnassingbé had signed an agreement by which members of the opposition would serve in a unity government, and **Edem Kodjo** of the **Convergence Patriotique Panafricain (CPP)** and **Yao Agboyibo** of the **Comité**

d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR) became his first two prime ministers until the **legislative elections of 2007** ushered in an RPT government. During this period, Gnassingbé and the major political parties also hammered out the **Global Political Accord (APG)** in Lomé, which promised a return to some of the key demands from the political transition of the 1990s, including fair electoral lists, term limits on the presidency, and more. The APG helped repair some of the damage from the succession crisis, and enabled international **donors** (notably the European Union and International Monetary Fund) to resume the flow of aid and cooperation.

In the early years of his presidency, Gnassingbé preferred to seek legitimacy through improved economic performance, rather than relying on brute military force. His delicate balancing act of reassuring the military brass and RPT stalwarts, while also putting new people and policies in place, showed signs of collapsing with the **coup attempt of 2009** when an apparent plot against him by two of his disgruntled brothers, **Kpatcha Gnassingbé** and **Rock Gnassingbé**, was thwarted. In the months that followed there were several other high-profile arrests which had the apparent effect of chilling further opposition within the military ranks. In addition to economic gains that might placate political rivals, Gnassingbé also managed to secure the cooperation of longtime family rival **Gilchrist Olympio**, who entered into a surprise deal for seven **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)** ministerial posts in a unity government after the **presidential elections of 2010**. In 2012, Gnassingbé was able to revamp the all-powerful RPT into the new **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party against the wishes of many important members, a further sign of growing influence in his own right. However, Gnassingbé (**reelected president in 2010 and 2015**) and the RPT/UNIR majorities who supported him in the AN (winning in 2007, 2013, and 2018) continued to drag their heels in implementing the reforms promised by the APG, prompting the powerful and concerted **street protests of 2017 and 2018**, which threatened the economic progress Gnassingbé had achieved. In a deft political move, in late 2019 Gnassingbé orchestrated the surprise passing in the AN of constitutional amendments the opposition favored: two-term limits on the presidency, and a second-round runoff if no presidential candidate gets an absolute majority in the first term. While this took from the opposition many of their main rallying points, the term limit provision does not apply to Gnassingbé retroactively, paving the way for him to remain in power until at least 2030, assuming the favorable rules help him to victory in presidential elections scheduled for 2020 and 2025. Gnassingbé is criticized by his political opponents for engaging in corruption, with the advancement of his cronies in positions of power as well as his opulent residences as supporting evidence. He has been rumored to be married to many women,

including Nana Ama Kufuor, daughter of former Ghanaian president John Kufuor (linked together from 2005), though no official record of these marriages is publicized and Togo has no official first lady. It is generally accepted that he has many children by his wives, though even less is known about these offspring, and he allegedly carries on extramarital affairs with women who hold prominent government and social positions. In the most recent **2020 presidential elections**, Gnassingbé faced a new rival, **Agbéyomé Kodjo**, but still fared better at the ballot box than any incumbent since 1990. In fact, the suspiciously inflated turnout figures and unlikely margin of victory (more than 50%) may signal a shift in his strategy from drawing legitimacy from economic performance to more strong-arm tactics. While more reminiscent of his father's political behavior, such a move will almost certainly dent his international credibility.

GNASSINGBÉ, KPATCHA (1970–). Former defense minister convicted of plotting to overthrow his half-brother, President **Faure Gnassingbé**. Son of former president **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, Kpatcha attended military school in Togo and is known to have close ties with **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** personnel, though his own civilian career took him into business. After earning a degree from Southeastern University in London, Kpatcha returned to Togo and was named director of the Société d'Administration des Zones Franches (SOZAF), which promoted contacts with figures in international trade and the **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)**. He later served as director of the state-run cotton agency **Société Togolaise du Coton (SO-TOCO)**. Kpatcha and Faure were both reportedly very close to their father Gnassingbé Eyadéma in his final years, and both were present the night of his death when Faure was (briefly) sworn in as president. The presence of Kpatcha, born of two parents from the north, was rumored to be reassuring to those in the armed forces and **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** who were more skeptical of Faure, whose mother was an **Ewe** from the south. In the aftermath of the **succession crisis of 2005**, Faure named Kpatcha to the sensitive post of minister of defense: a post so sensitive that Eyadéma himself rarely relinquished it, but kept that title for himself, alongside that of president. Kpatcha continued to wield political influence in that post and on the political bureau of the RPT, and also won a seat in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in the **2007 elections**, which he was forced to decline, as incompatible with his role as minister. However, toward the end of 2007, reports circulated that relations between the brothers had cooled considerably, and Kpatcha was not renewed in his post in the government reshuffle at the end of the year. In response, Kpatcha sought to be reinstated to his AN seat, taking up that role from 2008 until his arrest for plotting to overthrow Faure in the **coup attempt**

of 2009. Kpatcha attempted to use his military connections to evade capture, and his parliamentary immunity to escape prosecution, but was arrested and ultimately sentenced to 20 years in prison for his role in the plot. His health has declined in prison, prompting some to wonder whether Faure will show mercy and pardon him. He was rumored to have escaped prison in **Lomé** in May 2020 during a brief prison riot related to the **coronavirus** pandemic, but the Togolese authorities confirmed that he continued to serve out the second half of his sentence.

GNASSINGBÉ, COLONEL ROCK BALAKIYEM. Active military officer and Head of the Federation Togolese de Football (FTF) 1998–2007 and 2009–2011. Rock is a son of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and half-brother to **Faure Gnassingbé**. Rock's first turn as head of the FTF came to an end shortly after the country's first appearance at a World Cup in Germany in 2006. An apparent dispute over bonuses led to tensions between the federation and the coach and players at a crucial time, and Rock was ousted from the organization in consequence. His family connections seemed to have helped him regain that post, which he also held during the **attack on the national team in 2010**, and despite being implicated in the **2009 attempted coup**.

GNEHOU, CAPTAIN GASTON-CHARLES (1950–1977). Former president **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s brother-in-law. According to one official version, Gnehou was involved in a murky **1977 coup attempt** against the regime, leading to his arrest and death in prison. In actual fact Gnehou, about whom little is known, was gunned down by security personnel outside the tourist-filled Hotel de la Paix in Lomé and was then taken to the Tokoin Army Hospital where he was tortured and finally liquidated. His crime was apparently confronting and coming to blows with Eyadéma over the latter's rape of the wife of one of his uncles.

GNININVI, LEOPOLD MESSAN (1942–). Opposition leader and government member. Originally Professor of Physics at the **University in Lomé**, and a Marxist-Leninist-turned Social Democrat, Gnininvi set up a political party for his aspirations in 1990, the **Convention Démocratique Panafricain (CDPA)**, and until now remains its secretary general. He campaigned as a candidate for the CDPA in the **presidential elections of 1998 and 2003**, but withdrew his candidacy for both elections in favor of the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)** candidates. Gnininvi was one of the few members of the opposition to attend the funeral of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in 2005. After the **Accord Politique Global (APG)**, Gnininvi served as minister of state for mines and energy in 2006, minister of state

for foreign affairs and regional integration in 2007, and minister of state for industry, crafts, and technological innovations in 2008. He left the government prior to the **2010 presidential election** to maintain CDPA's reputation as an opposition party.

GNOFAME, ZOUMARO. Military general and cabinet minister. One of the military generals instrumental in putting **Faure Gnassingbé** in power during the **succession crisis** after the death of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in 2005, Gnofame had been serving as minister of the environment in Eyadéma's cabinet from 2003 until the latter's death. Gnofame went on to serve as minister of public service and administrative reform in 2008 in the government of **Gilbert Houngbo**, and has headed Togo's National Olympic Committee.

GNRONFOUM, TOSSEH KOKOVI (1937–). Former minister of rural development. Born in Lomé on 6 October 1937 and originally trained for a teaching career, Gnrnfoum went to a forestry school in Côte d'Ivoire, following which he was dispatched to Barres, **France** (1961–1963) and Nancy (1964–1966). Upon his return home, he served in rapid succession as Togo's deputy head of Water and Forests and director of the **Office National de Développement et Exploitation des Ressources Forestières (ODEF)**. In January 1977, he joined the cabinet as minister of rural development. The successive failures of Togo's agricultural development efforts brought about his dismissal from the cabinet in September 1982.

GOGUE, TCHABOURE AIME (1947–). Government minister and presidential candidate. Born in 1947 and educated in economics overseas, including in Canada, Gogue taught for several years at the University of Montreal (1973–1976) before returning to the **Université de Benin** (later **Université de Lomé [UL]**) where he was to rise to dean of the faculty. Gogue has been the author of several books. With the liberalization in Togo in the 1990s he cofounded the Alliance des Démocrates pour un Développement Integral (ADDI) party and joined the September 1991 **transition government** of **Joseph Koffigoh** as minister of planning and territorial development. He was shifted to head **education** and scientific research in the next government of September 1992 but was dropped from the third government's cabinet in September 1993. After serving as an ADDI deputy in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in 2013, Gogue ran for **president in 2015 and 2020**. Under the ADDI party banner, he gained just over 4 percent of the vote in 2015, coming in third behind incumbent president **Faure Gnassingbé** and **Jean-Pierre Fabre**. In 2020, with **Agbéyomé Kodjo** in the race, he found himself in fourth place with 2.38 percent of the vote.

GOLD. Togo's largest export earner, despite the fact that no large-scale gold mining industry exists in the country. International watchdog groups have determined that illegal mining operations in Burkina Faso, some with deplorable and unsafe conditions for miners, produce gold that is **smuggled** across the border and exported from Togo. *See also* MINING.

GOLD COAST. Early European name for what is today **Ghana**.

GOURMA. *See* GURMA.

GOVERNORS OF THE AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANÇAISE (AOF).

1895–1900	J. B. Chandie
1900–1902	N. E. Ballay
1902–1908	E. N. Roume
1908–1916	W. Merlaud-Ponty
1916–1917	M. F. Clozel
1917–1918	J. van Vollenhoven
1918–1919	G. L. Anjoulvant
1919–1923	M. H. Merlin
1923–1930	J. G. Carde
1930–1936	J. Brevie
1936–1940	J. M. de Coppet
1940	L. H. Cayla
1940–1943	P. F. Boisson
1943–1946	P. C. Cournarie
1946–1948	R. V. Barthès
1948–1951	P. L. Bechard
1951–1956	B. Cornut-Gentile
1956–1958	G. Cusin
1958–1959	P. A. Messmer

GOVERNORS OF TOGO, FRENCH. The title was “high commissioners” rather than “governor” in some cases.

March–April 1917	Gaston Léopold Joseph Fourn
April 1917–Jan. 1922	Alfred Louis Woelfel
Jan. 1922	Pierre Benjamin Victor Sasias
Jan. 1922–Dec. 1931	Paul Auguste François Bonnacarrère
Dec. 1931–Oct. 1933	Robert Paul Marie DeGuise
Oct. 1933–April 1934	Leon Charles Adolphe Pêtre

April 1934–Oct. 1935	Maurice Léon Bourguine
Nov. 1935–Oct. 1936	Léon Geismer
Nov. 1936–March 1941	Michel Lucien Montagné
March 1941–Feb. 1942	Léonce Joseph Delpech
1942	Jean-François deSaint Alary
1942–1943	Pierre Jean André Saliceti
1943–1944	Albert Mercadier
1944–1948	Jean Noutary
1948–1951	Jean Henri Arsène Cédile
1951–1952	Yves Jean Digo
1953–1954	Laurent Elysée Péchoux
1955–1957	Jean Louis Philippe Bérard
1957–1960	Georges Léon Spénale

GOVERNORS OF TOGO, GERMAN. Apart from **Gustav Nachtigal**, who was dispatched in 1884 on certain specific missions to the area, and Heinrich Randad, de facto but only interim governor, the following served as governors of German Togo.

1886–1889	Ernst von Falkenthal
1889–1895	Jesko von Putkammer
1895–1902	August Kohler
1902–1903	Waldemar Horn
1904–1910	Julius, Graf Zech auf Neuhofen
1911–1912	Edmund Bruckner
1912–1914	Adolf Friedrich zu Mecklenburg

GREEN REVOLUTION (1977). A program for self-sufficiency in food-stuffs, formally launched by President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in 1977. While the program was not successful, it did bring about a degree of self-reliance for basic staples. The program relied on a variety of incentives to stimulate both production and more efficient marketing of produce. The program included government outlays for the development of animal resources, building forest reserves, diversifying crop planting and production, and expansion of such basic staples as cereals, fruits, and vegetables. Government subsidies for fertilizers and insecticides were increased. The program came under severe fiscal cuts during the 1981–1982 **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** scrutiny of the **state sector**.

GROUP ASSOR. Powerful Paris-based marketing and purchasing agency that controlled much of Togo's import/export trade prior to 1990, as well as General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** personal financial transactions and investments. *See also* ASSOR, MAURICE.

GROUPE DE RÉFLEXION ET D'ACTION DES JEUNES POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE (GRAD). Youth and student group that sprang up in 1990 to press for democracy, multipartyism, and an end to the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** dictatorship.

GROUP DE RÉFLEXION ET D'ACTION FEMME, DÉMOCRATIE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT (GF2D). Nonprofit civil society group born from the **Collectif d'Associations des Femmes (CAF)**, a women's association set up in 1990. The CAF was based predominantly in the South, in opposition to both the regime of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and the monopoly exerted by the latter's official women's associations, particularly the **Union Nationale des Femmes du Togo (UNFT)**. It rapidly became the largest women's organization in Togo, replaced by the GF2D from 1992. The GF2D's mission focuses on promoting the rights and liberties of women in Togo, and has taken part in political protests against Presidents Eyadéma and **Faure Gnassingbé**.

GROUPE SOCIAL PANAFRICAIN (GSP). Electoral coalition including **Leopold Gnininvi**'s party the **Convention Démocratique Panafricain (CDPA)**, **Zarifou Ayéva**'s party **Alliance du Démocrates pour le Renouveau (ADR)**, and **Francis Agbobli**'s **Parti Socialiste Panafricain (PSP)**, formed late in 1993 pledging to boycott the **1994 legislative elections**.

GROUPEMENT DU THEATRE ET DU FOLKLORE TOGOLAIS (GTFT). Founded in **Lomé** in 1962 by the Cultural Affairs Department, the GTFT sponsored many cultural activities at home and abroad, though it was best known for its African Ballet ensemble.

GRUNITZKY, GILBERT YVES (1932–2004). Former secretary general of the ministry of interior. Born on 6 April 1932, in **Atakpamé**, Grunitzky was educated locally and in **France**, where he obtained a law degree. He is the author of a book on traditional chiefs, published in the late 1950s. In 1961, he joined the Togolese civil service as deputy inspector of the Maritime region and, following the collapse of the **Sylvanus Olympio** regime in 1963, was appointed secretary general of the ministry of interior (1963–1966). In 1965, he also became director of the Caisse de Compensation des Prestations Familiales et Accidents du Travail, serving in the position until 1968. From 1968 Grunitzky lived mostly abroad, especially in Côte d'Ivoire.

GRUNITZKY, NICOLAS (1913–1969). Engineer, political leader, and former president of Togo. Born in **Atakpamé** on 5 April 1913 to a Polish officer in the German armed forces in Togo and his wife of the Atakpamé

nobility, Grunitzky was also **Sylvanus Olympio**'s brother-in-law and hence also indirectly related to Dr. **Pedro Olympio**. Indeed, much of the early political history in Togo was a tug-of-war between the three above-named politicians. Grunitzky was educated locally and abroad (receiving one of the first scholarships ever granted to a Togolese), studying mathematics and obtaining an engineering degree (1937). Upon his return to Togo, Grunitzky joined the civil service as a public works engineer with the **Chemin de Fer du Togo (CFT)** and in 1949 started his own **transportation** company. (Later, in exile in the Ivory Coast, he was to establish a similar enterprise.) An active Gaullist underground member during World War II in Vichy-controlled Togo, Grunitzky was strongly supported after the war in his bid to be elected Togo's deputy to the French National Assembly. Despite the support of many of Togo's pro-French évolués and French civil servants, Grunitzky was defeated in his first effort in 1946 by Dr. **Martin Akou**, who ran under the aegis of Olympio's **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**. His second bid was successful, for by then the balance had swung against the CUT, and Grunitzky beat the incumbent Akou and represented Togo between 1951 and 1958. A founding member of the conservative **Parti Togolais du Progrès (PTP)**, which also included Dr. Pedro Olympio, Grunitzky's political career nearly came to an abrupt end in 1952 after his electoral defeat in his own home district for a seat in the **Assemblée Territoriale du Togo (ATT)**, when **Ewe, Kpessi, and Kabyé** voters alike rejected his candidacy. Temporarily expelled from the PTP party, Grunitzky made a comeback by utilizing his Paris platform and **French administration** supporters. In the process, Dr. Pedro Olympio was expelled from the PTP and, taking with him the less conservative members, set up the **Mouvement Populaire Togolais (MPT)**. Benefiting from the administration's apprehension regarding the CUT and its pan-Ewe policies, Grunitzky finally entered the Togolese assembly of 1955, the **Assemblée Législative du Togo (ALT)**, and became prime minister of the **Autonomous Republic** of 1956–1958, hammering out a tactical alliance with emerging northern political parties also being supported (against the CUT) by the French administration. Grunitzky was dislodged from power by the United Nations-supervised **elections of 1958**, in which his PTP party obtained only three seats (out of 46) and got barely a fifth of the votes the CUT polled. His electoral ally, the northern **Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN)**, was also trounced in the same elections, which saw the re-emergence of a strong CUT government under Sylvanus Olympio. Grunitzky remained in Togo until 1961, merging his party with the UCPN to form the **Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolaises (UDPT)**. In 1961, he relocated to the Ivory Coast with some of his pre-1958 colleagues and returned to **Lomé** only after the **1963 coup d'état** at the request of the **Insurrectionist**

Committee. Originally slated to become vice president under **Antoine Méatchi**, who was favored by the putschists, Grunitzky refused to serve under his young former minister, and French pressure tipped the balance in favor of a reversal of their respective positions.

A four-cornered coalition was forged between the resurrected parties (all except the CUT had been hounded until 1961 and banned in 1962), each receiving an equal number of assembly seats and a number of cabinet portfolios. The second Grunitzky administration was very much a rerun of his pre-independence conservative policies, indecisive rule, and familiar cabinet appointees, all of which had been defeated and rejected in 1958 during Togo's only honest election up to that point. Grunitzky's four years in power were also marked by a continuous tug-of-war between him and his aggressive, ambitious, and more militant vice president, intense fiscal pressures necessitated by the tripling of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** (a condition virtually imposed by the 1963 putschists), economic unrest in the south aggravated by the closed border with **Ghana**, and continuous plotting against the regime by a militant wing of the renamed CUT which refused to cooperate with Grunitzky or to accept the presence of Olympio's assassins at the helm of the armed forces. The regime was also unpopular in the south because of its timid and conservative domestic and foreign policies.

The contradictions inherent in the Grunitzky regime came to a head with the **Méatchi-Mama crisis**—in which Grunitzky felt forced to downgrade Minister of Interior **Fousseni Mama** when Mama clashed with Vice President Méatchi over a Méatchi-sponsored drive to unseat Grunitzky—and led to the resignation of the remaining PUT ministers from the cabinet and then the **Lomé upheavals of 1966**. Though the army belatedly moved in to prevent the collapse of the Grunitzky regime, he was toppled on the fourth anniversary of the first **coup d'état in 1967**. Following the coup, Grunitzky left Togo with some of his associates (notably his foreign minister, **Georges Apedo-Amah**) and relocated to the Ivory Coast where he had business interests. He died in a Paris hospital on 27 September 1969 after being injured in a car accident in the Ivory Coast. During the **National Conference** of 1991, there was mention of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** complicity in Grunitzky's death among the various allegations made against him. In 1984, Grunitzky's youngest daughter married Côte d'Ivoire's President Felix Houphouët-Boigny.

GRUNITZKY, YAO OTTO HANS (1934–). Former ambassador to the United States. Born in **Atakpamé** on 13 December 1934, and a nephew of Nicolas Grunitzky, the former president of the Republic, Yao Grunitzky was educated in Atakpamé and **Lomé** before proceeding to Bordeaux where he

studied law. Between 1959 and 1961, he also studied finance and treasury activities at the *École Nationale du Trésor* in Paris and, upon his return to Lomé, served in the National Treasury. In 1962, he was appointed Treasury Inspector and later, head of the Expenditures Division. In November 1964, he was appointed director of the Budget, holding this post until after the collapse of the Grunitzky regime in 1967. Shunted aside during much of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime, Grunitzky served briefly as minister of finance and the economy (September–November 1978) but was dropped for mismanagement of fiscal resources and other improprieties. Earlier, he had held the post of director of studies at the Togo **École Nationale d'Administration (ENA)** and other technical posts in the ministry of finance. He was appointed ambassador to the United States in 1980 and stayed in that post through 1983.

GUÉNOU, TOUSSAINT COSSY (1948–2016). Poet and educator. Born in Tsévié on 14 September 1948 and educated both in Scotland and at the **Université de Benin**, Guénou taught French at several Togolese lycées during his career. He dabbled in politics by briefly joining **Joseph Koffigoh's** post-transition party the Forces Nouvelles (FN), but focused the majority of his career on teaching and writing. He is the author of the play *La Veuve* and the volume of poetry *Les Maisons les Nuages* (1989) among other works.

GUIDE, LE. “The Guide”—popular reference to General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, part of the pervasive **cult of personality** in Togo.

GU-KUNOU, EMMANUEL. Educator and critic of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Gu-Kunou was a professor of Geography at the **Université de Benin** and one of Eyadéma's arch-critics. In August 1985, he was arrested for suspicion of complicity in the mysterious **bombs** that exploded in downtown **Lomé** that month. Both he and members of his family were severely tortured in prison and figured prominently in Amnesty International's efforts to safeguard basic civic and **human rights** in Togo.

GURMA (ALSO, GOURMA). Ethnic group of around 150,000 found mostly between Mossi areas and the Niger River in the Burkina Faso but also in small concentrations further south. In Togo, Gurma elements are to be found in **Sansanne-Mango** and in **Dapaong**. Calling themselves binumba, Togo's Gurma emigrated from the Fada N'Gurma area in Burkina Faso consequent to famines and wars and have assimilated local customs and **language**, though remaining mostly **animist**.

H

HABYE. Purification rites with rich magical symbolism, practiced by the **Kabyé** every five years in November.

HADJ HOUSE. *See* MAISON DU HADJ.

HALIDOU, ADAM AKARAWATO. Long the president of the **Union Musulmane du Togo (UMT)**. Halidou was appointed to succeed **Kassim Mensah** in August 1976. Of **Tchamba** origins, and widely respected for his piety and Koranic learning, Halidou was a postal inspector in civil life. He had been involved in the UMT from the outset and was the unanimous choice of the nominating committee in 1976.

HAMADOU, YACOUBOU KOUMADJO (1967–). Government minister. A lawyer by profession, Yacoubou Hamadou was president of the **Ligue Togolais des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)** and frequently critical of the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party prior to being tapped by Prime Minister **Gilbert Houngbo** as minister of **human rights** and democratic consolidation in 2008 and minister of arts and culture in 2010. In the government of **Kwesi Ahoomey-Zunu**, he was minister of labor from 2012 before taking charge of human rights again in 2013 with the special directive to implement the recommendations of the **Commission Verité, Justice et Reconciliation (CVJR)**. He joined the RPT's successor, the **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party and ran for a legislative seat in Ogou-Anie under the party banner in 2013, but was ousted from government in 2015.

HAUSA. A Muslim people numbering at least 50 million and found mostly in northern Nigeria and southern Niger and in small concentrations as traders throughout West and Equatorial Africa. They speak Hausa, which belongs to the Chadic group of the Hamito-Semitic **languages** and is infused with Arabic words because of Islamic influences. Estimates of Togo's Hausa community hover around 20,000, with over half in **Lomé** proper and the rest

in the various **zongo** in the North. A very important mercantile and religious group throughout Africa, Togo's Hausa have been instrumental in the spread of **Islam** in the country.

HAUTE AUTORITÉ DE L'AUDIOVISUEL ET DE LA COMMUNICATION (HAAC). An agency established in 1996 based on ideas of safeguarding press freedom and journalistic ethics that arose during the **Sovereign National Conference (CNS)**. The agency was created by a sharply divided vote in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** of 39–36 with most of the opposition opposing the powers of the HAAC to regulate journalists. Since its inception it has generally enforced the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)/Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party line, making it one of the most unpopular institutions of government. Over time the AN has given the HAAC additional powers to penalize journalists and news organizations with suspension for violations such as “serious errors” or “endangering national security.” Supporters argue that the HAAC does protect journalistic ethics in many cases, for example, enforcing equal air time for various presidential candidates during the **2015 presidential election** campaign. In theory, the HAAC would have the power to investigate violations of journalistic rules, rather than the police, but a new penal code passed in 2016 returns some power to enforce laws on journalists to the police, circumventing the HAAC.

HAUT-COMMISSARIAT À LA RÉCONCILIATION ET AU RENFORCEMENT DE L'UNITÉ NATIONALE (HCRRUN). Formed in 2015 to implement the numerous recommendations of the **Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation (CVJR)**, the length of time between the end of the commission's work and the establishment of the HCRRUN was one of the points of dissatisfaction raised by opposition groups during protests in the second half of the 2010s. The HCRRUN began a program of reparations to victims in late 2019, but it was unclear how many of the 35,000 victims whose grievances were heard by the CVJR would participate.

HAUTE CONSEIL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (HCR). Transitional legislature which replaced the 1990 **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**-controlled **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)** after the conclusion of the **National Conference** in August 1991. It was presided over by Bishop **Philippe Kpodzro** and had the specific function of ratifying a new **constitution** leading to multi-party elections. The HCR was constantly harassed and bullied by Eyadéma and his loyalist **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, and many of its edicts were ignored. Ultimately, after interim prime minister **Joseph Koffigoh** was abducted and confronted with an ultimatum by Eyadéma in the **attempted**

coup of 1991, the HCR conceded to the creation of a government of national unity with the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, also allowing Eyadéma to run for the **1993 presidential elections**. The HCR gave way in 1994 to the new **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** elected in February and a coalition government (with the RPT) headed by **Edem Kodjo**.

HEALTH FACILITIES. Constantly expanding, Togo has an elaborate system of health facilities for a country its size. In the early days of independence, the best facilities were in **Lomé** and the south; however, by the early 1980s the **La Kara** region, President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** own, had facilities virtually equal to those in the south. The center and far north of the country, however, lag behind these two regions. In 2003, the country had 36 hospitals (up from 21 in 1990), 590 health centers, maternity clinics or dispensaries, and 398 private medical offices. There were also 228 doctors working in public sector health and 264 working in private sector health, along with a network of thousands of community health workers across the country. These figures contribute to some hopeful human development indicators such as life expectancy and Human Immunodeficiency Viruses (HIV) prevalence, found in Appendix table 6.

HODO. Togo's first cargo ship, object of much nationalistic fervor at the time of its formal launching. *Hodo*, launched on 10 December 1978, in Flensburg, West Germany, weighed 7,000 tons. It connected French (especially Rouen) ports and West African ports and was the flagship of the **Compagnie Togolaise Maritime (CTM)**. The line added another cargo ship in 1980, but today most cargo ships operating to and from the **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)** are commercially owned and operated.

HOGBETSOTSO. Popular festival in southern Togo and several areas in southeast **Ghana** and southwest **Benin**, commemorating the exodus of the **Ewe** ancestors from **Notsé** and King **Agokoli's** brutal rule. Held annually (around September) at Notsé or other Ewe centers, the festival is a very lively affair and draws a large number of visitors from all over the region. The festival is known by a wide variety of names, all alluding to the historic Ewe dispersal or to Agokoli's rule.

HOMAWOO, KOFFI. Publisher of the independent and widely read *Courrier du Golfe* set up following the declaration of freedom of the press in 1990. The newspaper, its reporters, and Homawoo were intermittently harassed and/or brutalized by the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime. In January 1991, the newspaper was brought to court for publishing "false charges" against the

regime. Homawoo is a longtime member of **Gilchrist Olympio's Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**, staying with the party after the split that created the **Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC)** in 2010.

HOMETOWOU, DONOU. Managing director of the **Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole (CNCA)** in the 1980s, arrested and imprisoned for 20 years in 1988 for mismanagement of the company and embezzlement of over 2.5 billion CFAF. Two other employees received nine and 10-year sentences. Earlier, in 1987, five other individuals were sentenced to between six and 10 years for similar offenses.

HOTEL DU PARTI. Ambitious 32-floor **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party headquarters, construction of which commenced in 1976. Prior to that, the party offices were located in the Maison du Parti where they shared offices with other government services. The Togolese regime spared no effort to assure that the RPT edifice would be a modern one, capable of serving international conferences in style. During the heyday of the **National Conference** and early **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** edicts, the Hotel du Parti was technically “taken back” from the RPT, with the latter evicted from its premises. Like many of the HCR edicts, these were ultimately rescinded.

HOTEL SARAKAWA. One of **Lomé's** modern hotels, named after General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's airplane crash** in Sarakawa and landscaped in somewhat unusual manner to reflect that event. As with many of the city's hotels, massive kickbacks were received by General Eyadéma and other government officials, boosting the hotel's actual construction costs from 4.4 billion CFAF to 7.2 billion CFAF. Operated by the French Accor group from 1998, in 2014 the hotel was emmeshed in scandal when Accor was forcibly expelled from Togo, and President **Faure Gnassingbé** turned management of the hotel over to **Sonia Lawson**, sister of one of his government ministers who lacked any hotel management background. Today it is known as the Hotel Mercure-Sarakawa, and the main attraction is the Olympic-sized pool.

HOTEL 2 FÉVRIER. Luxury hotel in downtown **Lomé**, a veritable white elephant allegedly constructed solely due to the 35 percent kickback of construction costs to General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Due to its exorbitant price structure, when it was first opened if there were no official State conferences and/or Organization of African United (OAU) or other summit meetings, very few of the hotel's 362 rooms were occupied. It was the location of the

1991 **Conference Nationale**. In 2017, it was reportedly sold to an Indian group at a very favorable price.

HOUENASSOU, KAHOHONOU. Entrepreneur. A graduate of the Bon-necarrere secondary school and business school, Houenassou was invited to visit the United States on a cultural exchange program and was much impressed by marketing methods in the West. Opening a modern, American-style supermarket in **Lomé**, he attained virtually instant success. He participated in the **Conference Nationale**, and served as treasurer of the **Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH)** from 1990 to 1997.

HOUNGBO, GILBERT FOSSOUN. Prime minister 2008–2012. Viewed as something of an enigma in Togolese politics, unlike other PMs Hounbo has not declared a party affiliation and spent most of his career at the United Nations (UN) and other international agencies. Trained in business management and finance in **Lomé** and in Canada, he worked at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and later for the UN secretary general's office under Kofi Annan in the early 2000s. President **Faure Gnassingbé** tapped him for prime minister in 2008 as a neutral figure to ease the transition of government leadership by the political opposition. After the contentious **presidential election of 2005**, Gnassingbé was savvy enough not to put a loyalist of his own **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** in such a high-profile post, instead naming **Yao Agboyibo** and **Edem Kodjo** as his first prime ministers in keeping with the **Accord Politique Global (APG)**. Hounbo represented the beginning of the end of these unity governments, and was reappointed after the **presidential election of 2010**. Hounbo served until 2012, around the time of the creation of Gnassingbé's new **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party, which replaced the RPT.

HUILERIES DU BENIN. Company originally established in 1970 in Cavavé to extract oil from ground nuts. It was set up with 22 million CFAF in capitalization, 22.7 percent of which came from the **Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT)**. The first plant came into operation in 1972 but encountered immense operational problems: it could not acquire an adequate supply of peanuts for processing purposes because its cost structure required offering producer prices considerably lower than open market prices. Drought also afflicted West Africa, right down to the coastal areas, decimating groundnut harvests. More importantly, Togo, even in the best of times, had never produced enough groundnuts to provide the factory with more than a three-month supply of raw material. The company went bankrupt in

1976, when it could not pay its bills, but was not allowed to collapse. It was purchased by OPAT in January 1979 and continued operating at a deficit, employing 70 workers and working at 40 percent of capacity. It was again closed in 1990.

HUMAN RIGHTS. The human rights situation in Togo has been bleak under the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, and later **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party, and details of abuses by security forces have come to light much more frequently since the political liberalizations of the 1990s. Unlawful detentions, inhumane prison conditions, abuse and torture of detainees, and a general atmosphere of impunity for members of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** have been widely documented by human rights organizations both inside and outside of Togo. Security forces in Togo are notorious for detaining activists for expressing their political opinions, and many anti-government protests have ended in the death of protesters, and sometimes also security forces themselves. Detainees often report torture or degrading treatment when being questioned, and prisons are overcrowded with poor sanitation and nutrition. Early efforts to address the damage to Togo's international reputation began with President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH)**, and the independent **Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)**, both established at or near the beginning of political liberalization. After **presidential elections in 1998 and 2005**, tens of thousands of Togolese fled the country in an effort to escape brutal crackdowns against those suspected of opposing the ruling party. Recognizing the need to improve Togo's human rights record, and at the behest of opposition political leaders, in 2009 President **Faure Gnassingbé** set up the **Commission Verité, Justice et Reconciliation (CVJR)** to investigate any reported abuses committed from 1958 to 2005, and the commission received 35,000 reports. Critics noted that the CVJR had no mandate to investigate any abuses that took place after Gnassingbé took over the presidency from his father, **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, evading any personal responsibility and contributing to a continued atmosphere of impunity for security forces. After the CVJR finished its work, a new body, the **Haut-Commissariat à la Réconciliation et au Renforcement de l'Unité Nationale (HCRRUN)** was created in 2015 and has since then slowly moved to implement a program of reparations to the victims. Overall, there is very little accountability for security forces Togo who commit abuses, and while the state has always had the power to investigate and punish violations of human rights, cases where this actually happens are very rare.

HUNLÉDÉ, AYI HOUENOU JOACHIM. Former key minister for Togo's first three presidents. Born on 2 February 1925, to an important **Aného** family, Hunlédé was educated locally and at the Lycée Victor Bauot in Porto Novo (**Benin**), Dabou Teacher's Training College (Côte d'Ivoire), and at the University of Montpellier in **France**, where he obtained a degree in Law in 1952. Between 1952 and 1956, Hunlédé worked as deputy inspector of **Education** in north Togo and as a teacher at **Atakpamé**, following which he returned to Paris to study at the prestigious École Nationale de la France Outre-Mer (1956–1958). When he returned to Togo for the second time, he became deputy mayor of **Lomé** (1958) and, later, Mayor of **Tsévié**. In 1960, President **Sylvanus Olympio** appointed him Togo's first ambassador to France and Great Britain; he was later accredited also to the **European Economic Community (EEC)**. In September 1965, he was repatriated and appointed High Commissioner for Planning in the **Nicolas Grunitzky** administration. By now widely respected as a diplomat and an efficient administrator, Hunlédé became General Eyadéma's first foreign minister in April 1967. He was increasingly given total autonomy in determining Togo's foreign posture, even when his views went against General Eyadéma's original feelings (as when Hunlédé recommended the break with Taiwan and the recognition of China). An astute politician and a widely respected individual, Hunlédé became General Eyadéma's most successful cabinet appointee. Under his guidance, Togo steered a generally pro-French foreign policy while at the same time giving expression to Togo's vital national interests and Africa's changing circumstances. It was under Hunlédé's leadership that Togo began to play a modest role in intra-African affairs after the long period of quasi-isolationism under Olympio and Grunitzky. Late in 1976, Hunlédé resigned from his various political positions, retired from public life, and commenced a period of relative seclusion that resulted in his being ordained a pastor of the **Ewe Evangelical Church (EEC)** in September 1977.



IBRAHIMA, MEMOUNATOU. A close confidant of President **Faure Gnassingbé** and one of the most high-ranking women in the ruling **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party. Ibrahim was minister of social affairs and the promotion of women in governments formed 2006–2008. After the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party became UNIR, Ibrahim was named vice president of the party and was entrusted with organizing the first UNIR party conference in October 2017 in **Tsévié**. She is also a prominent member of the **Movement des Femmes UNIR (MFU)**. After the **legislative elections of 2018**, she became both the representative for Dankpen and second vice president of the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**.

INAWISSI, NAYE THEOPHILE (1953–). Educator and author. Born to Togolese parents on 20 December 1953, in Borada, **Ghana**, Inawissi was educated locally and at the Saint Paul Seminary in **Atakpamé**. Trained as a teacher, he taught history and geography at a school in Bouaké in Côte d’Ivoire. Inawissi has published several volumes of poetry and nonfiction that have gained him literary recognition. He ran for a seat in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in the **2013 legislative elections**, under the banner of the **Convergence Patriotique Panafricain (CPP)** party.

INDIGENAT. Civil statutes established in 1924 (though de facto from 1887) restricting the civil rights of the indigenous populations that had not attained the status of *évolué* or *assimilée*. Restrictions in civil and political liberties included the obligation to perform **corvée labor**, including porterage. Despite the imposition and enforcement of these policies by the **French administration**, those subject to the indigenat could not pursue legal redress except through customary law. The indigenat code, with its gross abuses and frequent arbitrary application, was one of the greatest sources of friction in colonial Africa until it was abolished in the aftermath of World War II. *See also* ASSIMILATION POLICY.

INDUSTRIE OLEAGINEAUX DU TOGO (IOTO). Cottonseed oil processing company. Deficitary as many of Togo's **state sector** ventures, in 1987 a French company, *Compagnie Française pour le développement des fibres textiles (CFDT)*, agreed to take over a majority (51%) equity in IOTO, thus saving it from closure. CFDT, today renamed Group Geocoton, already had a stake in many **cotton** industries in other African countries, and joined in partnership with private Togolese industries (owning 49% share) in the new venture, renamed **Nouvelle Industrie des Oleagineaux de Togo (NIOTO)**. During the transition, NIOTO dismissed some 40 percent of existing workers and shortly afterward started turning profits.

INDUSTRIE TEXTILE TOGOLAISE (ITT). One of Togo's first industrial companies, originally a mixed **German**-Togolese enterprise engaged in spinning, weaving, and printing textiles. Established in 1962 at Dadja in a **cotton**-growing area in the **Plateaux** region, with the Togolese government holding 25 percent of the shares and German interests 64 percent. Capitalized at 300 million CFA francs, augmented later to 540 million CFAF, and employing 1,300 workers, ITT commenced operations in its factory in 1966. In 1970, it produced 2.4 million meters of printed textiles of all kinds, and by 1975 the output had gone up to 20 million meters. The ITT bought its cotton from the **state sector Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT)**, exporting part of its products to neighboring states. An additional plant was constructed in **Kara** with a capacity of over 3,000 tons of textiles, aimed exclusively at foreign markets. In the mid-1980s, the Togolese government tried to privatize its textile industry—ITT and the **Compagnie Togolaise de Textiles (TOGOTEX)**—but was offered very low bids. The latter was actually closed down. The two plants were finally sold in 1989 to a Chinese entrepreneur from Hong Kong for barely US\$ 10 million.

INDUSTRIE TOGOLAISE DES PLASTIQUES (ITP). Joint company set up in 1980 by the Togolese government, the Danish company Daoplast, and the Swiss company Promatec. The company had also had financial backing from the Danish Fund for Cooperation and Development. Inaugurated in January 1981, the **Lomé**-based company produced an array of plastic tubes and other items. The Togolese government acquired 90 percent of the shares in the company in due course but ran it into the ground, and it had to close down as insupportable deficits were pile up. In late 1986, the company was privatized with German, Dutch, Danish, and private Togolese investors moving in, and it reopened in January 1987 with increased capitalization.

INDUSTRIE TOGOLAISE DU CYCLE ET DU CYCLOMOTEUR (ITOCY). Founded in **Lomé** in 1972, ITOCY produced a variety of bicycles.

Employing some 60 workers, in its heyday in the 1980s it was producing 4,800 Vespa scooters and 6,500 bicycles, for a turnover of over 258 million CFAF. It is capitalized at 140 million CFAF with the government having a 30 percent share in the enterprise.

INSTITUT ARABE DE KLOTO. One of the first and major examples of Arab cultural aid to Togo. In recognition of **Kpalimé**'s importance as an **Islamic** center, Arab funds were donated for the establishment of a large koranic school in 1969. In 1971, it enrolled 600 students, taught by a team of Egyptian and Togolese instructors. From that time, the number of students was augmented and the staff localized.

INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE DU CACAO ET DU CAFE (IRCC). Established in **Kpalimé**, the core **coffee/cacao** producing region, the IRCC aimed at furthering the production of robust coffee and cacao harvests. In 1985, it branched its experimental research into the production of fruits, especially bananas, guavas, mangos, and citrus.

INSTITUT DE RECHERCHES AGRONOMIQUES TROPICALES (IRAT). Experimental agricultural institute with headquarters in **Lomé** and land and farms in the countryside. IRAT was a major player in the drive to improve seeds and crops and to promote greater use of the proper kinds of fertilizers. IRAT cooperated closely with the **Société Togolaise du Coton (SOTOCO)** and the **Institut de Recherches du Coton et des Textiles Exotiques (IRCTE)**. From 1997, most of this work is done by the Institut Togolais de Recherche Agronomique in Lomé, supported by the ministry of agriculture.

INSTITUT DE RECHERCHES DU COTON ET DES TEXTILES EXOTIQUES (IRCTE). Experimental research station at Anie-Kolokope. IRCTE cultivated, perfected, and distributed cottonseed to farmers. It also undertook basic research and experimentation with insecticides. IRCTE was closely linked to the **Société Togolaise du Coton (SOTOCO)**.

INSTITUT DE RECHERCHES DU TOGO (IRTO). Branch of the French Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre Mer (ORSTOM) that was established in 1949 with the function of coordinating and publishing research and scientific data. IRTO published a large number of very valuable monographs through the 1960s.

INSTITUT D'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR DU BENIN. Joint Togo-**Beninois** institute of higher studies in existence between 1965 and 1970. The school had a Humanities division in **Lomé** and a Sciences division in

Porto Novo, Benin. Benin's 1970 decision to establish a Humanities section in Abomey-Calavi, as part of their new National University of Benin (UNB), brought an end to the joint institute and led to Togo's establishment of its own Université du Benin (UB) in Lomé, later known as the **Université du Lomé (UL)**.

INSTITUT FRANÇAIS D'AFRIQUE NOIRE (IFAN). Research and documentation center set up in Lomé in 1945 as part of a network of IFAN centers throughout Francophone Africa. In 1960, the Institute's name was changed to **Institut Togolais des Sciences Humaines (INTSHU)**. Prior to the establishment of IFAN, Togo possessed only a Service de Documentation Générale.

INSTITUT NATIONAL DE FORMATION AGRICOLE DE LOMÉ (INFAL). **Agricultural** training institute founded in Lomé in 1979 and aimed at promoting a host of training and modernization projects in the countryside. Its first projects were initiated only in 1981, financed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank.

INSTITUT NATIONAL DE RECHERCHES SCIENTIFIQUES (INARES). Organization created in 1965 and attached directly to the presidency, entrusted with the control, supervision, and centralization of all research conducted in Togo in the natural and applied sciences. It was frequently moved to control different ministries, including the ministry of higher **education** and research.

INSTITUT NATIONAL DE SCIENCE DE L'EDUCATION (INSE). Teachers college set up in 1972 in **Lomé** to satisfy the country's enhanced need for elementary and secondary teachers. A number of very valuable historical monographs were published by INSE; today it is part of the **Université de Lomé (UL)**.

INSTITUT NATIONAL DES PLANTES A TUBERCULES (INPT). State organ set up in August 1976 but operational only in 1979. It was mandated to promote the planting and marketing of crops such as potatoes, manioc, and igname.

INSTITUT PEDAGOGIQUE NATIONAL (IPN). **Lomé** Teachers Training School, increasingly involved in retraining existing teachers and lifting national standards of **education**.

INSTITUT TOGOLAIS DE RECHERCHE AGRONOMIQUE. *See* INSTITUT DE RECHERCHES AGRONOMIQUES TROPICALES (IRAT).

INSTITUT TOGOLAIS DES SCIENCES HUMAINES (INTSHU). Post-1960 name for the local IFAN research center in **Lomé**. Originally headed by Gabriel **Kukovi Johnson**, with Departments of Anthropology, Archaeology, Prehistory, History, Geography, Sociology, and Linguistics, INTSHU also maintained a museum, a library, and a documentation center. From 1965 it published the research periodical *Études Togolaises* at regular intervals and other monographs. In 1972, it was formally affiliated with the new Université de Benin (now **Université de Lomé**). Some of its publications, in the fields of Demographics and Oral History, are invaluable.

INSURRECTIONIST COMMITTEE. Formal name adopted by the core clique of **army** veterans that brought about the **coup d'état of 1963** and the transition to the **Nicolas Grunitzky-Antoine Méatchi** administration. Members of the Committee—all having promoted themselves to officer rank—included Lieutenants **Étienne Eyadéma**, **James Assila**, and **Robert Alidou Djafalou**.

INSURRECTIONS OF 1897 AND 1898. Revolt of the **Konkomba** ethnic group in northern Togo, occasioned by the brutalities of the nervous commander of a **German** column that opened fire at a Konkomba gathering at Binaparba market, killing 79 men, women, and children. The column, led by Dr. Gruner, was subsequently encircled at Bapure, a relief column (composed of **Chokossi** mercenaries) was blocked and ambushed, and a general Konkomba revolt commenced. The disturbance lasted from May 1897 to March 1898, during which time (in January 1898) a **Kabyé** revolt also occurred. The Konkomba were suppressed again in February and March 1923 and in 1935 and 1936, when they refused to pay taxes.

INTERNATIONAL FERTILIZER GROUP—TOGO (IFG-TOGO). A joint public-private venture formed in 2001 to replace the failing **state sector** business, the **Office Togolais des Phosphates (OTP)**. IFG-Togo was half owned by a Tunisian group, Brifco Limited, with 9 billion FCFA in capital at the time. However, the partnership was not fruitful, with reported disagreements about control between the two partners, and allegations of mismanagement. Less than five years later, the partnership was over, and concerns about the sector were so grave that the major **donors** the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank suggested full **privatization** in 2006. The new

government of President **Faure Gnassingbé** rejected this alternative as too radical of a step for a president still trying to establish legitimacy to both domestic and international audiences, and opted instead to create the **Société Nouvelle des Phosphates du Togo (SNPT)** in 2007, a venture at first fully state-owned.

INTER-TOGOLESE DIALOG. Grouping of the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** and the main opposition parties who met in 1999 to create satisfactory conditions for contested legislative elections, supported by **France, Germany**, the European Union, and the Francophonie. The group produced the **Lomé Framework Agreement**, which tried but failed to effectively resolve differences for the **2003 legislative elections** (originally scheduled for 2002).

ISLAM. Still a minority religion in Togo, Sunni Muslims represent an estimated 14 percent of Togo's population today. Islam was introduced in the region by the **Chokossi** clans that settled in the **Sansanne-Mango** region in the latter part of the 18th century. (Prior to that the Muslim beliefs of Togo's **Hausa** and **Fulani** had had only a minimal influence upon the animist beliefs of the majority.) Active—and occasionally violent—Chokossi proselytizing and their intermarriage with the **Moba** and the **Gurma** spread the religion. The **Kotokoli** of **Bafilo** and **Bassar** also slowly converted to Islam, straddling as they did trade routes that carried Muslim influences, including the **kola caravan routes** between **Salaga (Ghana)** and **Djerma** and **Hausa** country. At times bitter religious wars erupted between clans of the same ethnicity that had been proselytized in different manners. The **German administration** had a great deal of admiration for Islam and encouraged its spread in north Togo, closing the region (until 1912) to **Christian** missionaries.

Lomé has a large and well-organized, though factionalized, mostly **Hausa-Fulani** Muslim community. The principal centers of Islam in Togo are **Kpalimé, Sokodé**, and **Lomé**. The ethnic groups with the highest percentage of Muslims in the country are the **Chokossi, Bassari**, and **Kotokoli**; such smaller groups as the **Fulani** and **Hausa**, nonindigenous to the area, are overwhelmingly Muslim. Of the various Muslim sects prevalent in Islam, until recently the **Tarbiya** was largely unknown in Togo. The **Tidjaniya** is by far the dominant sect, though by the 1980s some smaller Muslim sects were beginning to take root. By the late 1980s and in the 1990s, Togo's Muslims were increasingly coming under the sway of various Muslim marabouts from **Senegal** and **Mali**. Togo's Muslim community received a major boost in prestige and a very noticeable increase in political clout with the creation of the **Union Musulmane du Togo (UMT)**, which also undertook a variety of

educational functions. Organized religious life among the Muslims of Togo has, however, been highly factionalized with recriminations of various kinds frequently erupting. Several leaders of the UMT were ousted from office for “dictatorial” policies, and the political leadership of Togo under President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** intervened to impose peace in the community. However, the interference of government authorities in the leadership of the UMT has contributed to perception of the UMT as co-opted and more conservative than an increasing segment of the Togolese Muslim population. The popularity of new groups like the **Association des Cadres Musulmans au Togo (ACMT)**, founded in 2006, attests to these more contemporary divisions. Also, the rise of Tikpi Atchadam’s **Parti National Panafricain (PNP)** party in 2017 captured the political imagination of youth in Muslim areas of Togo and mobilized a great deal of resistance against the ruling party, to the apparent dismay of the UMT. Two imams, **Mohamed Alassani** and **Alfa Wahid**, were detained by authorities in October 2017 for allegedly inciting violence, sparking additional outrage and violent demonstrations in Sokodé and **Bafilo**. While groups like the ACMT spoke out in defense of the imprisoned imams, the UMT’s public statements at the time were much more measured and conciliatory toward government. Government ministers and President **Faure Gnassingbé** himself suggested that the 2017 upheavals were supported by external—and possibly terrorist—Muslim groups, a charge vigorously denied by domestic Muslim groups opposed to Gnassingbé’s continuation in office. Relations between different **regligious** groups in Togo is generally peaceful, so it was unusual that in July and August 2018 four mosques in greater Lomé were looted. Those responsible were not apprehended, but the condemnation from other religious organizations, civil society, and government was universal.

ISSA, SAMA. Former minister of justice, labor and the civil service in the 1970s. Issa acquired notoriety for being suspended from office without pay for two months for being consistently late to work. Appointed in February 1977—and one of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**’s least successful appointees—Issa was dismissed from office exactly a year later.



JEUNESSE DU RASSEMBLEMENT DU PEUPLE TOGOLAIS (JRPT). General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s youth wing of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party. The JRPT was established following a Constituent Congress on 27 and 28 February 1970, as the youth wing of the RPT. In December 1971, all existing **youth movements** were dissolved, and their membership merged into the JRPT. Very much a control mechanism, the JRPT was never very popular or influential in southern regions. With the onset of the pro-democracy disturbances in 1990 the JRPT rapidly became merely the youth wing of the northern RPT.

JEUNESSE PIONNIERE AGRICOLE (JPA). Youth structures, initially set up with Israeli technical assistance in the mid-1960s, aimed at siphoning unemployed rural youth, training them in modern **agricultural** technology, and resettling them on virgin fields. The program was continued after Togo's break with Israel in 1973. It involved the training of groups of 100 to 300 young people for two years at a central farm, following which they were resettled to form cooperatives. A main farm school was at **Glidji**, near **Aného**, with other settlements in **Notsé**, **Togodo**, **Atakpamé**, **Sansanne-Mango**, **Kara**, and **Sotouboua**. The program was, compared to other countries that embarked on similar ventures with Israeli aid (including neighboring **Benin**), moderately successful. This was largely due to the fact that for large numbers of the population (and especially among the **Kabyé** in the north) agriculture was a viable option in the 1970s. On the other hand, the program was compromised by the departure of the Israeli instructors in 1973 (when Togo reluctantly ruptured diplomatic relations to conform with the Arab boycott) and by low financial and infrastructure commitments on the part of the state.

JOHNSON, AMPAH GUMALON. Rector of the **Université de Benin (UB)** in Lomé. Born in 1930 in **Aného**, Johnson completed secondary school at the Academy of Poitiers and continued higher studies in mathematics and natural sciences at the University of Poitiers (1952–1959). From 1956 to

1960 a Fellow at the prestigious French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), he later joined the faculty of the University of Abidjan as Reader in Zoology. He was recalled from Côte d'Ivoire in 1968 to become the founding chancellor of the new UB in Togo. He was a respected scholar and member of various learned societies, though his subservience to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** was intensely disliked in the university. He served until 1985, and in 2019 a 1,500-seat amphitheater bearing his name was inaugurated on the campus of the now renamed **Université de Lomé (UL)**.

JOHNSON, KUKOVI BENYI GABRIEL POLYCARPE. Former minister of information. Born in **Lomé** in 1924 and educated locally at Dakar and in **France** where he studied journalism, Johnson joined the staff of **Togo-Presse** becoming in due time the director general of **Editogo**. In March 1975, he was co-opted into President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s cabinet as secretary of state in charge of information, posts, and communications. In 1976, he mounted a brief propaganda campaign (at Eyadéma's behest) calling for the return to Togo of the territories "lost" to it in the **1956 plebiscite to Ghana**. The campaign, and Johnson's powerful links with **Libya**, brought Togo-Ghana relations to a nadir and much bitter acrimony. Though originally politically close to Eyadéma, Johnson was dropped from the cabinet in 1978 and left for self-exile in Paris the next year, declaring his opposition to his former leader. Notwithstanding this, he was invited back by the beleaguered Eyadéma in 1987 and was assigned to the presidency with responsibility for missions and diplomatic reporting. Constantly rumored to be reappointed to a major cabinet post, Johnson briefly reemerged in the political spotlight in February 1990 when he was named to his old post as minister of information. After the liberalizations of 1990, he lost his post due to being too close to Eyadéma.

JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU TOGO. Edited by **Editogo**, the official government gazette of Togo appears every two weeks and lists all laws, administrative decrees, and ordinances. Once published, these acquire the status of law.

JOURNÉE COMMEMORATIVE DES MARTYRS DE PYA. National holiday declared in 1972 commemorating a bloody clash at **Pya** (General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s home village) between **French** forces and a group of **Kabyé** on 21 June 1957. The date of 21 June has been elevated to the status of a national holiday as part of Eyadéma's **authenticity** drive, though it gained only slow and minimal acceptance, even in the north.

JOURNÉE DE LIBERATION NATIONALE. National Liberation Day commemorating the “liberation” of Togo from civilian rule by Togo’s **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)**. Since both of Togo’s 1960s **coups** occurred on the same day (13 January), the national holiday also commemorates former president **Sylvanus Olympio**’s assassination, a fact that rankles many in the south. The holiday was abolished by the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** in 1991, but like many of that body’s decisions, it was not lasting.

JOURNÉE NATIONALE DE LIBERATION ECONOMIQUE. National Economic Liberation Day (24 January) celebrates Togo’s nationalization of the important **phosphate** industry, **Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin (COTOMIB)**. Moving the company to the **state sector** was announced shortly after President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** revealed an alleged attempt on his life that formed part of the government’s **authenticity** and **Cult of Personality** drives. *See also* EYADÉMA’S PLANE CRASHES.

JUVENTO (ALSO JUVENTOS TOGO). Also known under its original, but largely unused, founding name, **Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise**. Established in September 1961 as a **youth movement** and as the more radical youth wing of the **Comité de l’Unité Togolaise (CUT)** of **Sylvanus Olympio**. Its leadership has included **Anani Santos**, **Andre Kuevidjen**, and Secretary General **Firmin Abalo**. Juvento was separated from the parent CUT by its former anti-French posture, panafricanist views (many of its leaders were quasi-Nkrumahists), and more adamant position on the **pan-Ewe movement**. Juvento suffered several splits and broke away from the CUT in July 1959 over Olympio’s conservative policies. Prior to the April 1961 elections, the party made a tactical alliance with the northern-based opposition, the **Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais (UDPT)**, forming the **Mouvement Nationaliste Togolaise-Juvento**. The formation was disqualified, however, as Olympio cracked down on sources of organized opposition, and, after the discovery of an alleged plot, Juvento itself was banned (in January 1962), and Togo became a de facto one-party state. Most of the party’s leaders were arrested (including the aging Santos) and imprisoned under harsh conditions in **Sansanne-Mango** in the far north. Following the **1963 coup d’état** Juvento joined President **Nicolas Grunitzky**’s four-cornered coalition that remained in office until the **1967 coup d’état**. With the rise of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime all parties, including Juvento, were banned.

A new party using the same name contested **parliamentary elections in 2002**, winning two seats in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**, but failed to win any seats in the **2007 election** and has not reappeared on the political scene.

K

KABASSEMA, MBA HANKPADE. Former director general of the **Office Togolais des Phosphates (OTP)**. He was arrested in April 1981 for massive embezzlement of funds and sentenced to life imprisonment, though he was released in 1984. At the time of the **National Conference** in 1991, Kabassema publicly revealed that General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** had amassed a personal fortune of 80 billion CFAF through kickbacks and high percentages from construction projects. A leader of the **Parti Démocratique Togolais (PDT)** and a member of the **Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)**, in 1992 he was assaulted during the kidnapping of members of the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** by members of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, though he was not a member of that body.

KABORÉ, SIKA BELLA (1958–). First lady of Burkina Faso since December 2016. Kabore is the daughter of **Mawupé Valentin Vovor**, former minister and president of the Togolese **Supreme Court**. Kaboré was educated in Togo and **France** as a jurist, meeting her husband Roch Kaboré who was also studying in France. Married in 1982, Kaboré has held a number of important administrative positions in Burkina Faso, becoming known for her efforts in support of maternal and child health. In 2017, Kaboré was designated as goodwill ambassador of the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children (CI-AF). She has received multiple honors over the last years, including becoming the first woman to receive an award from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Cultural Festival in 2019. She is also the president of the Organisation des Premières Dames d'Afrique pour le Développement (OPDAD).

KABOU. Important precolonial market town on the main Salaga (**Ghana**)-to-Kano (Nigeria) kola nut **caravan route**, in what is today the **Kara** region.

KABRÉ. Older, postcolonial term referring to the **Kabyé** ethnic group. (In the 1960s the name Cabrais was also used.)

KABYÉ (ALSO CABRAIS, KABRÉ, KABIYÉ). Mountain ethnic group estimated in 2016 to number over 850,000 and, together with certain closely affiliated peoples, roughly one quarter to one-third of the Togolese population. The Kabyé live mostly in the north (in the **La Kara** and **Centrale** regions), though as a result of migrations in search of land (encouraged as early as during the **German** and **French administrations**), concentrations are also found in the vicinity of **Atakpamé** in the Plateaux region. Their **agricultural** practices of tilling volcanic soil in the north, which suffers from water erosion, and practicing crop rotation, the Kabyé collective construction of stone embankments led the scholar Frobenius to nickname them Africa's Steinbauer ("stone-peasants"). The Kabyé are relatively cohesive as an ethnic group, possess chiefs with wider powers than their equivalents among southern ethnic groups, and are largely **animist**. Up to the 17th century, the Kabyé were spread over a much wider territory—up to Djougou (in Benin), for example. Invasions and expansion of such ethnic groups as the Bariba forced the Kabyé back to their core mountain retreats around Kara and Sokodé, where their population density is extremely high. Many have become assimilated with the **Kotokoli**.

The origin of the southern Kabyé was the German administration's creation of "improvement villages" (**Besserungsiedlungen**) in 1909 near **Notsé** and Atakpamé. The French continued the practice of enticing Kabyé elements to unoccupied land in the south, though some of the original settlements were more like penal colonies for road construction. There have been a number of southward migrations of Kabyé in search of better land, and many young people have moved to cities, especially **Lomé**, in search of work. The Kabyé (in French originally Cabrais, and more recently in recent official usage, Kabiyé), call themselves Lan-mba ("of the forests"), transformed by the first Germans into Lama. The name "Kabyé" is probably a corruption of the **Hausa** term kafiri, or pagans. There are several Kabyé subgroups, notably the Logba, Lamba, and Losso (the latter cultivating **palm** plantations found between Kara and the Benin border). In the absence of any effort on the part of either the German or French colonial administration to develop the north and under acute land pressure, many Kabyé in the past enlisted in either the police force or in the French colonial armies for duty abroad. Their repatriation shortly after Togo's independence and their integration into the much-expanded **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** after the **1963 coup d'état** (triggered by members of this group, including **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**) has resulted in the ongoing domination of the armed forces by Kabyé.

With the rise of the regime of General Eyadéma in 1967, significant efforts were been made to modernize and revitalize the northern regions of Togo and in particular the Kabyé areas. The creation in the mid-1960s of the

region of **La Kara** was a first step in the direction of defining the limits of the depressed Kabyé areas prior to the creation of specific structures charged with socioeconomic modernization. The process was greatly accelerated in the 1970s, with the result that the north has been virtually transformed, both socially and economically, in a relatively short time period. More recent studies of the Kabyé, including those by Charles Piot, have sought to dispel myths from early Western scholars and observers about the ethnic group, detailing contemporary migrations and the generational divide between older and younger Kabyé, the latter much more likely to pursue an urban lifestyle, but return to ancestral areas for celebrations. *See also* AKPEMA; EVALA.

KAGBARA, BASSABI. Higher **education** administrator and political party leader. An economics professor, Kagbara helped to found the private Institut Africain d'Administration et d'Etudes Commerciales (IAEC) in **Lomé** in 1986, going on to become president of the Group BK Université, overseeing private universities in countries across West and Central Africa. Positioning himself as a centrist in the Togolese political landscape, Kagbara founded the **Parti Democratique Panafricain (PDP)** in 2005. The PDP participated in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN) elections of 2007** but won less than 1 percent of the vote and no seats. The PDP continued to be an active player on the Togolese political scene, and Kagbara was named a vice president of the more moderate **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel** in advance of the **AN elections in 2013**. Kagbara ran for **president in 2010** under the PDP banner and received 0.4 percent of the overall vote, coming in sixth place. In 2019, Kagbara stepped down as head of the PDP, passing the reins to his son, **Innocent Kagbara**, then serving as a deputy in AN.

KAGBARA, INNOCENT (1980–). Political party leader. Kagbara was born in **Lomé** in 1980 and educated there, including diplomas from the private Institut Africain d'Administration et d'Etudes Commerciales (IAEC) run by his father, **Bassabi Kagbara**. He moved to Canada to pursue a career in business before returning to Togo and taking administrative positions at the IAEC, including director of communications for the institute in 2004, and rising to administrator of the Group BK, the group that oversees the IAEC and affiliated private institutions of higher learning in West and Central Africa. From 2017, Kagbara turned his focus to a political career, winning a seat in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in the **2018 legislative elections** and taking over the leadership of the **Parti Democratique Panafricain (PDP)** from his father in 2019. He began a preliminary campaign to become the youngest candidate in the **presidential elections of 2020**, but ultimately his candidature was not validated by the election authorities, and he did not appear on the ballot.

KAMBAKATE. One of the royal Mande clans of the **Chokossi**. The earliest to arrive in Togo, the Kambakate traditionally appoint the Imam of all the Chokossi from its learned class. The ethnic clan also has several other privileges and priorities in rites.

KARA. Main urban center of the **La Kara** region and, until 1981, name of one of the latter's districts. Kara (formerly Lama Kara) first became a separate **cercle** in 1951 because of **Kabyé** fears that they were losing economic and political power to the **Kotokoli** of the **Sokodé** region. In the mid-1960s, the Kabyé's special status was further confirmed by the carving of the La Kara region out of the **Centrale** and **Savanes** regions. The town is estimated at over 104,000, making it today Togo's third largest city. Kara has been built up in recent years, as indeed has the entire La Kara region, today linked via paved roads to Sokodé in the south and to Burkina Faso in the north. Thanks to the political dominance of the **Gnassingbé** family, Kara is often viewed as the second most important city for **education** and commerce, such as the secondary establishments of the **Université de Kara** (a branch of the **Université de Lomé**) and **Brasserie de La Kara** (a branch of the **Brasserie du Bénin**), to name just two examples.

KARAMOKO, NAMORO. Former minister of **agriculture** and prominent **Muslim** leader, one of the very few of the Quadriya sect. Born in 1912 in **Sansanne-Mango** in the far north of Togo and educated in a Koranic school, Karamoko was an educator before being appointed minister of agriculture by President **Sylvanus Olympio**. A northern **Chokossi** of royal origins, Karamoko was one of a few northerners that reached positions of prominence in the Olympio regime. He served as minister of agriculture until Olympio's demise in 1963, following which he returned to instruction and administrative duties at his former ministry. Elected vice president of the **Union Musulmane du Togo (UMT)** in 1970, he was also unanimously appointed Imam of the Chokossi community of **Lomé**. Retired from 1972, Karamoko participated in the **National Conference** in 1991 and briefly served as its temporary chairman, in due course ceding the post to Bishop **Philippe Kpodzro**.

KARAMON-KPIN, SALIFOU EL HADJ. Imam of **Sansanne-Mango** and an early leader of Togo's **Chokossi** community. Born in Sansanne-Mango in 1915 of the requisite **Kambakate** lineage and of royal blood, Karamon-Kpin studied in koranic schools and taught in several across the border in **Ghana**. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1965 and on his return to Togo became the lieutenant of the then-Imam, **Abdoulaye Sani**. When the latter died in 1970, Karamon-Kpin was the unanimous choice to succeed him.

KARIM, ABOU BOUKARI. Little-known political prisoner. Arrested for activities against the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime, Karim acquired a measure of notoriety upon his release from prison in 1978 because he vindicated Amnesty International's early claims that Togo had a habit of political imprisonment without trial. Karim had been detained without trial between 1971 and 1978.

KASINGA, FAUZIYA (1977–). Togolese woman at the center of a high-profile asylum case in the United States. A member of the ethnic group **Tchamba**, Kasinga (sometimes spelled Kassindja) grew up in northern Togo but fled to escape female circumcision and coerced marriage at the age of 17. Kasinga's father had protected her from the procedure while living, but upon his death her aunt became her guardian and Kasinga came under pressure to undergo the procedure to prepare for marriage to a much older man. Kasinga fled to Germany, and then to the United States on a falsified passport. Upon arrival in Newark International Airport in December 1994, Kasinga requested asylum. Instead of being assisted, she was held in detention by the Immigration and Naturalization Service for over a year, until her case drew public attention from reporting in the *New York Times* in 1996. She won her case and was freed from detention that same year when advocacy groups rallied to her cause, and helped set a precedent for persecution on gender grounds as a legitimate claim for asylum in the United States. She also wrote a book about the experience.

KATO KOAKOU, ATA (1947–). Engineer. Born in 1947 and educated in **France** in physics and mathematics, Kato Koakou has worked with the Industrial and Artisanal division of the ministry of industry from 1978 as head of division. An expert in intellectual property, as of 2000 he was vice president of the principal commission of the World Intellectual Property Organization.

KAZARO, MATTI TASSOU (1948–). Educator at the **Université de Benin** and published poet. He wrote a famous thesis called “Étude tragique dans la littérature africaine francophone,” and he also wrote “Le Devoir de violence face au public,” and “La réception du roman sahélien par la critique de langue française.”

KEKÉ, MICHEL (1933–). Diplomat. Born in **Atakpamé** on 14 September 1933, Keké was educated locally and in **France**, where he graduated with a doctorate in the Classics. After teaching for two years at a French Lycée (1961–1963), he joined the Togolese embassy in Paris as cultural attaché

(1963–1968). In May 1968, he was appointed first councilor at Togo's embassy to the United States, and in 1971, he became the deputy secretary general of the Francophonie Association. He returned to Washington in 1974 as ambassador to the United States. His diplomatic career was cut short in 1978, when he was recalled from his post to become councilor at the ministry of foreign affairs.

KÉKÉH, BIYEMI. Magistrate; first **woman** appointee to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cabinet. Kékéh joined the cabinet in February 1977 as secretary of state for health, women's, and social affairs. She was promoted to full ministerial rank in November 1978 and sat on a host of committees dealing specifically with children. Mrs. Kékéh was born in **Lomé** on 31 May 1932 and was educated locally at the Lycée Bonnacarrere, at Lyon University in **France** (1953–1957), and at Paris University (1957–1960), acquiring law degrees. After a brief course of studies at the National School of Overseas Studies in Paris in 1960, Kékéh returned to Lomé and was appointed to serve as magistrate in Lomé. There she set up a Children's Jurisdiction Division. Between 1963 and 1972, she served in Côte d'Ivoire in a similar capacity. Upon her return to Lomé in 1972, she was appointed vice president, later president, of the Lomé Court of Appeals from which she was promoted into Eyadéma's cabinet in 1977. She was later honored as a commander of the National Order of Togo.

KENKOU, KOSSI GNANRI (1943–). Born on 31 January 1943 and educated at the University of Paris where he obtained a doctorate in sociology in 1973, Kenkou specialized in rural development. He currently teaches at the **Université de Lomé's** School of Agronomy, and has published research on the urbanization of the city of **Lomé** as well as **agriculture**.

KERIM, BOUKARI (1938–1979). Former political prisoner. A physician and previously an activist in the **Union Nationale des Étudiants Togolais (UNETO)** and member of the former **Parti Togolais du Progrès (PTP)—Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN)** political party, Kerim was arrested by the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime in 1970 and kept in jail without trial for eight years. He died shortly after being released in 1979.

KERIM, LASSISSIDIKENI (1936–). Born in Kabou in the **Bassar** area on 14 March 1936, Kerim was educated locally and in **Sokodé** and trained for a teaching career. In 1970, he was appointed director of cabinet of the minister of civil service and later filled a similar post for the minister of planning. In 1975, he was appointed head of the Administrative District of **Lomé** and in

January 1977 joined **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s cabinet as minister of national **education** and scientific research. In August 1978, Kerim was shifted to head the ministry of labor. He was dropped from the cabinet in 1981 and reassigned to duties in the ministry of planning. A **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** Politburo member from 1972, Kerim, who is of **Konkomba** ethnic origin, was in charge of coordinating with and supporting the irredentist National Movement for the Liberation of Western Togoland (TOLIMO) movement calling for a reunification of all **Ewe** on both sides of the **Ghana-Togo** border.

KETA FORT. *See* PRINDSENSTEEN.

KETEHOU LI, BOONA DJATO (195?–2014). Civic activist, Ketehouli was elected vice president of the **National Conference** on 13 July 1991. He then served briefly in the first **transitional government** of **Joseph Koffigoh** as minister of communications and culture during the period September to December 1991, but continued his work with civil society engagement, becoming a member of the **Commission Verité, Justice et Reconciliation (CVJR)**. He passed away in 2014 while still working on the commission.

KLASSOU, KOMI (1960–). Prime minister. Born in **Notsè**, Klassou was educated locally and in 1989, obtained his master's degree in Geography from the **Université de Bénin**. After earning a PhD in **France**, Klassou returned to Togo and served as Prefect of Tchaoudjo 1997–1998, before being elected to the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**. He was named minister of youth and sport 2000–2003 under Prime Ministers **Agbéyomé Kodjo** and **Koffi Sama**, and minister of primary and secondary education 2003–2007, maintaining the confidence of President **Faure Gnassingbé** throughout the **succession crisis of 2005** and directing the latter's presidential campaign that year. Klassou was a member of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** and **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** after the party was renamed in 2012, serving as first vice president of the AN in the name of the party. Klassou became prime minister in 2015 and was renewed in the post even after the **2018 legislative elections**, though he submitted his resignation after the **presidential election of 2020** so that Gnassingbé could name a new government with **Victoire Tomegah-Dogbe** as the first woman to hold the post of prime minister.

KLOTO (FORMERLY KLUOTO). Important hilly prefecture in the **Plateaux** region snuggled against the **Ghanaian** border some 120 kilometers north of **Lomé**. Klotó's administrative capital and biggest town is the bustling

and expanding **Kpalimé**. The area is one of the main centers of Togo's **cocoa** and **coffee** plantations, and, consequently, the district's population (many of whom are **Ewe**) have a relatively higher income. The Ewe arrived in this region following the **Notsé** dispersal in 1720. Coffee and cocoa were introduced during **German colonial rule** and missionaries were active among the Ewe from an early date. (The **Bremen Missionary Society**, for example, was established there in 1847). Kloto is second after Lomé in terms of school enrollment (75%) and scores high on other socioeconomic indicators. Several important experimental farms and **agricultural** schools in the area exist, including the Centre de Formations Professionnelle Agricole de Tové, the École Nationale d'Agriculture, and the Ferme Expérimentale de Tové.

KLUTSÉ, KWASSI (1945–). Prime minister. Born in Agbelouve, Klutsé spent many years in the ministry of planning before being elevated to minister of that department in **Edem Kodjo**'s government of 1995. After Kodjo resigned, President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** appointed Klutsé prime minister, though he was not, at the time, a member of any political party. In 1997, Klutsé joined the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** and was renewed as PM after the **1998 presidential elections**, though he was unable to convince any members of the opposition to join the cabinet after the fraud and violence surrounding that election. Klutsé won a seat in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in 1999 and stepped down from the premiership, remaining in the AN until the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)** unseated him in the 2007 parliamentary elections.

KODJO, EDEM EDOUARD (1938–2020). Former prime minister of Togo, opposition party leader, and international statesman. Born in **Sokodé** on 23 May 1938, Kodjo was educated locally and in **France**, where he studied economics in Rennes and Paris. After a few years as an administrator with the Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française (1964–1967), Kodjo returned to Togo and began his meteoric rise in the government of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. In July 1967, Kodjo was named secretary general of the ministry of finance and government representative on the **Comité Constitutionnel**. An able and hardworking administrator, Kodjo was two years later appointed secretary general of the nascent **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** political party set up to legitimate Eyadéma's regime. Ambitious and upwardly mobile, Kodjo lost his post in 1971 when a collegiate Political Bureau was created to avoid too large a concentration of power in the secretary general's hands. Kodjo was retained in the bureau with responsibilities over finance and in 1972 was appointed Director of the **Société Nationale d'Investissement (SNIT)**. In 1973, he was brought into the

cabinet as minister of finance and also became governor of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regional office. In 1976, Kodjo accepted a nomination as secretary general of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Despite several brilliant years at the head of that organization, Kodjo's leadership stumbled over the twin issues of the admission of the Western Sahara government to the OAU (the territory was fighting for independence vis-à-vis Morocco, an important founding member of the OAU and influential faction leader) and the civil war in Chad. Indeed, by 1982, Kodjo's own government had disowned him (since his views were contrary to those in **Lomé**), while important other factions were also opposed to his continued leadership. He finally stepped down from the OAU position in late 1983.

Kodjo then joined the Sorbonne where he published a number of books and, according to all accounts, was an outstanding instructor. He returned to Lomé in 1987 and as the Eyadéma regime began to unravel joined in the **National Conference** of 1991, setting up a political party for his aspirations. Among the various politicians in Lomé he was at the time France's choice by far, but his years under Eyadéma tainted his credentials among many **Ewe** who tended to support former President **Sylvanus Olympio's** son, **Gilchrist Olympio**. Kodjo's unwillingness to join forces with **Yao Agboyibo** and Olympio split the Ewe vote and facilitated Eyadéma's clawing his way back to a reelection victory on the back of his loyal military, the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**. In the **legislative elections of 1994**, Kodjo's **Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** party only received a minority of seats (7) to Agboyibo's 36, but in appointing Kodjo prime minister in 1994, Eyadéma surprised all observers, part of a ploy to further split southern Ewe allegiances. Kodjo served as prime minister in the government of President Eyadéma between 1994 and 1996, and again for President **Faure Gnassingbé** 2005–2006, proving both times to be a candidate of the opposition yet still palatable to the party in power. His UTD party joined with three others to form the **Convergence patriotique panafricain (CPP)** in 1999, and he ran for the presidency himself in the **2003 election**, garnering only 1 percent of the popular vote. Kodjo stepped back from his leadership role in the CPP in 2009, preferring to focus on his international statesmanship. In 2011, he created an international organization to further aims of panafrikan peace and development, Pax Africana, and was later appointed a facilitator for the national dialogue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2016. By 2019, he was less visible on the international stage as he had reportedly suffered a debilitating stroke, and he died in April 2020 in France.

KODJO, MESSAN AGBÉYOMÉ (1967–). Prime minister and presidential candidate. Kodjo was born in Tokpli and went on to be one of the prominent

Ewe supporters of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. In 1983, he received a degree in organizational management from the University of Poitiers in **France** and then returned to Togo to serve as a director of the **Société Nationale de Commerce (SONACOM)** in the 1980s before joining the cabinet as minister of youth in 1988. The liberalizations of the early 1990s swept him aside, but he was appointed to the **transition government** under **Joseph Koffigoh**, again as a member of the RPT. Being loyal to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, he refused to carry out orders from Koffigoh, bringing the government to crisis. In the ensuing reshuffle he was removed, but stayed influential as director general of the **Lomé Port** 1993–1999. After being elected to serve as a deputy in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**, he was selected president of the legislature 1999–2000. Eyadéma appointed him prime minister 2001–2002, during which period **Yao Agboyibo** was jailed for defaming Kodjo, but relations with the Eyadéma appeared to have soured afterward, and Kodjo spoke out against the president after the **2003 presidential elections**. In response, he was expelled from the RPT and lived in exile in France until the death of Eyadéma in 2005. From 2008 he was head of the political party *Organization pour Bâtir dans l'Union un Togo Solidaire (OBUTS)*, under which heading he ran for **president in 2010**, earning just under 1 percent of the vote.

OBUTS renamed itself the *Mouvement Patriotique pour la Démocratie et Développement (MPDD)* in 2018, and Kodjo stood for **president again on 22 February 2020**. Facing not just the incumbent but also the popular **Jean-Pierre Fabre** of the **Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC)**, Kodjo faced a difficult battle but had a great deal of momentum throughout the campaign, capitalizing on popular dissatisfaction with Gnassingbé's refusal to content himself with three terms in office. However, even in the Togolese context of consistently suspicious election returns, the results of the 2020 poll were not credible, with Kodjo winning only 19.5 percent of the vote to Gnassingbé's 71 percent, a margin of victory more than double that of Gnassingbé's previous victories. Kodjo's home was surrounded by security forces as ballots were counted, contributing to the expectation that he had performed well, but the lopsided results—delivered in less than 24 hours—confirmed the suspicion of opponents of the regime that Kodjo had been robbed of victory. As often happens after presidential elections, the runner up declared himself the winner, though Kodjo may have taken the pagentry too far by being “invested” by Archbishop **Philippe Kpodzro**, naming a prime minister, and addressing the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** as their supreme commander. Kodjo was accused by the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** of plotting a coup, and in March the legislative body stripped him of the immunity he held as a former deputy, and former president, of the AN. On

21 April, Kodjo was detained by security forces for failing to respond to their summons. Conditionally released, Kodjo continued his legal fight, including appealing to the **Constitutional Court** to determine whether he had been legally stripped of immunity.

KODJOVI, AKANYI-AWUNYO (1939–). Ambassador to the United Nations. Born in **Tsévié** of **Ewe** ethnic origin, Kodjovi studied to be an educator and taught for several years in a **Lomé** school. With approaching independence, he attended Togo's **École Nationale d'Administration (ENA)** and in 1960 was attached to the ministry of interior. In 1965, he pursued further specialized studies and in 1967 was named prefect of the Tabligbo district. In 1970, he was shifted to head the Lomé Administrative District, and in 1975 he was named prefect of the **Dapaong** area. In March 1975, after only a few months in his last posting, Kodjovi was returned to Lomé to become high commissioner for Tourism, and in September 1976 he was nominated ambassador to the United Nations. He served in that capacity until March 1980, when he was repatriated and joined the cabinet as minister of justice, serving until September 1982.

KODJOVIKOPÉ. In the **Anlo** dialect of **Ewe** "little Kobjo's village," a suburb of **Lomé** squeezed between the latter and the **Ghana** border town of **Aflao**. It is a prosperous town and the acknowledged center of Togo-Ghana legal trade and **smuggling**. Within it reside a polyglot of nationalities from all over Africa as well as pockets of Indians and Lebanese. The town has served as a West African major foreign currency market, entrepôt for precious stones, a market for drugs from **Benin** and Nigeria, and forged documentation from all over Africa.

KOFFI, MAJOR AMOUZOU. One-time Head of the **Brigade de Recherche**. Koffi was President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** half-brother and entrusted with security and intelligence duties in the **Lomé** area.

KOFFIGO, JOSEPH KOKOU (1948–). Former prime minister of Togo. A **human rights** activist and lawyer, and founding member president of the **Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)**, Koffigoh was elected transition prime minister by the **National Conference** in 1991. Thought at the time to be politically neutral and understood not to be a candidate for the eventual presidency, many other prominent opposition figures supported his candidacy to save themselves for the highest office once, they assumed, President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** was out of office. Despite having their support, and the support of angry youth who regularly took to the streets calling

themselves the **Ekpemog**, Koffigoh was not equal to the task of wrangling a divided pro-democracy opposition and fending off the unified **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** and **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** supporters of President Eyadéma. Koffigoh was menaced by the military and forced to capitulate in a televised humiliation that brought RPT members into his government, restored executive powers to Eyadéma, and permanently undermined his own credibility with Eyadéma's opponents. In 1993, he formed his own party, the **Convention des Forces Nouvelles (CFN)**, and he won the party's one seat in the **1994 legislative elections**, which ended his term as prime minister.

From 1994, Koffigoh proved useful to Eyadéma and the RPT because of his human rights credentials and former alliance with opposition groups. He could diversify a cabinet by being a non-RPT member, as he was in 1998–2000 as foreign minister and 2000–2002 as minister of regional integration under Prime Minister **Agbéyomé Kodjo**, but could also be counted on to support the RPT position. Koffigoh had lost all credibility with Eyadéma's opponents, however, and when **Faure Gnassingbé** became president, the charade was up. Koffigoh lost his seat in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN) elections of 2007**, and the CFN did not win any seats at all, so Koffigoh turned to more international political pursuits, leading the AU observer mission to the 2010 elections in Côte d'Ivoire.

KOLANI, YANDAM. Young published Togolese author. He has written articles for “Les Seniors Reporters.”

KOLANI, YAYA ASSADOU. Former head of the **Association des Cadres Musulmans au Togo (ACMT)**. An anthropologist by training, Kolani was president of the **Association des Élèves et Étudiants Musulmans au Togo (AEEMT)** before rising to the leadership of the ACMT from 2010–2018.

KOLOR, CLEMENT (1929–1970). Former **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** deputy and party militant killed in the **1970 attempted coup** against **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Born in Anié on 7 April 1929 and a merchant by profession, Kolor was elected to the **Chambre de Députés** from **Atakpamé** in 1958 and became secretary of the Committee on Finances and the Economy. He served in the legislature until **Sylvanus Olympio's** demise during the **coup of 1963**, following which he was involved in several plots against the subsequent regimes of **Nicolas Grunitzky** and **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. He was arrested in August 1970 in connection with the **coup conspiracy** of that month. He died, allegedly, when he jumped out of the window of the police

station in an attempt to regain freedom; alternatively, he was tortured to death in prison.

KOMLAVI, YAO. Former cabinet minister. Though an **Ewe**, Komlavi has been an **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** supporter and was for a long time prefect of **Lomé**. In March 1987, he was appointed minister of the environment and tourism, and in May 1991 replaced General **Mawulikplimi** as minister of security and territorial administration. Briefly dropped from the cabinet after the **National Conference**, he was reappointed as a **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** minister in the **transition cabinet** of 30 December 1991, again as minister of security serving until September 1992.

KONGO, COLONEL KOFFI RAINHILL (1936–1985). Former commander of Togo's First Battalion, head of Military Intelligence and inspector general of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**. A **Mina** born abroad (in Cameroon), who joined the colonial armies to be demobilized in 1962 with the rank of Corporal, Kongo was one of the principal architects of the **coup d'état of 1963**. Promoted to officer rank (Lieutenant) after the coup, Kongo attended **France's** St. Cyr Officers School (the only Togolese officer to do so up to 1969) and was one of Togo's most polished and dashing officers. After the **1967 coup** in which General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** seized power, Kongo was dispatched to several countries (including **Ghana**) to explain the reasons for the coup, and he was appointed secretary of **Kleber Dadjo's Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN)**. In March 1970, Kongo was promoted to Major and later that year was a member of the **Cour de Sûreté** that tried the August 1970 plotters. One of Togo's best-known military officers, promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1978 and to colonel in 1981, Kongo was the most senior officer in the armed forces after Eyadéma. His possible political ambitions (he was one of only a few officers not to be granted senior cabinet rank initially) was assuaged by a series of high-ranking military appointments, ultimately inspector general of the FAT. In 1985, the regime announced he had died after a heart attack; later, stories circulated that he was executed for the embarrassingly mediocre performance of Togolese units in joint maneuvers with French troops, a story contradicted by French sources that stress that he was actually complimented for the Togolese performance. His wife claimed he had been poisoned by the regime. In reality, Kongo was arrested on 27 February, tortured, and executed for a suspected plot against Eyadéma.

KONKOMBA. **Animist** ethnic group found in northern Togo and **Ghana**. In Togo, the Konkomba are especially concentrated along the Oti River, a

tributary of the Volta, north of **Bassar** and between the areas occupied by the **Moba** and the **Chokossi**. The Konkomba call themselves kpunkpamba or kpakpamba and speak a **Gurma** dialect of the Voltaic group of **languages**. Living in clans that are not united into centralized structures led to them being vanquished numerous times historically by neighboring ethnic groups. They also suffered from deep interclan fissures that sapped their collective strength and resulted in protracted interclan fights. Konkomba villages can have large numbers of Bu-Kombong, better known as Gangan. The Konkomba were displaced in the middle of the 16th century by the Dagomba, who set up their capital, Yendi, on former Konkomba territory. In the latter part of the 18th century, the Konkomba were again displaced (to the west) by the Chokossi, who had just arrived from Côte d'Ivoire via Ghana and Burkina Faso. The Konkomba staged **insurrections against both the French and the Germans in 1897 and 1898**, February to March 1923, and 1935 and 1936. In 1981, the Togolese Konkomba—who had never forgiven their Nanumba neighbors in the former British Togo for voting in the 1956 plebiscite for union with Ghana—moved in large numbers across the border to join interethnic fighting in that country. Hundreds of Nanumba died in this serious incident. Konkomba unrest also took place more recently, in 1994.

KORTHO, SAMON ALPHONSE. Former powerful minister of rural administration and key lieutenant of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. A civil administrator by profession, Kortho worked as administrator in the Bobo areas in Burkina Faso prior to independence. He then returned to **Lomé** and occupied a variety of high-level positions as administrator in the Lomé district. In 1971, he was appointed to the Political Bureau of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** in charge of Press and Propaganda. A hardworking, very efficient, and ambitious individual, Kortho was brought into Eyadéma's cabinet in March 1975 as minister of rural equipment. He possessed more power and influence than his cabinet portfolio suggested, and he slowly became a permanent fixture of the Eyadéma regime. In March 1987, he was dropped from the cabinet to be promoted permanent director of the RPT party.

KOTOKOLI. A confederation of chiefdoms of **Gurma** origin that settled in the **Sokodé** area in the 17th and 18th centuries and one of the most **Islamized** in Togo (93%). Estimated in 2016 at over 350,000, the Kotokoli (also Coto-coli and similar variants) speak the Tem **language** and are more properly known as the Temba. They have a paramount chief (**Uro**) who resides in the Dedaure quarter of Sokodé. Their popular name, Kotokoli, comes from the Dendi koto kolim, which means “they give and take back,” a reference to the

Djougou merchant's annoyance at alleged Kotokoli sharp practices in trade. The name is also used for non-Temba of Muslim faith who speak Tem, except for the Fulani and **Hausa**.

The Kotokoli came to Togo from Burkina Faso in two major waves establishing seven royal villages (Kouma, Tchadabe, Kadambara, Paratao, Birmi, Yalouwo, and Pangalam) from which subsequent paramount chiefs have always been chosen by rotation. In the middle of the 19th century, Kotokoli country was swept by Muslim influences (some via the **Chokossi** to the north) that disrupted the cohesion of the ethnic group, causing religious cleavages and wars. Exacerbating this was the fact that in 1880 **Uro Djobo III**, whose attempt to monopolize the trade in salt, arms, and slaves was rejected by the chiefs of the other villages, invited **German** assistance to rid his territory of Muslim Chokossi mercenaries supporting his enemies. The Germans helped establish his dynasty over all the Kotokoli. Notwithstanding their original resistance to Islam, Uros have been Muslim, as are most of the Kotokoli, though they retain pre-Islamic practices, the best known being the four-day Adossa ceremonies. Their principal town (now suffused with other ethnic groups) is Sokodé, a Dendi word meaning "to close," a reference to the barriers that were placed on the main routes to the town in the past. The Kotokoli are often lumped together with the **Chamba** who, however, differ from them quite significantly. The first political leaders of the Kotokoli were **Derman Ayéva**, brother of **Issifou Ayéva**, fourteenth Uro, and **Fousseni Mama**, but over 50 percent of the Kotokoli crossed ethnic lines in the Sylvanus Olympio era to support the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** over their "own" **Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais (UDPT)** party. In the 1990s, the Kotokoli were organized behind **Zarifou Ayéva** also of the royal family, as his name signifies.

KOTOKOLI, UROS OF. As with all King lists, there is considerable dispute about both the sequencing and precise dates of the early Uros of the **Kotokoli**.

Ogoro Dam	c. 1700
Bang-Na	
Takpara	
Akoriko	
Kura	
Djobo Semo	
Tcha Djobo	?–1901
Tcha Godemu	1902–1911
Buraima	1912–1923

Anyoro	1924–1948
Issfou Ayéva	1949–1980
Koura Foudou Ayéva	1986–1994
Abdou-Latifou Ayéva	1994–2011
Souleyman Ayéva	2011–2012
Akoriko Ali	2012–present

KOUASSI, KWAM EDMOND. Former ambassador to the United Nations in the 1980s and author of numerous works on international relations and Africa.

KOUAVI, HIPPOLYTE (-1967). Former vice president of Togo. During the debates in the **National Conference**, where many of the crimes of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime came out into the open, it was revealed in July 1991 that Kouavi had been tortured to death after the **1967 coup**.

KOUESSAN, GEORGES WILLIAM (1967–). Pharmacist and presidential candidate in 2020. Born in **Lomé** in 1967, Kouessan studied in Togo at the **Université de Benin** (now Université de Lomé) before moving to Belgium to earn his first doctorate, in medicine. He holds another doctorate in pharmacology, as well as degrees in public health and the economics of health from studies in Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and **France**. He administered the Clinique Hotel Dieu in Abidjan and headed the Kouessan Pharmacy in Lomé. He contested the **2013 legislative elections** in the name of the political party he founded the same year, Sante du Peuple (People’s Health), but did not win a seat; in the **municipal elections of 2019** his party was likewise unsuccessful. He and his party joined the **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel** shortly afterward, and Kouessan became a vice president of that organization. Later he joined the **Coalition des 14 (C14)** as part of the council of presidents of that organization. Despite calling in 2019 for the opposition to unite behind a single candidate, Kouessan became the youngest candidate of seven in the **presidential election of 2020**, which was his first bid for national office, and the first time that a medical professional has run for the post in Togo. He earned 0.77 percent of the official vote, coming in sixth place in a field of seven.

KOUESSAN, GREGOIRE KINVI. Former secretary general of the militant **Juvento** political party. In March 1967, Kouessan, a trade unionist, was sentenced to imprisonment for ten months for illegal possession of weapons but was pardoned in September of the same year. He left the country shortly after and passed away, some suspect from poisoning.

KPANDÉ-ADZARÉ, RAPHAËL. Lawyer and longtime head of the **Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH)**. Kpandé-Adzare served as president of the LTDH 2010–2017. He became the second in command of the **Front Citoyen Togo Debout (FCTD)** once it was founded in late 2017. He has defended clients in a number of high-profile cases in Togo, including President **Faure Gnassingbé**'s half-brother **Kpatcha Gnassingbé**, disgraced minister **Pascal Bodjona**, and students from the **Ligue Togolaise des Droits des Étudiants (LTDE)** arrested in 2017 for demonstrating at the **Université de Lomé**.

KPALIMÉ. Administrative headquarters of the lush and hilly **cocoa/coffee** growing district of Kloto in the Plateaux region, formerly known as Palimé. The town of 35,000 (which reverted to its authentic indigenous spelling in the mid-1970s as part of an **authenticity** campaign), is Togo's fifth largest after **Lomé**, **Sokodé**, and **Kara** (and often almost the same size as **Atakpamé**, capital of the **Plateaux** region). It is named after one of the **Ewe** clans that migrated to the region in the aftermath of the historic **Notsé** dispersal of 1720. About 120 kilometers north of Lomé, Kpalimé is connected to the north and south with excellent paved roads and is also serviced by the railroad. The town lies in the rolling hills at an altitude of 800 feet and has a cool and humid climate; 9 kilometers away is the old administrative headquarters, at the historic German outpost of **Misahohe**.

KPALIMÉ CONGRESS, 1971. Important congress of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** held in Kpalimé, 12–14 November 1971. Among the various resolutions of the Congress were the “rejection” of plans to constitutionalize **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s regime (the time was not yet ripe), the call for a plebiscite on General Eyadéma's continued rule (thus legitimatizing the regime), a call for continued military involvement in the political life of the nation, and the abolition of the party's top executive positions (secretary general and deputies) in favor of a collegiate Political Bureau. The Congress also urged the creation of a women's and a youth wing, recommended the unification of the trade union movement, and took several foreign policy stands, including the recognition of China.

KPÉME. Togo's main **phosphate** exporting port, 25 kilometers from the actual mines and not far from **Aného** on the main Lomé–Aného highway. The port has a 1,200-meter wharf for bulk loading of phosphates and is connected with the inland mines by a 22 kilometer railroad and a 750-meter bridge over the Porto Seguro (**Lac Togo**) lagoon. Expansions and improvements have been undertaken to increase both the capacity and efficiency of the port.

KPESSI. Ethnic sliver of a larger grouping, currently residing in the vicinity of **Sokodé**. Originally part of the Ashanti Federation, the Kpessi became assimilated with the **Ewe** and adopted the latter's **language**. In 1752, they attacked and briefly conquered Kumasi (Ghana). When ultimately defeated in that battle, they retreated eastward, later becoming vassals of the Dahomean kingdom. Their main village, Kpessi, was at one time an important **caravan stop**. Estimates of the number of Kpessi in Togo vary since it is difficult today to distinguish them from the Ewe population; many are known to reside in the Sokodé area.

KPESSOSSO. **Goun-Mina** festival of the New Year, held in mid-August in the **Aného** area.

KPETIGO, ELIAS KWASSIVI. Former cabinet minister. An efficient **Ewe** administrator with an eye for detail, Kpetigo was a Treasury Inspector before he came to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** attention. In September 1979, he was appointed minister of commerce and **transport** and nine months later shifted to head the ministry of industry and state companies. He was reassigned duties within that ministry when dropped from the cabinet in September 1982. Kpetigo reemerged in politics with the liberalizations of the 1990s when he joined **Jospeh Koffigoh's** **transition government** in September 1991 as **Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** minister of the economy and finance, leaving it in February 1993.

KPODZRO, FANOKO HYACINTHE PHILIPPE (1930–). Archbishop of **Lomé**, chair of the **National Conference**, and outspoken critic of rule by the **Gnassingbé** family. Kpodzro succeeded Oguki Atakpah in May 1976 as bishop of **Atakpamé**, despite General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** objections to his nomination and orders to **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** militants to disrupt his investiture. Kpodzro's consecration was consequently moved to Lomé's cathedral, but a riot ensued as the services were disrupted and scuffling broke out. The pope formally lodged a protest with the Togolese authorities over the incident, but the Togo government retorted that Kpodzro and the **Catholic** Church had been interfering in Togolese internal civil matters. The entire incident, finally soothed, arose over Kpodzro's opposition to the **authenticity** drives in Togo, at one time reiterating that the dropping of Christian given names was tantamount to deserting the church. An old foe of Eyadéma and military rule, Kpodzro was instrumental in guiding to fruition the opposition to Eyadéma that led to the convening of the National Conference where Kpodzro was elected Chairperson. From 1992 Kpodzro was archbishop of Lomé until his retirement in 2007. From time to time, he

still weighs in on national politics, including about the **2020 presidential elections** in Togo (throwing his support behind **Agbéyomé Kodjo**), to the discomfort of the ruling party, and sometimes the church.

KPOMASSIE, TÉTÉ-MICHEL (1941–). Educator and author. Kpomassie attained a measure of renown when he became the first Togolese to visit Greenland and write about his travels. Born in Atoeta (near **Aného**), Kpomassie studied in Dakar, Marseilles, and Copenhagen before his visit to Greenland. In 1981, his book *An African in Greenland* won the Prix Littéraire Francophone, and later was named a notable book by the *New York Times*.

KPONTON, HUBERT KOFFI MENSAH (1905–1982). Born to **Aného**'s chiefly family on 3 November 1905, and the first Togolese to study at **École William Ponty**, Kponton was secretary of Dr. **Martin Akou**, Togo's first deputy to Paris. A historian of stunning artistic talents, Kponton invented a musical instrument, taught music at the **Université de Benin**, and established in his home compound what became the Musée Kponton, a collection of music instruments and art bequeathed to the state and now held by the **Musée National du Togo**.

KPONTON QUAM DESSOU, EMMANUEL KOKO (1903–1968). Towering political figure, former mayor of **Aného** and **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** militant. Born in **Aného** to the founding family of the historic town on 13 October 1903, Kponton Quam Dessou worked for many years with the Société Nationale de Développement (SONAD) before being elected to the **Chambre de Députés** in 1958. A year later he became mayor of **Aného**, remaining in these two positions until the **coup d'état of 1963**. In the legislature, he was the powerful president of the CUT parliamentary party as well as president of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and, in 1961, president of the Economic Committee of the Joint Euro-African Parliamentary Session in Strasbourg, **France**. An extremely influential CUT leader under **Sylvanus Olympio**, a powerful political broker among the **Mina** in **Aného**, and one of the best-known traditional southern leaders in Togo, Kponton Quam Dessou was virtually unknown outside his country until the 1980s when his biography and oral history of **Aného** was published in **Lomé**.

KPOSTRA, GERSON VICTOR (1918–1965). Former cabinet minister. Born in Amou Ablo (Akposso district) on 20 May 1918, Kpostra was educated locally and at the **École William Ponty** in Dakar and later continued his medical studies at Dakar University. Upon his return to Togo, he worked as head of the Hygienic Services in Lomé until 1958, while being a militant

of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** and later of **Juvento**. In May 1958, he was elected Deputy from **Kpalimé** and shortly after was appointed minister of health under President **Sylvanus Olympio**. He held this portfolio until 1963 despite the crackdown in 1961 and 1962 on former Juvento leaders. After the **1963 coup**, Dr. Kpostra left the country to serve with the World Health Organization (WHO). He died two years later in a traffic accident in Brazzaville.

KPOTA DAM. A dam on the Sio River at Kpota, some 11 kilometers west of **Tsévié**. Built with **Chinese** technical assistance (5,000 million CFAF and approximately 60 Chinese technicians), the dam took two years to build and offers opportunities for rice cultivation in flooded lowlands in the area.

KPOSSI, ADZO REBECCA (1999–). Olympic swimmer. Kpossi was the youngest competitor at the 2012 Olympics in London, and the first Togolese swimmer to compete on the international stage. In 2012, Adzo was nominated for the Best Hope for Africa Top Sports Awards.

KPOTOGBÉY, MESSUAVI K. (1943–). Former director of Personnel at the ministry of foreign affairs. Born in 1943 and educated in **France** in the Social Sciences, Humanities, and Public Administration, KpoTogbéy returned to Togo to become First Director of Economic Matters at the Foreign Ministry (1978–1980), following which he became personnel director. He was the Chargé d’Affaires for one year (1984–1985) at the Togolese embassy in Accra.

KUAKUVI, MAWULE KUAMVI (1945–). **Human rights** activist. Born in the capital **Lomé**, Kuakuvi attended the University in Rome, and later received his MA and PhD at the University of Paris-Sorbonne. In 1985, he published *Les racines du mal nègre*, on racism, history and Africa. Professor of philosophy at the **Université de Benin** (later **Université de Lomé**), Kuakuvi is a member of the **Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l’Homme (LTDH)** and the Union of African Human Rights Leagues.

KUDZU, MICHEL WAGBENOXEVI. Minister of health. Kudzu joined the third **transition government** of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** as minister of health and the population on 14 September 1992 and was reappointed in 1993, representing the **Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** party.

KUEVIDJEN, ANDRE (1926–2014). Former minister of justice and **Juvento** leader. Born in **Aného** on 14 December 1926 and trained in

mathematics, Kuevidjen worked as a school teacher between 1961 and 1963, while also serving as one of Juvento's leaders. Following the **1963 coup d'état**, he joined the four-cornered coalition of President **Nicolas Grunitzky** and served as minister of justice (1963–1967). He removed himself from politics with the rise of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime, but in July 1977—while director of the National Institute of Scientific Research—he was imprisoned for voicing criticism of Eyadéma's economic policies. With the political liberalization of the 1990s he attended the **National Conference** in 1991 and participated in the opposition **Collectif d'Opposition Démocratique (COD) I and II**.

KUTUKLUI, NÖE (1923–1988). One-time leading opponent of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime and former minister of labor and deputy secretary general of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**. Born in **Aného** on 2 December 1923 to a poor **Mina** family, Kutuklui was educated locally and then in Dakar, at Caen University, and at the University of Paris, where he obtained a degree in law. While in Paris, he became active in student movements and was elected President of the militant *Federation des Étudiants de l'Afrique Noire en France*. Returning to Togo in 1958, Kutuklui rapidly rose within the party hierarchy of the CUT and, in the party Congress of October 1962, was elected deputy secretary general. Very close to President **Sylvanus Olympio** during the latter's last two years, Kutuklui assumed CUT leadership after the **1963 coup d'état**, though other contenders might have had a better claim. Appointed interim minister of labor immediately after the coup, Kutuklui was arrested in April 1963 for plotting against the regime he had just joined. Released in November 1965, Kutuklui was the prime instigator of the **November 1966 Lomé upheaval** that would have toppled President Grunitzky had the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** not belatedly intervened. The principal fiery orator at the massive demonstrations, Kutuklui fled to asylum in **Benin** after the failure of the uprising. He was the only major Togolese personality to refuse to return to **Lomé** under the various amnesties issued by the Eyadéma regime. He was in part distrustful of the latter, whom he regarded as an assassin that should be expelled from Togo, and in part unwilling to compromise his radical socialist credentials by association with the various lukewarm governments in Lomé. Though it was doubtful whether he really had a significant following in Togo, Kutuklui was behind at least five known early plots to topple **Nicolas Grunitzky** and Eyadéma, the last being the anti-Eyadéma **1970 attempted coup**. In exile in Cotonou for some time, where he was under the personal protection of the presidency and free to practice law, Kutuklui was forced to leave Benin in 1972 since his presence was beginning to cause problems with Togo, referred to by the Beninois press

as the “**Kuluklui Affair.**” He practiced law in Senegal and Mauritania and in due time relocated to Canada and developed his law practice in Montreal, where he died in 1988.

KUTUKLUI AFFAIR. The so-called Affaire-Kutuklui rocked the unstable Presidential Council of Benin in 1972. Nöe Kutoklui, political heir of **Sylvanus Olympio** and leading opponent of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime, had been the sponsor of several anti-Eyadéma plots while in exile in Cotonou, barely a two-hour drive from **Lomé**. Following the final conspiracy (**coup attempt in August 1970**), Kutuklui’s expulsion from Benin was requested by the Eyadéma government. Despite Kutuklui’s popularity in Cotonou and his links with various Beninois politicians, President Hubert Maga signed the orders and was then faced with the embarrassing situation of Kutuklui’s disappearance (aided by Colonel Alphonse Alley and other friends) even as major pro-Kutuklui demonstrations rocked the coastal cities. After the Beninois coup d’état of 1972, Kutuklui returned to Cotonou but eventually had to relocate more permanently to Senegal/Mauritania, and in due time to Canada where he practiced law until his death in 1988.

L

LAC TOGO. Small lake near the Togo-**Benin** border, immediately behind the coastal region and opening into the Atlantic Ocean at the mouth of the Mono River. The lake's normally salt waters are greatly sweetened at times by the inflow of river waters at the height of the rainy season. The lake separates Togo's **phosphate** mines from the phosphate port of **Kpéme** and a 750-meter bridge has been constructed to transport the ore over the lake. Porto Seguro, 15 kilometers from **Aného** and near Kpéme, has a hotel-restaurant that draws many Togolese and **tourists**, especially on weekends. Porto Seguro has a very important **zongo** with a large Djerma population and is the site of important **fetish** ceremonies in its sacred forests. *See also* AGBODRAFO; ANIMISM.

LACLÉ, KPOTIVI TEVI DZIDZOGBE THEODORE (1934–2006). Former powerful minister of interior and a close **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** lieutenant and confidant. A southerner born in **Agou** in November 1934 and educated in the **Catholic** mission school on the plantation where he was born and at College Saint Joseph in **Lomé**, Laclé was a journalist with little prospect for advancement until he joined Eyadéma's presidential office staff. A former editor with **Radio Togo**, he served as public relations officer and later director of cabinet of the presidency. He served in that role for 10 years, becoming a member of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** Central Committee (1971) and delegate to the Lomé RPT Committee (1969). In February 1977 his long and loyal service to Eyadéma was rewarded by an appointment to executive duties as minister of interior; he served in that capacity for ten years, to be shifted to head the ministry of justice only in 1987, allegedly due to ill-health. Laclé was dismissed from the cabinet in 1989 when his increasingly brazen corruption (the true reason for his demotion) could no longer be tolerated. In 1989 he was placed on trial for various misdeeds including a 15 million CFAF lottery swindle.

LA KARA. Northern region with administrative headquarters in the city of Lama Kara, renamed **Kara** in the 1981 administrative organization of the

country. It was carved out of former parts of the larger **Centrale** and **Savanes** regions in the mid-1960s in order to delineate the core **Kabyé** areas prior to a major drive for their socioeconomic modernization and development. From the **1967 coup d'état** that brought to power a Kabyé-led administration, La Kara saw major advances in health services, **education**, and **agrarian** development that transformed the region, as massive construction efforts transformed the administrative and **tourist** infrastructure. In the 1981 reorganization of the Togolese **administrative structure**, the region was significantly expanded (entrenching earlier developments) by the addition of lands previously in the Centrale region, currently including the **Bassar** district in the west as well. The district boasts its own **radio** station, **airport**, and branch of the national **university**, all moves to demonstrate its role as the second most important city in the country after **Lomé**, even though it is third in terms of population, at most.

LALLE, TANKPADJA. Government minister, head of the Court of Accounts. Tankpadja Lalle entered government in 1999 under Prime Minister **Eugene Adoboli** with the tourism portfolio, but quickly moved to minister of economy and finance in 2000 in **Agbéyomé Kodjo**'s government. He served under PM **Koffi Sama** until the death of President Gnassingbé **Eyadéma** as head of trade and industry in 2002, and then tourism in 2003–2005. Head of the Cour des Comptes 2009–2012, charged with verifying public accounts, he came under criticism because the oversight organ never published any report on what opponents of the ruling party called excessive expenditures, under his leadership.

LAMA KARA. *See* KARA.

LAMBA. Northern ethnic group, nearly all of whom live in the Kandé region. *See also* KABYÉ.

LAMBONY, BARTHELEMY (1937–1974). Former cabinet minister. Lambony was born in Nandoga in the **Dapaong** district to **Moba** parents on 16 December 1937. Educated locally and in **France**, Lambony was a graduate of the École Nationale de la France Outre-Mer (ENFOM) and the universities of Bordeaux and Paris, where he obtained a degree in law. Upon his return to Lomé, Lambony joined the **Sylvanus Olympio** administration. A member of the **Juvento** party, Lambony was President **Nicolas Grunitzky**'s interim minister of **education** prior to the **1963 elections** in which he was elected to the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)**. There he became the Assembly's

president for the duration of the Grunitzky administration (1963–1967). A strong and ambitious personality, who at one time thought of supplanting Grunitzky of whom he was contemptuous, Lambony was brought into the **Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN)** following the **1967 coup d'état** and given responsibility over the Education portfolio. With the rise of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime in April 1967, he was brought into the cabinet as minister of information. He was a member of the Political Bureau of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** from its inception. In 1969, he was moved to head the ministry of labor and social affairs, and in 1972 he replaced the ailing Colonel **Dedum Assila**—whose responsibilities he had already assumed in an interim capacity—as minister of interior. In August, 1973 Lambony was dropped from the cabinet and attached to the presidential office until the end of his life.

LANGUAGES. With more than 30 languages spoken in the country, most Togolese are multilingual, speaking a language tied to their ethnicity or family at home, as well as a language dominant in their region or a “market” language that serves as a *lingua franca* between groups. The two largest linguistic groupings those who speak dialects of **Evegbé** (language of the **Ewe** group, and part of the **Adja** language family, who are 22.3% of the population) and **Kabyé** (part of the Gur language family, also spoken by the Mossi of Burkina Faso, 14.7%). These two languages were denominated “national” languages by Togo in 1975, alongside the official and former colonial language, **French**. While there was hope that the **education** system would effectively incorporate these two indigenous languages for instruction, French continues to dominate as the language of instruction, and it is the most widely written language in Togo. Newspapers and government documents are circulated in French, though **radio** broadcasts find audiences in other widely spoken languages, including **Mina** (an Evegbé variant), **Tem** (spoken by the Kotokoli), and **Gurma** (spoken by the Gurma and **Moba**). See also EDUCATIONAL REFORM OF 1975; VILLAGE DU BENIN; WESTERMANN, DIEDRICH (1875–1957).

LARE, AUGUSTIN NAMPOUGUIM (1937–). Diplomat. Born in Bidi-jenga-Kpantogou in 1937 and educated in Law in Paris and Geneva. Lare served for six months as director of Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry (1967–1968) before being sent abroad as First Secretary at the embassy of Togo to the United Nations. In 1974, he returned to **Lomé** and assumed duties in the Division of Political and International Affairs, rising to be division head.

LAWANI, GREGOIRE ESSOHANAM (1949–2013). Minister of youth, sports, and leisure in the fourth **transitional government** of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** in 1992. Born in Koumea and trained as an ecologist, Lawani was also a singer (nicknamed the “romantic crooner”), and businessperson. An environmentalist, Lawani founded Parti Ecologiste Panafricain (PEP) and the “Ecologie Sans Frontières,” but passed away in Brussels in 2013.

LAWSON, BENI. Former attaché at the Togolese embassy in Paris and a former **Lomé** businessman. Beni Lawson is a member of the **Lawson** family of **Aného** and hence tied by family relations to the opposition to the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime. He is also the brother of Lieutenant Colonel **Merlaud Lawson**, leader of one of the Paris-based opposition groups involved in several of the plots against Eyadéma. In 1979 Lawson was abducted by **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)** security service agents in Accra, **Ghana** and spirited into Togo to stand trial for the **1977 attempted coup** in a case that drew international **human rights** attention. He was later found not guilty and released, moving to exile in Paris.

LAWSON, BOEVI-MAWUSSI (1936–). Banker. Born in **Aného** on 18 January 1936, Lawson was educated locally at the Lycée Bonnacarrère and later secured professional Banking training (1957–1959). In 1959, he joined the **Banque Centrale de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCAO)** and became the bank’s section chief (1960–1965), manager (1965–1967), deputy director (1967–1973), agency director (1973–1975), and national director for Togo operations (from 1975). Unlike other members of his family, Lawson is apolitical.

LAWSON, CINA. Government Minister. Born in **Aného** but raised in Paris after her parents fled the political troubles of the early 1990s, Cina Lawson earned a degree in applied economics from the Sciences Po in Paris and a master’s degree from Harvard’s Kennedy School. She met President **Faure Gnassingbé** in 2009, while he was visiting the United Nations and she was working for Orange Business Service in New York. After Gnassingbé was **reelected in 2010**, he named her minister of posts, digital economy and technological innovation, a position she has held for a decade. Known as one of several young technocrats closest to the president, *Forbes* magazine named her one of the 20 most powerful young women in Africa in 2012, and Harvard honored her with the Alumni Public Service Award in 2019. Among her projects is **AgriPME**, a digital wallet accessible by cellphone, which enables farmers access agricultural subsidies. It boasts more than 150,000 Togolese

users. Lawson was rumored to have opposed President Gnassingbé's decision to pursue a fourth term in office in 2020, which may have caused a falling out between the two.

LAWSON FAMILY. One of the important **Aného** families, members of which are found in all branches of Togolese life. Until 1961, Lawsons were contenders with the Adjigo clan for the title Superior Chief of Aného, but in that year, by mutual agreement, the title was abolished. One of the founders of the family was “King” George Lawson, a Fanti from Accra (**Gold Coast**) who had been a steward on a slave ship before settling in Aného in 1812 and engaging in trade in slaves and commodities. Involved in a local power struggle, he styled himself “King of Glidji.” He died in 1883 and was succeeded by his son G. A. Lawson and another son who came to Aného from Lagos, both of whom acted as customs collectors for the infant chief of Glidji. Strongly pro-British, the Lawsons opposed the expanding **German** influence in the area and appealed for British assistance from Lagos. In retaliation, the Germans abducted several members of the household and shipped them off aboard the *Sophie*. They returned to Aného aboard the *Mowe*, together with **Gustav Nachtigal**, who set up the German colony of Togo. Descendants of the family have since served in a variety of public positions and in the liberal professions. Being part of the **Brazilian** elite, several of the Lawson family (but according to government sources the entire “clan”) were accomplices in the various plots against President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and attempted **coups**, together with other Brazilian families like the Olympios and the De Souzas.

LAWSON, J. NICOLAS MESSAN (1953–). Businessman and Togolese politician. Born in **Aného**, Lawson studied economics and hotel management in Ireland before taking on executive roles in several French companies and eventually his own business network that stretched from Togo to Ghana and the Ivory Coast. After the liberalization of 1991 Lawson attended the **National Conference**, and served in the transition legislature the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)**. He was invited by **transition** prime minister **Joseph Koffigoh** to serve as special advisor on political affairs. In **2003**, he **declared his candidacy for president** as an independent, giving up his French citizenship to mark his dedication. However, he won only 0.2 percent of the vote. In the wake of that election, he created the Parti du Renouveau et de la Rédemption (PRR), opting to try a second bid for the **presidency in 2005** after the death of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Though he withdrew from the race in protest over procedural concerns, Lawson's name still appeared on the ballot, and he fared little better than the previous election with 1 percent

of the vote. Lawson ran again in the **2010 election** under the banner of the PRR, making clear that he favored the party in power by disparaging the Togolese political opposition wholesale, but still came in last in a field of seven candidates with 0.3 percent of the vote.

LAWSON, LATEVI-ATCHO ELLIOTT (1948–). Diplomat and government minister. Born in Lomé on 9 September 1948, Lawson was educated locally and then studied English at the University of Bordeaux (until 1972). During his last year of studies, he obtained training in Diplomacy in Geneva. Upon his return to Lomé, he became assistant director of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences and later assistant director of the Political Department in the ministry of foreign affairs (1972–1974). In April 1974, he was appointed councilor at the Togolese Mission to the United Nations, and in 1979 he was reassigned to the **European Economic Community (EEC)** mission in Brussels. He later served as minister of justice 1995–1996, and authored a book about African international relations.

LAWSON, LIEUTENANT COLONEL MERLAUD. Former high-ranking army officer implicated in the **1977 attempted mercenary assault** on President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Prior to his conspiracy, Lawson was deputy quartermaster of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** as well as director of Direct Tax Contributions in the Office of Taxes. Regarded as somewhat of an Eyadéma protégé, Lawson was a key element in the 1977 affair and promptly fled to asylum in Paris when the attempt failed to set up the Paris-based anti-Eyadéma **Front National de Liberation du Togo (FNLT)** that offered an armed alternative to replace Eyadéma.

LAWSON, SONIA. Director of the **Palais de Lomé**. Originally from **Aného**, Sonia Lawson drew the notice of the Togolese press in 2014 when she was put in charge of the **Hotel Sarakawa** after the forcible ousting of the French Accor Group, who had previously been managing it. Critics complained that being the sister of **Cina Lawson** (minister of the digital economy) and friendly with President **Faure Gnassingbé** appeared to be Lawson's primary qualifications. Lawson was subsequently put in charge of the renovation of the colonial **Palais de Lomé**, and she became the director of the art and cultural center housed there from 2019.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATE. Following the Anglo-French invasion of **German Togo**, the British held the rich **cocoa** lands of **Kloto**, the Dagomba capital of Yendi, the three **railroads**, and **Lomé**, with the **French** occupying the rest of the colony. On 7 May 1919, the Supreme Allied Council

declared that the League of Nations would assume ultimate responsibility for Togo (and other such territories). On 10 July 1919, there was a new Anglo-French partition of Togo, with France retaining the bulk of her former sphere and gaining the Kloto region, Lomé, and the railroads. The British kept the former German station at Ho (in Kloto) and the Dagomba and northern regions. The two segments of the former German colony were designated Class B mandates of the League of Nations and under Article I:19 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany renounced future claims to its former colonial possessions. After the end of World War II, the two mandates became UN trusteeship territories under the same administering powers.

LIBERATION DAY. *See* JOURNÉE DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE.

LIBYA, RELATIONS WITH. Like most African states, Togo was the target of a concerted Libyan diplomatic and financial effort in the early 1970s, aimed at displacing the strong Israeli presence in the country until that date. With the break in relations with Israel in the aftermath of the 1973 Middle East War, several treaties between Libya and Togo were signed and a number of joint companies in a variety of areas were announced. Other treaties, including ones of military cooperation, were signed in 1975 and 1976. Culminating these contacts was the state visit to Tripoli of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in February 1976 and Mohmar Qaddafi's later visit to **Lomé**. Despite a profusion of contacts and treaties, relations were not smooth. In the 1980s, there were complaints of Libyan involvement in conspiracies against the regime, and the relationship between the two countries became more distant, as it remained until Qaddafi's death.

LIGUE TOGOLAISE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (LTDH). Human rights organization set up in 1991 as an independent counterbalance to the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**-sponsored **Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH)**; it still issues intermittent reports about human rights violations carried out by the Togolese government.

LIGUE TOGOLAISE DES DROITS DES ÉTUDIANTS (LTDE). Student organization created in July 2016 in the wake of the **Université de Lomé**'s last-minute decision to move the date of final exams five days earlier than planned. The students were outraged by the change, which they considered to have insufficient justification (the need to paint lecture halls) for the disruption it would cause, and the LTDE continued to channel student grievances through 2017 and 2018, culminating in the arrest of several leaders of the organization, including president **Foly Satchivi**. It later changed its name

to the Ligue Togolaise des droits des élèves et étudiants, though it kept the acronym LTDE.

LISSA. Creator of the universe according to **Ewe** mythology, the pantheon of which includes about 600 gods. **Mahou** is the wife of Lissa. Still widely venerated in Ewe society, traditional beliefs include veneration of a particular animal by each clan; the animal embodies the spirit of a clan ancestor. *See also* ANIMISM.

LISTE NATIONALE DE L'UNITÉ ET RECONCILIATION. Unified electoral list of Togo's four major postindependence political parties that was submitted to the electorate in the 7 May **1963 elections**, following the assassination of President **Sylvanus Olympio**. The Liste included 56 candidates for office, equally apportioned among the **Mouvement Populaire Togolais (MPT)**, **Juvento**, **Parti de l'Unité Togolaise (PUT)**, and **Union Démocratique des Populations Togolaises (UDPT)** under the leadership of the latter's **Nicolas Grunitzky** and **Antoine Méatchi**. At the elections, the Liste obtained 568,893 votes out of the 582,309 cast, with the total number of registered voters standing at 639,523, and members on the Liste became the deputies of the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)**.

LE LIVRE VERT. "The Green Book," a much-touted condensed version of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** manifesto and economic program, published by **Editogo** and widely distributed among the population in the mid-1970s. After the collapse of the Togolese economy in the 1980s, nothing much was heard about the document.

LOGBA. Northern ethnic group. *See also* KABYÉ.

LOI BODJONA. Popular nickname for the law passed by the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in May 2011 that stipulated the organizers of peaceful public demonstrations needed only to submit written notice to the proper authorities, rather than apply for a permit or other official permission as had been required at other times in Togo's recent history. Named for **Pascal Bodjona**, then minister of territorial administration and decentralization, who later fell out of favor with President **Faure Gnassingbé** and was arrested for corruption. The law was popular with opponents of Gnassingbé and the ruling **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party, and helped to facilitate the wave of popular demonstrations in 2017–2018. In August 2019, the AN modified the law, forbidding demonstrations in certain strategic areas of major cities, limiting the hours available to protest, and forbidding multiple protests in

different locations on the same day. Critics deplored these limitations on individual freedom and declared the Loi Bodjona “dead” as result of the modifications.

LOI CADRE. The “Enabling” Act passed by the French National Assembly in June 1956. The law expanded the legislative powers of the territorial assemblies in each of **France’s** colonies at the expense of the two French African federations, gave all overseas territories local autonomy, made suffrage universal, and established a single electoral college in each one. In the case of Togo (which was not a colony but a Trusteeship Territory), the **double electoral college** had already been abolished in February 1952, and the **Assemblée Legislative du Togo (ALT)** already had powers that assemblies in **France’s colonial administration** did not yet possess; the Loi Cadre essentially gave Togo total internal autonomy.

LOMÉ. Togo’s capital, largest city, and nerve center of the modern economy, as well as **administrative** headquarters of the **Maritime** region. Lomé’s population was about 800,000 during the 2010 census, and is estimated to be approaching 1.5 million today. The city has historically been composed of southern elements (**Mina, Ewe, and Ouatchi**), with sizable **Hausa** trading communities and other ethnic groups as well, including many foreigners, both European and African.

Lomé has been the capital of Togo since 1897 when German governor Koehler (whose tomb is in the city cemetery) shifted the capital from **Aného** to the small village of Alomé, settled in the 18th century by Ewe and Ouatchi arriving from **Notsé**. After its designation as capital, Mina traders relocated there from Aného and Porto Seguro. One of Lomé’s original quarters was its **zongo**, founded in 1884 by Hausa from Salaga—the latter the biggest trade entrepôt in the region and terminus of an important **caravan** artery. The zongo remained populated by Hausa and Yoruba merchants and their slaves and attracted other communities, notably **Kotokoli**, coming to benefit from the commercial activities and employment prospects offered by Octaviano Olympio, who relocated at the same time to the budding “village” from the **Brazilian** town of **Agoué** in Benin. In many ways, Olympio was the “founder” of Lomé. *See also* ANAGOKOME.

Rapid expansion of the city is blocked on two sides by the **Ghanaian** border (two kilometers from the center of the city) and the Atlantic Ocean. Lack of orderly city planning in its early days, and uncontrolled expansion since independence, badly scarred downtown Lomé, presenting major obstacles to urban planners. In the mid-1970s, major renovation projects for the center of the city announced, leading eventually to the construction of newer, more

modern buildings such as the **Maison du Peuple** and the **Presidence**. In the late 1990s, another round of improvements were launched in advance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit held in Lomé in 2000. In the eastern outskirts is the **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)**, constantly being expanded due to Lomé's booming trade and transit role vis-à-vis the landlocked countries to the interior, and the Tokoin military barracks and the **Université de Lomé** are located in the north. The main market, or Grand Marché (known as **Assigamé**, once home to the famous **Nana Benz**) is still a vibrant trading hub, though a fire in 2013 prompted much rumor and speculation that the government was moving trade out of the city center. There are two main paved roads connecting Lomé with the interior, and the capital is equidistant—in terms of driving time along the very scenic coastal highway—from Cotonou in **Benin** and Accra in **Ghana**, two hours away.

LOMÉ II. Unofficial name for President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s residence. *See also* PRESIDENCE, PALAIS DE LA.

LOMÉ CONVENTIONS. The Lomé Conventions, starting with Lomé I signed in 1975, aimed to provide a more productive and less neocolonial trade relationship between Europe and African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) group of states. The Lomé Conventions opened European markets to African minerals and **agriculture** under specific conditions and quotas, where they would otherwise not have preferential access. The success of the agreements was demonstrated by more and more ACP countries signing on to three subsequent agreements, Lomé II in 1981, Lomé III in 1985, and Lomé IV in 1992. By the early- to mid-1990s, however, such agreements flew in the face of globalization and the new pressure to enforce free market access by the World Trade Organization (WTO), backed by the United States. The Lomé Conventions were supplanted by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000.

LOMÉ FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT. Ultimately failed agreement issued by the **Inter-Togolese Dialog** which brought together President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and the major opposition parties to overcome the bitter divisions arising from the **1998 presidential election**. In exchange for a pledge from Eyadéma not to run again in 2003, as well as other concessions with respect to election organizing and security, the opposition agreed to participate in new **legislative elections** held in 2002, rather than 2004 as would have been expected after the (boycotted) **1999 legislative elections**. However, the government's revisions to the electoral code and **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)** seemed to go against the agreement,

prompting the opposition to boycott again, and Eyadéma to renege on the promise not to run in the **presidential election of 2003**.

LOMÉ INCIDENTS OF 1933. Also known as the “Révolte des Loméens,” a series of popular demonstrations and **French administrative** reprisals consequent to a period of general economic downswing and malaise. The protest took place among market **women** concerned about their livelihood, and supported by a parallel set of actions on the part of Ewe men to assert their political power. Local district and canton chief handed petitions to the **Lomé** police headquarters requesting that new taxes on market stalls be withdrawn. A dozen such new taxes had been announced during the preceding year as the French administration tried to raise funds in an effort at fiscal self-sufficiency at a time when the economy had become stagnant during the worldwide Great Depression. (Exports in 1934 were barely 33% of those in 1929.) The haughty French administration reacted to the petitions by arresting two of the chiefs, in general viewing the incident as a pro-British ploy rather than as a sign of economic malaise. The same afternoon, a crowd of 3,000 Africans marched through the streets demanding the release of their leaders, and a general strike was declared. The strong presence of **women** in these protests reflected their own interest, as well as their power to shame men in authority into denying women their rights. Though the prisoners were released that evening, the crowds did not disperse and demonstrations continued the next day. Several buildings were set on fire, including the home of **Jonathan Savi de Tové**, secretary of the Lomé Conseil de Notables, regarded a lackey of the administration. As tension increased, Lomé’s European population was issued firearms, and troops were brought in from the Ivory Coast. These troops commenced a veritable rampage that extended into the neighboring countryside. Fourteen Togolese were sentenced to death, and scores were imprisoned or fined for such minor infractions as travel without permits. Sentences of up to five years were handed out for such offenses. Numerous people were killed and women raped during the reprisals, and reporters and photographers from Dahomey (covering the events) were imprisoned. The entire pressrun of *L’Etoile du Dahomey*, which published an account of the atrocities, was confiscated by the French administration in that colony.

LOMÉ INDUSTRIAL FREE ZONE. Major initiative conceived in October 1989 to revitalize the Togolese economy with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) initiative and the Overseas Investment Corporation. Conceived of as a private enterprise zone governed by a special liberal investment code that would spur industrial relocations from outside the country,

the first enterprise to establish itself in the Zone was the subsidiary of the French Compagnie Generale des Matieres Colorantes (GMC), specializing in packing pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and agro-food products, that came in September 1990. An additional 19 companies had applied and been approved for relocation to the Zone, the site for which had been developed with 800 million CFAF, most from the GMC group. Most did not relocate per schedule, and some actually abandoned participation, due to the political demonstrations that shortly were to rock **Lomé** and were to last for 18 months. The initiative was later replaced with the **Zone Franche de Transformation pour l'Exploitation (ZFTE)**.

LOMÉ PEACE ACCORD 1999. Short-lived peace agreement signed in the Togolese capital in 1999 to end the civil war in Sierra Leone. Supervised by President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and the U.S. Special Envoy Jesse Jackson, the parties signed the ceasefire agreement and submitted to enforcement by UN Peacekeepers. However, many rebels refused to disarm under the conditions stipulated, and the agreement collapsed in 2000.

LOMÉ PORT. *See* PORT AUTONOME DE LOMÉ (PAL).

LOMÉ-TOKOIN. *See* AIRPORTS.

LOMÉ UPHEAVALS OF 1966. *See* COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 1966.

LOOKY, ALEXIS LAMSEH. Former head of the **Union Togolaise de Banque (UTB)** and **Chambre de Commerce d'Industrie du Togo (CCIT)**, charged with fraud. Looky served as head of the CCIT from 1994 to 2008, despite being arrested by Togolese authorities in 2000 and held in prison two years. He was eventually released with no charge and left for **France** in poor health. In 2009, he was convicted in France for money laundering, first discovered in 1998 during which time Looky was head of the UTB.

LOOKY, L. ZAKARY (1905–). Former **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** militant. Born in 1905 in the vicinity of Pagouda in the north, Looky worked as a public works surveyor before joining the CUT and becoming immersed in political activities. He served as president of the **Conseil de Circonscription** of Pagouda in 1959 and was the Treasurer (1946–1952) and Regional Director (1952–1961) of the CUT in Kara. Elected Deputy to the **Assemblée Representative du Togo (ART)** in 1946, he served as vice president of the Assembly before losing his seat in 1951 to a non-CUT delegate. With the rise of the **Sylvanus Olympio** regime, Looky once again

was elected from **Kara** (1961–1963) and was vice president of the CUT parliamentary party and a member of the Committee on Finance and the Economy. Following the **1963 coup d'état**, Looky moved out of political life into retirement.

LOSSO. Northern **animist** ethnic group found in the **Kara**, Niamitougou, and **Sansanne-Mango** areas and also, as a result of land pressures, in the vicinity of **Atakpamé**. Frequently lumped together with the **Kabyé**, the Losso numbered around 450,000 people in 2016.

LOSSOU, PAULIN KODJO. Deputy secretary of the **Mouvement Togolais pour la Démocratie (MTD)** political party, behind the September **1986 coup d'état attempt** against General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Lossou was in self-exile in Paris since 1972, organizing anti-Eyadéma activities. After the 1986 coup attempt, he was served deportation orders by Paris, directing him to Argentina. His appeal was in the courts when the Togolese secret service mounted both an assassination attempt (in Paris) and a kidnap attempt.

LOUMIOU, AHMED EL HADJ (1905–). Religious leader and educator. Born in **Lomé** in 1905 of devout **Hausa** parents originating from Sokoto (Nigeria), Loumiou studied the Koran under a succession of religious instructors and made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1945. Earlier he had set up a school of his own (in 1942) in the Lomé **zongo**—the first such school in Lomé. A highly respected member of the **Muslim** community, he continued his teaching until 1987.

M

MADJOLBA, COLONEL BITALA (1968–2020). Army commandant of the **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)** first Batallion d’Intervention Rapide (BIR), assassinated in May 2020. Born in Siou, Colonel Bitala Madjoulba pursued military training in Togo, Senegal, and Cameroon and served in the FAT from 1990, rising to the rank of colonel in January 2020. He was discovered dead in his office one day after attending President **Faure Gnassingbé**’s inauguration ceremony on 3 May 2020. He died of an apparent bullet wound, but the circumstances of his death remained unexplained, prompting much speculation on social **media** as to whether the death constituted a political assassination. A member of the **Losso** ethnicity, the mysterious death of Madjoulba was further dramatized by popular demonstrations in the region of his hometown, demanding that his body be returned immediately for burial, in keeping with local custom. The government opened two parallel inquiries into the death: a commission of inquiry led by minister of security **Damehane Yark** and a criminal investigation within the FAT.

MADJRI, DOVI JOHN (1940–). Journalist and author. Born in 1940 near **Lomé** to **Catholic** parents, Madjri was educated in Cameroon and Burkina Faso specializing in adult **education** and Social Psychology. On his return to Lomé, he secured a post with the Catholic weekly *Presence Chretienne*, moving to become its deputy editor and later editor. In 1971, he left for **Vogan** to be in charge of the latter’s Social Center and in 1973 became involved in trade union activities as well. He is the author of several acclaimed books, including a detailed overview of Togolese literature.

MAHOU. Wife of **Lissa**, creator of the world in the **Ewe** pantheon.

MAISON DE L’UNITÉ. *See* PALAIS DE CONGRÈS DE LOMÉ.

MAISON DU HADJ. Planned for several years but delayed by financial constraints, construction on the Maison du Hadji in **Lomé** was ultimately completed in 2013 with funds raised by the **Union Musulmane du Togo**

(**UMT**), support from Saudi Arabian interests, and a personal donation from President **Faure Gnassingbé**. The Maison du Hadj is located near the Lomé **airport**, providing a lodging and preparation space for **Muslims** making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Former **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** chief of staff **El Hadj Mohamed Atcha Tikipina** is the director.

MAISON DU PEUPLE. *See* PALAIS DE CONGRÈS DE LOMÉ.

MALLAM BELLO. *See* BELLY EL FOUTI, MOHAMED.

MALLY, KOMLAN. Prime minister 2007–2008. Born in Adiva, in Amou Préfecture (**Plateaux Region**), Mally served as prefect of Golfe and Wawa before being named minister of urban development in 2006. In December 2007, Mally was appointed prime minister by President **Faure Gnassingbé** after the **legislative elections** held under the **Accord Politique Global (APG)**, when opposition figure **Yao Agboyibo** stepped down. From 2002, Mally has been a Universal Peace Federation (UPF) Ambassador for Peace. His tenure as prime minister lasted less than one year, and from 2008 to 2011, he won a seat in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** and served as minister of state for health.

MALLY, THEOPHILE (1913–1973). Former powerful minister of interior under President **Sylvanus Olympio**. Born to an **Akposso** family in Gobe-Admiabra in 1913, Mally was a farmer until he joined the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** in the mid-1940s. In 1959 he became the president of the Executive Committee of the Akposso **Conseil de Circonscription** and joined Olympio's cabinet in May 1960 as minister of interior, press, and information (to January 1962). From the latter date until Olympio's assassination in 1963, Mally concentrated on his duties as minister of interior, dropping the other portfolios. Following the establishment of a one-party state, Mally was instrumental in tracking down and imprisoning most of the leaders of the opposition parties in Togo, becoming one of the most hated and feared men in the country. He did not fall into the dragnet set for Olympio's ministers at the time of the **1963 coup d'état** and escaped to Nigeria. He later also lived in Guinea. From abroad he directed several plots against the successor **Nicolas Grunitzky** government, vying with **Nöe Kutuklui** for the leadership of the CUT party. In 1967, he heeded the amnesty call of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, made his peace with the new regime, and returned to Togo. Not fully trusted and still resented by many he had previously persecuted, Mally was appointed to various secondary positions in the Eyadéma government. In 1970, he was a member of the **Cour de Sûreté** that tried the plotters of the

August attempted **coup**. Not heard of for some time, in March 1973 it was tersely announced that he had died in prison after being imprisoned on February 28 for passing a bad check.

MALOU, YAYA BENOIT (1932–2007). Former minister of **education**. A cousin of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, the **Kabyé** Malou was born in **Pya** in the vicinity of **Kara** in 1932. Educated in the missionary school and then at a **Protestant** secondary school in **Lomé** (1947–1953), Malou spent his early years teaching in **Atakpamé** and in Lomé. In 1958, he entered the Police Training School of the then Mali Federation in Dakar, Senegal, returning to Togo in 1960 to serve with the National Security forces in Lomé, Atakpamé, and **Sokodé** (1960–1963). Following the **1963 coup d'état**, Malou was appointed assistant director of the **Sûreté**, and in 1965 he attended a specialized course in **France**. After General Eyadéma's assumption of control over the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** in 1965, Malou was brought into President **Nicolas Grunitzky**'s cabinet as minister of education. (He had previously served very briefly as interim minister of interior.) In November 1966, totally disgruntled with Grunitzky's leadership style and the continuous Grunitzky-**Méatchi** tug-of-war in the cabinet, Malou—together with **Pierre Adossama**—resigned from the government, precipitating the Kutuklui-led **1966 uprising** in Lomé. Briefly arrested by Grunitzky for his role in the attempted coup, Malou was a member of the interim **Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN)** set up after the **coup of 1967** and was brought into Eyadéma's cabinet (as minister of civil service, works, and social affairs) after the latter's assumption of full power in April 1967. In August 1969, Malou was shifted to head the ministry of education. A key personal confidant of President Eyadéma, Malou held a great deal of prestige in the regime, though not power, his longevity in the cabinet and family relationship to Eyadéma notwithstanding. He was also a member of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** from its inception. His former political and personal connections could not save him in 1979, when he was dropped from the cabinet for feathering his nest too liberally. He was appointed director of the National Police Training College. In January 1983, he was summarily dropped from his college appointment and all political posts (including the RPT Politburo), allegedly for "improperly executing his duties." His purge was one of several demanded by the international community when faced with Togolese demands for a fiscal bailout in the 1980s and rampant corruption at the highest circles of the government and party. Despite this, Malou was later rehabilitated and made Grand officer of l'Ordre National du Mono, and commander of the Legion of Honor in France, and commander of the French Palmes Académiques. He passed away in December 2007, at the age of 75.

MAMA, FOUSSENI (1924–1983). Former minister of interior under President **Nicolas Grunitzky**. Born in 1924, in **Sokodé**, Mama's political fortunes were largely intertwined with Grunitzky's. Trained as a school teacher locally and at the prestigious **École William Ponty** in Senegal, Mama worked as an educator for eight years before being elected to the territorial assembly as **Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN)** deputy and cooperated with Nicolas Grunitzky's **Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP)**. He sat in the **Assemblée Legislative du Togo (ALT)** until 1956; between 1953 and 1956, he was also Togo's councilor of the Council at the French Union. In 1956, he was brought into Grunitzky's government as minister of state in charge of Public Works and just prior to the collapse of the government was promoted to head the ministry of interior. Locked out of power during the **Sylvanus Olympio** era (1958–1963), Mama was recalled to the cabinet with the establishment of the new Grunitzky administration following the **1963 coup d'état**. One of the pillars of the regime and Grunitzky's most loyal ally, Mama was minister of interior between October 1963 and November 1966. In November, he bitterly clashed with Vice President **Antoine Méatchi** over the latter's attempts to undermine the Grunitzky administration in the aftermath of which he was forced to accept a temporary demotion (to become minister of education) in order to avert a major crisis between the two leaders of the Togolese executive. His demotion, which was the last straw for the **Parti de l'Unité Togolaise (PUT)** ministers in the cabinet who were chafing at Grunitzky's lack of decisiveness in resolving his friction with Méatchi, led to a full-blown governmental crisis and the **Lomé uprising of 1966** that nearly toppled the regime. After the **1967 coup d'état**, Mama revolved in the outer perimeters of political power in Togo, serving as director of the **École Nationale d'Administration (ENA)**, training entry and middle level civil servants. A **Kotokoli Muslim** who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca, he assisted with the creation of the **Union Musulmane du Togo (UMT)** in 1963. In 1970, he sat—as a former minister of interior—on the **Cour de Sûreté** that tried the August **1970 coup** plotters and has been a member of the Political Bureau of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** in charge of political affairs. Mama was especially important to President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** because of his constructive role, at various stages, during the intensive schisms within the Togolese Muslim community. In 1970, he was virtually forced to take over the presidency of the community after the ouster of the former president and treasurer due to their autocratic mannerisms. Mama was reconfirmed in his office a year later but stepped down in 1972 in favor of **Kassim Mensah**, retaining honorary presidency status (granted to all former presidents), but he again had to mediate sharp cleavages internal to the community in succeeding years, before passing away in 1983. *See also* MÉATCHI-MAMA CRISIS.

MAMAH, FOUSSENI (1951–). Diplomat. Born in **Sansanne-Mango** in 1951, Mamah was educated in West **Germany** at the University of Saar and the University of Frankfurt, obtaining a PhD in Ethnology. After a brief stint in **Lomé** as the deputy head of the **Eyadéma Foundation** and the Institute of Political Studies, Mamah was appointed ambassador to Germany.

MAMIYABLE, LOLE. *See* COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF 1970.

MANGO. *See* SANSANNE-MANGO.

MANKOUBI, SANDANI BAWA (1938–2011). Economist, banking administrator, and administrative director of the Economy in the ministry of economics and finance. A **Moba** born near **Sansanne-Mango** in the north on 29 September 1938, Mankoubi obtained his professional training in Law and Economics at the University of Paris. Upon his return to Togo, he was appointed deputy governor of the **Banque Africaine de Développement (BAD)** (1964–1967) and administrator of the **Union Togolaise du Banque** (from 1964). After 1968 he was director general of the **Banque Togolaise de Développement (BTD)**, a member of the **Conseil Economique et Social (CES)**, and, in 1978, director of the Economy in the ministry of economics and finance. With the political liberalizations of the 1990s, Mankoubi became head of the **Union Togolaise pour la Rénouveau (UTR)** political party, aligned with **Gilchrist Olympio**.

MANUFACTURE TOGOLAISE DES PLASTIQUES (MTP). Company created in 1970 to manufacture shopping bags and other plastic products. Capitalized with ten million CFAF the company had a turnover of 36.7 million CFAF in 1979. It produced 60 to 70 tons of bags and had the capacity to manufacture 100 tons in its heyday, and some 15 percent of its products were routinely exported to neighboring states.

MARBLE. Marble and dolomite deposits found in Gnaoulou, 150 kilometers northwest of Lomé and Pagola, that have an estimated 20 million tons of reserves. To exploit these reserves, the mixed economy enterprise **Société Togolaise de Marbrerie et de Matériaux (SOTOMA)** was founded in 1968 with headquarters in **Lomé** and initial capitalization of 350 million CFA francs, two-thirds of which was state capital and the rest that of an Italian company. The company also produced bricks and ceramics, and its turnover was as much as 200 million CFAF. In the early days, it employed 350 workers and had an initial capacity of 25,000 tons yearly, augmented to 50,000 tons. Between 1968 and 1975, the **state** took a controlling stake in

the company, but it soon went bankrupt. The company was **privatized** and restructured in 1986 in cooperation with the company Norcem, Togo's share was reduced to 39 percent, and it was renamed the Nouvelle Société Togolaise de Marbrerie et de Matériaux (NOUVELLE-SOTOMA). Dissolved in 1991 after a slump in the international market, Togo's marble mining was relaunched in 2012 under the management of the **Société Pierres Ornementales et Marbres du Togo (POMAR-Togo)**, with the backing of Spanish interests and more recently the support of the **Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD)** and **Banque d'Investissement et de Développement de la CEDEAO (BIDC)**.

MARITIME. One of Togo's regions, with headquarters in **Lomé** and encompassing the **administrative** areas of Golfe, Lacs, Vo, Yoto, and Zio among others, and the urban communes of Lomé, **Aného**, and **Tsévié**. The Maritime is an area of great population density (more than 110 persons per square kilometer) and is Togo's most socially, economically, and politically developed region. The country's most important resource, **phosphates**, is found in the Maritime, as well as most industry and commercial enterprises. The **transportation** infrastructure of the region is dissected by the fully paved and scenic coastal highway that connects Lagos, Nigeria with Accra, **Ghana** via Porto Novo, Cotonou, Ouidah (all in **Benin**), Aného, and Lomé and is linked with the noncoastal areas by **railroads** and paved roads.

MARO. Strangers' quarters in northern Togo. Also known as wangara and **zongo**.

MAROIX, JEAN EUGENE PIERRE (1867–1942). **French** colonial officer. Born in Teret on 4 March 1867, Maroix was commissioned in 1893 and served in Madagascar, Senegal, and elsewhere before being sent to suppress the Holli revolt in Dahomey (now **Benin**). He later transferred his battalion to Savé by **rail** and marched overland into **German administered** Togo, conquering the Kamina radio station, an act that led to the German surrender of the colony to France. Named Commander of Togo in 1915, Maroix later saw action in several other countries and died in Nice in 1942.

MAWUPE VOVOR, VALENTIN. *See* VOVOR, VALENTIN.

MAWUSSI, EDIGBO EKELE. Former minister. A leader of the post-1990 **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)** political party, Mawussi was briefly minister of environment and tourism in Prime Minister **Joseph**

Koffigoh's third transitional government between 14 September 1992 and February 1993.

MAWUSSI, EPIPHANE AYI MAWUPE (1935–). International administrator and one-time diplomat. Born on 1 January 1935, Mawussi was educated locally and at the West Africa College in Accra, following which he attended a variety of universities, including Northwestern Polytechnic (London), London School of Economics, and the University of Paris, specializing in economics and banking. An intern (1961–1964) at the National Bank of Paris, Mawussi became a staff member of the bank in 1964 and in 1965 joined the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in Washington, DC, serving as an economic analyst of Third World Development Banks and as a loan officer. He resigned from IBRD in 1969 to join the Kez International company, a Montreal-based engineering advisory corporation. In 1970, he was appointed ambassador to the United States, but his tenure was equally brief, lasting a few months, following which he disappeared from both financial and public scenes.

MÉATCHI, ANTOINE IDRISOU (1925–1984). Former vice president of Togo. Born in Lama **Kara** to a branch of the **Sokodé** royal family on 23 September 1925, Méatchi was educated locally and abroad in Bamako, Mali, and **France** (1942–1953) in the field of tropical agriculture. Upon his return to Togo, he joined the civil service and was appointed deputy head of Agricultural Services, director of the Tové Farm School, and head of the Kloto Agricultural Promotion Project, all in the southern part of the country. A member of various northern conservative coalitions of chiefs and nobility supported by the **French administration** against the Ewe **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, Méatchi was selected by **Nicolas Grunitzky** to serve as his minister of agriculture (1956) and finance (1957) in the latter's **Autonomous Republic** administration. After the UN-supervised elections that toppled the Grunitzky regime, Méatchi was elected to the **Chambre de Députés** from Pagouda in the north. With Grunitzky's withdrawal from politics and relocation to Côte d'Ivoire, Méatchi became the de facto leader of their joint party, the **Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais (UDPT)**, which was a merger of Méatchi's **Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN)** and Grunitzky's **Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP)**. In the 1961 elections, Méatchi lost his parliamentary seat, was accused of plotting against the regime and arrested. Because of an administrative error in Kara (where he was being detained), he was able to slip across the border to Djougou, **Benin** and from there made his way to Accra, **Ghana** where he remained

in exile until the **1963 coup d'état**. While in Accra, he briefly headed the notorious Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs, becoming a militant. After the assassination of **Sylvanus Olympio**, Méatchi promptly came back to **Lomé** to claim the presidency. At the time, the inexperienced **Insurrectionist Committee** undoubtedly preferred to see a government formed by Méatchi, a northerner like themselves, over one by Grunitzky, who was also recalled from exile. France's opposition to Méatchi, and Grunitzky's unwillingness to serve under his former minister, tipped the balance against Méatchi, and a split executive government emerged with Grunitzky as president and Méatchi as vice president, in charge also of the portfolios of finance, economy, and planning. The constitutional arrangement was a disaster from the outset, for it threw together two mismatched personalities with contrary ideologies and styles of operation. The cautious and conservative Grunitzky clashed daily with the militant, ambitious, and abrasive Méatchi, whom he could not purge without causing a major governmental crisis. The continuous friction between the two men, Grunitzky's indecisiveness, and Méatchi's attempts to undermine his competitor led to the famous **Méatchi-Mama crisis**, the **attempted coup of November 1966** and, ultimately, to the **coup d'état of 1967**. After the November 1966 crisis, Méatchi was purged when Grunitzky passed a constitutional amendment abolishing the vice presidency; Méatchi was temporarily assigned to head the ministry of public works on 23 December 1966, three weeks before the coup d'état. Following the collapse of the Grunitzky government, many observers assumed that Méatchi would be elevated to power by the northern clique in the Army. Méatchi had, however, lost his credibility and support in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** and was not even included in the new cabinet of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Instead he was reappointed to his old professional post as director of Togo's Agricultural Services, serving in that capacity until 1978. For the next four years, he engaged in private commercial activity, but in 1982 Méatchi was ignominiously arrested and jailed for massive corruption during his long tenure as director of Agriculture at the **Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT)**. His purge was specifically demanded by French financial circles unwilling to pump additional funds into the ailing Togolese economy only to have them drained into the pockets of individuals such as Méatchi. Paradoxically, at the same time Méatchi's wife **Sheffi Méatchi** was elected to the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)** in 1979 and served on Eyadéma's cabinet. Imprisoned in the distant **Sansanne-Mango** prison under harsh conditions, according to Amnesty International Méatchi for all practical purposes was "executed" by torture, maltreatment, and starvation, dying in prison in March 1984 and not of a heart attack in 1987 as the Eyadéma regime originally maintained. Reliable sources have also claimed that Méatchi

was imprisoned less for his misdeeds than because he remained a threat to Eyadéma's increasingly beleaguered status in Lomé.

MÉATCHI, SHEFFI. Former secretary of state at the ministry of public health, in charge of social and women's affairs. Méatchi, who was **Antoine Méatchi's** wife, retained her governmental post despite her husband's arrest in 1982 for embezzlement while head of **Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT)**. She was also elected deputy to the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)** in 1979 and sat on several committees of the assembly. She was dropped from the cabinet in September 1984.

MÉATCHI-MAMA CRISIS OF 1966. Major cabinet crisis in November 1966 that led to the resignation of the last **Parti de l'Unité Togolaise (PUT)** delegates and ushered in the **attempted coup of 21 November 1966**. The crisis took place against the backdrop of the ongoing tug-of-war between President **Nicolas Grunitzky** and Vice President **Antoine Méatchi** and the long history of hostility between Méatchi and Grunitzky's loyal minister of interior, **Fousseni Mama**. During Grunitzky's absence in Paris, Mama informed the cabinet that his security forces had discovered that the anti-Grunitzky leaflets being distributed in **Lomé** were the handiwork of Méatchi. The latter immediately retaliated by suspending Mama from the cabinet, and only after Grunitzky's hurried return from Paris was a semblance of order established, with Mama downgraded to the ministry of education. Grunitzky's actions and unwillingness to purge Méatchi constituted the last straw for the PUT members in his cabinet who had been urging their more militant colleagues to cooperate with the Grunitzky regime. The day after they resigned from the cabinet, the country was rocked by the **Lomé upheaval of 1966** and, less than two months later, civilian rule came to an end in Togo.

MECKLEMBURG, ADOLF FRIEDRICH ZU (1873–1969). Last **German governor** (1912–1914) of Togo, prior to the surrender of the colony to French forces in 1914. Related to the Duke of Orleans, Mecklenburg was born in Schwerin on 10 October 1873. He participated in several expeditions in Central Africa and wrote two books on his travels. At age 86, he returned to Togo in 1960 to celebrate the country's independence. He died in his Holstein castle on 6 August 1969.

MEDIA. For a country that is small geographically and demographically, Togo has a vibrant media sector with over 400 newspapers registered 1998 to 2016, alongside 72 radio stations, and 10 television stations, according to the **Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication (HAAC)**. Many

private news sources have trouble sustaining their financing, making the media landscape fluid, and the government-run media outlets some of the most consistently available. These include the daily **Togo-Presse**, **Television Togolaise (TVT)** and **Radio Togo**. The organization Reporters without Borders ranks Togo 71st out of 180 countries of the world in press freedom, showing a slight improvement since the organization began including Togo in the list in 2013. As more of Togo's media moves online, Internet shutdowns during difficult political moments disrupt information access in Togo.

MEDEIROS, VICTOR DE (1932–). Diplomat and secretary general of the Foreign Ministry. Born in **Lomé** on 3 March 1932, Medeiros was educated locally and abroad at the universities of Strasbourg and Grenoble and at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies. Upon his return to Lomé, Medeiros was appointed director of the Department of Political Affairs and International Organizations in the Foreign Ministry (1963), and in 1966 he was sent to the United States as councilor at the Togolese embassy. In 1968, he was reassigned to the Paris embassy as First Councilor and Cultural Charge d'Affaires, and in 1974 he became secretary general of the ministry of foreign affairs in Lomé, finishing his career there.

MEDERSA DE LOMÉ. Early comprehensive **Muslim** school in **Lomé**. Constructed in 1965 with funds from Saudi Arabia, the Medersa was the first such school in Togo. In its first year, it enrolled 286 pupils, 150 of whom joined its primary section, with ten percent of the total student body coming from neighboring countries. Staffed originally by Egyptian teachers, over the years the student body has expanded, and the teachers were more likely to be Togolese. In 1983, for example, there were 423 students in the Medersa (15% from abroad) and the staff nearly all Togolese.

MÉMÉNE, COLONEL SEYI. Minister of interior in charge of Security from 1996. Méméne joined the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**—**Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** coalition cabinet of Prime Minister **Edem Kodjo** as an RPT member. Just prior to this appointment he had been director general of the National Police. Between 1986 and 1989 he had been President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s loyal head of security services after a period as director of Customs. In 1989, Méméne was implicated in the embezzlement of 500 million CFAF of funds connected with arms contracts and served 2 years in jail. He was rehabilitated in June 1991 to become director of Eyadéma's military cabinet before his further promotion in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, and he became minister of interior in 1996 under Prime Minister **Kwassi Klutse**. His loyalty to Eyadéma

was on full display in 1998 when the ministry of the interior took over the counting of **presidential election** ballots when early returns suggested Eyadéma might lose to **Gilchrist Olympio**. This intervention secured a victory for Eyadéma, but unleashed tensions and violence in Togo. Méméne moved to a new cabinet position as minister of justice in 2000 under Prime Minister **Agbéyomé Kodjo**, and went into retirement shortly after. He is often named among the “barons” of the RPT and military who promoted **Faure Gnassingbé**’s ascension to the presidency in the **succession crisis of 2005**.

MENSAH, KASSIM. Former ambassador and **Muslim** leader. Mensah is a Muslim dignitary of **Ewe** origins (which was unusual) who played a central role in helping create the **Union Musulmane du Togo (UMT)** in 1963. He served as the UMT’s secretary general between 1963 and 1970. In the latter year, he was elected the association’s vice president, and in 1972 he became president. During his presidency the very same charges he had leveled at prior executives (authoritarian leadership) were leveled against him; he was ousted from the association in 1976 and a year later dispatched by President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** to serve as Ambassador to **Libya**.

MENSAH, SABINE. One of the wives of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, and mother to President **Faure Gnassingbé**. Coming from the **Plateaux** region, Mensah’s influence was seen as both a benefit and drawback in the **succession crisis of 2005**—some thought Gnassingbé would better be able to bridge the ethnic divide in the country as a result, while others from the north were suspicious of her loyalties.

MERCENARY AFFAIR. *See* COUP (ATTEMPTED) OF OCTOBER 1977.

MESSAVUSSA, HERMANN (1932–). Former magistrate and political leader. Born in **Aného** on 14 May 1932 and a graduate of the University of Montpellier, Messavussa was an early leader of the **Juvento** party. He became apolitical in the 1960s and served as magistrate in the **Lomé** lower courts (1961–1963), minister of commerce and industry (1963), and judge on the Lomé Court of Appeals until his retirement.

METHODISTS. The oldest major **Protestant** proselytizing group still established in Togo. Commencing consistent activities along the coast in the middle of the 19th century under Thomas Birch Freeman and Thomas Joseph Marshall, the Methodist Church was especially established in Nigeria and **Benin** and limited its activities in Togo to the **Mina** and other coastal groups around

Aného. There the Church was assisted in its efforts by the **Lawson family**, which had family links with Freetown, Sierra Leone, then home base of the Methodist Church. In March 1888, Pastor Bryan Roe established himself in Aného and greatly expanded the church's **educational** and evangelical work. In 1930, the Methodist regional headquarters was shifted from Ahého to Cotonou, Benin—still subordinate to Lagos, Nigeria—though in 1957 a special district was created for efforts in the Lomé-Aného area. At that date the church counted 3,447 registered converts (with many more informal members) served by five pastors; there were also three schools (two in Aného and one in Lomé) with 727 pupils. The church suffered heavy attrition in membership as a result of the rise of the Prophet Harris movement in Côte d'Ivoire. Nevertheless, many of Aného's intellectuals (and hence a significant percentage of Togo's elite) are still members of the Methodist Church. Today the Methodist Church of Togo claims 45,000 adherents in 30 congregations, supporting educational and health care institutions. *See also* RELIGION; PROTESTANTS.

MINA. Collective name used to denote the **Ga** and **Ané** elements from El Mina (**Gold Coast**) that migrated to the **Aného** vicinity in the middle of the 17th century. The two groups founded **Glidji** and Aného. They adopted the **Ouatchi Ewe** dialect, adding to it traces of Ga. The Mina are today estimated at around 270,000 in Togo, and also are found along the coast from Lomé to Ouidah in Benin, many residing in the immediate vicinity of Aného and Porto Seguro. They form a very important percentage of Togo's commercial, intellectual, and political elite, their relatively small number notwithstanding.

MINA REPUBLIC. Term used by European cartographers and missionaries in the precolonial era to denote the decentralized polities along the **Aného** coast and its hinterland. The entities so referred were not always Mina nor exactly republican in political organization.

MINING. While **phosphates** represent the prime mineral export earner, Togo has considerable diversity in mineral resources and the exploitation of these resources is ongoing, with plans to expand. Limestone has been a feature of the mining sector almost as long as phosphates; Togo also produces **marble**. Other mined products that account for not insignificant parts of Togo's GDP are oil and **gold**, though Togo does not have commercial operations for these outputs.

Togo has large reserves of limestone, which are mined for the production of cement and clinker, especially for regional international export, including **Ghana**. West African Cement (Wacem) is a major player in the production,

as well as **Ciments du Togo or CIMTOGO** (a subsidiary of Heidelberg Cement Group). Indian and **Chinese** interests, including Diamant Cement and Chengdu Design and Research Institute of Building Materials Industry (CDI) work in cooperation with the Togolese government in this sector. Togo also has marble deposits (rivaling the quality of European marbles, according to the government) of approximately 20 million metric tons located at Pagala and Gnaoulou, exploited by the **Société Togolese de Marbrerie et Matériaux (SOTOMA)** from 1970 to 1991, and from 2012 by **POMAR-Togo**.

The production of gold and oil is far less straightforward. By some measures, gold is Togo's second largest export earner, though there are no commercial gold mines located on the territory. A Swiss nongovernmental organization (NGO) investigated this and found that gold from mines in Burkina Faso—often extracted under dire working conditions—was being **smuggled** into Togo and exported from there to sidestep oversight of the industry. The speculation that oil or natural gas reserves could be found in the West Africa region outside of Nigeria fuels periodic exploratory projects supported by the government, but Togo has not yet found a reliable source. Much like gold, however, crude oil reserves find their way into Togo's list of top exports, no doubt originating from Nigeria or other oil-producing neighbors.

MISAHOHE. Former **German** outpost on the Kpandu road, nine kilometers from **Kpalimé** in the Kloto prefecture. A **tourist** attraction because of its picturesque site at an altitude of 1,500 feet—dominated by the 2,900-foot Mount Kloto with its summit quinquina plantations—and relics of the bygone German era.

MIVEDOR, AYITE GACHIN ALEX (1927–2012). Former minister of public works, permanent director of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party, and for a long time the de facto number two civilian leader in the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime. He was born in **Aného** to **Mina** parents on 2 March 1917 and educated locally and at technical colleges in Bamako, Mali (1943–1947), Paris, and Toulouse (1947–1955), graduating as an electrical and hydraulic engineer. He then joined the Bamako Water Services, returning to Togo in 1958 to become head of the Electrical and Water Services division of the ministry of public works (1958–1966). A member of the militant Mali Youth Association while in Bamako (1956–1958), Mivedor joined the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** of **Sylvanus Olympio** in **Lomé** and supported **Nöe Kutakui** in the **attempted coup d'état of 1966**. After the collapse of the attempted takeover, Mivedor fled to Mali and only came back at General Eyadéma's invitation after the **1967 coup**. He was then appointed to the **Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN)** with responsibilities

for public works, later becoming the permanent deputy director of the RPT Politburo. After the establishment of Eyadéma's government in April of the same year, Mivedor was confirmed as minister of mines, energy, and hydraulic resources (later also of public works), a post he held until dropped from the cabinet in March 1979. He was retained in the RPT, with growing difficulty, until January 1983 when he too was purged—like so many of the Eyadéma “first team”—for corruption, embezzlement, and mismanagement of resources. His eclipse was not due to any revulsion with his acts within the government but due to insistence from abroad that a basic purge be carried out prior to any new development funds being committed. A detested figure in the south, his house was burned to the ground during the demonstrations calling for a **National Conference** in June 1991.

MLAPA III. Chief of the village of Togo, with whom **Germany** signed a protectorate treaty on 5 July 1884, giving them control over the coastal areas and eventually leading to the creation of the colony of Togo.

MOBA. Indigenous mountain ethnic groups living on the richer lands in the northern **Dapaong** area. Small Moba groups also reside in **Kara**, **Sansanne-Mango**, and **Lomé**. One of Togo's more homogenous ethnic groups, the Moba speak a **Gurma** dialect that is strongly influenced by the More **language** of Burkina Faso's Mossi people. Their total number has been estimated at almost 500,000. A tightly knit group, some Moba remain under the control of chiefs even in urban settings, who can send petty offenders or criminals back to their home villages as punishment, even from the anonymity of Lomé. (Of note is that **Emmanuel Bodjolle**, who challenged President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in the 1960s, was released by Eyadéma without hesitation to his home village, with the pledge of his village elders that he would not leave its confines.) In the multiparty era of the 1990s, the Moba have continued this support for **Ewe** leaders, standing behind **Gilchrist Olympio's** political aspirations, rather than the northerner Eyadéma.

MONGOYA, SEGNON K. (1953–). Author. Born in **Lomé** on 21 October 1953 and educated in **Catholic** schools, Mongoya has published several collections of folktales while holding a clerical post.

MONO RIVER. A 350-mile long river originating northeast of **Sokodé** and emptying in Grand Popo in the Gulf of Guinea. The river's last 100 miles are navigable and form part of the Togo-**Benin** border. Among the Mono's tributaries are the Ogou, Ofe, and Anié.

MONO RIVER PROJECT. Cooperative **Benin**-Togo effort in developing the resources of the **Mono River**. In 1978, an agreement was reached to build a hydroelectric dam at **Nangbeto** (on their joint border) with a capacity of 130 million kilowatts, reducing both countries' dependence upon **Ghanaian** electricity. Other dams, upstream of Nangbeto, have also since been commenced, under a master plan developed by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank.

MORAVIAN BROTHERS. Offshoot of the Unitas Fratrum (Unity of Brethren), the **Protestant** sect in Bohemia and Moravia that split from the Ultraquists in 1467 and after persecution became the origin of the Moravian Church and the Evangelical Czech Brethren Church. Under the leadership of Count Nikolaus von Zinzerdorf, the Moravian Brothers sponsored a number of early missionary efforts in Africa, including those of **Jacob Protten** in 1768 and 1770. Most of the efforts were unsuccessful due to **fetishist** opposition, hassles with commanders of the European forts and factories along the coasts, and the ravages of diseases.

MOSSI. Dominant Burkina Faso ethnic group. Small numbers of Mossi are found in Togo in the **Dapaong** area and further south as migrant **agricultural** labor.

MOUVEMENT DES FEMMES UNIR (MFU). Women's organization linked to the ruling **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party. The MFU replaced the Convention des femmes pour UNIR (CFU) when both the women's and youth party organs were "renewed" in 2017, in advance of the **2018 legislative election**. *See also* STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS.

MOUVEMENT DE LA JEUNESSE TOGOLAISE. Official founding name of the radical youth wing of **Sylvanus Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**. More commonly known as **Juvento**.

MOUVEMENT DES JEUNES UNIR (MJU). *See* STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS.

MOUVEMENT D'OCTOBRE 5 (MO-5). Ad-hoc name for the **youth movement** that sprang up in 1990 to resist by all means the continuation of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** dictatorship. It was named after the date of the first anti-Eyadéma demonstrations in 1990 and was at the forefront of all demonstrations and riots in **Lomé** of the early 1990s. The MO-5 spokesperson, Dovi

Ahlonko, announced the return of the members to Togo a few months after President Eyadéma's death in 2005.

MOUVEMENT DE REGROUPEMENT NATIONAL (MRN). Predecessor of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, declared in 1969 as the new single party of Togo. The MRN's constituent congress was held 28–30 November 1969, by which time the MRN's official name had been changed to the RPT.

MOUVEMENT ÉTUDIANT DE LUTTE POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE (MELD). Organization set up in 1990 among students to act as a pressure group for a return to multipartism in Togo. It was involved in all the anti-**Gnassingbé Eyadéma** demonstrations and riots in **Lomé** of the early 1990s.

MOUVEMENT NATIONAL DES ÉTUDIANTS ET STAGIAIRES TOGOLAIS (MONESTO). Successor to **Union Nationale des Étudiants Togolais (UNETO)**, following the latter's dissolution in October 1977 under charges of subversion against the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime. MONESTO was the sole union of Togo's student body until the liberalizations of 1990. *See also* STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS.

MOUVEMENT NATIONALISTE TOGOLAIS-JUVENTO. Electoral alliance between the militant **Juvento** party and the **Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais (UDPT)**, formed to contest the April 1961 elections in opposition to **Sylvanus Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**. The formation was disqualified, however, for allegedly not placing the required deposits on time. Its leaders were arrested shortly thereafter for an alleged plot, and Togo became a de facto one-party state.

MOVEMENT POPULAIRE TOGOLAIS (MPT). Political party founded by Dr. **Pedro Olympio** and his supporters after the 1951–1954 leadership struggle in the **Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP)**, in which Olympio lost out to **Nicolas Grunitzky** and was expelled. (The intraparty friction went back to 1951 when Olympio forces, dissatisfied with Grunitzky's overly conservative posture, expelled him.) When established, the MPT became Togo's fourth major party. Starting in 1961, **Sylvanus Olympio** began to eliminate sources of organized opposition, and the MPT and other parties were in due course dissolved. Following the **1963 coup d'état**, the MPT was resurrected under the leadership of **Samuel Aquereburu** (Pedro Olympio having taken on diplomatic duties) and participated in the four-cornered electoral and cabinet coalition of Nicolas Grunitzky that lasted until the second **coup in 1967**. With

the rise of the administration of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** all political parties, including the MPT, were banned.

MOUVEMENT POUR L'ÉPANOUISSEMENT DE L'ÉTUDIANT TOGOLAIS (MEET). Formed around 2011 at the time of student strikes at the **Université de Lomé**. Leader Abou Sedou later joined the pro-government youth movement.

MOUVEMENT TOGOLAISE POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE (MTD). Former Paris-based anti-Eyadéma “liberation” movement. Supported by **Brazilian** elements, both in Togo and in exile in **France**, the MTD was founded by the sons of **Sylvanus Olympio** in 1977 and led by **Gilchrist Olympio**. The MTD claimed responsibility for the **1977 attempted coup** in Togo. By 1985, however, the MTD was no longer under Gilchrist Olympio’s control.

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 2019. Long-anticipated municipal elections (the first in 32 years) were finally held 30 June 2019 in keeping with the ongoing **decentralization** reforms. An estimated 52 percent of the country’s 3.4 million eligible voters cast ballots for municipal councilors in nearly all 117 communes of Togo. With over 1,500 positions to fill on councils of various sizes, each municipal council then selected one of their members to serve as mayor. The ruling party **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** took the lion’s share of the seats with 895; **Jean-Pierre Fabre’s Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC)** came second with 134, and the opposition **Coalition De 14 (C14)** was the third largest with 131. Turnout was especially low in **Lomé** and elsewhere in the south. *See also* ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION.

MUSÉE NATIONAL DU TOGO. *See* PALAIS DE CONGRÈS DE LOMÉ.

MUSÉE PAUL AHYI. Financed by Togo’s famous artist and sculptor **Paul Ahyi**, the museum was inaugurated in 2011, one year after his death. Situated in the Cacavelli quarter of **Lomé**, the cultural space is designed to foster local and international artists interested in learning Ahyi’s techniques. Housed in modest quarters, the museum bears witness to the grand vision and sculpture of Ahyi, as well as pottery, tapestry, and jewelry.

MUSLIM. *See* ISLAM.

MUSTERKOLONIE. *See* GERMAN ADMINISTRATION.

N

NABÉDÉ, PAKAI ALEXANDRE (1930–). Former vice chancellor of the **Université de Benin**. Born in **Kara** in 1930, educated locally at **Sokodé** and at the Academie de Toulouse in Chemistry and Biology, Nabédé continued with medical studies in Toulouse and Morocco (1952–1960). He obtained his MD in 1960 and served as a physician in Morocco before returning to Togo in 1961 to become chief medical officer of the **Dapaong** district. A year later he was reassigned to **Lomé** and served in a wide variety of capacities, specializing further during several study trips abroad. From 1973 he was director of the National Medical Auxiliaries' School and, from 1975, vice chancellor of the Université de Benin.

NACHTIGAL, GUSTAV (1834–1885). **German** explorer, colonial administrator, and author. Better known for his extensive explorations in Central Africa from 1869 to 1875—about which he wrote his classic *Sahara and Sudan*—Nachtigal played a key role in the expansion of the German Colonial empire in West Africa by virtue of being the Imperial Commissioner that formally annexed Togo, Cameroon, and Luderitzland (Southwest Africa) in 1885. As far as Togo is concerned, Nachtigal—at that time consul in Tunis (from 1882 on), following his Central African exploits—was dispatched to West Africa to protect and expand the threatened German interests in the area, especially in Togo where elements of the **Lawson family** were appealing for British protection. Nachtigal arrived off the Togolese coast on board the *Mowe* gunboat with **Aného** hostages previously taken. On 4 July, he raised the German flag over Bagida (which became the temporary capital of German Togo) and later signed a treaty with **Chief Mlapa** of the small lagoon village of Togo that became the basis for the creation of German Togo. On 6 July, he named a provisional governor (an Aného French trader) to serve until von Falkenthal's arrival, and sailed off to Cameroon.

NANA, AWA DABOYA (1949–). Head of the **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)** in 1998, international mediator. Trained as

a jurist, Nana was one of the few **women** of her generation to teach law. She served as the president of Togo's Court of Appeals before being named president of the CENI to oversee the 1998 contest between **Gilchrist Olympio** and incumbent President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Nana and other members of the CENI were personally pressured and harassed as part of a larger campaign of intimidation by members of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** to stop the vote count that might embarrass Eyadéma if the results became known. Choosing to resign rather than endorse a fraudulent outcome, Nana's departure, along with several other CENI members, opened the way for the ministry of interior to take over the count, and shortly thereafter proclaim Eyadéma the winner. Nana went on to preside over the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** regional court in the 2010s. She also served on the committee charged with righting the wrongs of Togo's historical political violence, the **Haut-Commissariat à la Réconciliation et au Renforcement de l'Unité Nationale (HCRRUN)** from 2014, and has acted as Togo's lead international mediator.

NANA BENZ. Popular nickname for the **women** traders along the coast from Accra to Lagos, and especially in **Lomé**, after independence. They were highly successful businesswomen, as the "Benz" (from Mercedes Benz) signifies, who were indeed frequently driven around in their Mercedes Benz vehicles in the 1970s—the ultimate symbol of success in West Africa. The origins of the word "nana" are not established, though "na" can mean mother, and therefore signifies respect. As a group, they earned their wealth from trading in fabrics, there being incredible profits, for example, in retailing in Lomé's Grande Marché, **Assigamé**. They were courted by President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** for their political support, and he won their endorsement by making sure the cloth trade terms remained favorable for Togolese merchants, compared to the rest of the West Africa region. Though their power waned with the economic downturn of the 1980s, the so-called daughters of the Nana Benz like **Evelynne Trenou**, **Laura Doe Bruce**, and others in the Association **Professionnelle des Revendeuses de Tissus (APRT)**, carried on advocating for women in commerce during the political upheavals of the 1990s and beyond. *See also* REVENDEUSES.

NANGBETO. Site of a dam, 35 kilometers from **Atakpamé**, that regularizes the flow of the **Mono River**, irrigates 43,000 hectares of land, and generates 147 million kilowatts or 30 percent of the electricity need of the joint **Benin-Togo Compagnie Électrique du Bénin (CEB)** thus reducing dependence on **Ghanaian** electricity supplies. Construction on the dam, much delayed, began in 1984 and was completed in 1988 when it was inaugurated. The

project included 147 kilometers of high-tension lines carrying electricity to the national grid, and a dike 450 meters long and 50 meters at its highest point, creating a lake of 180 square kilometers. The cost of the dam—34 million CFAF—was less than originally anticipated.

NANJA, GENERAL ZAKARI. Chief of Staff of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, who appeared publicly to announce the death of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and suspension of the **constitution** in 2005. He was removed from his post after the **2009 coup attempt** headed by **Kpatcha Gnassingbé**, taking over the ministry of water and sanitation but shuffled out of government altogether in 2012.

NAPO, NYANDI SEYBOU ALEXIS (1939–). Former minister of labor and the civil service. Born in 1939 in Kabou-Tinalende (near **Bassar**) and of **Bassari** ethnic origins, Napo was educated locally and in Paris at the Institut des Hautes Études d'Outre Mer. He was attached to the ministry of foreign affairs between 1963 and 1967 and, after the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** takeover in 1967, he became head of the Pagouda Administrative District. In October 1968, he was named First Secretary at the embassy of Togo in **France**, he served in Paris for two years, returning to administrative duties in Togo in 1970 as head of the **Sotouboua** Administrative District, but in 1972 he was again called to undertake diplomatic duties, this time as ambassador to Zaire. He was repatriated in 1975 and briefly headed the **Bafilo** Administrative District before being named Togo's ambassador to France. Upon his return from Paris in 1980, he joined Eyadéma's cabinet as minister of labor and the civil service and in July 1985 was appointed ambassador to Germany. With the liberalizations of 1990, he was recalled to **Lomé** to head a division in the ministry of foreign affairs.

NATCHABA, FAMBARE OUATTARA. Former cabinet minister and parliamentarian. A northern administrator and law professor at the **Université de Benin**, Natchaba served as director of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s cabinet but fell from grace over a clouded incident and fled to Paris in 1981 for fear of his life. He was ultimately persuaded to return to **Lomé** and was given an administrative appointment in the ministry of interior. After the liberalizations of 1990 he became General Eyadéma's personal advisor on legal matters. In September 1992, he was appointed **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** minister of foreign affairs in the coalition under interim Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh**, where he served until his election to the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in 1994. A staunch defender of the RPT, Natchaba not only won a seat, he also rose to serve as president of the AN by 2000. He was still

serving in that post, though traveling abroad, when he was reportedly ordered home by President Eyadéma in early 2005. Natchaba declined to return, perhaps suspecting that he would be asked to resign his position in favor of the president's son, **Faure Gnassingbé**. Because the AN President is next in line in the order of succession, whoever held that post would, according to the 1992 **constitution**, have been legally elevated to interim president upon the death of Eyadéma. However, Natchaba's maneuvering to resist the pressure to resign did not scuttle the plan in favor of Gnassingbé. Instead, with Natchaba still out of the country at the moment of the president's death, the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** closed the borders, suspended the constitution, and declared Gnassingbé president of the republic, expected to serve out his father's term. Eager now to return home and claim his position as interim president, Natchaba's flight was rerouted from Europe to Cotonou, **Benin** as a result of the border closing, and by the time he was able to re-enter Togo, he had been supplanted as head of the AN by Gnassingbé in a late-night vote. When international pressure forced Gnassingbé to resign as president in favor of elections, the then vice president of the AN, **Abass Bonfoh**, became interim president of the republic, much to Natchaba's outrage. Though Natchaba remained a member of the RPT under Gnassingbé, the suspicion and bitterness aroused by this incident has prevented him from taking on the most responsible posts. *See also* SUCCESSION CRISIS OF 2005.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE. *See* CONFÉRENCE NATIONALE SOUVERAINE (CNS).

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 2018–2022. Adopted by the Togolese government in 2018, the Plan Nationale de Développement (PND) has three main goals: to help make Togo a financial and business center, to boost **agriculture**, industry and **mining**, and to “reinforce mechanisms of inclusion” with respect to society. The latter appears to mean not only refurbishing some towns and better providing electricity, but also to create a system of biometric identification, termed e-ID Togo, for every citizen. The goal of the plan is to increase the growth rates of the national economy to 6–7 percent each year.

NATIONAL FORESTS/NATIONAL PARKS. Starting from colonial times but redefined and expanded since independence, several areas have been set aside as national forests and/or parks. These currently include (1) the **Parc National de Fazao-Malfakassa** with 192,000 hectares in the **Centrale** region, managed by the Foundation Franz Weber; (2) the newest animal reserve of **Sarakawa** in the region of **La Kara**; and the Oti Reserve

and **Parc National de la Keran**, the largest at almost 3,500 square kilometers combined.

NIAMTOUGOU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. *See* AIRPORTS.

NOUPOKOU, DAMMIPI. Government minister. Prime Minister **Komlan Mally** first named him minister of mines from 2007, a post he held until 2015. Noupokou oversaw the important transition from the **Office Togolais de Phosphates (OTP)** to the new **Société Nouvelle de Phosphates (SNPT)**, which began operations in 2008. During his tenure, Togo also began mining **marble** again under the name **POMAR-Togo** in 2012, and he briefly took on the **transportation** portfolio that year, as well in the government of **Kwesi Ahomey-Zunu**. In 2019, Noupokou was named director general of the newly created state Agence Education Développement (AED) designed as one of several government structures supporting the **agricultural** sector.

NOUVELLE INDUSTRIE DES OLEAGINEAUX DE TOGO (NIOTO). The new name for **Industrie Oléagineux du Togo (IOTO)**, the former state-owned company producing cooking oil from **cotton**, soy and karité seeds, **privatized** in 1987. Deficitary when part of the **state sector**, once majority ownership (51% equity) passed into **French** (Compagnie Française pour le développement des fibres textiles [CFDT], later Group Geocoton) hands, the workforce was fully halved while production soared from the processing of 1,000 tons total in 1987 to 340 tons a day in 1990. Today the oil is sold commercially under the brand name Queens, and the company's factory is situated at the **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)**.

NOMENYO, SETH. Postindependence secretary general of the **Ewe Evangelical Church** of Togo. Of **Mina** origins, Nomenyo was educated locally before seeking further Theological studies in Cameroon and **France**. He was named secretary general of the church in 1961.

NORDDEUTSCHE MISSIONGESELLSCHAFT. *See* BREMEN MISSIONARY SOCIETY.

NOTSÉ. Historically important **Ewe** town 100 kilometers north of **Lomé** and 67 kilometers from **Atakpamé**. Located in the **Plateaux** region in the prefecture of Haho, of which Notsé is the headquarters. The name Notsé (changed in the mid-1970s from the colonial Nuatja) derives from the words Ihoua-tche ("I want to stay here under the tree"). The town was founded late in the 17th century by Afetche—from Afotchegnon ("we have made a good

journey”)—following the **Adja**-Ewe trek from **Tado**. Afotche’s son was King **Agokoli**, whose arbitrary and cruel reign led to the major Adja-Ewe dispersal from Notsé, still celebrated throughout the region in the **Hogbetsotso** festival. The town (pronounced “Notsieis” by the Ewe) thus has a special role in Ewe traditions and lore and is also referred to in oral history as Amedzofe (“place of origin”), Glime (“in the walls”), Agbogbome (“in the gates”), and so on. A large number of legends recount the Ewe dispersal in 1720, done in the middle of the night in order not to alert Agokoli to the desertion of a segment of his people. The **Be** clan remained last, beating drums to cover the noise of the mass departure and then forming the rear guard to scatter millet over their tracks, which pigeons picked up, further obliterating signs of the exodus. (For this reason, pigeon meat is still taboo among the Be.) The clans went off in three directions: west (establishing the town of Ho, among others); south (to found **Lomé**, Agouéve, and Bagida), and northwest. Several years later another migration occurred after a bad drought. The new settlers (most of whom went south) were called **Ouatchi**—coming from Notsé—which acquired a pejorative sense.

NOUVEL ENGAGEMENT TOGOLAIS (NET). Political party founded in 2012 by retired **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)** officer **Gerry Taama**. The party joined the **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel** to contest the **legislative elections of 2013**, but NET did not win any of the coalition’s six seats. The party supported Taama in his unsuccessful **presidential bid in 2015**, when he won just over 1 percent of the national vote. In 2018, the NET won three seats in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**, making it the third largest party after the **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** with 59 and the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)** with seven. However, given the UFC’s loss of legitimacy by cooperation with UNIR since 2010, NET was arguably positioned as the largest opposition party, joining forces with the **Parti Démocratique Panafricain (PDP)** in a parliamentary bloc. Taama was again nominated by NET in 2019 to contest the **2020 presidential elections**, but he withdrew his bid just before the deadline to be considered an official candidate.

NOUVELLE MARCHE, LA. The “New Road,” name of **Togo-Presse** from 1979, when the **Third Republic** came into effect, until the **Fourth Republic**, when it returned to the name Togo-Presse. “La Nouvelle Marche” was the rallying cry of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime, referring to his alleged nonethnic approach, an alternative to the infighting of the pro-1967 period. At its height the daily sold some 10,000 copies. After the liberalizations of 1990 and the sprout of various other nongovernmental papers, sales fell

dramatically to around 2,000 copies, though the subsidized paper cost only 30 CFAF compared to the average 250 CFAF of the independent press at the time. In the 2000s circulation was estimated at 8,000 copies per day. The hashtag #TogoEnMarche was used satirically by protesters during the **street demonstrations of 2017–2018** as part of their mobilization efforts.

NOUVELLE SOCIÉTÉ COTONNAIRE DU TOGO (NSCT). Replaced **Société Togolaise du Coton (SOTOCO)** as the main **cotton** enterprise in Togo in 2009. Aiming to correct problems with previous structures governing this important **agricultural** sector, the NSCT is 60 percent government owned and 40 percent owned by a cooperative of cotton growers. It was supported by a World Bank grant of US\$ 20 million for reform of several commodities, including cotton, the year of its formation. NSCT embarked on a strategy of increasing prices paid to farmers to incentivize increased yields over time. The growth has not been consistent with price, however, as weather and **smuggling** can still contribute to output levels independent of grower incentives. Togo produced 120,000 tons of cotton in 2016, and the 2 billion FCFA business is still dogged by allegations of fraud and mismanagement, and so far unable to return production levels to the highs experienced in the late 1990s, when output was closer to 200,000 tons.

NOUVELLE SOCIÉTÉ TOGOLAISE DE MARBRERIE ET DE MATÉRIAUX (NOUVELLE-SOTOMA). *See* MARBLE.

NOVISSI. **State sector** program launched in April 2020 to redistribute income via mobile phone transfers to the most vulnerable Togolese living in **Lomé** during the **coronavirus** pandemic. Novissi means “solidarity” in the **Ewe language**, and the program is designed to support the essential needs of workers in the large informal sector of the economy. These workers are most likely to lose their sources of income due to curfews and social distancing measures necessary to limit the spread of the virus. By May 2020, more than 1.3 million Togolese had registered for the program, according to the official government website, with 558,000 beneficiaries (of which 365,000 were **women**) receiving over 8 billion FCFA in disbursements. In May the program was expanded to include the prefecture of Tchoudjo, which includes the town of **Sokodé**, which had suffered a spike in cases of the virus. The program has been hailed by some economists as a good example of a universal basic income program representing comprehensive government action in the face of crisis.

NUATJA. *See* NOTSÉ.

NYATÉPÉ COO, DJODJI AKOLY (1942–). Academic. A Togolese born in Nigeria on 19 May 1942, NyaTépé Coo was educated at the University of Paris in Sociology with specialization in Demography. He was a professor of sociology at the **Université de Benin**, later **Universite de Lomé** and is the author of a number of studies of African Demography.

N'ZARA. Name of **Sansanne-Mango** by the **Chokossi** founders of the An-ufo kingdom, and conquerors of the town of Kundyuku, that was renamed N'zara.

O

OCAM and OCAMM. *See* ORGANISATION COMMUNE AFRICAINE, MALGACHE ET MAURITANIENNE.

OCAM VILLAGE. One-time elaborate housing complex built on the eastern approaches to Lomé for the 1972 Heads of State meeting of the **Organisation Commune Africaine, Malgache et Mauritanienne (OCAM)**. The complex included 16 double villas that could be transformed into 32 adjoining suites of international luxury class hotel status, with a total capacity of 216 rooms. While used to house important international delegations, the OCAM Village also doubled as a hotel in its heyday. In the 1970s, this luxury complex alone consumed fully 25 percent of **Lomé's** electricity. The suites were decorated by the well-known Togolese artist **Paul Ahyi** and others. However, over time there was not enough capacity to maintain the hotel, and it fell into disrepair and was closed in the 1990s. The name now serves as a description of the neighborhood and point of reference for giving drivers much needed directions in the sprawl of the capital. *See also* SOCIETE TOGOLAISE DE L'HOTELLERIE (STH).

OFFICE DES POSTES ET TÉLÉCOMMUNICATIONS DU TOGO (OPTT). State-run post office and phone company, established in 1985 and replacing the older state-run entity dubbed the PTT, for Postes, Telephones, Telegraphs. The OPTT functioned as one unit until 1995, when as part of a larger administrative reform of the **state sector**, it was broken up into two entities: the **Société des Postes du Togo (SPT)** and the **Société des Télécommunications du Togo (Togo Telecom)**. The former has remained the main postal service for Togo since that time, though Togo Telecom has undergone a number of additional changes to accommodate the changing nature of telephone service and mobile communications. *See also* TOGOCEL; TOGOCOM.

OFFICE DES PRODUITS AGRICOLES DU TOGO (OPAT). **State sector** purchasing and exporting monopoly for **coffee, cocoa, cotton**, peanuts,

palm oil, karité, and other **agricultural** products. Established on 22 June 1964, OPAT was also given the function of stabilizing and controlling local prices, granting loans for agricultural projects, and conducting research on methods that could yield higher productivity. OPAT essentially took over the functions performed previously by the Togolese Caisses de Stabilisation, and the group was supervised by the ministry of trade and industry. Throughout the years, several crops have either been added or removed from its sphere of control, reflecting the need for either greater centralization or more specialized agencies. It was privatized in 1996.

OFFICE NATIONAL DES ABATTOIRS ET FRIGORIFIQUES (ONAF). State-run organization set up in September 1975 with funds from Togo's then booming **phosphate** exports, charged with centralizing and coordinating beef supplies and slaughterhouses in Togo. ONAF was one of the first of the deficitary state companies dissolved in 1984 in accord with the 1982 **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** edict that decimated the **state sector**.

OFFICE NATIONAL DE DÉVELOPPEMENT ET EXPLOITATION DES FORÊTS (ODEF). Specialized state agency set up on 26 October 1971, with the help of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and operative from February 1973, at first under the ministry of rural economy. ODEF is in charge of research, reforestation, development, exploitation, and export of Togo's timber resources. Headquartered in **Lomé**, and employing 141 people, the agency (now supervised by the ministry of the environment) boasts having reforested 19,500 ha throughout the five regions of Togo.

OFFICE NATIONAL DES PÊCHES (ONP). State group set up to develop the Togolese fishing industry. There has always been a small but vibrant indigenous fishing industry in Togo, at various times organized into cooperatives, sometimes linked to ethnicity. In the 1960s and 1970s, their centralization and modernization was regarded by the government as of prime priority of the ONP in order to augment the protein supplies of the country. In 2007, it was estimated that fishing employed 10,000 Togolese directly, with another 15,000 working retail sales or fish farming. The ONP responsibilities were absorbed into various directorates of the agricultural ministry, or Ministère de l'Agriculture, de la Production Animale et Halieutique (MAPAH), as of 2012.

OFFICE NATIONAL DES PRODUITS VIVRIERS (ONPV or TOGOGRAIN). State company set up to market staple food products in

Togo. Its activities were limited to the **agricultural** sector, namely maize, sorghum, millet, and rice. In order to stabilize prices, TOGOGRAIN purchased stocks of these grains at the time of harvest and stockpiled them in silos as a hedge against droughts or shortages. Under the leadership of **Antoine Méatchi**, audits of the company in 1982 showed extremely poor financial accounting procedures and evidence of embezzlement, for which Méatchi was arrested. The major scandal that erupted after these revelations did further damage to Togo's deficit-ridden **state sector** and added a boost for its **privatization**.

OFFICE NATIONAL DU DEVELOPPEMENT DE L'ELEVAGE (ON-ADEC). State group set up in 1976 to aid and develop Togolese stockbreeding and to serve as a conduit of supplies for the **Office National des Abattoirs Frigorifiques (ONAF)**.

OFFICE REGIONALE POUR LA POPULATION DES PRODUITS VIVIERIS (ORPV). Series of state organizations set up in each prefecture replacing the **Sociétés Régionales de Développement et d'Amenagement (SORAD)** organizations that previously performed much the same task. Two years later, under the ORPVs the "**Green Revolution**" commenced.

OFFICE TOGOLAIS DES PHOSPHATES (OTP). State agency created on 10 January 1974, to market Togo's **phosphates** after the nationalization of **Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Benin (COTOMIB)**. Positioned under the general supervision of the minister of finance and the economy, OTP was the key economic force in Togo in view of the importance of phosphate exports in the national economy until 2001. However, production continued to fall throughout the 1990s as facilities degraded and officials in the OTP were accused of mismanagement. The sector was not able to attract new investment to repair and modernize facilities and boost production, prompting restructuring of 2001 when the OTP was replaced by **International Fertilizers Group Togo (IFG-Togo)**—named and advertised in English rather than French, as an invitation to a wider range of international investment. However, the underlying problems remained in the sector until the 2010s.

OGMA YAGLA, WEN'SAA. Educator, graduate of Algiers University in the field in Public Administration. Ogma Yagla was an Instructor at the **Université de Benin**, later **Université de Lomé**, where was head of the division of Judicial and Administrative Studies. He has written several articles and books, including *l'Edification de la Nation Togolaise* in 2004.

OHIAMI, KOKOU CONSTANTIN (1942–). Diplomat. Born on 13 December 1942, in Amou-Oblo and of **Akposso** origins, Ohiami studied at the University of Toulouse (1963–1967) and at the University of Paris (1967–1968), following which he was appointed director of the Cultural and Personnel Division of the Foreign Ministry. In 1970, he became deputy head of the Conferences section in the Ministry and between 1970 and 1972 he was assistant director of its Economic Division. In 1972, he was shifted to active diplomatic duties by an appointment to Togo's Mission in Geneva, Switzerland.

OHIN, ALEXANDRE JOHN. Surgeon and diplomat. Born in **Aného** on 20 March 1920, Ohin studied at Dakar's School of Medicine, and practiced in Togo for ten years (1943–1953). After further studies in the United States he served as Resident Surgeon at the Washington University School of Medicine (1954–1960) and later as research fellow at New York's Albert Einstein College of Medicine (1960–1961), before returning to **Lomé** to become chief surgeon of Togo's National Hospital (1961–1967). A member of **Sylvanus Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, Dr. Ohin was involved in the **1966 Lomé upheaval** against the successor regime of **Nicolas Grunitzky** and was briefly imprisoned after the coup failed. After the **1967 coup**, he served on the **Comité de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN)** with responsibility for the health portfolio, and in June 1967 was appointed ambassador to the United States, the United Nations, and Canada. He served as vice president of the 23rd General Assembly of the United Nations and relinquished his diplomatic duties in 1971, returning to his medical post in Lomé.

OHIN, ELLIOT (1951–). Vice president of the **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)**, government minister from 2010. A fuel trader who spent 15 years living in the United States, Ohin served at **Gilchrist Olympio's** right hand in the UFC organization, sticking by him when Olympio negotiated a partnership with President **Faure Gnassingbé** after the 2010 presidential election. Ohin was rewarded with the post of minister of foreign affairs which he held for three years, but after having limited impact he was shuffled sideways in 2013 into the newly created ministry of state reform. From 2015 he had no portfolio at all, but was retained at the cabinet level in the government of **Komi Kllassou**, apparently to remain a visible sign of the cooperation between the UFC and ruling **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party.

OHIN, JACOB. Togolese painter whose pioneering work and assistance to budding painters has created a new generation of artists in Togo, including **Adambounou Dabla**.

OKOULOU-KANTCHATI, ISSIFOU (1951–2016). Government minister. Born in **Mango** and educated in **France** in economics, Okoulou-Kantchati joined the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** in 1977. However, with liberalization in the early 1990s, he became head of the **Alliance des Démocrates pour la République (ADR)**, and served on the transition **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)**. Before the **legislative elections of 1999** he rejoined the RPT and was elected to represent the Oti prefecture in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**, and reelected in 2002. In 2003, he began his ministerial career, serving first as minister of energy and water and in successive governments as minister of Environment and Urbanism through 2008. At the time of his death, he was working on a national commission to **privatize Togolese banks**.

OLYMPIO, BONITO HERBERT (1933–1994). One of **Sylvanus Olympio**'s sons. Bonito Olympio was born on 1 April 1933, and studied engineering. He left Imperial College (London) in 1955 to join his father's company, Unilever, first in London, later in Accra, **Ghana**, as sales manager. His entrepreneurial talent brought him to the attention of Enrico Mattei who appointed him managing director of Agip in Togo and **Benin**. After his father's assassination, Bonito went to Guinea where he worked for some time with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Allegedly the most important financial contributor to the several plots aimed at unseating President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, he was arrested and spent some time in jail in both Conakry and Cotonou. In May 1969, he was expelled from Ghana (where he had gone to reside with his mother), and set up residence in Paris and Abidjan, though he returned to Accra several years later. In August 1979, the Eyadéma regime sentenced him to death in absentia (together with his brother **Gilchrist Olympio**) for his role in the **1977 attempted coup**. While living in Accra, Bonito Olympio suffered a mild heart attack in December 1993, and died of the same cause on 25 August 1994. His funeral was attended by the vice president of Ghana and condolences were received from several heads of state.

OLYMPIO, ELPIDO (1940–). Architect and one of **Sylvanus Olympio**'s sons. Born in **Lomé** on 5 August 1940, and educated locally and at Achimota College (**Ghana**, 1952–1960), Princeton (1960–1965), and Cornell Universities (1965–1967). Olympio married Marie, daughter of Ivory Coast's President Houphouët-Boigny, though they later divorced.

OLYMPIO, GILCHRIST (1936–). Opposition party leader and presidential candidate. One of **Sylvanus Olympio**'s sons and for many years prime seeker of revenge against his murderer, General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**.

Trained in Britain in Economics and a businessman sometimes based in Paris, Olympio was involved in several attempts to unseat the Eyadéma regime in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1977, he was a prime financier of a **mercenary plot** that had to be aborted, and in 1983 and again in 1987 he was implicated in plots to import assassins to **Lomé** to kill Eyadéma, for which he was twice sentenced to death in absentia. Forced to leave **France** (because it was supportive of Eyadéma), Olympio—who in 1977 in Paris had set up the Mouvement Togolaise pour la Démocratie (MTD) with the support of his brothers and members of the **De Souza** family—relocated to London where he was a part time lecturer at the London School of Economics.

During the liberalization of the 1990s, Olympio returned to Togo after 25 years of exile to participate in the **National Conference** and was greeted by several thousand supporters. His first speech before the conference electrified the audience; in it he called for a new agenda for Togo and not for revenge against Eyadéma. The latter's ouster was, however, assumed, since the National Conference stripped Eyadéma of all executive powers and barred him from running for office again. Olympio then set up a political organization to further his goals, the **Union des Forces pour le Changement (UFC)**. At the conference he threw his support behind **Joseph Koffigoh**, assuring the latter's election as interim prime minister, a post supposedly for only one year until new elections were held. His insistence that Eyadéma vacate the **Presidential Palace** at all costs led to attempts on his life by **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** units loyal to Eyadéma, one of which—in the midst of an electoral campaign in the northern Assoli prefecture on 5 May 1992—assaulted his motorcade. Olympio was seriously wounded and evacuated to Paris where he spent six months under treatment.

In 1993, Olympio, then the most popular and powerful politician of Togo, was excluded by Eyadéma from contesting the August **1993 presidential elections**, on the grounds that Olympio had not properly tendered the necessary medical certificate attesting to his good health, and this led to an electoral boycott of several other southern leaders who had considered contesting the elections. The result was that Eyadéma's "victory" of a huge majority, and Olympio's UFC boycotted the **legislative elections of 1994** as well. In 1998, Eyadéma and the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party adjusted the rules to make Olympio eligible again, in hopes of restoring foreign aid from **donors**. When Olympio appeared poised to win, however, the ballot counting was interrupted and the ministry of the interior took over, declaring Eyadéma the winner of the **presidential election of 1998**.

Though supported by thousands of party members and the rest of the opposition leadership who could see clearly the machinations, from this point forward Olympio's strategy was harder to discern, and his behavior more

unpredictable. Always high-handed and carrying the banner of the radical opposition, Olympio had never gotten along with the more moderate opposition figure **Edem Kodjo**, a fellow **Ewe**, because he saw him as a collaborationist too close to France. Olympio also seemed to see himself as a “first among equals” among the opposition, demanding separate meetings during international mediation attempts rather than working in concert with others, or having a deputy sign for the UFC rather than risk sully his own name in case the agreement ultimately went nowhere. And yet, Olympio did not appear above negotiating a separate deal in the aftermath of elections: during the **2005 presidential elections** (in which Olympio did not stand, but the UFC vice president **Emmanuel Akitani-Bob** did, in his place), Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo announced he had brokered a deal for the UFC to take seats in a unity government, no matter what the ballot outcome, but Olympio denounced the deal publicly in the face of a backlash from his own supporters. He supported UFC members running for **legislative seats in 2007**, winning more than any other party, but Olympio appeared to have been hoodwinked by the appearance of free and fair elections that masked new **electoral system** structures for the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** that overrepresented the north. Moreover, the gentleman’s agreement between President **Faure Gnassingbé** and Olympio (who appeared to personally get on well) that would have allowed the UFC to have control over the AN executive was undermined by deputies of the RPT, and the UFC was left in a position of appearing to collaborate with the ruling party, a fate it had avoided for years.

Olympio appeared to miscalculate again in 2010: he was eligible and expected to run head-to-head in the **presidential election** against Gnassingbé, which in popular imagination would have the two sons play out the rivalry between the two fathers. But Olympio failed to return to Togo in time for the physical exam required of candidates, citing back pain, and his UFC Vice President **Jean-Pierre Fabre** appeared on the ballot instead. Olympio’s support for Fabre seemed lukewarm, but Fabre’s appeal with younger opponents of the RPT was strong. Gnassingbé’s official victory was decisive, whereupon Olympio opted to forge a solo agreement with the RPT to share power in a unity government just weeks after the election. Many UFC members were shocked and outraged that he acted without consultation and in defiance of postelection efforts to protest the outcome and defend the UFC’s candidate, while members of other opposition political parties considered it rank treason. An ugly split in the UFC followed, in which security forces of the FAT found themselves in the unusual position of defending the UFC by cracking down on supporters of Fabre’s faction, and Olympio pushed for the removal of former UFC AN deputies who had split from the party. When the dust settled, Olympio retained leadership of the UFC and support of a core

following, while Fabre and his sympathizers went on to form the **Alliance National pour le Changement (ANC)**. Olympio's miscalculation was evident in the sharp drop in the UFC's fortunes in electoral contests since then, winning only three seats (a loss of 24, even as the AN size increased overall by ten seats) in the **legislative election of 2013** and just seven in the **election of 2018**. Olympio is now sidelined in Togolese politics, occasionally speaking out in the press but no longer carrying the mantle of the opposition as he once did.

OLYMPIO, HARRY OCTAVIANUS. Cousin of **Gilchrist Olympio**, former minister for the Promotion of Democracy and the Rule of Law. Olympio traded on the recognizability of the family name when President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** appointed him to the cabinet in **1998**, after the disastrous **presidential elections**, to help give the appearance that not all in the opposition were excluded. In 2001 he was appointed head of the Comité Paritaire de Suivi (CPS), tasked to implement an accord between the government and opposition, but it was ultimately unsuccessful. He also formed the Rassemblement pour le Soutien de la Démocratie et du Développement (RSDD), which won three seats in the **2002 legislative elections**, though the elections were boycotted by what became known as the "legitimate" opposition. In 2006, Olympio was sought by authorities in connection with a bomb attack on a police station—he fled the country and has lived in exile since.

OLYMPIO, LUCIEN. Lawyer. As an attorney, Olympio, one of **Sylvanus Olympio's** sons, served as General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** envoy to **Nœ Kutaklui**—Sylvanus' brother-in-law—to invite the latter to return from exile in **Ghana** in **1967 after the coup d'état** of that year. Olympio served as attorney general to the **Supreme Court** between 1966 and 1970. In 1970, he was downgraded to technical counselor at the ministry of civil service after he expressed, together with other lawyers, dissatisfaction with the manner in which the plotters of the August **1970 conspiracy** were being tried. Though the other lawyers were later reinstated to their former positions, Olympio was not, and he left the country for Paris shortly after.

OLYMPIO, PEDRO (1898–1969). Founder and leader of the **Parti Togolais du Progress (PTP)** and, after his expulsion from the latter, of the **Mouvement Populaire Togolais (MPT)** and former ambassador to West Germany. Born in **Lomé** on 28 May 1898, Dr. Olympio was educated locally, in **Steyl** (Netherlands), and in Germany, following which he completed his medical studies in Munich, Hamburg, and Paris, returning to **Lomé** to open a private clinic and to practice surgery. Sylvanus Olympio's cousin, Pedro Olympio

linked up with **Nicolas Grunitzky** in 1946 to form Togo's second political party (after the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise [CUT]**), the pro-French and French-supported PTP. The party was composed mostly of French officials, citizens, and évolués and was favored by the local administration over Sylvanus Olympio's CUT. From 1951 to 1955 the party suffered a major schism in its leadership over the PTP's conservative stance and loss of electoral support, a schism that resulted first in the expulsion from the party of Secretary General Grunitzky and then his comeback and the expulsion of Dr. Olympio. In 1955, Olympio set up a new party, the MPT, but the party fared poorly at the polls, declined rapidly in importance, and was banned, as were other parties, after the imposition of one-party rule in 1962. Dr. Olympio himself became a representative (of Africa) on the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) in 1958, and between 1964 and 1968 he served as Togo's ambassador to West Germany.

OLYMPIO, SYLVANUS EPIPHANIO (1902–1963). Former president of Togo, founding member of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** and nationalist leader. Born in **Lomé** on 6 September 1902, to an influential **Brazilian** family. Olympio was educated locally, at the University of Vienna, and at the London School of Economics. Returning to Lomé in 1926, he joined the then largest commercial firm, the United Africa Company (UAC), and served with it in Nigeria (1926–1928), **Gold Coast** (1928), and Togo (1928–1938), becoming its general manager for Togo and a prosperous merchant himself. A founding member of the pro-French **Cercle des Amitiés Françaises** and later the CUT, Olympio was imprisoned in 1942 by the local Vichy regime (in Djougou, Benin) and only returned to Togo after de Gaulle's rise to power. In 1946, he led his young party to victory at the polls for the **Assemblée Représentative du Togo (ART)** and became the Assembly's president (1946–1952). His involvement in the pan-Ewe unification movement and links with the **All-Ewe Conference** in the Gold Coast and British Togoland and his various petitions to the United Nations against the local **French administration** brought him into a collision course with France in the late 1940s. The local administration engineered his relocation to the Paris branch of the UAC and, when he refused the "promotion," convicted him of contravening currency regulations in 1954, imposing both a fine (US\$ 25,000) and a prohibition from running for elective office. Simultaneously, with the crackdown on the CUT and the harassment of its leaders, the French administration actively encouraged the formation of more pliable parties and alternate political strata, leading to the CUT boycott of all elections until 1958 and the rise of Olympio's major rival, **Nicolas Grunitzky**. In 1958, the United Nations-supervised elections

put an end to the **Autonomous Republic** administration of Grunitzky and brought Olympio and the CUT to power. Olympio became prime minister (1958–1961), and, after constitutional revisions, president (1961–1963). After independence, his overly conservative and paternalistic policies alienated various groups in the country. By 1959, the more militant **Juvento**—once the CUT’s youth wing—had declared its autonomy and become a separate party. Northern leaders chaffed at the total lack of attention their regions were receiving, merchants in Lomé grew antagonistic over the closure of the border with **Ghana**, the **cocoa/coffee** producers of the **Kloto** area (both **Akposso** and **Ewe**) grew discontented with the tax levied on their crop by the fiscally hard-pressed regime in Lomé, and **Catholics** in urban areas were incensed by Olympio’s clash with the archbishop and his seizure of several issues of the local Catholic journal. From 1961 to 1962, Olympio intensified his drive against organized political opposition to his administration. Political leaders were imprisoned for alleged plots, a political coalition that was coalescing to compete in the elections of 1961 was disqualified (for alleged failure to post the necessary deposits), and, in 1962, all parties except the CUT were formally banned. In 1962, Olympio’s stress on budget balancing and austerity brought him into conflict with the recently demobilized veterans of France’s colonial armies. The latter petitioned to be integrated into an enlarged Togolese **armed forces**, a request Olympio rejected on the grounds that Togo neither had the need for a bigger army nor the funds to subsidize such a luxury. The veterans’ aspirations to continue their military careers coalesced with ambitions within the existing noncommissioned and officer corps for faster promotion and enhanced status within an enlarged force, resulting in the **1963 coup d’état**. Olympio met his death, at the hands of sergeant (later general) **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and a small group of veterans, in what was in essence cold-blooded murder. The self-acknowledged assassin was Eyadéma. Following the collapse of the regime, all opposition leaders returned to Lomé or were freed from prison, and Nicolas Grunitzky assumed the presidency. Organized opposition to the results of the coup d’état, and to the integration into the **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)** the men that had assassinated Olympio, coalesced around **Nöe Kutuklui**, a former Olympio lieutenant, who masterminded, from Cotonou, the early plots to unseat both the Grunitzky (1963–1967) and Eyadéma (1967 +) regimes. Events in the 1970s and 1980s proved that Olympio’s assassination would not be forgotten or forgiven: Olympio’s sons and members of the powerful **Brazilian** elite in self-exile were at the core of several attempts to overthrow Eyadéma by **coup**, and from 1990 **Gilchrist Olympio** attempted to challenge him electorally. Sylvanus Olympio’s memory was formally rehabilitated in 1990 and official government celebrations of Eyadéma’s rise

to power in 1967 (**Liberation Day**, 13 January) are a constant reminder of his legacy, taking place on the same day and month as the 1963 coup.

OMBRI, PANA (1932–). Former minister of the civil service. A **Kabye** born in Koumea in 1932, Ombri was educated locally and worked as a schoolteacher between 1952 and 1959. In 1960, he became administrative secretary at the ministry of interior and shortly after head administrator for the districts of **Lomé**, **Kara**, and **Atakpamé** (1960–1963). After the collapse of the **Sylvanus Olympio** regime, Ombri was brought into **Nicolas Grunitzky**'s cabinet as minister of civil service, labor, and social affairs, a position he held until late 1966. From 1968, he served as fiscal and program director at the ministry of commerce, industry, and tourism and in other technical and administrative positions. He worked at the ministry of foreign affairs until he retired.

OPPOSITION GROUPS, 1967–1990. The main opposition groups to the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime during the period 1967–1990 (when the era of multipartyism was inaugurated) were movements set up by Togo's **Brazilian** families, who refused to accept the Eyadéma "usurpation" of power and refused to forget **Sylvanus Olympio**'s cold-blooded murder. Most of the original politicians of 1963, who for some time afterward connived in this plotting, rapidly fell by the wayside, some in retirement, others made peace with the regime, and still others lived in exile in West Africa or in Paris. Organized opposition to the Eyadéma regime centered around the **Mouvement Togolaise pour la Démocratie (MTD)** of Olympio's sons and the **Front National de Liberation (FNLT)** of former lieutenant colonel **Merlaud Lawson**, both based in Paris. Later, in the mid-1980s a newer, ideological, opposition party was established abroad—the **Parti Communiste Togolais (PCT)**. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

ORGANISATION COMMUNE AFRICAINE, MALGACHE ET MAURITIENNE (OCAM). A grouping of most of Francophone Africa, later joined by Mauritius, for purposes of economic, social, and cultural cooperation. Indirect successor to the Brazzaville Group, OCAM's most successful venture was the creation of Air Afrique, the multinational airline of French Africa, as well as a joint telecommunications system and cooperation on joint technical colleges. From 1970 the organization (and Air Afrique) suffered attrition as several states resigned their membership or curtailed their participation. Paradoxically, from 1970, Togo began to play a more active role in OCAM, including hosting the 1972 heads of state meeting. The organization folded in 1985.

ORGANISATION TOGOLAISE DES TRAVAILLEURS DÉMOCRATIQUE (OTTD). Popular Trotskyite **trade union** organization under the charismatic leadership of **Claude Améganvi**. The OTTD rose on the ashes of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s enforced trade union unity once political liberalization reached Togo in 1991. The union merged with another to form the **Parti des Travailleurs (PT)** in 1997, and the PT joined the **Collectif Sauvons le Togo** in 2012.

OSSEYI, JEAN-ALEXANDRE (1935–1971). Police inspector and one of the main defendants in the 1970 conspiracy trial. Born on 22 April 1935, in **Atakpamé**, Osseyi was an early member of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** party and in August 1960 was appointed Regional Secretary of Nyekonakpoe. In January 1962, he was brought into the secretariat of minister of interior **Theophile Mally** as an attaché, a position he occupied until the **1963 coup d'état**. Following the coup, he reverted to normal police duties until arrested in his home in August **1970 after the coup attempt**, together with the others who allegedly plotted against President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Osseyi was the main defendant at the subsequent trial and was given a stiff prison sentence. He died in 1971 while in prison, secretly executed.

OUATCHI. Ewe ethnic group estimated in 2016 as numbering roughly 580,000 people, residing mostly in the vicinity of **Aného** and Tabligbo. Their name means “from Nuatja”; they migrated from that town (now **Notsé**) not at the time of the original major **Adja**-Ewe dispersal in 1720 but sometime later during a time of major droughts. Their late migration from Notsé has given them a bad name and in contemporary times “Ouatchi” has acquired a pejorative connotation of backwardness among the more developed and sophisticated coastal Mina and Ewe populations. Their **language** (Ouatchi or Watyi) is quite similar to **Anlo-Evegbé** and is also spoken in **Atakpamé** and in the Grand Popo-Athieme regions of Benin. Most Ouatchi are **animist**, though some have recently been converted to **Christianity**. *See also* AGO-KOLI; HOGBETSOTSO FESTIVAL.

OURASANAH, MANSOUR. Award winning Togolese designer. Born in Togo and emigrated to the United States at the age of 16, Ourasanah pursued studies in engineering and architecture before turning to innovative industrial design. His design, *Lepsis: The Art of Growing Grasshoppers*, was a finalist for the INDEX Design to Improve Life Award, and helped propel Ourasanah to a 2014 Vilcek Prize in Design.

P

PALIMÉ. Bustling capital of the **Kloto** prefecture, renamed **Kpalimé** in 1972.

PALIMÉ CONGRESS, 1971. *See* KPALIMÉ CONGRESS, 1971.

PALAIS DE CONGRÈS DE LOMÉ. Togo's Palais de Congrès was built by the **Chinese** in the 1960s as a concert hall and conference venue, also known as the "Maison du Peuple" or "Maison de l'Unité." Imposing modernistic building inaugurated in **Lomé** on the occasion of the 1972 **Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM)** summit meeting. Built at the cost of US\$ 8.5 million on the Place de l'Indépendance, the structure boasts a 17,000 square foot, 3,000 seat conference hall (at the time reputed to be the third largest in the world after that of Brasilia and Los Angeles), which is of a unique architectural design. Located in the Quartier Administrative of Lomé and featuring large open grounds near the center of town, the Palais often showcases art during festivals and also houses National Archives and the **National Museum of Togo**. The building's facade is of **marble** (from Togolese quarries), and some of the interior decorations were designed by Togolese artists. The Maison du Peuple was until the liberalization of the 1990s the national headquarters of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** but the **National Conference** both renamed the building (to Maison de l'Unité) and disbanded the RPT, evicting it from the building. The RPT, however, would not comply and retained premises in the building. Never intended to house the legislative branch of government, the Palais nevertheless served that purpose for almost three decades before the current seat (**siege**) **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** was completed in 2018. Both the Palais de Congrès de Lomé and the newer Palais de Congrès de Kara were slated for renovation as of 2019.

PALAIS DES GOUVERNORS. *See* PALAIS DE LOMÉ.

PALAIS DE LA MARINA. *See* PRESIDENCE, PALAIS DE LA.

PALAIS DE LOMÉ. Originally, the Palais des Gouverneurs during colonial times, the building was an example of colonial architecture left abandoned after the political upheaval of the 1990s. Designed by architect Ernst Schmidt and constructed by the **Germans** in 1889–1905, it was positioned on Togo’s shore, designed to be seen by passing ships and serve as a sumptuous refuge for first German, then **French**, colonial authorities. The Togolese reclaimed the building at independence in 1960, using it first as a seat of government until 1970, then high-level offices. It was briefly used as the seat of Togo’s prime minister in 1991, but came under attack when the **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)** sought to intimidate interim PM **Joseph Koffigoh**, and was abandoned shortly after. Despite the fortuitous positioning facing the beach and 10 hectares of grounds, the building was left abandoned for almost 25 years before being renovated as an art and cultural center. The renovation took several years and 3 billion FCFA, financed and constructed locally (unlike the many construction projects financed and directed by the Chinese) in keeping with the ethos of reclaiming the cultural heritage of Togo. The Palais de Lomé reopened in 2019 under the direction of **Sonia Lawson**, with the addition of a botanical garden.

PALM PRODUCTS. Palm plantations and the production of both palm oil and palm by-products are not as fully developed in Togo as in neighboring countries, especially Benin. Moreover, with the coming of age of Togo’s **phosphate** industry, the economic importance of palm products declined drastically. Today, Togo is a net importer of palm products.

PANOÛ, KOFFI (1947–2003). Cabinet minister and journalist. Koffi Panou began his career as a journalist, and became the spokesperson of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and director of his residence, before joining the cabinet under **Eugene Adoboli** as minister of communication and then transitioned to foreign affairs under PM **Agbéyomé Kodjo**. He died of a heart attack at age 54.

PAN-EWE MOVEMENT. *See* ALL-EWE CONFERENCE (AEC).

PAPSON MOUTITÉ (1982–). Stage name of Amoussou Midodji Stephane, Togolese singer accused by female collaborators of sexual assault. He was arrested in April 2020 and imprisoned while awaiting trial. Though he maintained his innocence, his surprise release in May 2020—supposedly for health reasons—provoked a backlash against authorities, and rumors circulated on social **media** that his close relationship to the **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party in power was responsible.

PARASTATALS. Though formally espousing a free enterprise system, Togo managed a large number of state enterprises, especially in the aftermath of the **phosphate** mini boom of 1974. Most of these were grossly deficitary, opened the gates to crass corruption and embezzlement, and ultimately literally bankrupted the state. Many attempts at **privatization** were not successful, however, and the companies either collapsed or continued to be a burden on the state. Today, President **Faure Gnassingbé** oversees an economy with both public and private enterprises, sometimes moving one company from private to public, as **Shell-Togo**, or public to private, such as **Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique du Togo (BIA Togo)**. Such moves often seem to be made for pragmatic, rather than ideological reasons. *See also* STATE SECTOR.

PARC NATIONAL DE LA KERAN. National park formally established on 19 June 1973, though in reality only completed between 1977 and 1981, comprising 86,000 hectares of land south of the **Kandé-Sansanne-Mango** road and 27,000 hectares of hunting reserves contiguous with it. Though some of the scenery is lovely, there is simply not much wildlife in the park, which cannot compare in attractions to similar reserves in neighboring Burkina Faso and **Benin**. The creation of the park required the forced relocation from their lands of thousands of farmers, with recalcitrant individuals bombed from the air, their huts and fields burned and chiefs imprisoned in Sansanne-Mango.

PARTI COMMUNISTE TOGOLAIS (PCT). Originally clandestine hardline pro-Albanian party (Bainsite version of Albanian interpretation of Marxism-Leninism) established in exile in 1980 with links to counterpart parties in **Benin**, Burkina Faso, and Canada (obtaining from the latter both funds and printed material) with the goal of fomenting a national revolution. During the single-party years of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** dictatorship the PCT was active among youth and distributed a large amount of leaflets acutely embarrassing to the regime and to Eyadéma personally. Many of the abuses of **human rights** of the 1980s were detentions, tortures, and liquidations of youth suspected of links with the PCT or found with its leaflets in their possession. The party came out in the open in May 1991 with the political liberalizations of that year, but, apart from support within the **Organisation Togolaise des Travailleurs Démocratiques (OTTD)** union, it was not very successful with the wider urban public, something that was viewed as surprising by observers in light of its significant inroads (when underground) among youth at the **University du Benin**. The party is very indirectly the successor of the earlier **Parti de la Revolution Socialiste du Benin (PRSB)**.

PARTI D'ACTION POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT (PAD). Opposition political party set up after the liberalizations of 1991, at first in alliance with the **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)**. In 1999, PAD was one of the parties that joined with **Edem Kodjo's Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** to form the **Convergence patriotique panafricain (CPP)**. PAD's founder **Issa Samarou** became one of the vice presidents of the CPP.

PARTI DE LA REVOLUTION SOCIALISTE DU BENIN (PRSB). Stillborn "parent" political party established in 1959 by two Beninois cousins, Louis Behanzin (later Marxist instructor in Guinea and briefly in the early 1970s advisor to the militant Beninois military regime) and Theophile Paoletti, at the time Beninois trade union leader. The PRSB drew inspiration from the neo-Marxist Parti Africain d'Indépendance in Senegal and was supposed to operate in Togo and **Benin**. In Togo, its branch, even less active than in Benin, was the Parti Socialiste Revolutionnaire du Togo (PSRT). Its ideological plank included immediate independence, socialist economic policies, and militant panafricanism. Though it appealed to some students and intellectuals, especially in Benin, the PRSB had no discernable impact upon either Togolese or Beninois politics. In the 1980s, a more radical version of the PRSB was founded, when Radio Albania announced the establishment of the **Parti Communiste Togolaise (PCT)**. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

PARTI DE L'UNITÉ TOGOLAISE (PUT). Second name of **Sylvanus Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**. Though the newer name was adopted as early as 1961, the party was still widely known as the CUT until the **1963 coup**. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

PARTI DÉMOCRATIQUE DU RENOUVEAU (PDR). Opposition political party set up after the liberalizations of 1991 by **Zarifou Ayéva**, a former minister under General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, to garner the generally solid **Kotokoli** vote around **Sokodé**, its prime base.

PARTI DEMOCRATIQUE PANAFRICAIN (PDP). Centrist political party founded by **Bassabi Kagbara** in 2005. After unsuccessfully contesting the **legislative elections in 2007** (winning less than 1% of the overall vote and no seats), the PDP nominated Kagbara as its presidential candidate in 2010. Kagbara came in sixth place out of seven candidates with 0.4 percent of the national vote. When the opposition split into rival coalitions **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)** and **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel**, the PDP joined the latter and Kagbara became a vice president of the grouping, which won six

seats in the **2013 elections** for the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**. From 2017, the leadership of the party began to transition from Bassabi Kagbara to his son, **Innocent Kagbara**, who won the PDP's one seat in the AN elections of 2018. The PDP nominated Innocent Kagbara to be its candidate for the presidential contest in 2020, but his candidacy was not approved, and he did not appear on the ballot.

PARTI DES DÉMOCRATES POUR L'UNITÉ (PDU). Opposition political party set up after the liberalizations of 1991, in May, by **Jean-Lucien Savi de Tové**. The party joined the opposition alliance **Collectif d'Opposition Démocratique (COD)**, but had little independent support from the electorate. The PDU joined **Edem Kodjo's Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** in forming the **Convergence patriotique panafricain (CPP)** party in 1999.

PARTI NATIONAL PANAFRICAIN (PNP). Surprisingly little is known about the structure or membership of the PNP, given its outsized influence on Togolese politics in 2017–2018. Generally understood to have formed by **Tikpi Atchadam** in 2014 and based in **Sokodé**, the party began organizing and recruiting members for several years before drawing national attention in 2017. The fluid nature of the party system in Togo, as well as the party's tendency to focus on northern areas rather than **Lomé**, enabled the PNP to operate under the mainstream radar for several years while they recruited supporters. The party's first secretary general, Dr. **Kossi Sama**, assumed the role of spokesperson for the PNP and the elusive Atchadam, whose skill at communicating via WhatsApp and mobilizing via social media was an invaluable asset. Moreover, the party's focus on constitutional reforms and term limits was a refreshing change from the inability of the traditional opposition to gain traction at the ballot box. The PNP coordinated its largest demonstrations for the 2017 50th anniversary of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** rise to power in 1967, asserting that half a century of rule by one family was too much. The large demonstrations of August reached well outside the traditional opposition stronghold of Lomé, but encompassed Sokodé, and even **Kara**, as well as smaller towns. The scope and coordination of the movement seized the popular imagination as well as the attention of other opposition leaders, and brought down retribution from the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, and the government even shut down the entirety of Togo's Internet access for six days in September 2017 in an attempt to interrupt mobilization via social media. In a familiar pattern of reprisals sparking renewed protests, PNP members who were beaten, harassed, imprisoned and killed by security forces became martyrs, including Sama. The PNP joined the **Coalition de 14**

(C14) in 2017 with other opposition parties, including the **Alliance National pour le Changement (ANC)**, also known for successful popular mobilization. The **street demonstrations** and show of unity that resulted shook the confidence of the government and hurt the prospects for economic growth, though President **Faure Gnassingbé** (in retrospect, very wisely) resisted making any major concessions until after the December **2018 legislative elections**, boycotted by the PNP and the rest of the opposition, when his party controlled a supermajority in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**. With Atchadam in hiding, opposition unity began to crumble, and Gnassingbé was able to steal the PNP thunder by pushing forward **constitutional amendments in early 2019** granting some of their demands, but making sure he was insulated from their effects, paving the way for Gnassingbé to stay in office through 2030. Outmaneuvered and now undermined by operating in the shadows, of the best-known opposition groups only the PNP chose to boycott **2019's municipal elections**, and PNP members were reduced to announcing they did not support **Agbéyomé Kodjo** in the 2020 presidential elections (after Kodjo's campaign claimed the endorsement), rather than pursuing their own agenda. In early 2020, a group calling itself the "Tigre Revolution" carried out attacks against **gendarmes** in Lomé and Sokodé, and authorities attributed the organization of this group to the PNP, though party members living in exile denied involvement.

PARTI TOGOLAIS DU PROGRES (PTP). Togo's second political party after **Sylvanus Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, founded in 1946 by Dr. **Pedro Olympio** and **Nicolas Grunitzky** (both related to Sylvanus Olympio). The PTP was essentially a conservative pro-French association of traditional northern notables and southern civil servants and évolués with a sprinkling of French citizens, heavily supported by the local **French administration** against the CUT and its nationalist and pan-Ewe platforms. The PTP fared poorly at the beginning, with Grunitzky polling only 25 percent in his race for a seat in the French National Assembly in 1946 against the candidacy of Dr. **Martin Akou**, who ran with CUT support. From 1951 to 1955, the party was rent by major leadership schisms. Grunitzky, who in 1951 was deserted by large blocs of voters in his own home districts, was first expelled; then, making a comeback, he expelled the rival faction headed by Dr. Pedro Olympio, who set up the **Mouvement Populaire Togolais (MPT)**. Since Grunitzky had won his second contest against Akou in 1951 and had a source of support in the French National Assembly and among the local French administration, he emerged as the main leader of the PTP.

The party dominated the Togolese political scene in the early and mid-1950s, relying upon French support and established tactical alliances

with the nascent northern **Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN)**. The above formation was dislodged from power following the **1958 United Nations-sponsored elections**: the PTP barely campaigned in the latter election, sure of its electoral alliance of chiefs and notables, but obtained only a fifth of the votes cast for the CUT. The 1958 defeat brought down the premiership and government of Nicolas Grunitzky and catapulted Sylvanus Olympio and the CUT to power. In October 1959, the badly shattered PTP and UCPN merged to form the **Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais (UDPT)** under the leadership of Grunitzky, **Antoine Méatchi**, and several other northern leaders. As the CUT began to hound and harass opposition parties (prior to their ban in 1962), Grunitzky left the country and renounced political activities, leaving the UDPT to fall under the control of Méatchi. Following the **1963 coup d'état**, the exiled leadership of both the former PTP and the UCPN coalesced to revive the UDPT, which became the dominant party of the Second Republic (1963–1967). *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

PARTITION. *See* FRENCH ADMINISTRATION; LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATE.

PATAKIDEO, AHL. Journalist. Patakideo was the author of a series of underground tracts attacking General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** for abuse of power, corruption, and **human rights** violations. He was arrested in 1978 and detained without trial until 1991.

PÉRE, DAHUKU. Militant of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** and former minister of labor and civil service. Pére joined the cabinet in February 1990, continuing to hold his RPT Politburo portfolio as general delegate for youth. After the political upheavals of 1991 he lost his cabinet seat. He ran for a seat in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in the **1994 legislative election** as a member of the RPT, and was reelected in 1999. But in 2002, he lashed out at the RPT for not being sufficiently inclusive, and was banned from the party, along with **Agbéyomé Kodjo**, and his Order of Mono was revoked. He formed his own party and stood for the presidential elections in 2003, earning just 2 percent of the vote. He then tried another political party, the Alliance Démocratique pour la Patrie (Alliance), formed with Kodjo, but was unsuccessful in legislative elections. He joined forces with **Jean-Pierre Fabre** for the **2010 presidential elections**.

“PERSONAL UNION” WITH DAHOMEY. *See* FRENCH ADMINISTRATION.

PERSONALITY CULT. Starting rather modestly in the early 1970s and rapidly reaching grotesque proportions (until somewhat restrained by negative world opinion in the mid-1980s and completely arrested with multipartyism in 1992), the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** Personality Cult had great visibility in Togo. Giant pictures of “Le Guide” appeared all over the country, outfits made of cloth (pagnes) depicting Eyadéma’s portrait were nearly de rigueur in many circles; his larger-than-life busts and monuments were erected in many centers, and the press constantly referred to the “Guide de la Nation,” “Le Fondateur-President du RPT,” “Le General,” and the “Savior of the Common Man.” The Personality Cult paradoxically commenced early in the 1970s as an effort on the part of Eyadéma—a northerner and a military usurper—to drum up support for his rule. Later inspired and aided by North Korean advisors, the Personality Cult became a stifling aspect of contemporary Togolese life. In 1977, a three-and-one-half ton statue of Eyadéma (sculpted in North Korea) was erected in downtown **Lomé**, at the height of the perennial adulation of Eyadéma. (The latter was mutilated and removed with the liberalization in 1991.) *See also* AUTHENTICITY.

PETIT POPO. *See* ANÉHO.

PEUL. *See* FULANI.

PHOSPHATES. Togo’s principal **nonagricultural** export since the mid-1960s and the country’s major industry and employer. First detected in 1927 and “rediscovered” in 1952, Togo’s calcium-phosphate deposits are mostly found and quarried northeast of **Lac Togo** in Hahotie and Dagbati, to be transported to the coast at **Kpéme** where the ore is loaded onto ships for export. Deposits are currently estimated at 50 million tons, and the early discovery and exploitation of these reserves catapulted Togo to a position as one of the top five phosphate producers in the world from the 1970s to the early 1990s. Today, however, increased global demand and production in many areas (including **China**, the Middle East, and the Americas) means Togo barely ranks in the top 20 of phosphate producers in the world. Since 2010 Togo has invested heavily in the sector to improve the production of phosphates for fertilizer, as well as related production of limestone and clinker, but the diversification of the economy as a whole means the country is less dependent on this sector than previously (closer to 10% of export earnings, down from as much as 40% in previous decades), and the national economy less vulnerable to price shocks in this sector.

In 1954, an international consortium was formed to develop the **mines** and facilities in the south that were renamed the **Compagnie Togolaise des**

Mines du Benin (CTMB, or COTOMIB) in 1957. State participation went up from 19.5 percent to 35 percent by November 1972 and soon after to 50 percent. The mines were fully nationalized early in 1974 after General Eyadéma's claim that COTOMIB officials, fearful of impending nationalization, had conspired to assassinate him. In 1973, the company had 1,100 workers, and exports amounted to 6.3 million CFA francs. A major surge in world prices for phosphates in 1974 quintupled Togo's earnings from phosphate exports to 34,532 million CFA francs that year, but prices dropped abruptly in 1975, causing major fiscal shortfalls on a regime that had banked that prices would remain high. *See also* EYADÉMA'S PLANE CRASHES.

In order to garner higher profits, Togo set up a state phosphate marketing organization **Office Togolais des Phosphates (OTP)** in 1974, and COTOMIB's productive capacity expanded after nationalization, with a fifth line (of lower grade ore) coming into production in 1980, raising capacity to over four million tons a year. Moreover, in 1984, a feasibility study was carried out that supported the opening up of the Dagbati phosphate deposits (near existing mines) and the opening of a phosphoric acid factory and fertilizer plant (at a cost of US\$ 500 million) with a capacity of 1,000 tons of phosphoric acid. Early expectations of a phosphate-led transformation of the country were thwarted, however, since phosphate prices generally remained stagnant, even going down. In 1988, for example, phosphates accounted (at 36.5 billion CFAF) for 26.5 percent of exports, while in 1991 (before the social upheavals that lowered production, making comparisons impossible) phosphate exports brought in 35.6 billion CFAF accounting for 24.7 percent of Togo's exports.

From the 1990s sales of Togolese phosphates slowed, in part because of concerns about the high levels of cadmium—a toxic heavy metal found in increasing quantities in European soil—in Togolese phosphates. The OTP was **privatized** in 2002 under the **International Finance Group Togo (IFG-Togo)**, which combined private Tunisian and **French** interests with the Togolese state, but this partnership was short-lived and production continued to slide due to obsolete machinery and management difficulties. In 2007, phosphates came back into the **state sector** by way of the **Société Nouvelle des Phosphates du Togo (SNPT)**, and significant new investments took place from 2010 to improve facilities and boost production. These efforts have paid off in increased production, back up to around 1–1.5 million tons per year. Unhealthy and difficult working conditions for the some 1,500 SNPT employees, low wages, and poor living standards in the towns around the mines led to a series of strikes from 2013 to 2016, when a settlement was reached promising improvements on the part of SNPT, and a guarantee of no strikes for at least four years. A US\$ 1.4 billion investment from Elenilto, an Israeli company, in expanding facilities for carbonate phosphate is projected

to produce a combined five million tons per year of phosphate, fertilizer, and phosphoric acid. *See also* RAILROADS.

PIC D'AGOU. Name of Togo's second merchant marine cargo ship. Purchased in 1980, it joined the *Hodo*, flagship of the Societe Nationale Maritime.

PIRACY. From 2010, concerns about piracy in the Gulf of Guinea have been on the rise, and the high volume of seafaring traffic moving in and out of the **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)** makes the issue of particular concern for Togo. In 2011, Togolese PM **Gilbert Houngbo** raised the issue during an address to the UN General Assembly, calling for greater cooperation in developing security strategies. Despite this, attacks on tankers rose and there was an increase in successful hijackings, many suspected to be carried out by Nigerian gangs in search of oil and ransom. From 2013 Togo's port was considered a high risk area, and in 2018 the Gulf registered 40 percent of the world's piracy incidents and the lion's share of kidnapped crew members.

PLAN NATIONALE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT (PND). *See* NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 2018–2022.

PLATEAUX. Region of Togo with administrative headquarters in **Atakpamé**, the region has some of the more fertile land in Togo. It is the center of Togo's **cocoa/coffee** producing plantations, and is the most advanced socioeconomically after the Maritime. **Cotton** and peanuts are also grown in several areas of the Plateaux, though production levels are low. The region is well connected with the north via all-weather roads and to the south by the **railroad** and several paved roads.

PLEBISCITE OF 1956. The 1956 plebiscite was held in the British Trusteeship of Togoland at the suggestion of the Visiting Mission of the Trusteeship Council (1955), after Britain's announcement that following the impending independence of the **Gold Coast** she could not continue administering British Togoland. (The British administered the Trusteeship Territory from the Gold Coast.) In the plebiscite all adults were given two choices: independence as a region within **Ghana** or continued trusteeship status, pending a later decision regarding the disposition of the territory. The Visiting Mission divided the region into four "zones" along linguistic and ethnic criteria, but the Trusteeship Council rejected the recommendation that each zone decide its own future separately, though later, in 1958, the formula was used for a similar plebiscite in northern and southern British Cameroons. **France** resisted efforts to

have a similar plebiscite, holding instead the **Referendum of 1956** that led to the creation of the **Autonomous Republic of Togo**. The 1956 plebiscite resulted in 93,095 votes for merger with the Gold Coast and independence within Ghana and 67,492 votes against that course of action. In the northern regions of British Togoland, where pro-unification desires were strongest on the part of the ethnic elements artificially separated by the Gold Coast British Togo border, among the Dagomba, for example, the pro-unificationist vote was solid: 49,119 for and 12,707 against. In the south, among **Ewe** and other ethnic groups, the vote was 43,976 for unification and 54,785 against. On the basis of the combined vote of the entire territory, British Togoland merged with the Gold Coast and became a region of Ghana, contrary to the desires of a significant percentage of the Ewe and related ethnic groups that had hoped for unification within a larger Ewe state. From that time, successive Togolese governments and leaders periodically voiced irredentist claims, as have Ewe groups in Ghana. In the late 1970s, for example, the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime sponsored a remarkable press campaign to support its demand that the results of the 1956 plebiscite be put aside, and close contacts were maintained with irredentist groups in Ghana, which have at times received financial support from Togo.

PLIYA, JEAN (1931–2015). One of neighboring **Benin's** foremost authors and political ideologue, in later years Pliya was established in Togo as an educator. Born in Djougou (Benin) to a **chiefly** Fon family on 13 July 1931, Pliya studied locally and in Ivory Coast, Senegal, and **France**, training as a teacher. He has taught at Lycée Coulibaly in Porto Novo (Benin) and at Benin's national university. In the 1960s, he published his widely acclaimed *Kondo*, *Le Requin* and *L'Arbre Fetiche*, the latter bringing him the highly coveted Grand Prix de la Nouvelle Africaine. From 1959 to 1960, he was briefly cofounder of a militant Beninois party, and between 1961 and 1965 he served as Benin's director of National **Education**, deputy to the National Assembly, and secretary of state for information and tourism. Following the coup d'état of 1965 in Benin, Pliya worked mostly abroad in France, and later in Togo as professor of geography at the **Université du Bénin** in **Lomé**. A practicing **Catholic**, he was a lay representative to the 1994 African Synod in Rome and also published religious tracts. He died in May 2015 in Abidjan.

POLITICAL PARTIES. The history and evolution of the Togolese party system can be divided into several stages: (I) 1945–1969, before the establishment of the one-party state under General Eyadéma, (II) 1969–1990 the period of single-party rule, and (III) 1991–present when political liberalization enabled many different political parties and alliances to form.

I. From 1945 to 1961, a multiplicity of parties existed on the Togolese scene, but the period was marked by a tug-of-war between the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** led by **Sylvanus Olympio**, and the **Parti Togolais du Progrès (PTP)** led by **Nicolas Grunitzky**. The CUT was established in 1941 as an essentially pan-Ewe movement, and garnered most of the Ewe and **Mina** intelligentsia—obtaining much support from the center of the country as well—to become Africa's first nationalist movement. Its domination over Togolese politics lasted between 1946 and 1951, following which the **French administration**, for some time fearful of the party's pan-Ewe aspirations and alleged "pro-British" stances, engineered the creation, entrenchment, and electoral success of alternate conservative, pro-French, and docile political formations such as the PTP and the **Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN)**. The CUT boycotted the **1951 elections** and was in the political wilderness until the **1958 UN-supervised elections** in which the party scored a smashing victory against all the other parties and formed the government that was to lead Togo to independence. Another party active in this period was **Juvento**, originally the militant CUT youth wing, differing with Sylvanus Olympio and other CUT leaders on a variety of positions. Juvento had, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a panafricanist and socialist coloration that led it to break with the CUT and emerge as a separate party in 1959.

Opposing the CUT was the PTP, Togo's second oldest party, established in 1946 by Grunitzky and Dr. **Pedro Olympio** (both of whom were related to CUT's Sylvanus Olympio). The PTP—strongly supported by the local French administration against the CUT—was essentially a conservative alliance of pro-French notables, **chiefs**, civil servants and évolués. From 1951 to 1955, the party suffered a series of leadership schisms that resulted first in the expulsion of Grunitzky and later (1955) his ascendance and the expulsion of Pedro Olympio. During this period, the PTP was allied with the UCPN, a northern conservative alliance of chiefs/notables founded in 1951 to counter the dominance of political life by southern elites and parties. Aided by the French administration and alliance with the UCPN, the PTP formed or participated in the governments until 1958. In that year, the UN-supervised elections brought about the dramatic electoral victory of the CUT and the collapse of the Grunitzky administration. Totally shattered by the 1958 results, the PTP never recovered. It merged with the UCPN in October 1959 to form the **Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais (UDPT)**, hoping to compete against the CUT in the 1961 elections, but the formation was disqualified on spurious grounds and shortly afterward all parties except the CUT were abolished, until the **coup of 1963** restored electoral competition for a short period.

From 1963 to 1967, the party system was still dominated by leaders of parties from the postindependence and pre-coup era. Grunitzky, former leader

of the UDPT who had left Togo for Côte d'Ivoire, returned to **Lomé** in the aftermath of the 1963 coup d'état and the reestablishment of competitive politics and wrenched the leadership of that party from **Antoine Méatchi**, who had stayed in Togo until his 1961 arrest and escape from the police. Dr. Pedro Olympio, after his expulsion from the leadership hierarchy of the PTP, founded the **Mouvement Populaire Togolais (MPT)** in the mid-1950s, which was banned in 1961 and resurrected after 1963 under **Samuel Aquereburu**'s leadership. Juvento was likewise resuscitated, and joined the MPT, UDPT, and the "collaborationist" part of the **Parti de l'Unité Togolaise (PUT)**, (ex-CUT) to form a four-cornered coalition that ruled Togo between 1963 and 1967. The **Lomé upheaval of 1966** was linked to a major **crisis between Méatchi and Fousseini Mama** grounded in the continuous friction between Méatchi and Grunitzky as two parts of the unstable executive, as well as to opposition to the leadership on the part of the masses in the southern urban centers. Several weeks after this crisis, the **1967 coup** put an end to the Second Republic, and all political parties were banned then, and for the first two years of **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s rule.

II. From 1969 to 1991, coup leader General Eyadéma, following constant stage-managed mass petitions to remain in office, began an attempt to legitimate his rule through the construction of a single "national" movement, the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** in which all political elements were supposedly represented, while the opposition to his rule moved most activities abroad. The RPT was highly decentralized for much of its existence, though it boasted an increasingly large membership. Governed by a collegiate Political Bureau (that replaced a short-lived experiment under a secretary general and several deputies), the RPT established ancillary organs such as a youth wing and a women's branch. Holding Congresses in various parts of the country, including the **Kpalimé Congress** of 1971 and the **RPT Sixth Congress of 1982**, the RPT was nominally the ultimate source of authority in Togo, though it was always under the control of General Eyadéma and his closest associates in this period. The RPT acquired special status in 1979 when the Togolese regime formally constitutionalized itself. By the mid-1980s, RPT activity was largely sporadic and carried out by sycophants (including many **Ewe**, whose presence was touted by Eyadéma as attesting to the RPT's national character) and other favor-seekers aware that links to the RPT hierarchy could unlock doors.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of opposition parties were established abroad, vowing to oust Eyadéma. These included the **Mouvement Togolaise Pour la Démocratie (MTD)**, based in Paris and headed by **Gilchrist Olympio** (one of President Olympio's sons), who became in the 1980s Eyadéma's most implacable foe, and supporter of increasingly violent efforts

to topple the dictatorship in Lomé. Sometimes aligned with the MTD's efforts was the **Front National de Liberation du Togo (FNLT)**, established in Paris by the Lt. Col. **Merlaud Lawson**. The **Parti Communiste Togolais (PCT)** began as a pro-Albanian party supported by Trotskyite sources in Canada, and stood for a total restructuring of Togolese society and not merely the replacement of Eyadéma. In this period, the PCT was primarily active in distributing inflammatory anti-Eyadéma leaflets and embarrassing details about the regime. Many of the **human rights** abuses perpetrated by Eyadéma were related to the regime's harsh treatment of actual or suspected PCT members, since mere possession of its literature was grounds for torture and possible death in prison.

III. From 1990, global pressures and domestic upheaval forced Eyadéma to ride out the democratization storm by legalizing all political formations and inviting back all opposition elements (many sentenced to death in absentia) to participate in the **National Conference**. The result was a large number of new parties, most emerging in May 1991, and various multiparty coalitions were formed. In an oft-repeated pattern, new parties or coalitions will form in advance of elections, but do not survive to the next one. Meanwhile, the ruling RPT has been rebranded **Union Pour La République (UNIR)**, and the opposition to it has been marked by division and clashing personal ambitions among the leadership, astutely exploited by Eyadéma and his son and successor **Faure Gnassingbé**, whenever feasible.

From 1991 until the late 2000s, three political leaders dominated the opposition electoral landscape, Gilchrist Olympio of the **Union des Forces du Changement (UFC)**, Yawovi Agboyibo of the **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)**, and Edem Kodjo of the **Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)**; later the **Convergence Patriotique Panafricaine (CPP)**. While a great many leaders, parties, and alliances tried to challenge Eyadéma (and after 2005, Gnassingbé) at the polls, they were unable to gain more traction than these three members of an older guard of opposition, as long as Olympio, Agboyibo, and Kodjo remained active and (relatively) unsullied by complicity with the ruling party. The competition existing between these three, however, meant that they were rarely united, and each of them was tempted to join in forming a "unity" cabinet and enjoying a taste of executive power as prime minister, even when official election results were not in their favor. Important changes around 2010 created new openings for leaders like **Jean-Pierre Fabre** of the **Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC)** and **Tikpi Atchadam** of the **Panafrican National Party (PNP)** to take up the next generation struggle against what is now considered a ruling dynasty supported by the dominant UNIR.

Establishing itself as the centrist, three members of Yao Agboyibo's CAR (formed in May 1991) joined a unity government with the RPT in September 1992 as part of the jockeying for position in the transition period. Olympio's Union UFC was the post-1991 successor to the MTD, pulling in several other smaller parties. The most radical of the mainstream opposition and sure of Ewe and southern support in their own right, the UFC refused to join alliances of the many newly formed opposition parties and interest groups, including the **Collectif des Démocrates (COD)**. Both the CAR and the UTD (the latter also formed in May 1991 and headed by Kodjo), were willing to support these alliances, and COD members agreed to unite behind Kodjo alone to stand against Eyadéma in the **presidential election in 1993**, as his past support for Eyadéma seemed to make him a conservative, and promising, choice. The division of the Ewe vote between Kodjo, an Ewe from the **Kpalimé** area, and Olympio—that has its roots in intra-Ewe competitions as much as in Kpalimé's memories of excess taxation on their **coffee-cocoa** crops by Olympio's father—and the two leaders' inability to join hands in general were major reasons why Eyadéma was able to claw his way to power in 1993, ultimately running unopposed except for independents with little vote share.

In the **legislative elections of 1994**, the conditions for the poll improved enough to convince Kodjo's UTD and Yao Agboyibo's CAR to participate in what many consider a rare example of free and fair electoral contest in Togo's history. The UFC maintained their boycott, paving the way for the CAR to win 36 seats—primarily in southern districts, to the RPT's 35. The UTD was the third largest in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** with seven seats, but Eyadéma shrewdly offered Kodjo the post of prime minister over Agboyibo, and when Kodjo accepted, the hope of a united opposition against the RPT in the legislature was dashed. By the time of the **1998 presidential contest**, the UFC was ready to participate with Olympio as their candidate, though they were not able to unite the opposition behind him, as Agboyibo ran and came in third with 9.5 percent of the official vote. However, the official count, which gave Olympio 34 percent to Eyadéma's 52 percent, was highly suspect, and the UFC party faithful were well organized and mobilized to protest. The fallout from the 1998 elections led to an opposition boycott of the **2002 parliamentary elections**, and **constitutional changes in 2002** which rendered Olympio ineligible for the contests of 2003 and 2005. Instead, the UFC vice president (and one of the founding members), **Emmanuel Akitani-Bob**, ran under the UFC banner. Both Agboyibo and Kodjo (having disbanded the UTD and formed the CPP), ran against Akitani-Bob in 2003, but after the death of Eyadéma they agreed to unite behind him in the unexpected **presidential election of 2005**, in hopes of preventing Gnassingbé

from taking power and becoming ensconced. Gnassingbé emerged victorious and borrowed a leaf from his father's book by offering Edem Kodjo the post of prime minister in his first government.

By 2006, after a decade on the sidelines, opposition parties were prepared to hammer out a new political accord with the RPT, dubbed the **Accord Politique Globale (APG)**. Creating conditions for free and fair elections endorsed by European mediators, all the main players agreed to participate in the **2007 legislative elections**, including the UFC for the first time. A new **electoral system** and redistricting, however, taught the UFC that winning almost half the votes translated to less than one-third the seats, as the electoral map overrepresented the north of the country and the RPT secured the majority again. CAR was the only other party to win any seats, though 25 other parties, including the CPP and 20 others that were brand new, competed in the contest.

While Olympio was eligible—and expected—to run in 2010 for the first time since 1998, the UFC's dynamic new vice president, **Jean-Pierre Fabre**, ran in his place, backed by a supportive coalition of opposition parties called the Front républicain pour l'alternance et le changement (FRAC). Though Agboyibo also ran in 2010, Kodjo had stepped back from Togolese politics by this point, marking the end of a generation and giving rise to new political formations. Fabre performed about as well as Akitani-Bob had according to official results, and waged a well-followed campaign of outrage over irregularities (many documented by international observers) in those official results. In a surprise move, Olympio forged a solo agreement with the RPT to share power in a unity government just weeks after the election, bringing about a split in the UFC. Those who felt betrayed by Olympio's capitulation either joined Fabre's **Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC)** or other new parties, and the damage was so great that the UFC was able to gain only three seats in the enlarged **2013 legislature** and six seats in the **2018 legislature** (down from 27 in 2007). Meanwhile, Fabre's ANC and his **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)** won 19 seats in 2013, and was among the coalitions leading historic protests in 2017 and 2018.

Meanwhile, President Gnassingbé quietly set about transitioning the old RPT party to the new UNIR. Having secured the cooperation of the once-radical opponent Olympio, Gnassingbé was in a strong position to convince members of the old guard in the military that it was time to let go of the past, though many did so reluctantly. The new party seemed to draw from the same constituents as the old, though it has employed tactics like gerrymandering and inflated voter rolls more than violence and intimidation to win legislative majorities, and presidential contests, since 2007. When the

party does need additional support the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** still seems willing to step in as the enforcer, as when **Tikpi Atchadam's Parti National Panafricain (PNP)** organized protests across the country in mid-2017, and a crackdown on the manifestations in **Sokodé** left at least two dead and a dozen wounded. Gnassingbé's inflated margin of victory in the **2020 presidential election** signals a possible change of approach for the UNIR, and a return to the older electoral tactics of his father in seeking to crush, rather than manage, dissent. *See also* **OPPOSITION GROUPS, 1967–1990.**

POLO, AREGBA. Minister of justice, representing the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. Appointed to the third **transitional government of Joseph Koffigoh** in September 1992, Polo was retained in his post in 1993 for another term of office. In 2015, he was named one of nine members of the **Cour Constitutionnelle**.

POMAR-TOGO. *See* **MARBLE.**

PORT AUTONOME DE LOMÉ (PAL). Lomé's important deepwater port. Of vital interest to regional international commerce as well as domestic political power and intrigue, the 16.6-meter deepwater PAL has recently been upgraded to triple its capacity of 20-foot equivalent containers to almost 1.2 million from 2013 to 2017, overtaking the port of Lagos in terms of overall capacity, and enabling almost 1,000 ships per year, including larger third generation ships, to pass through.

The life of the port began on 9 July 1963, when a West German-Togolese treaty was signed for the construction of a new deepwater port immediately east of the center of **Lomé** that would also serve landlocked Burkina Faso. The project—negotiated by former president **Sylvanus Olympio**—was at the time Germany's biggest capital commitment in Africa and an indication of a desire to assist her former *Musterkolonie* (model colony). Lomé's original wharf traced its origins to the German colonial era, though a new one had been constructed in 1928. The latter rapidly became inadequate, and negotiations had commenced for the construction of a major joint Togo-Benin port in **Agoué**, midway between Cotonou and Lomé but in Beninois territory. Benin, however, obtained a French commitment to build up Cotonou's port and, shortly afterward, Togo sought out West German funds for her own port in Lomé. The port and duty-free zone were completed in 1968 and were a major boost to trade. Imports rose between 1968 and 1972 from 189,641 to 300,000 tons, straining the 400,000 ton capacity of the installations, leading

to a major expansion of the facilities in the late 1970s. In 1978, for example, 808 vessels of 3.3 million gross tons called at Lomé, unloading 1.12 million tons of goods and loading in turn 326,000 tons.

By 1981, existing facilities were again under strain as more and more transit traffic for the inland states (Burkina Faso, Niger) chose Lomé as their preferred port. A virtual doubling of the capacity of the port was completed in the mid-1980s, and a **Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD)** loan of 5,000m CFA taken for further improvements in 1995. The long social turmoil of the 1990s, aimed at dislodging General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, played havoc, however, with the Port's activities, as **trade union** strikes and a drop in economic activity plagued the country. The government moved to **privatize** port management in 2002, while making sure to keep key political figures in prominent management positions (see below).

The fortunes of PAL and other regional ports can rise and fall according to political difficulties, in addition to logistical concerns. For instance, Lomé's port benefited from additional traffic when Côte d'Ivoire experienced political difficulties in 2002, but lost traffic in 2005 after the death of Eyadéma and the resulting **succession crisis**. Interest in meeting the international shipping demands for the inland, landlocked neighbors has led to something of a horse race over north-south road and **rail** improvements to link West African ports, including Lomé, to Ouagadougou and Bamako in order to further secure port investments. Domestically, the port is a vital source of revenue and economic activity located in the heart of what the government might consider "opposition" territory, and as such, the port leadership includes key figures like **Rock Gnassingbé** as director general in charge of security, and Rear Admiral Fogan K. Adegnon as director general. Moreover, port improvements have been implicated in the **Bolloré corruption scandal**, as French prosecutors allege that tycoon Vincent Bolloré agreed (through his communications subsidiary Havas) to help President **Faure Gnassingbé** in his **2010 reelection** campaign in exchange for renewing Bolloré Africa Logistics' lucrative contract to operate the port, around the same time.

The most recent 2014 improvements (undertaken by Mediterranean Shipping Company and **China Merchant Holding**) included enlarging the container terminal to receive additional ships, a new transshipment terminal for transferring cargo from deep water ships to smaller vessels for regional shipping, and a streamlined system for formalities ("guichet unique" or single window as it is known). The government is clearly keen to demonstrate that the port of Lomé is business-friendly and free of corruption, though petty thievery (especially for auto parts) and bribery are ongoing problems. More recently, **piracy** has been a concern for traffic to and from the PAL. International financial agencies clearly see the improved port as a valuable asset

for Togo and a bright spot in forecasts, even as regional trade slowed right at completion of the most recent improvement projects, and higher revenues were slower to materialize than anticipated.

PORTO SEGURO. *See* LAC TOGO.

PRESIDENCE, PALAIS DE LA. In contrast to most Francophone states, Togo lagged behind in the construction of a new official residence for its chief executive. For fiscal reasons, the stately but old **German colonial** headquarters known as the **Palais de Gouvernors** served, until 1969, as the presidential residence during the administrations of both **Sylvanus Olympio** and **Nicolas Grunitzky**. A new modernistic building began construction in 1969 and was completed in time for Togo's tenth anniversary of independence (1970). Allegedly built with funds obtained from Nigeria, the low-profile building is near the waterfront, centered on a 5,000 square meter plot. Designed by the Frenchman Jean Cyr, the structure was built at a cost of 500 million CFA francs. Paradoxically, General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** preferred, for security reasons, to sleep in his modest villa in the Tokoin military camp in the northern part of the town, known as Lomé II ("Lomé deux"). A new presidential palace, only a few hundred meters from Lomé II, was planned from 2003, when Eyadéma laid the first stone. Inaugurated by President **Faure Gnassingbé** in 2006, the new palace, commonly known as Palais de la Marina, was constructed by the **Chinese** under the supervision of Ma Lihua. Gnassingbé has been criticized for having multiple large private residences in addition to the opulent palace.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. *See* ELECTIONS.

PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s main power prop within the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** and force of repression against society. In the 1980s and 1990s it was a 1,200-person elite corps, much of it **Kabyé** with many of the personnel recruited not only from General Eyadéma's home village of **Pya** but from his neighborhood quarter of Pya-bas. Entrusted with guarding the presidency, the guard was heavily armed with Israeli weapons and originally trained by North Korean officers. At the head of the guard was an Eyadéma second cousin, Colonel Ayi Donou Gnassingbé. The guard was implicated in a string of individual murders and mass brutalities as far back as 1980 and was involved, inter alia, in the **Bè Lagoon massacres** and the assault on **Gilchrist Olympio**'s motorcade in 1992. Changes to the Presidential Guard surrounding President **Faure Gnassingbé**, made by then defense minister **Kpatcha Gnassingbé** in 2007, may have

triggered a falling out between the two men, and the subsequent accusation that Kpatcha was plotting to overthrow his half-brother.

PRINDSENSTEEN. Danish fort built in Keta on the coast (currently in **Ghana**, midway between Accra and **Lomé**) in 1784. The fort funneled the slave trade from the hinterland and helped radiate Danish influence along the coast. The fort was ceded to Britain in 1850.

PRIVATIZATION. The first drive to privatize the country's **state sector** commenced in the mid-1980s under General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** as the deficits piled up by the mismanaged and plundered state companies began to exert a major fiscal drag on the economy. At the time, Togo had 33 publicly-owned enterprises and 25 mixed economy companies in which the government possessed a share in equity, down from the original 73 of the early 1980s. Efforts to sell off much of the state sector were difficult, as the prices offered by foreign entrepreneurs—often for risky enterprises, hitherto poorly run—were low, while other enterprises could not find buyers. Ten companies, finding no buyers no matter what the price, were closed down and dismantled.

In this period, the best examples of state enterprises closed down due to mismanagement to metamorphose later under private ownership as profitable were **Nouvelle Industrie Oléagineux du Togo (NIOTO)**—the former **Industrie Oléagineux du Togo (IOTO)** cooking oil company—that under **French** majority control saw soaring production and profits after nearly halving the workforce, and the **Société Togolaise de Textiles (Togotex)** at **Kara**, now operating as Togotex International, bought by a **Chinese** entrepreneur from Hong Kong. Subsequent rounds of privatization took place under Eyadéma and later President **Faure Gnassingbé**, including the **tourism** sector with the sale of state-owned hotels from 1997, and **banking**. Since cooperation with international **donors** resumed in 2007, Gnassingbé has pursued a mixed strategy of having the state invest in some industries in anticipation of future privatization (like **phosphates**), nationalizing other industries (like **Shell-Togo**), or engaging in joint ownership (notably the **Nouvelle Société Cotonnaire du Togo (NSCT)**, which is owned by the state and cotton growers in cooperation.) *See also* PARASTATALS.

PROTESTANTS. As in many parts of West Africa, evangelical protestant churches have made considerable inroads in Togo in the past two decades. Today an estimated 17 percent of Togolese are Protestant, up from just 3 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. Among the many organizations are the Presbyterians and the Assemblies of God, with the two largest Protestant

congregations. **Methodists**, Baptists, Lutherans, and Seventh Day Adventists are also active in the territory, where 42 percent of the population is Christian but the majority of those are still **Catholic**.

The history of Protestantism in Togo began with the Norddeutsche Missionengesellschaft (or **Bremen Missionary Society**). Approximately 100 pastors were sent to the **Gold Coast**-Togo coastal areas before official **German colonization** of Togo, fully half of them perishing from various tropical diseases. For a long time, their base was **Aného**, where other orders were also established. Despite the withdrawal of the society after the German loss of the colony, many Protestants still called themselves “Brema” up to the 1940s. Missionary efforts were concentrated in the south, and only in 1912 was the north opened to proselytizing. The society was joined in its efforts by the Basle Missionary Society, which commenced activities in the Gold Coast in 1827, spreading from there to the Akwapim hills and into German Togo.

Following the expulsion of German missionaries from Togo in the aftermath of World War I, neither British nor **French** orders were able to staff the vacated Protestant centers. Consequently, in both British and French Togo, the Protestant churches became autonomous, staffed by indigenous adherents. They underwent several changes in nomenclature, and in 1957 the French Togo church renamed itself the Église Évangélique du Togo (today the **Église Évangélique Presbytérien du Togo [EEPT]**). The church expanded its efforts among youth and into the north, baptizing thousands and establishing schools and helping to revitalize the **Evegbé language**. The Methodist Church is the oldest major Protestant church still operating in Togo. Established in **Aného** in the mid-19th century and originally assisted by the local **Lawson family** there, the Methodist Church suffered heavy attrition in membership with the rise of the Prophet Harris Movement in the Ivory Coast. It still has serious support among the **Mina** of **Aného**, a fact that encouraged it to construct a Methodist university there in 1970. The American missionary society the Assembly of God first established itself in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Dahomey in the interwar years and then moved into **Sansanne-Mango** (1950) and, in 1951, to **Bassari** (now Bassar) in north Togo. *See also* RELIGION.

PROTTEEN, JACOB (1708?–1769). Early missionary in the **Gold Coast**-Togo coastal regions. Born in **Christiansborg** to a Danish soldier and a princess of the **Aného chiefly** family, Protteen was enrolled at the school for mixed-race children established in the fort in 1722 by Army Chaplain Elias Svane. In 1727, Protteen was brought to Copenhagen where he met Count Zinzendorf, founder of the **Moravian Brothers**, who subsidized Protteen’s **education** and sent him back to Africa in 1737 (together with a European

missionary who promptly succumbed to disease) to proselytize in the Gold Coast-Togo area. After several efforts in the Aného area, Protten fell afoul of Dutch governor Hartog when he suggested a mixed-race school at El Mina. He was imprisoned until April 1739, following which he taught children of local notables, undertook missionary efforts without the support of the Moravian Brothers (1757–1761, 1764–1769), married in Europe, and tried to spur attention to the need for more missionaries in Africa.

PYA. General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s home village and final resting place. A small, undistinguished, and inconsequential village 12 kilometers from **Kara**, Pya acquired fame, recognition, and massive largess—water, electricity, roads, school improvements, funds for churches—as side benefits from Eyadéma's rise to power. In 1976, the structure of an old **Protestant** church was transformed into a temple for all faiths, refurbished with mosaics and imported tiles, all in honor of Eyadéma. Soon after he became president, many of Eyadéma's childhood friends, a few of his primary school teachers, and most youth in the quarter where he was born (Pya-bas) obtained jobs in **Lomé**, in the latter instance in the **Presidential Guard**. In early 2005, after lying in state in the capital for a month, Eyadéma was laid to rest in the family mausoleum in Pya.

Q

QUADJOVIE, SEMEHO (1934–). Former director general of **Editogo**. Born in **Lomé** on 26 December 1934, and educated locally, Quadjovie worked as a teacher in Ivory Coast between 1954 and 1958 and at home (1959–1961). In 1961, he won a prize that secured him entry to study journalism at the University of Strasbourg. He returned to Lomé in 1965 and joined Editogo with specific responsibilities over **Togo-Presse**, the daily newspaper of Editogo. After moving up to the newspaper’s editorial board, Quadjovie became editor in chief in 1967 and director general of Editogo in 1975, before retiring.

QUAM-DESSOU XIII, ATA. Traditional King (**chief**) of **Aného** between 1922 and 1977 (when he died). Head of the Adjigo clan in competition with the **Lawson** clan, each historically claiming original arrival in the area and hence the right to be superior chiefs of Aného. In 1961, with the concurrence of the major leaders of both clans, the actual title was abolished.

QUARTIER ADMINISTRATIF. Administrative center of **Lomé**, stretching from the coastal road inland to the Octaviano Nétimé quarter that borders the lagoon in the north. Most of the major urban renewal of the 1970s took place on this strip of land, and the area underwent a restoration in the early 2010s. Here you can find the **Hotel 2 Février**, City Hall, and the **Palais de Congrès**.

QUASHIE, MARYSE. Activist and professor. Quashie earned her first PhD in **education** from the University of Paris, and her second in Togo before becoming a faculty member at the **Université de Lomé**. A prominent **Catholic** and one of the founding members of the **Ligue Togolaise de Droits de l’Homme (LTDH)**, Quashie was a member of the presidium of the **National Conference** in 1991. She has served as a leader in a number of civil society organizations, most recently as the spokesperson for the **Forces Vives “Espérance pour le Togo,”** founded in 2018.

R

RADIO DIFFUSION TELEVISION DE LA NOUVELLE MARCHE (RTNM). State television system established in July 1975 at a cost (at that time) of 600 million CFAF, for the barely 2,000 TV sets in the country.

RADIO TOGO. The main state-run radio station, with separate stations for **Lomé** (Radio Lomé) and Kara (Radio Kara). Previously known as Radio de la **Nouvelle Marche**, which was established in 1953, the stations transmit in French and several local **languages**. From 2003 broadcasts have been available online to users around the world.

RAILROADS. Togo's rail service dates to the turn of the 20th century and the **German** colonial era, when the **Chemin De Fer Du Togo (CFT)** combined cargo and passenger services. An estimated 519 km of railway lines reached from **Lomé** in the south as far as **Blitta** in the north, with other shorter tracks along well-traveled routes. In its heyday the CFT carried 1–2 million passengers each year, but the decline of aging rail service in favor of automobiles and buses throughout the region affected Togo as well, and all passenger rail service ceased by the mid-1990s. Talk of a revival happened in 2014, when President **Faure Gnassingbé** unveiled a plan for “Blueline Togo” rail service serving Abidjan, with the support of the **Bolloré** Group (prior to the breaking of the **Bolloré scandal**). Critics called the plan a white elephant, unveiled for the sake of the **2015 presidential election**, though the Blueline remained a feature of Gnassingbé Vision Togo 2030. An improved rail line linking Togo with Burkina Faso could have real economic benefits in supporting the ability of the **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)** to move cargo to Togo's landlocked neighbor, and Togo is facing competition from **Ghana** in railroad construction for the purpose of serving commerce in the interior of the region.

RANDOLPH, EMILE MARC (1940–). Diplomat. Born in **Aného** on 25 April 1940. Educated in Paris, Randolph commenced his career in the foreign ministry with an appointment as head of Economics and Technical

Cooperation Programs in 1963. In 1968, he was transferred to Brussels as counsellor at the Togolese embassy to the **European Economic Community (EEC)**; in 1973, he was shifted to Paris in a similar capacity.

RASSEMBLEMENT DU PEUPLE TOGOLAIS (RPT). General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s political vehicle, and between 1969 and 1991 Togo's single political party. Founded in 1969 after preliminary caucuses in **Kpalimé** (in August) and in **Kara** and a constituent congress in November in **Lomé**. The RPT was originally established as a "national" (i.e., nonethnic) movement with General Eyadéma as president, and **Edem Kodjo** as secretary general. In 1971, a Political Bureau and Central Committee were established, largely out of **Kabyé** apprehensions that under the vigorous drive of Secretary General Kodjo the party was really becoming "national" and might become an alternate source of political power not beholden to Eyadéma. The party's motto was "**La Nouvelle Marche**" (or sometimes, "Le New Deal"), although its original planks were rather vague, primarily referring to the need to mobilize and unite all ethnic groups in the country. The creation of the RPT was very much an effort in the direction of legitimating Eyadéma's rule, though one of the first major pronouncements of the RPT was that the "constitutionalization" of the regime was not yet opportune in light of existing ethnic cleavages that, allegedly, were the reason for the **1967 coup d'état**; the party instead recommended the continuation of the Eyadéma regime and set the groundwork that led to the popular plebiscite that confirmed Eyadéma in power.

The RPT's statutes called for a Congress at least every three years. A women's section the **Union Nationale des Femmes du Togo (UNFT)** and a youth wing **Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Togolaise (UNJT)** were set up in the period 1971–1973, both tightly under the control of the RPT and heavily staffed by either loyal Eyadéma supporters or relatives of the latter's principal political lieutenants. In May 1978, membership (and the paying of dues) became compulsory for all government employees, but this failed to revitalize the moribund party, while the membership dues met only a small part of the fiscal needs of the voracious party hierarchy. In 1976, the RPT Congress had passed several administrative changes to make the party even more beholden to Eyadéma, with all members of the smaller Politburo (9 instead of 15) and Central Committee (22) becoming personal appointees of the president. Militancy was declared as the criteria for all promotion within the party and civil service, and nonparticipation in RPT activities was for the first time equated with disloyalty. This created much sycophancy and a phalanx of yes men, hiding corruption and inefficiency that finally emerged into the limelight in the late 1970s. By 1981, the economic situation was catastrophic. A series of purges at the highest levels of the party toppled key figures of

the past, including former Eyadéma lieutenants of long standing. In 1982, it was also announced that much of the **state sector** would be denationalized if **private** buyers could be found. A long list of such companies scheduled for dismantling was published, though the process of closing down companies, selling them off, or restructuring them has been a very long, drawn out one. However, the early attempts to manage corruption, coupled with an established willingness to engage with free-market principles, helped the RPT to survive the wave of democratization in Africa that came after the 1989 fall of the Soviet Union and toppled many surviving Marxist-Leninist one-party states, including neighboring **Benin**'s. *See also* KPALIMÉ CONGRESS, 1971; RASSEMBLEMENT DU PEUPLE TOGOLAIS (RPT) CONGRESS (SIXTH), 3 DECEMBER 1982.

The convening of the **National Conference** marked an end of an era for the RPT. The party and its ancillary organizations were headquartered in the imposing **Maison du Peuple** in Lomé until the social upheavals of 1991, when in June the National Conference renamed the latter Maison de l'Unité and the RPT was dissolved. (It survived, just as Eyadéma was to bounce back to power.) Many Southerners and other non-**Kabyé** collaborators deserted the RPT to publicly castigate the party, regime, and Eyadéma and to set up their own political vehicles. Though the conference stripped Eyadéma of most executive powers in 1992, he was able to force interim Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** to set up a coalition government with his RPT (with the latter securing six of the 18 ministries, including the most important). The dominance of the RPT was only meaningfully challenged after the **Assemblée Nationale (AN) elections of 1994**, when they failed to win an outright majority (until strategic by-elections to reconcile "irregularities" rectified that situation). From that time, redistricting and revising electoral lists have given the more sparsely populated north a disproportionate share of the electoral districts, ensuring victory for the RPT even though the bulk of their support comes from the north, rather than the densely populated south. In April 2012, the RPT dissolved at the final party conference in **Blitta**, while at the same time the new, replacement **Union pour la République (UNIR)** was inaugurated in **Atakpamé**. President **Faure Gnassingbé** clearly had to work against the disapproval of certain RPT stalwarts, and against the legacy of his own father, in making this move, but he understood that the party had too many negative associations to be an effective vehicle for moving forward. The decisive **2015** victory of UNIR in the **legislative elections**—winning 62 of the 91 seats in an expanded AN—seemed to endorse this view.

RPT CONGRESS (SIXTH), 3 DECEMBER 1982. Important RPT Congress convened in **Lomé** with a specific mandate to examine Togo's

crumbling **state sector** that was dragging the state to national bankruptcy. A favorite sinecure posting for former high officials since the 1970s, the state sector had become bloated, eminently unprofitable, and corruption-ridden. The RPT decided at its meeting to immediately dissolve several companies and place several others on strict probation, ordering their dissolution unless they turned in profits within three months. One state company, **Togoroute**, was **privatized**. Most of the RPT recommendations were not followed through with until years later. *See also* PARASTATALS.

REFERENDUM OF 1956 (FRENCH TOGOLAND). In October 1956, the **French administration** in Togo held a referendum over the issue of whether Togo was to remain a UN Trusteeship Territory or become an **Autonomous Republic** within the French Union. Fearing the panafricanist appeal of Nkrumah's neighboring **Ghana** and the pan-Ewe sentiments rife on both sides of the Ghana-Togo border, the French administration "assisted" in the victory of the Autonomous Republic option, with **Nicolas Grunitzky** emerging as the leader of the republic. Sixty percent of **Lomé's** voters (and 30% in the entire south) did not vote, many heeding the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** appeal for a boycott on the grounds that the referendum was not being supervised by the United Nations and that its results would be falsified. In 1958, France was forced to allow United Nations-supervised elections (on 27 April) in which Nicolas Grunitzky was solidly defeated and **Sylvanus Olympio's** CUT party won 29 of the 46 seats in the **Chambre des Députés**.

REFERENDUM OF 1992. The referendum of 27 September 1992, was on the issue of a return to a multiparty civilian rule and a new **constitution**. All the political parties campaigned for a yes vote, and 98.11 percent of the people ratified a return to civilian rule and the new constitution of the **Fourth Republic**. The latter set up a semi-presidential system with a separation of powers and a head of state elected for five years.

REFUGEES. Above and beyond the usual movement of peoples across West African borders for social or economic reasons, some individuals and groups in Togo may flee the country over land for political reasons, usually fleeing persecution or retribution as a result of opposition to the ruling party. The largest such movement was the wave of some 200,000 refugees from Togo escaping the violence during the troubled political transition of 1993. Many returned, only to flee again as the protracted struggle continued through 1994. By 1997, the UNHCR reported 20,000 Togolese refugees still remained in **Ghana** and **Benin** from this earlier wave. The violence following the **2005 elections** that brought **Faure Gnassingbé** to power prompted at least 40,000

Togolese to flee the country. Togo also sometimes hosts refugees from Ghana or Benin, particularly the former during times of political or ethnic strife.

REGIMENT INTER-ARME TOGOLAIS (RIAT). Historically an elite ultra-loyalist, mostly northern, rapid intervention force, part of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** bulwark against opposition. Today they are known as Regiments Inter Armes (RI) and numbered an estimated 1,400 in 2010.

REGIONS. Postindependence **administrative** units into which Togo is divided. There were four such regions originally: **Maritime**, **Plateaux**, **Centrale**, and **Savanes**; a fifth “economic” region was set up in 1967, **La Kara**, later greatly expanded and transformed into a fifth full-fledged political division. The regions are subdivided into prefectures, and most recently further subdivided into communes.

RELIGION. The estimated religious breakdown of the Togolese population is 35 percent animist, 14 percent **Muslim** and 43 percent **Christian**; the latter figure is composed of 26 percent **Catholics** and 17 percent **Protestants**, based on 2016 estimates. The Muslim population is, as elsewhere in Black Africa, probably underestimated, while the Christian affiliation estimates may be somewhat inflated.

RESERVE DE FAUNE DU SARAKAWA. *See* NATIONAL PARKS.

RESERVE DE LA KERAN. A national reserve along the western side of Togo's north-south road axis, north of Naboulgouto **Mango**, and between the Oti and Kamougou Rivers. It is the largest such park in Togo. *See also* NATIONAL PARKS.

REVENDEUSES. Retail merchants, mostly **women**, that at one point constituted fully one-third of Togo's working population and were a prime economic power in **Lomé**. Also known colloquially as **Nana Benz**, many of Lomé's revendeuses were extremely prosperous prior to the 1990s, involved in long distance import-export, the profitable **smuggling** activities between **Ghana** and Togo, and in the retail textile trade. President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** went out of his way to appease and assure Lomé's revendeuses of the government's intentions not to change the country's liberal import-export code, thus cultivating the political support of this extremely important and influential interest group.

RÉVOLTE DES LOMÉENS. *See* LOMÉ INCIDENTS OF 1933.

S

SAFIOU, MOHAMED DJIBRIL EL HADJ. Religious leader and first president of the **Union Musulmane du Togo (UMT)**. A former deputy to the **Chambre de Députés** and its vice president, Safiou had fallen out with President **Sylvanus Olympio** and been imprisoned in the far north at the time of the **1963 coup d'état**. A **Kotokoli Muslim** with a significant following, he was appointed head of the nascent UMT in 1963. Safiou came under attack for his quasi-dictatorial leadership traits and was ousted in a bitter internal upheaval in 1970. He then retired from the union, engaging in teaching and various religious activities for the remainder of his life.

SAGBO, FELIX-KODJO. Minister of interior from May 1994 in the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**—**Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** coalition government headed by **Edem Kodjo**. From 2012, he has been ambassador of Togo to Belgium, the European Union, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Holy See.

SALAMI, ABDOULAYE (1935–). **Trade unionist** and former secretary general of the **Union Nationale des Travailleurs Togolais (UNTT)**. Born in **Bassar** in 1935 to a Nigerian **Yoruba** father and a Togolese mother, Salami was educated locally (in **Sokodé** and **Lomé**) and in **France**, where he studied telecommunications. Immediately after his return to Togo, Salami joined trade union activities, becoming secretary general of the Postal and Telecommunications Workers' Union. A very popular figure among unionists, Salami presented his candidacy for the leadership of Togo's main trade union, the UNTT, and in 1968 at the age of 33, he defeated the incumbent, Innocent Toovi, becoming secretary general of the union. A former opponent of the **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** regime, Salami was denied entry into Togo when he tried to attend the Sixth Congress of the union in Lomé in May 1968; only the threat of a paralyzing general strike made the government change its mind and relent. He was definitively deported out of the country in the 1970s—after being arrested and tortured by the regime—on the grounds that he was

Nigerian. For much of the 1970s, Salami was involved in wider unionist activities, mostly abroad. An implacable foe of Eyadéma, Eyadéma's secret service tried to kidnap him from **Ghana** in 1977, but were not successful.

SALAMI, AMOUSSA (1938–). Former minister of equipment, public works, and housing. Born on 18 September 1938, in **Mango** and educated in **Lomé** and at the University of Dakar in physical education, Salami proceeded to study for a degree in civil aeronautical engineering at the School of Aviation of Toulouse (1966–1968). Upon his return home, he was promptly appointed director of Aviation (1970–1977), and in 1977 he joined the cabinet. Later, Salami was injured in a car crash and dropped from the cabinet.

SALINES DU TOGO. *See* SOCIÉTÉ DE SALINES DU TOGO.

SAMA, KOFFI (1938–). Prime minister of Togo. Sama is of **Kotokoli** origins, born at Amoutchou in Ogou prefecture and trained as a teacher. He was elected to the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)** in 1979, and went on to hold other important political and economic roles in Togo, such as secretary general of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, cabinet minister in the early 1980s and general director of the **Société Togolaise du Coton (SOTOCO)**, 1990–1996. **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** appointed him prime minister in 2002, and he held that position at the time of Eyadéma's death in 2005, announcing the “national catastrophe” to the nation in a televised address. After **Faure Gnassingbé** was elected president, he left the post and was succeeded by **Edem Kodjo**. He continued to wield influence in the political system, acting as a special advisor to Gnassingbé and leading the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** observer mission for the Malian presidential election of 2007. Thought to be a close confidant of the current president, he has served as an official counselor to the presidency in recent governments.

SAMA, KOSSI. Doctor and political party leader. Secretary general of the **Parti National Panafricain (PNP)** of charismatic leader Tikpi Atchadam. Sama served as the spokesperson for the elusive Atchadam from early in the party's history. At the height of party activism, Dr. Sama was arrested with two dozen other PNP supporters in August 2017 in **Lomé** after a banned protest. He was sentenced to 18 months in prison, but served three, reporting that he was beaten by security forces of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** while detained. He was pardoned by President **Faure Gnassingbé** in November, as part of an agreement to begin talks between government and opposition.

SAMAROU, ISSA ALASSANI. Political leader and cabinet minister. First joining the cabinet of the **transition government** of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** in September 1991 as minister of industry and state corporations, Samarou was retained through the latter's third transition government. Samarou, then a leader of the **Parti d'Action pour le Développement (PAD)**, was dropped from the cabinet in February 1993. He was later one of the vice presidents of **Edem Kodjo's Convergence Patriotique Panafricaine (CPP)**, going on to serve as minister of industry in the unity government formed under Kodjo in 2005.

SAMAROU, ISSA EL HADJ. Influential **Lomé** trader and entrepreneur. Of **Kotokoli** origins, Samari owned extensive property in Togo (including several movie theaters in **Sokodé, Kpalimé, Kara, and Dapaong**), numerous buildings, and a trucking fleet involved in both internal and external trade.

SAMAROU, SAIBOU. Son of influential **Lomé** trader and entrepreneur **El Hadj Issa Samarou**, Saibou Samarou was a businessperson in **France** until the mid-1990s when he returned to Togo and was elected a deputy of the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in 1999. Appointed secretary of state in the government of **Koffi Adoboli**, he was swept up in the embezzlement scandal that took down Adoboli's government and forced to resign, eventually becoming one of three (including Adoboli) convicted in absentia.

SANI, ABDOULAYE (1888–1970). One of the most famous **Chokossi** imams of **Sansanne-Mango**, under whose leadership the Chokossi solidified their **Muslim** affiliation. Raised and educated in a Koranic school, Sani was a trader for many years, traveling to **Benin, Burkina Faso, and Ghana** before settling down as a Koranic teacher in Sansanne-Mango in 1921. He acquired great renown as a devout Muslim and in 1929 was elevated to the imamship that he was to occupy for the next 41 years. Sani was extremely active as a Muslim proselytizer, spreading the faith to neighboring ethnic groups as well as serving as a cultural anchor for the Chokossi, who were undergoing major socioeconomic change at the time.

SANKAREDJA, MARTIN. Former minister of **education**. Of **Moba** origins, Sankaredja was born in **Dapaong** in the north and worked as a teacher at a local **Catholic** mission. A member of **Sylvanus Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, Sankaredja was appointed minister of education in May 1959 and held that position for four years until the **coup d'état of 1963**. After the coup, he became director of the **Sociétés Régionales de Développement et d'Amenagement (SORAD)** branch in the **Savanes** region and,

following the **1967 coup**, he was briefly the first president of the **Conseil Economique et Social**, relinquishing the post to **Gervais Djonjo** in October 1968, though remaining a member. Following this, Sankaredja moved out of the public limelight, taking up teaching and commerce until his retirement.

SANSANNE-MANGO. Northern Togolese town (estimated population about 38,000 and one of the ten largest towns in the country) that was capital of the precolonial **Chokossi** kingdom. The town's name comes from the **Hausa** words for "war camp" (Sansanni) and the Mande name for the Anno, founders of the town and kingdom around 1765. The actual inhabitants, the Chokossi, call the town and region N'zara, and their **chiefs** claim descent from the ruling Kong clan in Côte d'Ivoire. Most of Togo's Chokossi are found in the Oti region, where the Anoufou dialect and **Muslim** religion are widely prevalent. Since the kingdom straddled the kola nut routes and was in close contact with Hausaland to the east, there is an important Hausa element in Sansanne-Mango.

SANTOS, ANANI IGNATIO. Former minister of justice and leader of the **Juvento** party. Of **Brazilian-Ewe** origins, Santos was born in **Aného** on 3 February 1912 and was educated locally and at the University of Paris (on one of **France's** first scholarships to Togolese), where he obtained a law degree, thus becoming one of Francophone Africa's first lawyers. (His PhD thesis, defended in 1943, was on the possibility of France's **assimilation policy** solving Africa's problems.) Santos gained a great deal of fame for his defense of the leaders of the bloody 1947 uprising in Madagascar (and similar individuals and events), and he appeared before the United Nations in 1954 and 1957 to plead for the independence of Togo. An early member of **Sylvanus Olympio's Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** and the leader of the latter's more militant Juvento youth wing, Santos was elected to the **Chambre de Députés** in 1958 and shortly after became Olympio's minister of justice, **transport**, and commerce (May 1958–June 1959). In June 1959, he resigned from the cabinet and led Juvento out of the CUT, becoming one of Olympio's sharpest critics. In April 1961—as the CUT began cracking down on all sources of opposition—Santos forged an alliance between the Juvento and the northern parties in the country, which was disqualified from competing against the CUT in that year's elections. Shortly thereafter Togo became a de facto one-party state, and Santos and all other opposition leaders were imprisoned under harsh conditions in **Sansanne-Mango**. Released after the **1963 coup d'état** and called to participate in the post-coup **Nicolas Grunitzky** four-cornered coalition, Santos was prevented from assuming a political role because of his broken health, though his party joined the

coalition. Abroad for some time after the 1963 coup, Santos was appointed to the **Comité Constitutionnel** following the 1967 military takeover by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, and went on to practice law.

SANTOS, MICHEL ADJAI (1930–). Former international journalist. Born in **Lomé** on 7 May 1930 and educated at the **Catholic** Mission School in **Lomé** and at a lycée in Dakar, Senegal, Santos acquired his higher **education** at the University of Paris (1956–1959), obtaining also additional diplomas in Paris. He served as program producer for the Voice of America in Paris between 1962 and 1965 and later (1965–1967) as program producer for the Voice of America in Liberia. Between 1967 and 1970, he served in a similar capacity with the Voice of Germany, when he was appointed information officer with the UN Economic Commission for Africa based in Addis Ababa.

SANVÉE, MAJOR KOUAO STEPHEN. Former commander of the Second Battalion of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**. Of **Mina** origins and linked to the influential **Brazilian** families, Sanvée was a lieutenant and head of the General Services Administration of the armed forces in 1971. In 1974 he was promoted to captain and two years later to major. He was involved in the anti-**Gnassingbé Eyadéma** mercenary **plot of 1977**. Arrested and severely tortured at the time, he was sentenced to death for his role in the conspiracy, though his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and in 1985 he was pardoned.

SARAKAWA MAUSOLEUM. Part of the Eyadéma **Personality Cult**, the small Sarakawa village, in the **La Kara** region, is the site of the 24 January 1974 crash of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s plane. Allegedly a conspiracy by **French** expatriate interests fearful of impending nationalization of the coastal **phosphate** works (an act that came in retaliation for their alleged attempt to liquidate Eyadéma), Eyadéma's alleged miraculous escape from the crash landing is commemorated in Sarakawa. A virtual shrine for members of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** and **Kabyé** ethnic group, a monument was erected in the exact spot of the crash (including parts of the original plane as well). The village is otherwise known for its sacrifices and dances in the rainy season in honor of its founder priestess, though the name "Sarakawa" is synonymous with this incident in Togo, and roads and hotels have also borne the name in commemoration. *See also* EYADÉMA'S PLANE CRASHES.

SATCHIVI, FOLY. **Human rights** activist and former leader of the **Ligue Togolaise des Droits des Étudiants (LTDE)**. In 2017 and 2018, he

organized meetings of students to air grievances against the **Université de Lomé**, and he and other leaders of the organization were repeatedly detained and released by authorities. He later formed his own human rights group, d'En Aucun Cas. Folly was arrested and tried in August 2018 for inciting rebellion, and in January 2019 he was convicted and sentenced to four years in prison. Though his appeals were unsuccessful, his case was publicized by international human rights groups and he ultimately granted a pardon by President **Faure Gnassingbé** in October 2019.

SAUVONS LE TOGO. *See* COLLECTIF SAUVONS LE TOGO (CST).

SAVANES. Northern region with administrative headquarters in **Sansanne-Mango** and encompassing the prefectures of Oti and Tone (prior to 1981 known as Mango and Dapango). The region covers 8,130 square kilometers and, prior to the 1967 creation of the economic region of **La Kara**, stretched even further south. The population of the Savanes is composed mostly of **Lamba**, **Chokossi**, **Kabyé**, **Fulani**, and other groups, including **Mossi** from Burkina Faso. The main cash crops are **cotton** and peanuts.

SAVI DE TOVÉ, BIBI YAO BRUNO JOHN EMMANUEL. Administrator and diplomat. Born in **Lomé** on 17 August 1922, Savi de Tové was educated locally and at the **École William Ponty** in Dakar, after which he joined the **French colonial administration** to serve in postings in Togo (1943–1952), with the Guinean Treasury (1952), in Senegal (1952–1958), and in Mali (1958–1967), where he was inspector of finances. Returning to Togo in 1967, Savi de Tové was appointed ambassador to West Germany and ambassador to **Ghana** in 1976. In February 1978, he returned to Lomé to become minister of justice in **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cabinet but was dropped in March 1980 to become a technical consultant in the ministry of foreign affairs until his retirement.

SAVI DE TOVÉ, JONATHAN (1895–1971). One of Togo's towering personalities. Born in Tové (near **Tsévié**) to an influential family on 15 August 1895, Savi de Tové started his adult life as a lawyer's clerk in Cameroon, and eventually became **German Governor** Ebermayer's personal secretary. After a trip to Germany (in 1918), Savi de Tové returned to Togo to become an instructor of **languages** and later school director of the **Protestant** mission in Togo (1920–1928). He was the principal assistant of **Diedrich Westermann**, the famous linguist, in the compilation and codification of the **Evegbé** grammar. In 1928, Savi de Tové became secretary of the **Conseil de Notables** of **Lomé**, and in 1934 he was one of the first appointments to Lomé's Municipal

Council. Already an extremely influential and well-off merchant, his official standing and pro-**French** sentiments focused popular resentments upon him that burst out during the **Lomé incidents of 1933** and resulted in the burning of his house. In 1941 he cofounded the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, and following World War II, Savi de Tové was elected to Togo's first Assembly, the **Assemblée Représentative du Togo (ART)**, and continued serving as Deputy for 17 years until the **1963 coup d'état**. A strong pan-Ewe nationalist, Savi de Tové cooperated with Daniel Chapman and the latter's **All-Ewe Conference** and Ewe Newsletter. Also an expert on various African and European languages (including French, German, Spanish, and English), Savi de Tové remained a renowned professor of linguistics while also serving as a diplomat, to West Germany 1961–1964, inter alia. During the **Nicolas Grunitzky** presidency, Savi de Tové was mostly locked out of power and positions of influence.

SAVI DE TOVÉ, KWASSI JEAN-LUCIEN (1939–). Opposition leader. Savi de Tové, a member of the famous southern family, was consistently an opponent of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and was jailed in 1979 for nine years for a conspiracy against Eyadéma. On his release, he went to **France**. In May 1991, during political liberalization, he returned to set up a political party, the **Parti de Démocrates pour l'Unité (PDU)**, aligned with **Gilchrist Olympio**. In March 1993, he was selected by a segment of the opposition parties (then organized as **Collectif d'Opposition Démocratique** or **COD-2**) as their candidate for the prime ministership instead of **Joseph Koffigoh**, by this time regarded in the south as a collaborationist. In the **1994 parliamentary elections**, Savi de Tové did not even qualify to run for election in the second round in his own district. In 1999, Savi de Tové's PDU joined with **Edem Kodjo's Union Togolaise pour la Démocratie (UTD)** and others to form the new **Convergence patriotique panafricain (CPP)**, which has struggled to find electoral support in legislative contests. In successive governments headed by Edem Kodjo in 2005 and **Yao Agboyibo** in 2006 he was named minister of trade and industry. Once the **Cadre permanent de dialogue et de concertation (CPDC)** was created to fulfill the goals of the **Accord Politique Global (APG)**, Savi de Tové was named the body's president in 2009.

SCHUPPUIS, KODJO-ELLOM WILLIAM (1938–). Diplomat and ambassador of Togo to the United States. Born on 10 June 1938, in **Aného**, Schuppuiis was educated locally and in Douala, Cameroon. He continued his studies in law and political science at the University of Paris until 1969. Returning to Togo, he first served as deputy of the Administrative Department

of the Foreign Ministry (1970–1972), following which he was appointed first counselor at Togo’s Mission to the United Nations. In 1977, he was reassigned to Brussels as Togolese ambassador to the **European Economic Community (EEC)**, and in July 1983 he was appointed ambassador to the United States, remaining in that post through 1992.

SCHUTZGEBIET TOGO. German for Togo Protectorate, official name during the **German colonial administration**.

SENATE. Though provided for in the **1992 constitution**, Togo’s Senate has not yet been established, making Togo a de facto unicameral system, with the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** as the only legislative body. According to Article 52 of the 1992 constitution, the Senate was supposed to include members elected from each of Togo’s administrative regions (2/3) and members appointed by the president of the Republic (1/3), to serve five-year terms. As a body, they were to deliberate on bills having to do with territorial administration, law and finance, before the other chamber, the AN, would pass the bill. However, if the Senate had not weighed in during the stipulated time, the Assembly could move forward on the bill without their opinion. As a consultative body, therefore, the Senate was nonessential, and the enabling legislation to create the Senate was never passed. The **constitutional amendments of 2019** included revisions to Article 52, adding former presidents to the list of members (for life), and changing the term of senators to six years with two-term limits. Moreover, the constitution now stipulates that former presidents (automatically Senators) cannot be investigated, arrested, or detained for any act taken during their term as president. While the procedure for Senate contributions to legislation is the same, given the nature of electoral districts in Togo, the changes in mandate and membership appear to favor the ruling party having greater representation in the legislative branch of government, and offer any president who may wish to (or be forced to) step down a secure way to transition from the highest office to a more honorary position in the Senate, accompanied by full immunity. The Senate is slated to be established in 2020, though it is unclear whether legislative elections for both chambers will take place at the same time, now that AN deputies also have six-year terms. The next legislative **election** would ordinarily take place in December 2023.

SEYBOU FOFONA, HARIMIAOU EL HADJ (1892–1976). Religious leader and educator. Born a **Tchamba** of a Guinean grandfather who married into Chamba royalty, Seybou Fofona was influenced by the Tidjaniya sect of **Islam** and consequently began to travel extensively in Africa and the Middle

East. He undertook six years of intensive religious studies in Beirut, Lebanon and then moved and settled down in Sokoto, Nigeria, Mauritania, and Morocco. Later he also traveled to India, Italy, Turkey, and British Palestine. At home, he became Imam of the **Lomé Hausa** community as well as leader of the Hausa of Kandi, North Benin, where he maintained a Koranic school. Seybou Fofona died in Kandi on 6 January 1976.

SHELL-TOGO. Company that operated filling stations in Togo as well as the **Société Togolaise de Stockage de Lomé (STSL)**, and the **Complex Pétroleum du Lomé (COMPEL)**. Shell-Togo was taken over by the Togolese government in 2017. After Shell announced in 2010 their plans to divest from 21 African countries including Togo, the government of **Faure Gnassingbé** slowed the company's exit over the terms of shared assets. After protracted negotiations, the Shell-Togo facilities were taken over by the state-run **Togo Invest Corporation**.

SHIARI. *See* FETISHISTS.

SIDI TOURE, DJIBRILLA (1928–1973). Surgeon and former ambassador to **France**. Born in **Sokodé** and of **Kotokoli** origins, Sidi Toure studied medicine and surgery abroad and, upon his return to Togo, became resident surgeon at Sokodé's hospital and municipal councilor of Sokodé. In September 1965, he interrupted his medical career to become Togo's ambassador to France and the **European Economic Community (EEC)**, positions he held until March 1968. He died several years later in 1973.

SIMILSI. *See* FULANI.

SIMTEKPEATI, MICHEL (1927–2001). Educator, diplomat, and former cabinet minister. Born in 1927 in Patatoukou, Simtekpeati studied political science and **languages**, graduating with a doctorate. He first taught at various schools in **Ghana** (1948–1952) and Liberia (also 1948–1952), and served for two years in an administrative position with the French embassy in Monrovia (1957–1959). After completing his studies in Paris, Simtekpeati taught English at a Lycée in Munster (1964–1965), served the next two years with the Liberian Foreign Ministry, and was appointed head of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)'s Social Affairs Section (1966–1968), with headquarters in Addis Ababa. In 1968, Simtekpeati was appointed Togo's ambassador to Ghana, following which he became technical councilor at the Foreign Ministry. In mid-1975, he was brought into the cabinet as minister of youth and sports but was reassigned to technical duties in the Foreign Ministry in

1978. After teaching a few years in Northern Togo, he retired, and passed away in **France** in 2001.

SIO RIVER DAM. Inaugurated in January 1980 after two years of construction, the dam, ten kilometers west of **Tsévié**, irrigates 660 hectares of land, making it suitable for rice cultivation. Part of the **Chinese** effort in Togo, the dam's construction cost 5,000 million CFAF. Its construction involved a team of 360 Togolese and 61 Chinese workers and technicians.

SIVOMEY, MARIE (1923–2008). Former mayor of **Lomé**. Born in **Aného** on 3 July 1923, with the maiden name of Gbikpi, Sivomey was educated locally and in Porto Novo, **Benin**. She then entered the **French colonial administration** and served first in Togo and then in Burkina Faso (1953–1958), returning to Togo in 1959. Between 1959 and 1964, she continued working in the higher echelons of the civil service, but in 1964 she was purged (on political grounds) from her post as principal administrative secretary of the Direction des Finances. Following the **1967 coup d'état**, she made a comeback and was personally appointed mayor of Lomé by General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**; according to some sources, she was the first **woman** to serve in such a post in sub-Saharan Africa. An able administrator, Sivomey was also Togo's delegate to the UN General Assembly's 16th and 17th sessions. In mid-1974, she was dropped from Lomé's mayoralty and appointed to an administrative position in the ministry of interior. She passed away in 2008.

SLAVE COAST. Geographic stretch of the coast of West Africa, which historically large numbers of slave ships visited to purchase slaves from native middlemen. The "Coast" is conventionally defined as the region between the Volta River (in **Ghana**) and Lagos (Nigeria) or in effect the mostly coastal regions controlled by the **Adja** or **Ewe** people, whose principal kingdoms were Ouidah, Allada, and Dahomey, all currently in **Benin**.

SMUGGLING. Once considered a major problem in many African states, smuggling is the illegal transfer of crops and luxury goods across state borders. Smuggling activities often reflect (a) the persistence of traditional precolonial trade routes and commercial networks, (b) weak control over their territorial boundaries by African states, and (c) the enhanced profit motive in a situation where borders separate countries with radically different import/export policies and taxation systems. Smuggling activities in Togo were greatly encouraged when neighboring **Ghana** consistently imposed strict import policies and high import tariffs alongside Togo's extremely liberal policies before

the 1990s. Consequently, large quantities of Ghanaian **agricultural** goods were smuggled into Togo and exchanged for low-priced European imports (watches, liquor, cigarettes, etc.), which were then smuggled back to Ghana where they fetched high prices. **Coffee** and **cocoa** are primary commodities produced in Togo and Ghana that may fetch a different price at different times on different sides of the border, making it worthwhile to **transport** them across to sell, and the authorities (if not complicit) would have no way of distinguishing the origin. Despite half-hearted efforts at different times on the part of both Ghana and Togo to stop the illicit trade, smuggling activities have continued by land and by canoe. More recently, **gold** has been smuggled from Burkina Faso to Togo, becoming one of Togo's most valuable export commodities despite the absence of any commercial gold mining sector in the country. Since the 2000s, a greater concern along the borders has been **trafficking** in stolen or illegal goods through Togo to other destinations, as these activities are less likely to benefit the domestic Togolese producers and consumers as compared to the smuggling of crops, and they bring far greater risk of associated violence.

SOCIÉTÉ AGRICOLE TOGOLAISE-ARABE-LIBYENNE (SATAL). Joint company set up in Togo in 1978 with Togolese and **Libyan** capital (1.4 million CFAF equally shared), aimed at **agricultural** development and especially the setting up of experimental farms and the production, processing, and marketing of agricultural goods.

SOCIÉTÉ DES CEMENTS DU TOGO (CIMTOGO). *See* CEMENTS DU TOGO.

SOCIÉTÉ DES POSTES DU TOGO (SPT). State-run postal service established in 1995 as a separate entity with the breakup of the **Office des Postes et Télécommunications du Togo (OPTT)**. The SPT offers mail service (via post office boxes rather than residential delivery) and **banking** at offices throughout the country.

SOCIÉTÉ DES PRODUITS LAITIERS DU TOGO (SOPROLAIT). Originally a small **state sector** company producing milk products for the Togolese and neighboring markets. Set up in 1981 with a capacity of producing 360 tons of cheese annually, SOPROLAIT was sold off to Danish interests in 1985 as part of the **privatization** drive.

SOCIÉTÉ DES SALINES DU TOGO (SALINTO). Former **state sector** company mining Togo's salt deposits. In 1981, the company produced 600

tons of salt, selling its entire product on the local market. The company was both deficit-ridden and inherently unprofitable, despite several major infusions of capital. Keen competition from both foreign and local suppliers and inefficient operations at the plant made SALINTO a constant money loser. The company closed down in 1983, after the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) Congress of 1982** edict to eliminate unprofitable companies from the state sector, and after a prolonged search for someone to purchase the company, it was **privatized** in 1987.

SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DES MOULINS DU TOGO (SGMT). Wheat grinding plant in Togo, located near the **Lomé port**. Set up in 1971 with 45 percent Togolese state capital and 55 percent foreign private funds, total capital investments were 750 million CFAF. The company had the capacity to produce 420 tons per day, and in 2014 was bought by SOMDIAA, an international agro-industry conglomerate specializing in wheat and sugar, with branches in many African countries.

SOCIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE DE PRÉPARATIONS ALIMENTAIRES (SIPAL). **Parastatal** confectionary company set up on 23 April 1975, with an initial modest capitalization of five million CFAF, later increased to 22 million (1977). It was a partnership of Togolese, Burkinabe, and **French** investors, producing confectionary from wholly imported raw materials. Later renamed SIPAL LUDO SA, it currently produces pasta and other foodstuffs.

SOCIÉTÉ INTERAFRICAINNE DE BANQUE (SIAB). Formerly Banque Arabe-Libyenne Togolaise du Commerce Extérieur (BALTEX), a joint Togolese-**Libyan** bank (with 50% equity on the part of each partner) set up in 1975 and active from January 1977. The bank doubled its working capital by the end of its first year and pumped some US\$ 5.6 million into Togolese development projects. It has financed the building of a banking center in **Lomé**, the expansion of **Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin (COT-OMIB)** facilities, and in funding the various joint companies set up by Togo and Libya under their accords of technical cooperation. In 1991, the bank's name was changed to Société Interafricaine de Banques (SIAB), though with the same partners and equity. In 2017, SIAB was acquired by the Wari group, headed by Kabirou Mbodje, Senegalese mobile banking mogul and equestrian champion, as a means to capitalize on Togo's otherwise lagging mobile banking opportunities.

SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE DES CHEMINS DE FER DU TOGO (SNCT).
See CHEMIN DE FER DU TOGO (CFT).

SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE DE COMMERCE (SONACOM). Former **state sector** agency established on 29 November 1972 to replace the Société Togolaise d'Exportation et d'Importation with 2,000 million CFAF capitalization. SONACOM had a total monopoly over the sale of certain basic staples within Togo, and expanded progressively to cover all food and industrial products. Its director general, operating under the minister of commerce, was first Germain Choukroun and later **Maurice Assor**. SONACOM's monopoly over certain products was abolished in December 1988, and its activities came under greater scrutiny when it was revealed at the 1991 **National Conference** that the company had become a major conduit for illegal transactions on behalf of General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**.

SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE DE SIDERURGIE (SNS). Former **state sector** steel factory. Located in the **Port of Lomé**, the SNS's founding stone was laid on 13 January 1977, to commemorate the economic independence of Togo. The plant commenced operations exactly two years later, but immediately encountered major technical problems and being utterly inefficient to operate had to be shut down for three months. Scheduled to produce 20,000 tons of steel yearly, with plans to expand production by 1984 to 80,000 tons (via a second branch at Bandjeli, site of local iron ore deposits), the factory worked at less than 37 percent capacity. It piled up monumental deficits and was closed down in 1982. Its flagship role as leader of the "heavy industry" sector of Togo gained it a reprieve in 1983, and it was allowed to reopen conditionally, subject to rectifying its balance sheet. It was incapable of doing so, working at 25 percent of capacity, and was closed down again. Its 12-ton electrical steel making furnace, for example, was too costly to operate all along, it being cheaper by far to import steel billets for the rolling mill than to produce them locally.

The company became the first major one in the state sector to be **privatized** when it was leased in 1984 for ten years at US\$ 250,000 a year to an American entrepreneur (John Moore), who reopened the plant with only 140 of its original 300 workers and immediately turned a profit. It changed its name to **Société Togolaise de Siderurgie (STS)**.

SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE DE TRANSPORTS ROUTIERS (TOGOROUTE). Originally a **parastatal** company involved in long distance trucking. Set up in **Lomé** in 1976 with 250 million CFAF capital (60% from the state, the rest from abroad) the company was **privatized** in 1986, becoming a private enterprise under the sole name of Togoroute.

SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE D'INVESTISSEMENT ET FOND ANNEXES (SNIT & FA). **State sector** organ established in mid-1972 with 300 million

CFAF capital (later, 500 million) for the purpose of encouraging foreign investments in Togolese enterprises and industry.

SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE POUR LA RENOVATION ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE LA CACAOYERE ET DE LA CAFEIERRE TOGOLAISES (SRCC). State agency created on 14 June 1973, in charge of modernizing Togo's **agricultural** crops—**coffee** and **cocoa**. Among the specific tasks of the SRCC were the regeneration of 10,500 hectares of plantations and the planting of new crops on a further 29,000 hectares. By 1978, it had rehabilitated 15,000 hectares of cocoa land. It employed some 480 workers in its heyday and was assisted by the French **Institut de Recherche du Cacao et du Café (IRCC)** and **Institut de Recherches Agronomiques Tropicales (IRAT)**. It was dismantled as part of the liberalizations of the 1990s.

SOCIÉTÉ NOUVELLE DES PHOSPHATES DU TOGO (SNPT). State-owned and operated **phosphate mining** company established in 2007 to replace **IFG-Togo** and attempt to make this important economic sector live up to its potential after years of mismanagement. The state made significant new investments from 2010 to improve facilities and boost production to attract investment, rather than waiting for international investors to recognize the hidden potential. Those efforts have paid off in increased production, back up to around 1–1.5 million tons per year from a low of 800,000 tons in 2009. Unhealthy and difficult working conditions for the some 1,500 SNPT employees, low wages, and low living standards in the towns around the mines led to a series of strikes from 2013 to 2016, when a settlement was reached promising improvements on the part of SNPT, and a guarantee of no strikes for at least four years. In 2015, a US\$ 1.4 billion investment from Elenilto, an Israeli company, and supported by the **Chinese** concern Wengfu, was slated to expand facilities for carbonate phosphate with the goal of producing a combined 5 million tons per year of phosphate, fertilizer, and phosphoric acid. *See also* PARASTALS; PRIVATIZATION.

SOCIÉTÉ PIERRES ORNEMENTALES ET MARBRES DU TOGO (POMAR-Togo). *See* MARBLE.

SOCIÉTÉ TOGOLAISE DE BOISSONS (STB). Former **state sector** enterprise established in 1970 to produce soft drinks and other beverages. By 1981, STB had invested 350 million CFAF and had a turnover of 3,000 million CFAF. As part of its activities, STB also distributed products of the **Brasserie du Benin**. STB operates in **Lomé** and employs 149 workers. The

company was **privatized** and streamlined under **French** management in 1990, and the state now has only a 25 percent equity. *See also* PARASTALS.

SOCIÉTÉ TOGOLAISE DE L'HOTELLERIE (STH). Former **state sector** organ that owned most large hotels in Togo. Set up as part of a massive expansion of **tourist** facilities in Togo in the 1970s aimed at satisfying a significant tourist boom. By 1980 the boom had ended, causing acute fiscal squeezes on STH. By 1982, Togo had 4,000 international-class hotel beds, 1,400 in **Lomé**, and some hotels of rather stunning architectural grace. Among the latter, one could mention the ultra-luxurious, 30-story US\$ 100 million **Hotel 2 Février** in the center of the capital (reputed the most luxurious in all of Africa but a white elephant otherwise) and the **Hotel Sarakawa** that was designed by a Cameroonian architect to resemble the famous **plane crash** from which President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** escaped unhurt in 1974. STH signed management contracts with foreign hotel groups, thus assuring efficient management of the buildings. Only the old (but in the 1960s, the pride of Lomé) Hotel du Benin was directly managed by the STH. The company was **privatized** in 1990. *See also* OCAM VILLAGE.

SOCIÉTÉ TOGOLAISE DE NAVIGATION MARITIME (SOTO-NAM). **Lomé**-based shipping company in which the state originally had a controlling (51%) interest. Capitalized at 100 million CFAF, the company purchased its first vessel in 1978 (the *M.S. Hodo* container ship) and in 1980 received its second vessel (the *M.S. Pic d'Agou*). The company served a variety of **ports** but concentrated its shipping activities on the Rouen (**France**)-Lomé route. The company was liquidated in 1997 when it could not find a buyer as part of the **privatization** drive.

SOCIÉTÉ TOGOLAISE DE PROMOTION POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT (TOGOPROM). **State sector** organ based in **Lomé** and capitalized with 200 million CFAF, charged with identifying areas of need in the developmental drive of the country and satisfying the investment needs of these areas. The company was involved in the urban renewal of downtown Lomé after the forced relocation of the city's **zongo** opened up valuable urban space.

SOCIÉTÉ TOGOLAISE DE SIDERURGIE (STS). Successor to the **Société Nationale de Siderurgie (SNS)**, the first Togolese **state sector** enterprise to be **privatized**. Leased for ten years to an American entrepreneur (John Moore) in 1984 for a rent of US\$ 250,000 a year and capitalized at 700 million CFAF, the STS produced 8,000 tons of reinforced bars for the

Mali, Niger, and Burkinabe markets, some 2,000 to 2,500 tons of scrap iron for Spain per quarter, and had a turnover of four million dollars. The new management was profitable from its first month of operations, having cut the labor force by 50 percent and switched to production of various coils from local scrap material. In the late 1980s, Moore was in the process of bidding for a similar steel mill in neighboring bankrupt **Benin** and in trying to acquire two other former Togolese state enterprises.

SOCIÉTÉ TOGOLAISE DE STOCKAGE DE LOMÉ (STSL). Capitalized at 300 million CFAF, later increased to 4,000 million, STSL was owned by **Shell** until 2017, then sold to the **state sector**. It includes the old refinery facilities of the **Société Togolaise des Hydrocarbures (STH)**, and is used for stockpiling purposes. *See also* PARASTALS; PRIVATIZATION.

SOCIÉTÉ TOGOLAISE DES HYDROCARBURES (STH). Former **state sector** body controlling Togo's oil refinery that processed oil imported from Nigeria, **Ghana**, and **Libya**. The refinery was inaugurated on 12 January 1978, and was hailed as a symbol of Togo's coming of age industrially. It has a capacity of one million tons and the ability to satisfy the processed oil needs of the entire region. Capitalized at 4,000 million CFAF (60% Togolese, 40% Libyan), the facilities were to be supplied by tankers of up to 80,000 tons in weight. Togo's hopes to break into the global oil monopoly were, however, dashed. The refinery lost massive amounts of money yearly, while operating at 25 percent capacity with few customers abroad. Even neighboring Nigeria imported processed oil from Curacao and elsewhere around the globe rather than from **Lomé**, 200 kilometers away, because the STH oil was too expensive. In 1982, the new refinery was reduced to the demeaning task of selling on the Rotterdam spot market where there are no fixed, long-term contracts. The plant, operating much below capacity, was scheduled for closure or **privatization** in 1982 in order to eliminate the massive drain on state fiscal resources. It was finally privatized in 1985 and taken over by **Shell** for stockpiling (not refining) purposes, under the name of **Société Togolaise de Stockage de Lomé (STSL)**. *See also* MINING.

SOCIÉTÉ TOGOLAISE DE MARBRERIE ET DE MATERIAUX (SOTOMA). *See* MARBLE.

SOCIÉTÉ TOGOLAISE DU COTON (SOTOCO). **State sector** company founded in March 1972 with 200 million CFAF capital (augmented to 2.2 billion) under the direction of the ministry of rural economy. The company, with headquarters in **Atakpamé**, was created to counter **agricultural**

worker dissatisfaction with facilities previously offered them by the state, leading to major disaffection with **cotton** production following the 1972 drought. SOTOCO was entrusted with some of the activities previously handled by the **Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT)**, specifically with developing new private and state cotton plantations and assisting in the planting and harvesting of existing plantations, with the aim of doubling the cotton harvest by 1976 (from 12,000 tons in 1974). SOTOCO opened much new acreage to cotton cultivation in the 1980s and setup a new ginning factory in **Kara** in 1981 with a capacity of 24,000 tons of cotton. A newer ginnery, with the assistance of the Compagnie Française pour le développement des fibres textiles (CFDT), based in **France**, was also opened in **Notsé** in 1984. By 1991, output was up to 100,000 tons, and by the end of the decade nearly double that. However, in 2006 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was concerned that SOTOCO was not paying farmers on time, and that farmers were apt to switch crops as a result, making yields far less predictable and the sector less productive than it could be, yielding less than 50,000 tons in some years in the 2000s. SOTOCO was liquidated in 2008 and replaced with the **Nouvelle Société Cotonnière du Togo (NSCT)** in 2009.

SOCIÉTÉS REGIONALES DE DÉVELOPPEMENT ET D'AMÉNAGEMENT (SORAD). Regional development organizations established in 1965 in each of Togo's regions. Their predecessors were the pre-independence Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance and the postindependence Sociétés Publiques d'Action Rurale. The SORAD were quasi-public organs, specifically called for by the first five-year **Development Plan** (1966–1970), with administrative and fiscal autonomy under the general supervision of the ministry of rural economy. Expected to become fiscally solvent, each regional SORAD was originally set up with six million CFA francs capital. Their purpose was to spur **agricultural** modernization, supply credit to farmers, develop cooperatives, open new roads and markets, and, in general, to coordinate and execute all regional development plans called for in each of the national five-year development plans. Each SORAD was subdivided into sections responsible for each circonscription, though some of these sections were much more active than others. The record of the SORAD was mixed; most did not become fiscally solvent and all from the outset lacked trained cadres and funds. Moreover, only a few regions actually benefited from the activities of the SORAD (**La Kara** being a prominent example), and there was poor coordination among the regional bodies. The SORADs were replaced in 1975 by the **Office Régionale pour la Population des Produits Vivriers (ORPV)** structures.

SOKODÉ. Rapidly growing northern town of at least 117,000, Togo's second in size after **Lomé**. Sokodé is the administrative center of the **Centrale** region and the Tchaoudjo prefecture. In the precolonial era, Sokodé was an important trading center and juncture of various **caravan routes**. The Sokodé region was traditionally inhabited by the **Kotokoli**, and their paramount **chief** (**Ayéva**) resided in the Dedaure quarter of the town. The influence of **Islam** on Sokodé is more visible than in any other of Togo's cities. The name of the town comes from the Dendi word "to close," from the Kotokoli practice of barring routes leading into town. Sokodé greatly expanded in size in the 1980s, overtaking and surpassing **Kpalimé** in the south, which used to be the second largest town in Togo.

SOLIDARITY TAX. Tax levied on all salaries in the **state sector** and private sector effective 1 January 1983. Amounting to a 5 percent levy, it was similar to the tax imposed during the **Sylvanus Olympio** years, much hated and contributing to the disenchantment of much of the population. The tax was made necessary by the increasing economic morass so evident in the 1980s in Togo.

SOMBA. Known also as the Tamberma, the Somba are an ethnic group (in reality, three quite disparate groups) found in the Atakora Mountains in northwestern **Benin** and in adjoining areas of Togo, including in the vicinity of **Sansanne-Mango**. Their main concentration is in the Kandé area with scattered groups also found in **Sokodé** and **Dapaong**. Frobenius referred to them as Africa's "castle" peasants (in German, "burgbauern"), a reference to their unique two-storied domiciles (sombatata or **tékyèté**) and individualistic pattern of life.

SOMBATATA. *See* **TÉKYÈTÉ**.

SOTOUBOUA. Large prefecture in the **Centrale** region with headquarters in the town of the same name, spanning the entire western half of the region, and including the important town of **Blitta**. The town of Sotouboua is 55 kilometers southwest of **Sokodé**.

SOUWA. Colorful traditional celebration of the harvest among the **Kotokoli**.

SOVINTO. Company created in 1964 to bottle wines and produce soft drinks not manufactured by other companies in **Lomé**. SOVINTO also distributed products of the **Brasserie du Benin**. Wines were imported from Spain and

France and rebottled locally. SOVINTO's turnover quintupled between 1973 and 1978, but like much of the **state sector**, the growth could not be sustained.

STATE SECTOR. Togo's state sector, mostly deficitary and mismanaged, was one main reason for the economic decline in the 1980s. Starting with the 1974 one-year boom in state revenues thanks to **phosphate** exports, the government began a major expansion of the number of enterprises either fully or partly under state ownership. By the early 1980s it was clear that their deficits were a major drag on the economy and could no longer be sustained: President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** paradoxically noted at the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) 1982 Congress** his impression that the state was "investing only to make losses" and that this was no longer acceptable. Despite an effort to close down or **privatize** much of the state sector, this was a slow process since many enterprises were in unprofitable areas. Some successes were achieved with **banks**, for example, while other unprofitable ones like Société Nationale Maritime (SOTONAM) could not find buyers. Togo under President **Faure Gnassingbé** has been keen to improve economic performance, adopting a pragmatic, rather than ideological, approach in determining whether entities would be privatized or brought under state management. Togo has also recently embarked on new joint, or **parastatal**, ventures with private companies, sometimes using English-language names for Togolese state entities such as **Togo Invest Group**, in an apparent attempt to attract anglophone capital. When deemed in the national interest, the Togolese government has also bought out private companies, as in the case of **Shell-Togo's** protracted departure from Togo, ending in 2019.

STREBLER, JOSEPH (1892–1984). Former archbishop of **Lomé**. Born in Strasbourg in 1892, Strebler came to Togo from the **Gold Coast**, and his proselytizing activities in the north resulted in the creation of a separate vicarage centered around **Sokodé** under his charge (1937). Fluent in several dialects, Strebler expanded the missionary effort among the **Moba** and other northern ethnic groups in the 1940s. In 1945 he became bishop of Lomé (replacing Cessou) and in 1956 archbishop of Lomé. During the **Sylvanus Olympio** presidency (1960–1963), Strebler clashed with Olympio a number of times, and the **Catholic Church's** journal, the *Presence Chretienne*, was banned on at least two occasions. In 1962 Strebler left Togo, turning over the leadership of the church to the Togo-born **Robert Casimir Dosseh**. He became the archbishop of Nicopolis in Epiro until his retirement in 1971, and passed away in 1984.

STREET DEMONSTRATIONS 2017–2018. While popular demonstrations have been a feature of Togolese politics since 1990, in the 2010s they became more regular and sustained, culminating in the massive protests in 2017 and 2018 that were widely reported in the international press and threatened to take down President **Faure Gnassingbé**'s government. Unlike earlier protests centered in **Lomé** and points south, these demonstrations were also massive in north-central cities like **Sokodé** and farther north locations such as **Dapaong** and **Sansanne-Mango**, attracting hundreds of thousands of people demanding Gnassingbé's departure and a return to the presidential term limits and other checks on executive power originally enshrined in the **1992 constitution**. Some protests descended into violence and became riots, prompting repression by the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** and a fresh wave of protests in response.

Earlier popular protests began with discontent against President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s rule during the "Third Wave" of democratization that swept the continent and led to the calling of the **Sovereign National Conference** and the lengthy general strike intended to force Eyadéma to resign. In the aftermath of the failed democratic transition and Eyadéma's return to power, popular protests centered on elections, which, when not boycotted by the opposition, were the target of outrage when the official results consistently (and implausibly) showed a poor showing for candidates from opposition parties supported by many in the densely populated south of the country. However, this pattern was disrupted after **Gilchrist Olympio**'s 2010 decision to join a coalition government with the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, rather than backing the protest of his **Union des Forces de Changement (UFC)** party's candidate, **Jean-Pierre Fabre**, who had just been defeated by Gnassingbé in the **2010 presidential election**. Fabre, who immediately broke with Olympio and the UFC, proved to be an adept mobilizer and helped to usher in a newer generation of opposition political leaders who wielded street protests as a powerful tool in 2012 and 2013, under the banner of Fabre's **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)**. This mobilization was helped by the so-called "**Loi Bodjona**" which was passed by the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in 2011 (and named for the soon-to-be disgraced minister of local administration **Pascal Badjona**) in which protesters did not need a permit from government to assemble, but only needed to inform authorities of the timing and location of popular gatherings. These regular demonstrations drew thousands, and sometimes tens of thousands, of people in orange garb (the ANC's color), and forced the delay of the legislative elections from October 2012 to July 2013. A spike in protest activity surrounded the **legislative election of 2013** and the **presidential election of 2015**, but the effort was arguably waning when a new player burst on the scene in 2017.

Marking the 50th anniversary of the Eyadéma-Gnassingbé clan in power, **Tikpi Atchadam**, head of the **Parti Nationale Panafricaine (PNP)** led a series of protests in his home base of Sokodé and other towns across Togo in August 2017. Though the protesters engaged in violent acts such as burning a police station, the crackdown against them (using live ammunition) was documented in pictures shared on WhatsApp and other social **media** platforms, sparking additional protests in response. Members of the PNP, including Secretary General **Kossi Sama**, were arrested and served jail time for failing to heed government strictures on protests in key locations of the capital. The banning of peaceful protests was enough to finally unite the remainder of the opposition, including the more moderate **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel**, which had resisted aggressive protest tactics to this point. Gathering the CST, PNP, and the Arc-en-Ciel under the banner of the **Coalition de 14 (C14)**, the group led strikes and demonstrations that drew tens of thousands of participants and international media attention. The government appeared unable to stop the tide, despite a range of tactics from shutting down the Internet for the entire country 5–11 September 2017, in advance of a planned march, to releasing political prisoners and offering a constitutional referendum on constitutional changes later that month (though stipulating that term limits would not retroactively apply to Gnassingbé). Economic growth forecasts were adjusted downward as the government tried to weather the storm of protests that continued through 2018, forcing the delay of the **legislative election** scheduled for July, in hopes of inducing opposition parties to participate. The C14 maintained their boycott up to the **December 2018 election**, but opposition unity was beginning to falter as parties began to leave the C14 and position themselves for the **2020 presidential** contest. Gnassingbé and the UNIR capitalized on their supermajority in the legislature, and the opposition fragmentation, to pass **constitutional amendments** in May 2019 without proceeding to a referendum, thereby meeting the opposition demands but on Gnassingbé's terms, opening the way for him to constitutionally serve as president until 2030. In the end, the street demonstrations, at one point poised to topple the Gnassingbé dynasty, ended in a hollow constitutional victory and prospect of continued dominance by the ruling party.

STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS. The **Université de Lomé (UL)**, named **Université du Bénin** until 2001) has seen a number of important youth organizations rise and fall, often along north-south ethnic lines, and politically mobilized for or against the party in power. From 1972 to 1990, the ruling party tried to consolidate all of Togo's youth movements under the **Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Togolaise (UNJT)**, though independent movements sprang up at strategic times. The **Union Nationale des Étudiants**

Togolaise (UNETO) was one such organization disbanded in October 1977 when it was discovered that it was involved in activities opposing President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. To replace it, the regime set up another organization, **Mouvement National des Étudiants et Stagiaires Togolais (MONESTO)**, which was still in place when the pro-democracy movement of the late 1980s began, and groups like the Association Togolaise des Étudiants de l'Université du Bénin (AETB) and **Groupe de Reflexion et 'Action des Jeunes pour la Démocratie (GRAD)** sprang up on the opposition side. In the context of political liberalization, civil society groups flourished and student groups were no exception. In short periods of time they formed, consolidated (as with the Front des Étudiants en Lutte pour la Démocratie [FELD]), split apart in response to crackdowns by the authorities or internal divisions, and reformed.

More recently, student riots in 2011 at the UL involved students from multiple groups, who were taken by surprise by sudden changes in degree requirements. The campus was forced to close, but representatives of three student groups ultimately reached an agreement with the university administration to reopen the school: **Mouvement pour l'épanouissement de l'étudiant togolais (MEET)**, Haut Conseil de Coordination des Associations et Mouvements (HaCAME), and Union des Étudiants de Togo (UETO). MEET members students clashed with administrators again in 2016, alongside a newer group formed that year, the **Ligue Togolaise des Droits des Étudiants (LTDE)**. In response to the UL administration moving exams earlier than scheduled in order to paint lecture halls, these groups staged strikes and clashed with the security forces as well as university authorities. Capitalizing on the momentum of the **street demonstrations of 2017–2018**, these groups were quite militant and members were arrested several times, notably LTDE leader **Foly Satchivi**, who was convicted and imprisoned, though later released after international **human rights** groups had taken up his cause. In an effort to counterbalance student mobilization closely aligned with the political opposition, the ruling **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party revitalized its own youth wing, formalized as Movement des Jeunes UNIR (MJU) in 2019.

SUCCESSION CRISIS 2005. When President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** passed away on 5 February 2005, there was a process in place for succession based on the **1992 constitution**: the president of the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** was to take over the post provisionally for 60 days, and new elections would be held within that time frame for a new president to serve a regular term of five years. However, it was clear to those closest to Eyadéma that he preferred to be succeeded by one of his sons, **Faure Gnassingbé**, who

also had the support of key constituents in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** and many “barons” of the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**. Shortly after the death of Eyadéma was announced, General **Zakari Nandja** made a televised announcement that because the president of the AN, **Fambare Natchaba**, was out of the country, there was a power vacuum, so the FAT would immediately suspend the constitution, close the borders, and oversee the swearing-in of Faure Gnassingbé as the president of Togo. Natchaba, who was hastening back from Europe on official business, was kept out of the country by the closed borders, in effect reinforcing the claim of a power vacuum. However, the international outcry that followed this move was nearly universal, and particularly vehement on the part of the African Union (whose chair, Malian leader Alpha Omar Konaré, called it a “**coup d'état**”) and the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**, effectively demonstrating that Gnassingbé would not be officially recognized as president by vital allies. The AN convened on 6 February to vote Faure Gnassingbé in as the president of that body, but also **amended the constitution** so that the head of the AN would serve as head of state for a five-year term, bypassing the need for another election. This did not satisfy the critics internally or externally, however, though Gnassingbé held on for a few more days until ECOWAS imposed sanctions on 19 February; and then only was he swayed by a face-to-face meeting with Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo. Though Natchaba continued to make his case that he should be reinstated as head of the AN since he had never actually vacated the post, when Gnassingbé agreed to step down as president the AN convened again to reverse the earlier constitutional amendment, so that a provisional president would only serve for two months until an election was held. Then on 25 February, they voted in **Abass Bonfoh** (who had been vice president of the AN to Natchaba's president) as the head of the legislature and therefore provisional president of the Republic. When the **presidential elections** were subsequently held on 25 April 2005, Gnassingbé won a five-year term, according to the official—though contested—results.

In many ways, Gnassingbé ascension conforms to troubled political transitions of the past, in which the military has the final word. But the adherence to at least the appearance of constitutional principles (though they were continually modified) and succumbing to international pressure represent a break with the past. However, while the international community may have been mollified, the domestic opponents of the RPT and supporters of democracy certainly were not: they came out in force to protest the fraud evident in that election, as well as the imposition of dynastic control supported by military intervention, and the bloody crackdown and **human rights** violations that followed the election led tens of thousands of **refugees** to flee the country.

SÛRETÉ NATIONALE. The official Togolese security service that monitors potential sources of subversion. Distrusted by Eyadéma, some of the Sûreté's activities were duplicated by ancillary organizations set up by and attached to the presidency, the **Brigade de Recherche et d'Investigation** and the **Brigade de Vigilance**.

SUPREME COURT. *See* COUR SUPRÊME.

SYNDICAT DES ENSEIGNANTS PROTESTANTS DU TOGO (SEPT). Small trade union of **Protestant** teachers in Togo under Secretary General Michel Kodjo. In 1973, the union was forced to merge into the single national union federation, the **Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo (CNTT)**.

T

TAAMA, GERRY KOMANDEGA (1975–). Military officer and politician. Born in 1975 in Siou, in the north of Togo, Gerry Taama graduated from the **Université de Lomé** with a degree in sociology before attending l'Ecole Supérieure Militaire de Saint-Cyr in France with a focus on international humanitarian law. Upon returning to Togo, he joined the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, serving in an armored regiment and contributing to a UN peacekeeping mission in Côte d'Ivoire. He retired from the army in 2008, and in 2012 he founded his political party **Nouvel engagement togolais (NET)**, which participated in the **legislative elections of 2013** as part of the **Coalition Arc-en-Ciel**. He was a candidate in the **2015 presidential election**, winning just over 1 percent of the national vote and placing fourth of five contenders. Taama himself won one of the three **NET Assemblée Nationale (AN)** seats in the **legislative elections of 2018**, becoming the third largest party in elections dominated by **Union Pour La République (UNIR)**, who captured 59 of 91 seats, and the **Union Pour La République (UFC)** with seven. In his capacity as deputy, he allied with the **Parti Démocratique Panafricain (PDP)**, forming a small opposition bloc. He was supported by the NET as their candidate for the **2020 presidential elections**, but withdrew his candidacy and did not appear on the ballot. Taama is also the author of two books and the editor of his own publishing house, Editions Moffi.

TABLIGBO. Agricultural and mining district in the **Maritime** region with administrative headquarters in the town of the same name. It is also site of the original **Ciments de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CIMA O)** plant, now **Ciments du Togo (CIMTOGO)**. The town of Tabligbo is 47 kilometers from **Aného**, with a population estimated at around 16,000. In June 1981 **administrative reorganization** of the country, the district's name was changed to the Prefecture of Yoto, though its headquarters and the name of the town remained unchanged.

TADO. Historically important group of small villages (some in ruins) on the east side of the **Mono River**, 72 kilometers from **Atakpamé**. According

to tradition, a small earth house in Tado Adjatché (or TadoAdja), the oldest village, contains a jar with the skulls of the ancient kings of the **Adja-Ewe**. Tado is regarded as the area where the Adja settled after their trek from Ketou (currently in **Benin**). Later they moved from Tado to **Notsé**—one branch swinging into Benin—and starting dispersing again in 1720, mostly to the south. The area is therefore the traditional point of origin of both the Adja population of Benin and of the Ewe of Togo.

TAMBERMA. Ethnic group found in Togo and in **Benin**, better known in both as the **Somba**. Tamberma is the corruption of the word Betammariba.

TAY, AMEWUSIKA ALPHONSE KWADZO (1942–). Administrator. Born in **Agou** on 15 November 1942, Tay was educated locally and at a lycée in **France** before going to study engineering (1959–1964) followed by commerce (1967–1971) in Paris. He then joined the Togolese civil service as chief administrative officer and head of the Division of Surveys and Planning (1971–1973) and then (1973–1975) deputy director of the Department of **Education** Planning, and cultural advisor and principal officer to the secretary general of the World Festival of Black Arts and Culture in Lagos (1975–1977). In 1977, he was appointed director of the Department of Conferences at the latter's Dakar headquarters, and later moved to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) office in Paris, serving 18 years and becoming a senior programming specialist for **education** of children in difficult circumstances until his retirement.

TCHA-GOUNI, ATI ATCHA (1953–). Economist. Born in 1953 and educated in **France** in economics, on his return to **Lomé** Tcha-Gouni became deputy head of regional coordination in the Department of Regional Planning. He was named to a cabinet position in the 1998 government of **Kwassi Klutse**, and has served several subsequent prime ministers as secretary of state for Planning and Territorial Development. He is the author of several books on agrarian planning and development.

TCHALLA, PITANG (1954–2017). Director of Togo's national radio from mid-1987 to 1992. Then director general of **Television Togolaise (TVT)** 1992–2002, Tchalla served as minister of communication 2002–2005 under President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, and was counselor to President **Faure Gnassingbé**. He passed away unexpectedly in 2017 while serving as president of the **Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication (HAAC)**.

TCHALLI, PAUL (1947–). Longtime key cabinet minister. Tchalli was **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s minister of commerce and **transport** for five years until March 1987, when he was briefly dropped from the cabinet and appointed director general of the **Office Togolais des Phosphates (OTP)**, in charge of the important **phosphate** sector. He was brought back into the cabinet as minister of rural development later that year and was finally dropped from the cabinet in February 1990.

TCHAMA, COLONEL CHRISTOPHE. **Lamba** senior officer from Kandé. Though not part of the inner circle in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, Tchama was the third-ranking officer in the army in the late 1970s. As head of the Commando Battalion, he outranked more notorious figures like **Koffi Kongo**, but in 1977 was allegedly liquidated after disagreeing with General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s ethnic policies.

TCHAMBA. Small indigenous ethnic group mostly residing in the town of the same name about 35 kilometers from **Sokodé** in the **Centrale** region. Most are **Muslim** and are closely associated with the **Bassari** and with the **Kotokoli** whose vassals they once were. Their **language** is quite distinct, however, from that of any of their neighbors.

TCHAO, PADUMHEKOU CHRISTOPHE. Government minister. As a member of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, and later its successor party **Union Pour La République (UNIR)**, Christophe Tchao served as minister of communication and culture from 2008 to 2010 and then minister of tourism 2010–2012, both governments headed by **Gilbert Houngbo**. After serving five years in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**, he stepped down as head of the UNIR majority in 2019, moving on to serve on the governing board of the **Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)**.

TCHASSONA TRAORE, MOUHAMED (1960–). Notary and presidential candidate. Originally from **Sokodé**, Tchassona Traore trained as a lawyer and notary, and since 1995 has held several leadership positions in societies of notaries in Togo and in the region, including the National Chamber of Togolese notaries of which he was president 2000–2008. He also has worked with various social organizations including the **Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH)** 2006–2010, and was a founding member of the Cercle de réflexion et d'orientation d'actions de développement (CROAD). He began his political career in **Zarifou Ayéva**'s **Parti Démocratique de Renouveau (PDR)**, representing the opposition during negotiations for the 1998 Accord

Cadre de Lomé and the 2006 **Accord Politique Global (APG)**. In 2006, he founded his own party, the **Mouvement Citoyen pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MCD)**, which participated in the **2007 legislative elections** but did not win any seats. For the **2013 legislative elections** the MCD party was part of the alliance **Arc-en-Ciel**, which went on to win six seats. Tchassona Traore himself competed in the **2015 presidential election** and won 0.90 percent of the vote, coming in last of five candidates. In **2020, he ran for president** again in a field of seven, earning just 0.63 percent of the vote and again coming in last place.

TCHOKOSSI. *See* CHOKOSSI.

TCHOUKOU. Millet beer, a very popular beverage especially among the rural population of North Togo.

TÉKYÈTÉ. Known also as Sombatata, these are the unique two-storied domiciles (“castles”) of the **Somba**. Usually 12 to 14 feet high, with a diameter of 30 feet, the lower section is for stables and storage and the upper section provides living quarters for the extended family. The granaries are turret-like protrusions. There is usually also a shrine near the entrance to the house, honoring the clan’s lineage founder and its place of origin. Widely photographed by tourists, the Somba now routinely demand payment for the privilege.

TELEVISION TOGOLAISE (TVT). Togo initiated television broadcasts in September 1973 with daily 21-hour programming. The extremely small audience and poor sales of television sets resulted in 1974 in a 40 percent slash of prices of TV sets. For technical reasons, early broadcasts could only be seen within a 15-kilometer radius of **Lomé**. With the infusion of **state sector** funds in the 1970s, improvements were initiated, and by 1982 broadcasts could be seen in most parts of the country. Now also available online, TVT still functions as a state-run **media** outlet and has been headed by several directors who also had significant political careers, including **Pitang Tchalla** and **Koffi Panou**.

TEM. Language of the **Kotokoli**.

TEMBA. *See* KOTOKOLI.

TEMEDJA CAMP. Military camp near **Atakpamé**, one of the most notorious detention and torture centers under General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. Still in use by the **Forces d’Armées Togolaises (FAT)** and regularly visited by

President **Faure Gnassingbé**, he asserted in 2017 during a visit there that the opposition was responsible for the deadly violence during the ongoing **street demonstrations**, prompting outrage from opponents that he should fail to hold the security forces to account in such a setting.

TEO. *See* BOKONOU.

TÉPÉ, COLONEL KOFFI (1947–1993). A former minister of interior and deputy chief of staff of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, Tépé died during the 25 March 1993 assault on General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** compound in the Tokoin barracks. The brains behind the daring assault to eliminate Eyadéma, Tépé personally killed General **Yao Amegie** when the latter, captured, refused to join the rebels. Tépé was then attacked by surrounding troops and beaten to death.

TERRITORIAL REORGANIZATION, 1981. *See* ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION.

TÊTOU, AHMED. Former head of the **Union Musulmane du Togo (UMT)** who died unexpectedly in 2007, leaving the organization under the control of his vice president **Inoussa Bouraïma**, who remains in charge of the organization in an interim capacity more than 12 years later.

TEVI, JEAN. *See* TEVI-BENISSAN, TETE.

TÉVI-BENISSAN, TÉTÉ JEAN. Former minister of finance, economy, and planning. Born in **Aného** of **Mina** origins, Tévi-Benissan became President **Nicolas Grunitzky's** head of the Programs Division in the ministry of finance and the economy in 1964. In August 1968, he was shifted to director of Customs, and exactly one year later he was brought into General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cabinet as minister of finance, economy, and planning. In a 1973 cabinet reshuffle, Tévi-Benissan moved to head the ministry of commerce and industry. In March 1975, he was dropped from the cabinet, later to be reintegrated into it as minister of finance and the economy. Seen as close to Eyadéma, he was regarded in many circles as vital for the recovery of the Togolese economy. Nevertheless, in September 1984, he was dropped from the cabinet and fled the country under charges of corruption in a large (\$20 million) foreign-financed road improvement project. Tévi-Benissan was to claim from Paris that he was made a scapegoat for the fiscal irregularities of others, including Eyadéma himself. He lived out his final years in the United States, passing away in 2002.

TÉVI-BENISSAN, PATRICK DATÉ (1961–2020). Chief of staff for **Faure Gnassingbé**. Son of **Tété Tévi-Benissan**, Patrick was born in **Lomé** and trained as a mine engineer in Europe before earning his MBA from Northwestern University. He returned to Togo in the late 1990s and worked in the **banking** sector until he was tapped to join President Gnassingbé's Presidential Council on Investment. From 2012 he has served as *Secrétaire Générale de la Présidence* (Chief of Staff). He succumbed to a longstanding illness in 2020, and was eulogized by President Gnassingbé.

THIRD REPUBLIC (1979–1991). The period of one-party rule under the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** is commonly known as the Third Republic. Togo had two previous **constitutional** republics, from 1961 at independence and 1963–1967 between the two **coups d'état**. Though Eyadéma was in charge from 1967, he did not set up a constitutional system or **political party** until 1979, ushering in the Third Republic. The one-party state structure was common in sub-Saharan Africa at that time, at least nominally seeking to unify fractured political landscapes and engage in state-building. However, in Togo it served to entrench vested interests and promote corruption and **human rights** abuses, which, alongside the “Third Wave” of democratic transitions in Africa beginning with **Benin** in 1989, provided the impetus for the beginning of the end of the Third Republic. A **transition government** was appointed in 1991 and the constitution of the **Fourth Republic** passed by **referendum in 1992**, but the violent and protracted (and ultimately unsuccessful) transition to democracy only came to an end with **elections in 1993 (presidential)** and **1994 (legislative)**.

THOMPSON DOSSOU, RUDOLPHE MESSAN (1894–1965). Civil administrator. Born in **Aného** on 30 November 1894 and educated under **German colonial rule** as an accountant, Thompson Dossou served as **Lomé's** Municipal Councillor between 1959 and 1963 and was concurrently **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** and 1961–1963 Deputy to the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)**. A longtime accountant and administrator with the Caisse de Compensation des Prestations Familiales, Thompson Dossou died shortly after the **1963 coup**.

THOMPSON TRENOU, ADJOAVI (1921–2008). Defense Counsel with the **Lomé** courts. Born in **Tsévié** in October 1921 of **Ewe** origins, Thompson Trenou studied locally in **Benin** and Senegal, becoming an instructor of music and physical education. She then switched fields and studied economics in Paris and in Rabat, Morocco, returning home to serve in quick succession

as secretary general of the **Assemblée Representative du Togo (ART)** (1950–1952), bilingual (English/French) secretary for World Health Organization's (WHO) Africa headquarters (1952–1954), secretary general of the Grand Council of French West Africa (1956–1959) and, between 1959 and 1972, secretary general of the **Chamber of Commerce**. Completing her law degree at the University of Abidjan (1972–1973), Thompson Trenou assumed duties as defense counsel with the Lomé Lower Court. A prolific author, she wrote extensively on the condition of **women** in Africa.

TIDJANI, ASSANI. Head of the army, minister of defense. Born in Nigeria, Tidjani rose through the military ranks in Togo to become Chef d'État Major of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, and was a close friend of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. The portfolio of minister of defense, rarely relinquished by Eyadéma, was entrusted to Tidjani in 1999 and 2003, and he was among the military officers who strongly supported **Faure Gnassingbé** to succeed his father in 2005. He was sidelined, however, alongside others of his generation, as Gnassingbé consolidated power. He apparently expressed his distaste for the idea of laying down the old ruling party, the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, in favor of a new one, but his real fall from grace came after discovery of the alleged plot by **Kpatacha Gnassingbé** to unseat his brother in 2009. Tidjani was arrested as an accomplice after the fact, and sentenced to 20 years in prison, though he died of liver cancer in 2012 after serving only one year.

TIDJANIYA. Dominant **Islamic** sect in Togo. Introduced in **Chamba** areas by Mallam Aboubaker from Segou, Mali, some time before the **German occupation** of the territory, it rapidly became the dominant sect of Togolese Islam. Aboubaker himself returned to Mali after 12 years of proselytizing in Togo, but his work was continued by **El Hadj Harimiao Seybou Fofona** who gave the sect its greatest drive toward supremacy in the country.

TIGNOKPA, AYAWOVI DEMBA. Government minister. The first (and only) **woman** to have held the post of finance minister in Togo (2002–2003), Tignokpa then worked for the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** 2004–2011 supporting technical assistance and capacity building in the public administration of member countries. In 2013, she was elected **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** deputy for her home region of **Bassar**, and in her five years in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** she served on that body's finance and economic development commission. Most recently, she took over the post of minister of planning from Assimaidou Kossi in 2019, under Prime Minister **Komi Klassou**.

TIGOUÉ, KOUANVI VICTOR (1936–). Diplomat. Born in **Lomé** on 12 September 1936, Tigoué received a law degree abroad before joining the Togolese civil service. Technical counselor at the ministry of interior during the last year of **Sylvanus Olympio's** administration (1962–1963), Tigoué was dispatched to **France** after the **1963 coup d'état** to serve at the Togolese embassy with the rank of First Councilor. In October 1966, he was named deputy representative to the **European Economic Community (EEC)** in Brussels, and in 1968 he was transferred back to Lomé to head the Political Division of the Foreign Ministry (eventually becoming its secretary general), following which he was appointed Togo's representative to the **Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM)** based in Bangui, Central African Republic. He held a brief interim post as secretary general of the ministry of foreign affairs in 1974, and served as a representative for the OCAM again in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

TITIKPINA, MOHAMED ATCHA EL HADJ. Army chief of staff and government minister. Mohamed Atcha Titikpina was serving as head of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's Presidential Guard** in 2005 when the president died, prompting the **succession crisis**. He was among the officers of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** who supported **Faure Gnassingbé** for president, and was subsequently named minister of security in 2006, under the government of **Yao Agboyibo**. He served in the post under successive governments until 2010, when he was elevated from the rank of colonel to brigadier general and named chief of staff of the FAT. He fell out of favor and was dismissed from that post in 2013. He was rumored to be under arrest for a plot against Faure in 2014. He subsequently became more active in **Muslim** social organizations, including serving as director of the **Maison du Hadj** (Hadj House) in **Lomé**.

TOGBÉ, JACQUES DABRA (1930–). Former Ambassador to the United Nations, educator, and lawyer. Born in Akloa in the Akposso **circonscription** on 3 May 1930, Togbé was educated in **Lomé**, Porto Novo, and in Ouidah's seminary (the latter two in **Benin**), following which he studied at the University of Montpellier and at the Institut des Hautes Études d'Outre Mer, obtaining a law degree with specialization in labor law. Initially head of the Labor Inspection Services (1965–1968), Togbé became director general of Labor and Social Security in 1968. A member of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** from its inception, Togbé was the party's deputy secretary general for two years prior to the abolition of the post and later was a member of the party's Political Bureau (1969–1971). A delegate to the International Labor Organization (1964–1965) and professor of labor law and

social security at the **École Nationale d'Administration (ENA)** Togolaise in Lomé (1965–1972), Togbé was appointed permanent Representative to the United Nations in April 1972. He served in that post until 1977, when he was recalled to Lomé and placed on trial for embezzlement of embassy funds. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Released in 1984, he relocated to Paris.

TOGBLÉKOPÉ. Relocation site of the **zongo** in **Lomé**. The original zongo was a slum, a veritable eyesore in downtown Lomé. It was razed to the ground, and the entire population relocated to the new zongo some 18 kilometers north of Lomé. The distance from the capital was a major hardship for much of the population who historically were traders who then had to commute a total of 36 kilometers daily on foot. With the increasing urbanization of Togo and expansion of Lomé, Togblékopé is one of many exurbs of the city, but fortuitously located along the main north-south highway.

TOGO CELLULAIRE (TOGOCEL). Created in 1997 as part of the liberalization of the telecommunications sector and the breakup of the **Office des Postes et Télécommunications du Togo (OPTT)**. Togocel took over the burgeoning sector of mobile communications, claiming 65 percent of the mobile telephone market in Togo and 3.85 million clients. In 2017, the government merged Togocel with **Togo Telecom** under the aegis of **Togocom**.

#TOGO DEBOUT. Social **media** hashtag used during **street demonstrations in 2017 and 2018**. *See also* FRONT CITOYEN TOGO DEBOUT.

TOGO EN MARCHE. Originally a publication issued by the ministry of information and published by **Editogo** from 1962, with a circulation of around 10,000 at its peak. Today Togo en Marche is a private company which supports the *Tam Tam magazine* and *Cauris d'Afrique* magazine. The hashtag #TogoEnMarche was used satirically by protesters during the **street demonstrations of 2017–2018** as part of their mobilization efforts against the party in power.

TOGO INVEST CORPORATION. **State sector** company created in 2012. Tasked with strengthening infrastructure for the sake of development, the investment holding company controls or supports a number of important assets in Togo, including newer areas of the **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)** and the components of the former **Shell-Togo**. *See also* PARASTATALS.

TOGO-PRESSE. *See* LA NOUVELLE MARCHE.

TOGO PROTECTORATE TREATY: BAGUIDA, 5 JULY 1884. Treaty between the German Consul General Dr. **Gustav Nachtigal** and Chief **Mlapa III** of the village of Togo that formed the basis of the establishment of the **German colony** of Togo.

TOGO TELECOM. Created in 1996 alongside **Togocel** when the **Office des Postes et Télécommunications du Togo (OPTT)** was split into separate entities, including Togo Cellulaire (**Togocel**) for mobile services and Togo Telecom for landline or “fixed” telecommunications. Togo Telecom also managed the country’s international Internet infrastructure, leading to a conflict of interest in 2002 when voice-over-Internet calling became widely available, undercutting revenues from telephone calls and prompting Togo Telecom to temporarily cut off such calling from Togo altogether. Ultimately, the government of Togo decided to merge the Togo Telecom with Togocel again in 2017, forming the public company **Togocom**.

TOGOCOM. Fusion of Togocel and Togo Telecom, also known as Group TogoCom, created in 2018 as a **state sector** company. However, the government promptly began seeking a strategic **private** partnership for the group, finding it in late 2019 with an international consortium comprised of Axian Group based in Madagascar and Emerging Capital Partners (ECP). At the time, Togocom employed 1,400 workers and took in annual revenues of 120 billion FCFA. A new director general, Paulin Alazard, took over from ten-year veteran DG **Affoh Atcha-Dedji**, promising new investments in Internet infrastructure and services such as mobile money transfers. *See also* PARASTATALS.

TOGODO. The Togodo National Reserve is located north of Tokpli, west of the Benin border, marked by the **Mono River**. *See also* **NATIONAL FORESTS/NATIONAL PARKS**.

TOGOFRUIT. **Parastatal** organization set up in November 1971 under the ministry of rural development to assist in the diversification of Togo’s **agri-cultural** produce and specifically to assist in the cultivation and marketing of locally grown fruits. Its full name was Société Nationale Pour Le Développement De La Culture Fruitière. Despite several well-conceived projects (including a cashew nut program with Italian assistance), Togofruit was an uneconomical enterprise, and it was finally disbanded in 1983 as part of the drive against the deficit-ridden **state sector**.

TOGOGRAIN. Popular name for the **Office Nationale des Produits Vivriers (ONPV)**.

TOGOTEX. *See* COMPAGNIE TOGOLAISE DES TEXTILES.

TOGOVILLE (or TOGO). Name of a small lagoon village where, on 5 July 1884 Dr. **Gustav Nachtigal** signed a treaty of protection with **Chief Mlapa III** that became the key document sanctioning the absorption of the entire area into the new **German colony** of Togo, called after the name of the village. A descendant of Mlapa have been **chief** of the village, which is also an important **animist** site. Togoville is situated near **Lac Togo**, as well as a sacred forest where Pope John Paul II met with fetish priests in 1985. *See also* TOGO PROTECTORATE TREATY.

TOKOIN. **Lomé** suburb in which are located the international **airport**, headquarters of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, barracks of the First Infantry Battalion (within which General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** resided, at what was known as **Lomé II**), and the **Université de Lomé**.

TOMEGAH-DOGBE, VICTOIRE SIDÉMÉHO DZIDUDU (1958–). Prime minister from 2020. The first **woman** to hold the office of prime minister, Tomegah-Dogbe was born in Bagdoubé in the Vo region and was educated in economics and management at the **Université du Bénin** and at programs in Denmark and Switzerland. She began her career in the mid-1980s at the **Industrie Togolaise des Plastiques (ITP)**, briefly working at **Shell-Togo** in the early 1990s before being named director general of ITP from 1994 to 1998. From 1998 she worked for the UNDP for a decade as a resident representative in Congo-Brazzaville, Burkina Faso, and **Benin** in succession before returning to Togo to begin a ministerial career. In 2008, then prime minister **Gilbert Houngbo** named her minister delegate in charge of grassroots development, a newly created position. In 2009, Tomegah-Dogbe became the first woman to serve as chief of staff to the Togolese president, maintaining and even expanding her ministerial portfolio to include artisans, youth, and youth employment in 2010. She won a seat in her home district of Vo as a member of the **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party in **legislative elections in 2013**. She was rumored to be out of favor with President **Faure Gnassingbé** by 2016, but after the **presidential election of 2020**, Tomegah-Dogbe replaced **Komi Klassou** as head of the new government.

TORDJO, ALFRED KWAMI (1944–). Academic and briefly cabinet minister. A professor of law at the **Université de Bénin**, Tordjo was integrated

into the first **transition government** of Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh** as minister of justice between 26 September 1991 and September 1992.

TOULÉASSI, PASTOR KOKOU. Pastor of the **Evangelical Church of Togo**. Touléassi, General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s brother-in-law, acquired notoriety in March 1990 when he was elected in an irregular manner by the 46th synod of the church as the new moderator of the 113 pastors. He replaced Pastor **Agbi-Awumé**, who was unacceptable to Eyadéma, having refused to echo government positions on several occasions. In the first (secret) ballot, notwithstanding pressure behind Touléassi's candidacy, Agbi-Awumé received the highest vote. Asked to withdraw his candidacy that was splitting the church, Agbi-Awumé complied but in the second secret vote Touléassi still could obtain only 54 votes. Despite standing rules requiring an absolute majority (57 votes), Touléassi was declared elected. *See also* PROTESTANTS.

TOURISM. Though relatively small in absolute numbers, the number of tourists coming to Togo and the revenue accruing to Togo from tourist expenditures are significant. In the late 1970s, tourism became the third highest foreign currency earner after exports of **phosphates** and **coffee**. Though Togo has less to offer the tourist than, say, neighboring **Benin**, tourism has flourished when the political scene is calm. In contrast to the stringent austerity in **Ghana** and the Marxist curtain blanketing Benin until 1990, for many years Togo was able to offer an easygoing way of life, attractive and modern tourist facilities, and an open economy that made tourist purchases easy. The worldwide recession notwithstanding, in 1979 twice as many tourists came to Togo as in 1974, for a grand total of 100,000 (also twice that of neighboring Benin in that year), dramatically increasing to 143,000 tourists in 1982, followed by a downswing, accelerated in the 1990s due to the 3 years of social turmoil in the country. When foreign aid flows resumed to Togo in 2007, tourism rebounded alongside many other industries, and by the mid-2010s, Togo was welcoming around 275,000 to 300,000 tourists annually.

Togo's tourist attractions are modest. Apart from the scenic coastal strip (duplicated on either side in Ghana and Benin), the hinterland is not particularly remarkable. Nor does Togo have (as both Ghana and Benin do, as well as Nigeria) a sizable, visible historical heritage or architectural depository, since precolonial kingdoms were not highly centralized in this region. In the far north, the **La Kara** region and the **Somba** areas are very appealing, but again, their counterparts in Benin are of equal attraction. The largest number of tourists come from **France**, but Togo attracts 10,000 or more each year from Nigeria, Benin, and countries in the interior of the region.

TOZOUN, KOKOU BIOSSEY (1955–2016). Journalist and former minister. Originally from Mono, Tozoun began his career at **Radio Lomé**, and also served as president of the Union Générale des Syndicats Libres (UGSL) in the early 1990s. He was elevated to the post of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s chief of staff 1996–1998 and became a member of the political bureau of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party. He was tapped by Eyadéma as minister of public works 1998–2003, and served as minister of communication 2005–2006 and minister of justice 2007–2008 under Prime Minister **Komlan Mally**. He was elected head of the **Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication (HAAC)** in 2011, and was one of the “barons” of the RPT who supported Gnassingbé in the 2012 transition of the ruling party from the RPT to the **Union Pour La République (UNIR)**. Tozoun was still serving as head of the HAAC in 2016 when he was suddenly taken ill and passed away at age 61.

TRADE UNIONS. In January 1973, all trade unions in Togo were merged into the single trade union federation, the **Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo (CNTT)** that in 1989 had 70,000 members in three federations—**state sector** labor, **parastatal** labor, and private sector labor. Prior to that date, Togo had several trade unions, including the most important: (1) **Union Nationale des Travailleurs Togolais (UNTT)**, with 15,000 members and by far Togo's biggest union federation; (2) **Confédération Syndicale des Travailleurs du Togo (CSTT)**, a small (600 member) **Catholic** trade union affiliated internationally with the Confédération Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants; and (3) **Syndicat des Enseignants Protestants du Togo (SEPT)**, an even smaller union of Togo's **Protestant** teaching personnel.

With the liberalization of 1990, trade union unity was thrown into a situation of flux. Many local unions seceded—spearheaded by **Claude Améganvi**'s **Organisation Togolaise des Travailleurs Démocratique (OTTD)**. The CNTT retained most unions, however, by adopting a more confrontational stance against the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** and President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. However, the secession of the **Collectif des Syndicalistes Indépendants (CSI)**, which shortly renamed itself Union Nationale des Syndicats Indépendants du Togo (UNSI), was a blow to the organization and membership. The CSTT also reformed in this period, and is still in existence today, alongside a newer trade union group, the Synergie des Travailleurs du Togo (STT) formed in 2013 representing civil servants. The latter was responsible for a number of strikes as part of the popular protest movements of 2017 and 2018.

TRADITIONAL CHIEFS. *See* UNION NATIONALE DES CHEFS TRADITIONNELS DU TOGO (UNCTT).

TRAFFICKING. In addition to the ongoing practice of **smuggling** crops and goods across the border of **Benin** and Togo in search of markets and better prices, drug trafficking and other criminal activities have increased in Togo in the past decade, specifically in **Lomé**. The large and bustling **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)** combined with the nearby national boundaries with **Ghana** and Benin (and not far beyond that, Nigeria) has become a hub of a larger West African problem that both the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime have pledged to tackle. High-profile seizures of ivory (2014), drugs, and stolen cars hint at the volume of illegal goods that pass through, with everyone from Islamist terrorist groups to relatives of President **Faure Gnassingbé** being accused of profiting.

TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENTS, 1990–1993. As an aftermath of the **National Conference** a one-year transitional government was envisaged to oversee the drafting of a new **constitution**, and to govern until competitive presidential and legislative **elections** could be held. The process was prolonged, however, by **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, his loyalist **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, and disarray of the opposition forces, so that three successive one-year transitional governments were each headed by Prime Minister **Joseph Koffigoh**. At the end of the third such government—in which by brute force a “national unity” coalition with the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** was forced upon Koffigoh—the **presidential elections of 1993** took place and General Eyadéma (who was reelected president via fraud and intimidation) appointed **Edem Kodjo** as the new prime minister of Togo. *See also* HAUT CONSEIL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (HCR).

TRANSPORTATION SECTOR. Togo’s transportation sector is an important economic engine, by some estimates contributing as much as one-third of Togo’s GDP. It consists of passenger and freight by road east and west along the coastal highway that stretches from Nigeria to Côte d’Ivoire, and north and south for 750 kilometers along the RN1 road from **Lomé** to the border of Burkina Faso. The latter is targeted for expansion to carry even more traffic as part of the **Plan Nationale de Développement (PND)** of 2018–2022. The north-south road axis is made all the more central to economic activity by the bustling deepwater **Port Autonome de Lomé (PAL)**, which brings in freight destined for landlocked countries in the interior. Togo boasts some 11,000 kilometers of road, though only about 1,800 kilometers are paved. In 2014, it was estimated Togo roads served some 40,000 trucks large and small for cargo, and 200,000 motorcycles or mopeds, in addition to private vehicles and minibuses for public transportation.

Togo is also served by two main **airports**, one in **Lomé** and one further north in Niamtougou. Prior to the **coronavirus** pandemic, Togo had signed a number of international agreements designed to facilitate and increase traffic through Togo's airports, though travel restrictions designed to slow the spread of the virus interrupted progress toward those goals in 2020. Togo's **railroads** historically supported passenger traffic, but in more recent decades have focused on moving freight, including **mining** output like **phosphates**, to or from the PAL and other strategic locations.

TRENOU, DEDE EVELYNE (1953–). Cloth trader and leader of **women** entrepreneurs. Daughter of **Laura Doe Bruce**, the famous **Nana Benz**, Trenou studied literature in Togo and marketing in Paris before returning to Togo and establishing herself as a prominent cloth trader in her own right. For many years she has served as secretary general of the Association Professionnelle des **Revendeuses** de Tissu (APRT), as well as treasurer of Conseil National du Patronat du Togo (CNPT). She founded the Association des Femmes Chefs d'Entreprises du Togo (AFCET), and continues to be active in the **Lomé** cloth trade. *See also* ASSIGAMÉ.

TRENOU, RODOLPHE. Former President **Sylvanus Olympio**'s indispensable Chef du Cabinet and former secretary of state for information and the press. Born in **Aného** on 2 June 1917, Trenou was educated locally and at the prestigious **École William Ponty** in Dakar, Senegal, following which he completed medical studies at Dakar University and in Paris. He worked as a physician in **Lomé**, **Sansanne-Mango**, **Bassar**, and **Aného**, and, as an early member of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, was elected to the **Assemblée Représentative du Togo (ART)** as a delegate from **Sokodé** in 1946, becoming secretary general of the ART. During the mid-1950s, Trenou was abroad as an intern and physician in Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and **France**, returning to Lomé upon Olympio's assumption of power in 1958. He served as Olympio's cabinet director (1958–1962), during which time he presided over the declaration of "Terre de nos aïeux" as Togo's official national anthem. In January 1962 was named secretary of state for Information and the Press, and at the time of the **1963 coup d'état**, he was one of two ministers not caught in the dragnet for Olympio's cabinet and stayed abroad practicing medicine. He returned to Lomé in 1984, where he operated a private medical clinic until his retirement.

TRIMUA, CHRISTIAN. Government minister. Trimua is a lawyer, trained in Poitiers, **France** in public law. He specializes in electoral law, and even his detractors among the opposition in Togo admit he is especially talented

in that arena. In addition to being a member of the law faculty of the **Université de Kara**, he has served on international law and justice commissions in Cameroon, Central African Republic, and Chad. Trimua is frequently a government spokesperson on controversial newsworthy events, such as the **constitutional changes of 2019** and the **presidential election results of 2020**. Under President **Faure Gnassingbé**, Trimua has served as presidential counsel and as secretary of state for interagency relations from 2013. He was named minister of **human rights** in early 2019.

TSEGAN, CHANTAL YAWA DJIGBODI. First **woman** to serve as president of Togo's **Assemblée Nationale (AN)**, or any of the preceding legislative bodies since 1946. Trained as an inspector of taxes, Tsegan served as a director in the ministry of **transportation** in 2010 before being elected as a deputy of the AN for the **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party in 2013. In 2019, Tsegan was voted in as president of that body, and in that capacity oversaw the dramatic **constitutional changes** that may enable President **Faure Gnassingbé** to remain in office until at least 2030.

TSÉVIÉ. **Agricultural** district and town in the **Maritime** region. Some 55,000 people live in the town, which is 35 kilometers from **Lomé**. Tsévié traces its name to one of the **Ewe** clans that migrated from **Notsé** during the great dispersal at the beginning of the 18th century. The region is in the center of **palm** oil cultivation. The name of the district was changed in June 1981 to the prefecture of Zio; the headquarters and name of Tsévié remained unchanged, however.

TYOKOSSI. *See* CHOKOSSI.

U

UNION DÉMOCRATIQUE DES PEUPLES TOGOLAIS (UDPT). October 1959 merger of the **Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP)** of **Nicolas Grunitzky** and the **Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN)**, both in the process of disintegration following the 1958 United Nations-supervised elections that toppled the **Autonomous Republic** of Grunitzky and brought to power the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** of **Sylvanus Olympio**. In March 1961, the CUT declared a one-party system and, by the end of the year, all parties, including the UDPT, were dissolved. Following the **1963 coup d'état**, the party was resurrected under Nicolas Grunitzky (who returned from self-imposed exile) and **Antoine Méatchi**. The UDPT joined with Togo's other three major political formations in an electoral coalition that divided the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT)**'s seats in equal numbers, forming the parliament during the Grunitzky administration. Following the **1967 coup**, all parties were dissolved. *See also* MÉATCHI-MAMA CRISIS; POLITICAL PARTIES.

UNION DES CHEFS ET DES POPULATIONS DU NORD (UCPN). French-supported conservative northern political alliance of traditional elements and notables established in 1951 to break the political dominance of southern and **Ewe**-led political parties. Its leaders were the **Derman Ayéva**, a **Kotokoli**, and **Fousseni Mama** (before the latter switched his support to **Nicolas Grunitzky**); other traditional leaders were the **Uro** of the **Bassari**; **Nabiema Tabi**, chief of the **Chokossi**; and **Oudine**, leader of the **Konkomba**. The party initially allied itself with the **Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP)** of Grunitzky and Dr. **Pedro Olympio** and, after the internal PTP schism that led to the creation of the **Mouvement Populaire Togolais (MPT)**, supported Grunitzky over Pedro Olympio. Following the 1958 UN-sponsored elections that brought to power **Sylvanus Olympio** and the latter's **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)**, the UCPN rapidly disintegrated and in 1959 merged with its old ally, the PTP, to form the **Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais (UDPT)**. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

UNION DES FORCES DE CHANGEMENT (UFC). Political party of **Gilchrist Olympio**. Formed in 1991 from the old **Mouvement Togolaise Démocratique (MTD)**, the **Union Togolaise pour la Reconstruction (UTR)**, **Alliance Togolais des Démocrates (ATD)**, and the **Parti des Démocrates pour l'Unité (PDU)**. For many years, the UFC was considered the most radical of the mainstream opposition by refusing to compromise with the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party, as other parties led by **Yao Agboyibo** and **Edem Kodjo** had sometimes done. The UFC boycotted all post-1991 **legislative elections until 2007**, for example. Because Olympio was the son of the first president **Sylvanus Olympio** deposed by **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, direct competition between Olympio and Eyadéma (and later **Faure Gnassingbé**) captured the imagination of the electorate, and shaped views about elections even when the UFC was not running. After the punishing election manipulation and violence of the **1998 presidential contest**—the only time Olympio did face Eyadéma—Olympio was barred from running by eligibility requirements until 2010, and preferred to support UFC Vice Presidents to run in his stead: **Emmanuel Akitani-Bob** in 2003 and 2005, and **Jean-Pierre Fabre** in 2010. However, the younger and more dynamic Fabre seemed more of a threat to Olympio's own legacy, and a schism emerged when those protesting Fabre's official loss to Gnassingbé were suddenly undercut by a separate deal Olympio made to secure seven UFC seats in a unity cabinet. Many UFC partisans were shocked and outraged that he acted without consultation and in defiance of the attempt to defend the UFC's electoral performance, and members of other opposition political parties considered it rank treason. An ugly split in the UFC followed, in which security forces found themselves acting in apparent defense of the UFC by cracking down supporters of Fabre's faction, and Olympio pushed for the removal of former UFC National Assembly members who had split from the party. When the dust settled, Olympio retained leadership of the UFC and support of a core following, while Fabre and his sympathizers went on to form the **Alliance National pour le Changement (ANC)**. Olympio's UFC continued to participate in legislative contests, but managed to win only a scant three seats in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in 2013, down from 27 in 2007. The UFC rebounded slightly to six seats after the **2018 election**, thanks to an ANC boycott of the poll, but the energy of the political opposition, and the moral authority commanded by rigorous opposition to the ruling **Union Pour La République (UNIR)** party, has moved decidedly away from the UFC and Olympio. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

UNION ÉLECTRIQUE COLONIALE (UNELCO). Colonial-era electricity installations in Togo that were transferred in 1965 to state ownership

under the **Compagnie Électrique du Togo (CEB)**. The sole hydroelectric station at the time was at **Kpéme**, inaugurated in 1963, and relying on electricity from **Ghana**.

UNION MONETAIRE OUEST AFRICAINE. French West Africa's monetary union. *See also* COMMUNAUTE FINANCIERE AFRICAINE (CFA) FRANC; FRANC ZONE.

UNION MUSULMANE DU TOGO (UMT). Association of Togo's Muslim leaders. Successor since 1963 of the **Association de la Jeunesse Musulmane du Togo (AJMT)**. The UMT only began to operate in earnest a decade later, as a result of which Togolese **Islam** received a major boost, especially in the **educational** field. The first UMT leadership included **Fousseni Mama**, a minister who was instrumental in setting up the UMT and later stepped in to heal the schism that tore the association apart. Mama was councillor, with **Belly El Fouti** as Treasurer, **Kassim Mensah** as secretary general, and **El Hadj Safiou** (Mama's cousin and an ex-deputy to the **Chambre de Députés**, imprisoned by President **Sylvanus Olympio** in the far north of Togo) as president.

The UMT suffered numerous splits and was beset by chronic strife. In 1970, the leadership of Safiou was challenged, and he was overthrown on charges of quasi-dictatorial rule. It took the personal intervention of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** and all the persuasive powers of Fousseni Mama (untarnished by the strife) to attain a modicum of stability in the association. In May 1970, Mama was appointed president, with Mensah and **Namoro Karamoko** as vice presidents. In 1972, Mama stepped down, and Mensah was named his successor but rapidly fell afoul of the membership. In 1976, a new president, **Halilou Adam**, was selected with Karamoko as second vice president and Mama Zendjina as first vice president. Both Fousseni Mama and Kassim Mensah were designated as "honorary members" of the ruling council.

Throughout the 1980s up to the period of political transition, the UMT solidified ties with the ruling **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party and leadership, rarely speaking out against government injustice the way some other religious orders did. Most noticeably, former government minister for the RPT, **Inoussa Bouraïma**, became head of the UMT in 1997. Though his post was supposedly interim after the death of the previous president, **Ahmed Têtou**, Bouraïma remained president of the organization as late as 2019, resisting calls for a new election. This conservative tendency led to increasing dissatisfaction with the UMT on the part of Togolese Muslims, and gave birth to a younger generation of more outspoken organizations

such as the **Association des Élèves et Étudiants Musulmans au Togo (AEEMT)** founded in 1996 and the **Association des Cadres Musulmans au Togo (ACMT)**, created in 2006. Members of these organizations were more supportive of **street demonstrations of 2017–2018**, compared to the UMT, for example, and spoke out more forcefully about the arrest of Imam **Djobo Alassani** in 2017. *See also* ISLAM.

UNION NATIONALE DE LA JEUNESSE TOGOLAISE (UNJT). Until 1990, the country's unified youth movement into which all existing movements were consolidated in 1972. *See also* STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS.

UNION NATIONALE DES CHEFS TRADITIONNELS DU TOGO (UNCTT). National Union of Togo's traditional leaders. In one form or another, the union has been in existence since President **Sylvanus Olympio's** days and is today largely apolitical. Members receive a stipend that has varied over the years and was once curtailed (under Olympio), causing much antagonism. President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** in particular cultivated the leaders of the UNCTT, realizing that they form an important source of political support, making the organization one of the four "marching wings" of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** alongside youth women's, and worker's organizations. After being represented in the **National Conference**, however, the UNCTT has had a less formal role to play in national political conversations, though members continued to play roles in their communities. *See also* CHIEFS.

UNION NATIONALE DES ÉTUDIANTS TOGOLAIS (UNETO). Student association that was disbanded in October 1977, when it was discovered that it was involved in anti-President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** activities. To replace it, the regime set up another organization, the **Mouvement National des Étudiants et Stagiaires Togolais (MONESTO)**. *See also* STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS.

UNION NATIONALE DES FEMMES DU TOGO (UNFT). The women's section of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)**, Togo's single political movement 1970–1990. Established in a constituent congress in **Lomé** the 28–29 March 1972, all existing women's organizations were merged into the UNFT. With the liberalizations of 1990, the UNFT monopoly was challenged by the creation of the **Group de Reflexion et d'Action Femme, Démocratie et Développement (GF2D)**, more openly opposed to the administration of President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**. As an organization of women

supportive of the ruling party, the UNFT was replaced by the **Convention des femmes pour UNIR** in November 2012.

UNION NATIONALE DES TRAVAILLEURS TOGOLAIS (UNTT). Until the January 1973 creation of a single **trade union** confederation the **Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo (CNTT)**, the UNTT was Togo's biggest trade union. Founded in 1946, the UNTT had 15,000 members and 22 affiliated unions under the secretary generalship (1972) of Seth Bassah. Most members were government workers and employees of the private sector. During the presidency of **Sylvanus Olympio**, organized labor was one of the bulwarks of the regime (despite the austerity of his administration that resulted in periodic friction), and after the rise to power of **Nicolas Grunitzky** in 1963 the UNTT lashed out on several occasions against the conservative policies of the regime.

UNION POUR LA RÉPUBLIQUE (UNIR). Successor to the former ruling **Rassemblement de la Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party and current ruling party. Created in 2012 by **Faure Gnassingbé**, the party was launched later than originally planned because of resistance from the “barons” of the RPT—leaders from the generation of former President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** (Gnassingbé's father) who had already resisted laying down the RPT in the early 1990s when demanded by the **National Conference** and **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)**. Upon taking power after the **succession crisis of 2005**, Gnassingbé did not immediately have the political clout to shed the negative associations of the RPT and start anew. However, by the time his brother **Kpatacha Gnassingbé** was detained for a **coup plot in 2009** and former radical opponent **Gilchrist Olympio** had agreed to enter into a unity government in 2010, the way was paved for Gnassingbé to assert that a new party would help move the country forward. Among the founding members was **Georges Aidam**, former vice president of the opposition **Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)** party. UNIR's stated goals of uniting the country, respecting **human rights**, and promoting prosperity ring hollow to many opponents, who see the UNIR as a continuation of the RPT, and the domination of the party in **legislative elections since 2013**, and more recently in the **municipal elections of 2019**, is remarkably reminiscent of the old RPT. *See also* POLITICAL PARTIES.

UNION TOGOLAISE DE BANQUE (UTB). Commercial **bank** established in 1964 with 2,000 million CFAF in capital and with headquarters in **Lomé**. The bank has 46 branches covering the five regions of the country.

From the start, the Togolese state held a 35 percent share in the equity, with the other partners being Credit Lyonnais (35%), Deutsche Bank (18%), and the Banca Commerciale Italiana (12%). However, in 1994 the government took full control of UTB after political turmoil prompted the withdrawal of the European partner banks. Slated for **privatization** alongside other undercapitalized banks in the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-backed restructuring of the financial sector, the UTB was never sold. Plans to merge UTB with the **Banque Togolaise pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (BTCI)** seemed final in 2017, but were put on hold in 2018 awaiting additional negotiations with the IMF, and the banks continued to operate independently.

UNION TOGOLAISE POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE (UTD). Political party set up by **Edem Kodjo** in May 1991 with its strength in the **Ewe** areas around **Kpalimé**. The party won seven seats in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in the **1994 legislative elections** in a coalition with the **Yao Agboyibo's Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR)**, but when Kodjo accepted President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** offer to serve as prime minister, despite Aboyibo having many more seats, the coalition was broken. The UTD joined with three others to form the **Convergence Patriotique Panafricain (CPP)** in 1999.

UNION TOGOLAISE POUR LA RENOUVEAU (UTR). Political party set up in May 1991 and headed by Dr. **Marc Atipide**, aligned with **Gilchrist Olympio**. Atipide was killed in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** ambush of the Olympio motorcade (of which Atipide was a part) on 5 May 1992.

UNITÉ TOGOLAISE (UT). Shorthand abbreviation of the **Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT)** and its successor, **Parti de l'Unité Togolaise (PUT)**. Also, the name of the influential party newspaper edited by CUT Secretary General **Jonathan Savi de Tové**.

UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP. *See* FRENCH ADMINISTRATION.

UNIVERSITÉ DE KARA. Established by presidential decree in 1999, the Université de Kara sought to balance the influence of the **Université de Lomé** (at the time called the Université du Bénin) in the south by providing more **educational** opportunities (and fewer anti-government influences) for youth in the north of the country. Situated to the southeast of **Kara** city center, the UK officially opened in 2004 with about 1,500 students and 20 faculty across three departments.

UNIVERSITÉ DE LOMÉ. The flagship—and for many years the only—university in Togo. Founded on 11 September 1970 under the name Université du Bénin, as an autonomous national university after the collapse that year of the former joint Togo-Benin Institut d’Enseignement Supérieure du Bénin, which had operated with a Humanities section in **Lomé** and a Science section in Porto Novo. The new university, on the **Atakpamé** road in Lomé’s northern suburbs, commenced with schools of Law and Economics, Medicine, Social Sciences, and Letters, and an Institute of Technology, expanded to ten schools by 1974. During the 1990s, the university was the site of youth mobilizations by **student organizations**, including the student strike of March 1991 influential in President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**’s acquiescing to hold a **National Conference** a few months later. The UB changed its name to Université de Lomé (UL) in 2001, which helped reduce external confusion between it and Benin’s National University of Benin (UNB), and Nigeria’s University of Benin in Benin City. In 2011, student riots over poor campus services and sudden changes in degree program requirements led to a two-month shutdown. In 2015, the UL boasted over 44,000 students and more than 500 faculty, and from 2016 Dodzi Komla Kokoroko has served as the university’s president.

UNIVERSITÉ DU BENIN. Former name of **Université de Lomé**, 1970–2001.

URO. Title of the paramount **chief** of the **Kotokoli**, whose residence has traditionally been in the Dedaure quarter of **Sokodé** in northern Togo. *See also* KOTOKOLI, UROS OF.

URO ISSIFOU. Fourteenth **Uro** of the **Kotokoli** of **Sokodé**, ascending the throne in 1949. *See also* KOTOKOLI, UROS OF.

URO JOBO II. The first **Uro** of the **Kotokoli** to convert to **Islam**. Although Uro Jobo III converted to **Christianity** after the death of Uro Jobo II, the Kotokoli rapidly became Islamized. *See also* KOTOKOLI, UROS OF.

V

VIDEROT, TOUSSAINT MENSAH. One of Togo's best-known poets. Born in the early 1930s, his first volume in French, *Courage*, appeared in 1957 and shortly afterward he published a novel, *Pour toi, negre, mon frère...* "*Un homme comme les autres.*"

VILLAGE DU BENIN. Originally created in 1968 for other purposes, the Village du Benin acts as a cultural and training center and has become Togo's leading specialized French **language** school. Found in the outskirts of **Lomé**, it offers a wide variety of courses of varying lengths, often bilingual, with the financial support of **France** and other international partners. Students from **Ghana** and Nigeria, in particular, seek to master the French language for diplomacy, advanced study, or other purposes. In 2018, the organization, now known as Centre International des Recherches et d'Étude de Langues, Village du Benin (CIREL-VB), celebrated 50 years in operation with a Golden Jubilee.

VODUN. Various ancestral and spirit cults, deities, and **fetishes**, encompassing cosmological beliefs and myths. Once the powers of the vodun have been proven effective, they become venerated and worshipped. Many such beliefs and practices have come to Togo from Ashanti areas of **Ghana**, and there has also been a very strong **Yoruba** influence. The beliefs have also been exported via the slave trade to the islands of the Caribbean and to Brazil. The cults are still very well established in southern Togo and in non-**Muslim** areas in the north. The **Ewe** in the south have an estimated 5,000 divinities, the principal ones being **Mahou** and **Lissa**, the female and male original progenitors. It is speculated that Lissa may be a deformation of the Yoruba Orisha, corresponding to the sun, while Mahou symbolizes the moon. *See also ANIMISM.*

VOGAN. Seat of the Vo prefecture, previously also the name of an **agricultural** district in the **Maritime** region with administrative headquarters in the town of the same name, which is 23 kilometers from **Lomé**. Within

its boundaries is found Hahotoe, the center of Togo's **phosphate** mines. In the **administrative reorganization** of the country in 1981, the name of the district was changed to the prefecture of Vo, though the name of the town remained unchanged.

VOIX DE LA RÉNOVATION NATIONALE. Official name for **Radio Togo**. Previously known as the Voix du Nouveau Marche, and after the liberalizations of 1991, as Voix du Togo.

VOUDUN. Ancient **Ewe** quarter of **Atakpamé** settled by a clan that did not follow the standard **Adja**-Ewe route from **Tado** to Nuatja (now **Notsé**).

VOULÉ-FRITITI, KOFFI AGBENYAGIN (1934–2015). Formerly known as Marcel Voulé-Fritz; former minister of youth, sports, and culture. An **Ewe** born in Kayès, Voulé-Frititi completed a degree in Paris and became the director of the cabinet of the minister of interior. He later served in rapid succession as technical consultant to the minister of national **education** and director of the **Institut National de Recherches Scientifiques (INARES)** and in 1966 head of the Department of Planning of Education, a post he held for 11 years. In January 1977, he was brought into **Gnassingbé Eyadéma's** cabinet, serving for the next four years until June 1981. A member of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** Politburo, he was dropped from the leadership strata in 1983 and completely purged from his other duties on the grounds of "inefficiency." However, he returned to public life by being elected a deputy in the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** in successive **legislative elections 1999–2007**, earning the distinction of being the most senior member of that body, aged 73, at the start of his final term.

VOVOR, VALENTIN MAWUPE (1925–1992). Surgeon, former minister of health, and former president of the **Supreme Court**. Born on 29 October 1925, in Agome-Koussountou, Vovor was educated in **Kpalimé's Catholic** mission, the elitist **École William Ponty** in Dakar, Senegal, Dakar's School of Medicine, and at the Universities of Montpellier and Dijon. He specialized in surgery and gynecology and returned to Togo in 1957 to join the National Hospital Center. In 1961, he became head of the Surgical Clinic of Dakar's Faculty of Medicine, and in 1962 he was appointed chief physician of the Kpalimé Medical Subdivision and head of the Office of Studies at the ministry of health (1962–1963) and director of the Nursing School of Togo (1962–1963). Well known abroad through his 70-odd scientific papers and books, the till-then apolitical Vovor was appointed minister of health following the **1963 coup d'état**, holding the position until January 1966, when he became

director of Togo's Midwives School. A member of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** and its Political Bureau, Dr. Vovor was appointed President of the Supreme Court in 1972. In 1974, he stepped down from this position and reverted back to his medical and teaching duties in **Lomé**. Upon retirement, he was elected a **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)** representative and then Speaker (president) of the legislature, serving in the latter post 1985–1988.

W

WAHID, ALFA ABDOUL. Imam of **Bafilo**. Arrested on 22 October 2017, shortly after Imam **Djobo Mohammed Alassani**, for alleged violent anti-government rhetoric. Like Alassani, Wahid was known to have connections to **Tikpi Atchadam**'s political party the **Parti National Panafricain (PNP)**, and his release became a rallying cry for the political opposition to the government. He and Alassani were released on 8 December 2017.

WALLA, KOFFI. Former minister of rural development between 1984 and 1988. Walla replaced the powerful **Kodjoulou Dogo** in September 1982 as minister of planning and administrative reform. Prior to this, he had been minister of commerce and **transport**. In December 1979, he was also elected deputy to the **Assemblée Nationale du Togo (ANT II)**. Walla, who is indirectly related to General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**, is of **Kabyé** ethnicity. Walla came out of retirement in 2012 to become director of the **Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale (CNSS)**. In 2016, he was accused of corruption and eventually ordered to reimburse six billion FCFA he misdirected from CNSS through his own construction company, SEGIM.

WALLA, GENERAL SIZING AKAWILU. Formerly the **Kabyé** commander of the Second Military District of **Kara**, Walla—General **Gnassingbé Eyadéma**'s brother-in-law—was the first Kabyé to graduate from the elite St. Cyr military staff college in **France**. In 1987, when **Agossoye Assih** was purged due to gross corruption, Walla, then a major in the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, replaced him. He participated in the **National Conference** in 1991, and served as interior minister 1998–2002 where his fiery and confrontational style led him to openly challenge not just members of the political opposition, but the press and Amnesty International for their negative **human rights** reporting of the **1998 presidential election**. He was briefly detained in 2011 with **Assani Tidjani** as part of the investigation into the **2009 coup attempt** by **Kpatcha Gnassingbé**, but never charged.

WANGARA. Name given in north Togo to “strangers’ quarters” in urban centers. Also known as **zongo** or **maro**.

WASUNGU, PASCAL BAGNINGUSAMA ARFA (1937–). Sociologist and international administrator. Born in Baga-Niamtougou in north Togo on 8 September 1937 and educated locally at the Ouidah (Benin) Seminary and in Brussels Institut de Travail where he obtained inter alia certification as a Labor Inspector (1963–1967), Wasungu also studied at Brussels Free University and at the Catholic University of Louvain, specializing in the social sciences (1966–1968). He then proceeded to the Sorbonne and other Parisian institutes, completing a PhD in sociology (1976). He has occupied a variety of positions: before his advanced studies, he was a teacher at the **Sokodé Catholic Mission** and later a civil servant in the ministry of social affairs and civil service. In Paris, he taught in the University of Paris’s Department of Anthropology (1968) and was a Sociologist attached to the Renault vehicle factories (1970–1971). He then joined the Economic Commission for Africa as associate social affairs officer (1972–1980) and most recently taught in the Sociology Department of the **Universities of Lomé and Kara**.

WATYI. *See* OUATCHI.

WESTERMANN, DIEDRICH (1875–1957). World-renowned and foremost linguist of Southern Togolese dialects. Born on 24 June 1875 in Baden, a small village near Bremen, Germany, Westermann became a missionary at the age of 20 and was eventually sent to **German Togo**. There he displayed his remarkable aptitude for linguistics and wrote the standard dictionary of **Ewe** and several other seminal tracts. He made major contributions to the linguistic study of at least a dozen other coastal and interior **languages** in his barely four years in Togo, works that have withstood the test of time and remain seminal studies to this day. He later served in Liberia, Sudan, and Spain. In his work, he was assisted by **Jonathan Savi de Tové** while in Spain. Between 1925 and 1930, Westermann also served as director of the International African Institute in London.

WOLOU, KOMI (1964–). Professor and presidential candidate. Born in Kamboli, a town east of **Sokodé** and close to the border with **Benin**, Wolou was trained as a lawyer and obtained his doctorate from the University of Lille II in **France**. He served in leadership positions at the **Université de Lomé (UL)**, including dean of the Law Faculty 2016–2019. He became ensnared in controversy as the director of the Togolese bar association, where his detractors accused him of fraud in 2018, but he was later cleared of all

charges by the Togolese **Supreme Court**. He ran for president of Togo in the **election of 2020** as a member of his own Pact Socialist pour le Renouveau (PSR) party, winning 1.14 percent of the vote (according to provisional results) and coming in fifth of seven candidates.

WOMEN. There are an estimated 100 women for every 98 men in Togo, or over four million Togolese women, who have a history of mobilizing for their rights and the welfare of the country. While the statistics on the condition of women show improvement, women in Togo are still more likely to be poor and less educated than men, even though national laws (e.g., the Code des Personnes et de la Famille, passed in 1980 and most recently revised and updated 2014) nominally protect their rights. These laws are often incomplete or not fully implemented, and women in Togo may feel more bound by customary law, not national law, on issues of inheritance or domestic violence, for example. Moreover, when political troubles disrupt economic progress, as they frequently have since the 1980s, women and children are more likely to suffer disproportionately. Still, adult literacy for women improved from 38 percent in 2000 to 51 percent in 2015, and life expectancy for women is estimated at 68.6 years, up more than 10 years from the start of the millennium. Maternal mortality stood at 396 deaths per 100,100 live births in 2017, with a fertility rate of about 4.3 children per woman. The high-profile case of **Fauziya Kasinga** seeking asylum in the United States in 1994 brought international attention to female genital cutting in Togo, and the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** outlawed the practice in 1998, in response. Women make up the majority of workers in the **agricultural** sector, which is the largest source of employment in Togo, but seldom have access to collateral, credit or training that might improve their circumstances. Women's work in both urban and rural areas may make up as much as 70 percent of informal sector activity, while formal sector wages are often significantly skewed in favor of men, and men are more likely to be promoted to higher ranks. One exception is in trade and commerce, where the famous **Nana Benz** have historically dominated the market for cloth with "wax" patterns, making Togo's **Assigamé** market a regional hub for the trade. The volume and importance of this trade, and the desire avoid government restrictions that might diminish the gains, made the Nana Benz a powerful political as well as economic force from the 1960s. Though their power has since waned, the so-called daughters of the Nana Benz still wield considerable influence.

Women in Togo have taken to the streets to demand their rights, famously in the 1933 **Révolte des Loméens** against taxes imposed by the **French** colonial government. In 1991, a women's demonstration to release prominent political prisoners met with a violent crackdown by security forces and

prompted a drubbing of government in the press that crackdowns on mixed gender protests had not. The women's wing of the **Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)** launched a strike in 2012 to pressure men to take greater action against President **Faure Gnassingbé** by withholding sex. Many national-level organizations have taken up women's various causes, including the **Convention des femmes pour UNIR** (recently renamed **Movement des Femmes UNIR** or **MFU**) of the ruling party, and the **Groupe de réflexion et d'action Femme, démocratie et développement (GF2D)** on the side of the opposition. At the national level, at the beginning of 2020 the **Assemblée Nationale (AN)** had 15 women representatives out of 91, and a woman, **Chantal Yawa Djigbodi Tsegan**, held the title of president of the National Assembly for the first time in the 74 years of Toglese legislatures. Of around 25 cabinet-level positions, 2 women have served since 2017, most recently Koko Ayéva and Zouréatou Tchakondo-Kassa-Traoré.

WORLD BANK. *See* DONORS, RELATIONS WITH.

Y

YAGNINIM, BITOKOTIPOU. Former cabinet minister and ambassador to **France** turned influential elder statesman of the **Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT)** party. An administrator from north Togo, Yagninim was minister of labor and the civil service between 1987 and February 1990 when he replaced General **Yao Amegie** in one of the latter's portfolios as minister of justice. Though ousted from the cabinet during the liberalizations of 1991 he was named ambassador to France 1994–1995, and regained the position of minister of justice 1998–2000. After serving on the **Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI)** for the **2002 legislative elections**, Yagninim was named as Togo's representative to the newly inaugurated **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** Council of Elders. In this capacity, he joined election observer missions to member states, including Benin's 2006 presidential election.

YANDJA, YENTCHABRE. Former government minister. Having served in administration for a number of years, Yandja was elevated briefly to minister of planning in 1991 and served as interim minister of foreign affairs in 1995. From 2005 to 2008, he was named minister of development, then regional planning, then trade in quick succession, before being dropped from government. Yandja went on to serve as administrator of the **Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD)**, representing Togo.

YANGA. **Language** of a small ethnic sliver in the extreme north of Togo in the **Dapaong** area. The language is considered a dialect of Mòoré, widely spoken in Burkina Faso.

YAMGNANE, KOFI (1945–). Civil engineer and French politician. A citizen of both **France** and Togo, Yamgnane served as France's first black mayor and a member of Francois Mitterand's cabinet during the latter's second term. Yamgnane was friendly with President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** during frequent visits to Togo, but was disqualified by the **Constitutional Court** when he tried to run for the Togolese presidency against **Faure Gnassingbé**

in the **2010 election**. Amid rumors of pressure on the Court by the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)**, they offered the dubious grounds of discrepancies between French and Togolese documents about the day and month of his birth. Yamgnane called the decision political, and Gnassingbé went on to win reelection. Yamgnane's Sursaut Togo party contested the **2013 legislative elections**, but did not win any seats.

YARK, DAMEHANE (1963–). Minister of security 2012–present. Born in 1963 in **Dapaong** and at the forefront of security measures during the **street protests of 2017–2018**. Yark rose through the ranks of the **Forces d'Armées Togolaises (FAT)** through the **gendarmerie**, reaching rank of colonel, and was named minister of security in 2012, a post which he currently holds as of 2020. Yark was promoted to the rank of brigadier general in April 2018.

YEMTIA, MAGBENGA BISSAM (1953–). Economist. Born in 1953 in Sion, Yemtia completed his **education** in Togo in **Atakpamé**, following which he went to the local **Université de Benin** obtaining a master's degree in developmental economics and obtained further specialization in tourist economics at the University of Aix-Marseille in **France**. He was head of the Human Resources Division and a Developmental Economist at the ministry of the plan in **Lomé**.

YORUBA. An ethnic group found mostly in southwestern Nigeria and numbering over 40 million worldwide. In Togo, the Yoruba **Ana** ethnic group is centered in **Atakpamé** and its vicinity and is regarded as the most western extension of the Yoruba people. Another Yoruba influence comes from more recent immigrants from Nigeria to Togo, who do not necessarily identify as Ana, including the parents of Togolese footballer **Emmanuel Adebayor**.

YOUSSEF, AHMED (1946–). Director of the **Lomé** Medersa, educator, and religious leader. Born in 1946 in **Kpalimé** of a **Hausa** father and a **Yoruba** mother, Youssif studied locally in a Koranic school and was later sent to study in a similar center in Djougou, **Benin**. He returned to Lomé and taught in the newly opened Medersa, becoming its director in 1976. Youssif traveled extensively, including to **Libya** and the then-Soviet Union.

YOUTH MOVEMENTS. *See* STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS.

YWASSA, LEONARD BAGUILMA (1926–2003). Former government minister, prominent member of **Nicolas Grunitzky's Union Démocratique des Peuples Togolais (UDPT)** party and ambassador to **France**. Born in

Koka near Niamtougou in the far north, Ywassa was trained as an **agricultural** engineer at the Agricultural College of Nancy (France) and at other institutes of agriculture. In August 1956, Ywassa was appointed minister of **education**, civil service, labor, and social affairs, holding these positions until Grunitzky's government was ousted, following the United Nations-sponsored **elections of 1958**. He served as an opposition deputy in the **Chambre de Députés** from Niamtougou (1958–1961) and rose to become secretary general of the UDPT in 1960, and with Nicolas Grunitzky's return to power after the **1963 coup d'état**, was promoted to director of Agriculture (1963–1966). In the last weeks of Grunitzky's government, Ywassa was brought into the cabinet as minister of rural economy, but he lost the post after the **coup of 1967**. In March 1968, he was appointed ambassador to France, Great Britain, and the **European Economic Community (EEC)**. Somewhat later he was reassigned to the ministry of rural economy, where he served as deputy director until his retirement in 1986.

Z

ZINSOU, SÉNOUVO AGBOTA (1946–). World-famous Togolese playwright and theater director. Zinsou founded a theatrical group in **Sokodé** in 1968 and in 1972 won the coveted African Grand Prix for his *On Joue la Comédie*, which allowed him to complete a master's in Fine Arts in **France**. From 1978, he was the director of the Troupe Nationale du Togo, a theater, ballet and music company. A very talented dramatical author who wrote several popular plays, he again won an inter-African prize in 1984 for his *Le Tortue qui Chante*. He served as a member of the transitional **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** in the early 1990s, and as a vocal critic of the **Gnassingbé** family, lived in exile in **Germany**.

ZONE FRANCHE DE TRANSFORMATION POUR L'EXPLOITATION (ZFTE). Export Processing Zone in which companies can operate without taxation for at least 10 years. First established in Togo in 1990, today there are three ZFTE, two in **Lomé** (located near the **Port Autonome de Lomé [PAL]** and the **airport**) and one in **Kara**, in use by some 60 different companies before the political turmoil of the **street demonstrations of 2017–2018**, which hurt economic growth. **Human rights** groups in Togo have drawn attention to problematic working conditions for some 9,000 workers in the “zone franche,” in part because some aspects of Togolese labor law were until recently exempted inside the zones.

ZONES D'AMENAGEMENT AGRICOLE PLANIFIE (ZAAP). Originally established in 1978, planned **agricultural** development zones are tracts of land designated by the state to improve land use and provide collective benefits. Since the mid-2010s, the idea has been supported by international **donors** to promote both mechanized agriculture and young adult employment in rural areas. However, the full potential of these structures has not been realized.

ZONGO. Name in much of West Africa, as in Togo, referring to “strangers” commercial quarters in urban centers, at times used specifically to

refer to **Hausa** quarters. The term “zongo” comes from the original **caravan** encampments in the vicinity of urban centers and water supplies that were specifically reserved for the use of foreign transient traders passing by. The original zongo of **Lomé**, founded in 1884 when Lomé was a small village, and was a sprawling slum on prime downtown land by 1970. It was razed to the ground in 1977, and its population was forcibly relocated to **Togblékopé**, 18 kilometers north of the town, where the new zongo was created. Many of the original traders did not relocate to the new zongo but moved to other zongo, feeling (correctly) that its distance from downtown Lomé and “modern character” would detract from prospects of trade. Today, virtually every important commercial entrepôt in Togo has a zongo.

Appendix

Table A.1 Administrative Divisions as of 2018

<i>Region</i>	<i>Prefecture</i>	<i>Number of Communes</i>	<i>Seat of Prefecture</i>
Maritime	Agoue-Nyivé	6	Agoue-Nyivé
	Avé	2	Kévé
	Bas-Mono	2	Afagnan
	Golfe	7	Lomé
	Lacs	4	Aného
	Vo	4	Vogan
	Yoto	3	Tabligbo
	Zio	4	Tsévié
Plateaux	Agou	2	Agou-Gadzépé
	Akébou	2	Kougnohou
	Amou	3	Amlamé
	Anié	2	Anié
	Danyi	2	Danyi-Apéyéomé
	Est-Mono	3	Elavangon
	Haho	4	Notsé
	Kloto	3	Kpalimé
	Kpélé	2	Adéta
	Moyen-Mono	2	Tohoun
	Ogou	4	Atakpamé
	Wawa	3	Badou
	Centrale	3	Blitta
	Sotouboua	3	Sotouboua
La Kara	Tchamba	3	Tchamba
	Tchaoudjo	4	Sokodé
	Mô	2	Djarkpanga
	Assoli	3	Bafilo
	Bassar	4	Bassar
	Binah	2	Pagouda
	Dankpen	3	Gérin-kouka
	Doufelgou	3	Niamougou
Savanes	Kéran	3	Kanté
	Kozah	4	Kara
	Cinkassé	2	Cinkassé
	Kpendjal	2	Mandouri
	Kpendjal-Ouest	2	Naki-Est
	Oti	2	Mango
	Oti-Sud	2	Gando
	Tandjouaré	2	Tandjouaré
	Tône	4	Dapaong

Source: visionsolidaires.com

Table A.2 Population by Region, 2010 Census

<i>Group</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Ewe	1,324,157	22.3
Kabyé	853,391	14.3
Ouatchi (Gbe)	584,245	9.8
Moba	498,109	8.4
Losso	451,712	7.6
Kotokoli	351,838	5.9
Mina (Gen/Goun)	273,672	4.6
Adja	232,696	3.9
Ana-lfe	165,079	2.8
Gourma	157,545	2.7
Peul and others	109,360	1.8
Total	5,001,804	84.1

Source: Minority Rights Group International, from information provided by the Togolese government to the UN CERD in 2016; <https://minorityrights.org/country/togo/>

Table A.3 Population by Ethnicity, 2016

<i>Group</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Ewe	1,324,157	22.3
Kabyé	853,391	14.3
Ouatchi (Gbe)	584,245	9.8
Moba	498,109	8.4
Losso	451,712	7.6
Kotokoli	351,838	5.9
Mina (Gen/Goun)	273,672	4.6
Adja	232,696	3.9
Ana-lfe	165,079	2.8
Gourma	157,545	2.7
Peul and others	109,360	1.8
Total	5,001,804	84.1

Source: Minority Rights Group International, from information provided by the Togolese government to the UN CERD in 2016; <https://minorityrights.org/country/togo/>

Table A.4 Heads of State and Heads of Government

<i>President</i>	<i>Term Began</i>	<i>Prime Minister (party)</i>	<i>Term Began</i>
Sylvanus Olympio	1961		
Nicholas Grunitzky	1963		
Gnassingbe Eyadema	1967		
		Joseph Koffigoh	1991
		Edem Kodjo (UTD)	1994
		Kwassi Klutse	1996
		Eugene Adoboli	1999
		Agbeyome Kodjo	2000
		Koffi Sama	2002
Abass Bonfoh	2005 (interim)		
Faure Gnassingbe	2005		
		Edem Kodjo (CPP)	2005
		Yawovi Agboyibo (CAR)	2006
		Komlan Mally	2007
		Gilbert Houngbo	2008
		Kwesi Ahoomey-Zunu	2012
		Komi Klassou	2015
		Victoire Tomegah-Dogbe	2020

Table A.5 Selected Economic Indicators

Gross national income (GNI) per capita (2011 PPP \$)	1,593
Population living below income poverty line, PPP \$1.90 a day (%)	49.2
Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)	34.5
Employment in services (% of total employment)	46.0
Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people)	77.9

Source: UNDP Human Development Reports, Togo <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TGO>

Table A.6 Selected Human Development Indicators

Total population (millions)	7.9
Median age (years)	19.4
Life expectancy at birth (years)	60.8
HIV prevalence, adult (% ages 15–49)	2.1
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	49.2
Literacy rate, adult (% ages 15 and older)	63.7
Urban population (%)	41.7

Source: UNDP Human Development Reports, Togo <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TGO>




Figure A.1 Togo GDP Growth, 1989–2018. *Source:* World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Bibliography

CONTENTS

Introduction

1. General Works
2. Early (19th-Century) Historical and Exploration Accounts
3. Other Historical Studies
4. Anthropology, Sociology, and Ethnology
5. Politics, Administration, and International Relations
6. Economy, Agriculture, and Trade
7. Education
8. Science, Health, and Environment
9. Religion
10. Literature
11. Linguistics
12. Art, Music, and Dance
13. Tourism
14. Reference and Bibliography
15. Selected Websites

INTRODUCTION

The bibliography that follows reflects the rich history of scholarship on Togo, despite the country's small size and complex history. While not as well-studied as larger and more populous African states, Togo has been the subject of a steady stream of scholarship from authors publishing in French, German, and English (in particular), which both references and critiques the scholarship of the past. Early ethnic studies, in particular, form the groundwork of much of the current anthropological, sociological, and political analysis of the people of Togo, but have come under welcome reexamination recently as our understanding becomes more sophisticated and the Togolese people and cultures themselves continue to grow and change. In a similar vein, political analysis

of Togo's various "failures" like military coups and abortive democratization have given way to studies that use the example of Togo to better understand concepts like dynasty, term limits, competition, and liberalization in the context of contemporary sub-Saharan African politics. The bibliography focuses particularly on works of social science and history, while offering a sampling of Togolese literature and literary critique and reference works and web pages for further reading. For a more comprehensive listing of early works on Togo's history, especially in German, and documents related to the period after World War I when Togo was under League of Nations/United Nations administration, please consult earlier editions of this volume.

For researchers and other readers interested in English-language works on precolonial Togo, the following are especially suggested: for the precolonial era along the Ghana-Nigeria coast, Newbury's (1961) study is unrivaled: for the early colonial period see the articles by Amenumey (1969), Cardinall (1926, 1927), Darkoh (1968), and Knoll (1974). For the so-called Ewe "problem" prior to Togo's independence, the best items are Coleman's 1956 monograph, Amenumey's several works, and Welch's chapters in his 1966 book. Early anthropological sources in English include Tait's articles, especially his 1961 chapter on the Konkomba in Ghana. Finally, early postindependence events are surveyed by Kitchen (1963), Howe (1967), Chardon (1970), and Decalo (1973), in individual chapters on Togo in the books by Thompson (1972) and Decalo (1976, 1990), and in various reference works that have since stopped publication but are often available in libraries, such as the monthly *Africa Research Bulletin*, the annuals of *Africa Contemporary Record*, and the annual reports and quarterly country survey of the *Economist Intelligence Unit*.

Turning to early French language sources, the best single volume on Togo remains the massive *Histoire du Togo*, written by the prolific Robert Cornevin. The book, twice updated, presents the best single work compendium of facts on Togo's ethnic groups, precolonial history, French administration, religion, and early political evolution. It contains only sparsely detailed data on the postindependence era, but such material is not lacking in French, including in Cornevin's other publications. He has also written a brief book on German colonization in Africa (1969), which can be read in conjunction with Attignon's (1972) study of the evolution of Togo from the Congress of Berlin to the Conference of Brazzaville. Also of note are the studies of Froelich (1956), Luchaire (1957)—whose articles are really lengthy monographs—Pauvert (1960), and Brioux (1967) on the Ewe unification movement and Kratz's two part contribution on Togo's early decades under German rule. Other seminal historical works include that of Agbanon II (1991), d'Almeida (1982) on the period under Governor Auguste Bonnacarrère, and Gayibor's

numerous fascinating studies (especially of 1983). These are but a sampling of a very rich body of historical analysis that exists in French.

HISTORY, SOCIOLOGY, AND ANTHROPOLOGY

One episode in Togolese history that has recently been revisited is the Tuskegee expedition from Alabama (in the U.S.) to Togo with a focus on cotton growing, while the latter territory was still under German control. Both Zimmerman (2005) and Beckert (2005) urge a reexamination of those events in light of postcolonial understandings of identity, agency, and agriculture. Women's issues in Togo have likewise been a subject of greater care and attention. One can draw a line from the early works by Cordonnier in the 1980s about women traders in Lomé to Sylvanus's (2016) examination of the modern production and international trade in cloth, still dominated by women in the Togolese context. The political action of Togolese women from the early 1930s is given greater attention from Almeida-Ekué (1992) in French and Lawrance (2003) in English. Pauvert (1955) on the Kabyé is a precursor to a more postmodern understanding of that ethnic group from Piot (1999), and Riviere and Surgy's studies of the Ewe should be balanced by the 2005 edited *Handbook of Eweland*, which includes Togolese scholars as contributors. It is also worth noting the roles played by rumor and humor in Togolese life, examined in detail by Toulabor (1981, 1994) and Ellis (1993), but also the subject of literature and drama by Togolese authors such as Apedo-Amah (2013) and the famous Yves-Emmanuel Dogbe.

POLITICS AND CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS

Togo was the subject of political analysis in the in 1970s and 1980s as a one-party state that appeared to embrace more free-market principles than neighboring Benin with its Marxist-Leninist leadership. It came under additional scrutiny in the 1990s as a case of failed democratization, again in contrast with Benin, which succeeded in unseating the dictator (Heilbrunn 1993; Nwajiaku 1994). While the initial wave of scholarship prompted by the so-called Third Wave of democratization in Africa was in danger of overlooking Togo as nothing more than a contrast, Hounnikpo (2001), Attisso (2001), and Seely (2009), recognize the political dynamics at play in Togo as illustrative of trends elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Osei (2018) also does an admirable job of meeting Togolese politics where it is, and putting it in the context of the politics of other countries in the region. The dynamics

of political succession has also drawn Ebeku (2006) and Banjo (2008) to the study of Togo.

Between academic studies of contemporary Togo, which often focus on a moment in time, and the power of the Internet as a “commons” for accounts of Togolese politics that unfortunately can be scrubbed by authorities at strategic moments (such as election season), there are many valuable contributions from international or nongovernmental organizations that capture rich detail and offer influential analysis, among them Manley (2003), Kohnert (2006), Breuer et al. (2017), and the many detailed—and chilling—accounts collected by Amnesty International.

GENERAL WORKS

Ameagbleame, S. *Histoire, littérature et société du Togo*. Frankfurt: IKO Verlag, 1997.

Ayoko, Rebecca, and Carol Mann. *Quand Les Étoiles Deviennent Noires: Des Rues D'abidjan Aux Podiums D'Yves Saint Laurent*. Paris: J.-C. Gawsewitch, 2012.

Clark, John C., and David Gardinier, eds. *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.

Cornevin, Robert. *Histoire de l'Afrique des Origines à Nos Jours*. Paris: Payot, 1956.
———. *Histoire des Peuples de l'Afrique Noire*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1960.

Curkeet, A. A. *Togo: Portrait of a West African Francophone Republic*. Jefferson: McFarland 1993.

Decalo, Samuel. *Togo*. World Bibliographical Series, V. 178. Oxford, England: Clio Press, 1995.

Dossouvi Logo, Hilaire. *Lutter Pour Ses Droits Au Togo*. Mémoires Africaines. Togo. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004.

Francois, Y. *Le Togo*. Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1993.

Houngnikpo, Mathurin C. *Africa's Elusive Quest for Development*. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2006.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance, 1993–1994*. London: Institute, 1993.

Kassindja, Fauziya, and Layli Miller Bashir. *Do They Hear You When You Cry*. New York, N.Y.: Delacorte Press, 1998.

Marguerat, Yves. *La Naissance Du Togo: Selon Les Documents De L'époque*. Les Chroniques Anciennes Du Togo, No 4. Lomé: Éditions Haho, 1993.

Morgenthau, Ruth Schachter. *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Nugent, Paul. *Smugglers, Secessionists & Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Life of the Borderlands Since 1914*. Western African Studies. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002.

- Packer, George. *The Village of Waiting*. New York: Vintage Books, 1988.
- Piot, Charles. *Nostalgia for the Future: West Africa after the Cold War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
- Piot, Charles and Kodjo Nicolas Batema (contributor). *The Fixer: Visa Lottery Chronicles*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019.
- Roberts, Richard L., and Benjamin N Lawrance. *Trafficking in Slavery's Wake: Law and the Experience of Women and Children*. New African Histories. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012.
- Robinson, Kenneth. *The Dilemmas of Trusteeship*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Seely, Jennifer C. *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa: The Cases of Benin and Togo*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Stoecker, Helmuth (ed). *German Imperialism in Africa: From the Beginnings until the Second World War*. London: C. Hurst, 1986.
- Sylvanus, Nina. *Patterns in Circulation: Cloth, Gender, and Materiality in West Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016.
- Thompson, Virginia, and Richard Adloff. *French West Africa*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958.
- Toulabor, Comi M. *Le Togo sous Eyadéma*. Paris: Karthala, 1986.

EARLY (19TH-CENTURY) HISTORICAL AND EXPLORATION ACCOUNTS

- Adams, John. *Sketches Taken During Ten Voyages to Africa between the Years 1786 and 1800*. London: Hurst, Robinson Co., 1822.
- . *Remarks on the Country Extending from Cape Palmas to the River Congo*. 1823. Reprint, London: Frank Cass, 1966.
- Bettencourt, Vasconcellos Corte Real do Canto, Vital de. *Descripção Historica, Topographica e Ethnographica do Diçtricto de S. Joao Baptista d'Ajuda e do Reino de Dahomena Costa da Mina*. Lisbon: Typographia Universal, 1869.
- Bosman, Willem. *A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinee*. London: J. Knapton, 1705.
- Bouche, Pierre Bertrand. *Sept Ans en Afrique Occidentale; La Côte des Esclaves et le Dahomey*. Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1885.
- François, Kurt von. *Ohne Schuss Durch Dick und Dunn. Erste Erforschung des Togo-hinterlandes*. Esch-Waldems: Eigenverlag von Gotz, 1972.
- Freeman, Thomas Birch. *Journal of Various Visits to the Kingdoms of Ashanti, Aku and Dahomi in Western Africa*. 1844. Reprint, London: Cass, 1968.
- Norregard, Georg. *Danish Settlements in West Africa (1658–1850)*. Boston: Boston University Press, 1966.
- Schnapper, Bernard. *La Politique et le Commerce Français dans le Golfe de Guinée de 1838 à 1871*. Paris: Mouton, 1961.

- Snelgrave, William. *A Full Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave Trade*. London: Knapton, 1734.
- Zoller, Hugo. *Die Deutschen Besitzungen an der Westafrikanischen Kuste*. Berlin: W. Spemann, 1885.

OTHER HISTORICAL STUDIES

- Agbanon II. *Histoire de Petit Popo et du Royaume Guin*. Lomé: Haho, 1991.
- Agblemagnon, Ferdinand N' Sougan. "Le Concept de Crise Appliqué à une Société Africaine: les Ewes." *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie* 23 (1957): 157–166.
- Almeida-Ekué, Silivi d'. *La Révolte Des Loméennes, 24–25 Janvier 1933*. Lomé: Nouvelles éditions africaines du Togo, 1992.
- Almeida, Silivi Kokoe d', and Seti Y. G. Gbedemah. *Le Gouverneur Bonnacarrère au Togo*. Abidjan: Les Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1982.
- Amenumey, D.E.K. "The Ewe People and the Coming of European Rule 1850–1914." Thesis, London University, 1964.
- . "The Extension of British Rule to Anlo (Southeast Ghana) 1850–1890." *Journal of African History* 9, no. 1 (1968): 99–117.
- . "German Administration in Southern Togo." *Journal of African History* 10, no. 4 (1969): 623–639.
- . "The Pre-1947 Background to the Ewe Unification Question." *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 10 (1969): 65–85.
- . "The 1956 Plebiscite in Togoland under British Administration and Ewe Unification." *Universitas* (Accra) 2 (1976): 126–139.
- . *The Ewe in Pre-Colonial Times: A Political History with Special Emphasis on the Anlo, Ge, and Krepi*. Accra: Sedco, 1986.
- . *The Ewe Unification Movement. A Political History*. Legon (Ghana): Ghana University Press, 1990.
- Attignon, Hermann. "Lomé." *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines* 81 (1972): 49–57.
- . "Le Togo de Congrès de Berlin à la Conférence de Brazzaville." *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines* 82 (Oct. 1972): 28–58.
- de Barros, Philip L, Louise Iles, Lesley D Frame, and David Killick. "The Early Iron Metallurgy of Bassar, Togo: Furnaces, Metallurgical Remains and Iron Objects." *Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa* 55, no. 1 (2020): 3–43.
- Beckert, Sven. "From Tuskegee to Togo: The Problem of Freedom in the Empire of Cotton." *The Journal of American History* 92, no. 2 (2005): 498–526.
- Blackshire-Belay, Carol Aisha. "German Imperialism in Africa: The Distorted Images of Cameroon, Namibia, Tanzania, and Togo." *Journal of Black Studies* 23, no. 2 (1992): 235–246.
- Brieux, Jean-Jacques. "L'Affaire Ewe: Un Exemple du Role de l'ONU dans le Processus de Decolonisation." *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines* 21 (Sept. 1967): 102–121.

- Cardinall, A.W. "The Story of the German Occupation of Togoland." *Gold Coast Review* 2 (1926): 192–207; 3 (1927): 56–72.
- Cogneau, Denis, and Alexander Moradi. "Borders That Divide: Education and Religion in Ghana and Togo Since Colonial Times." *The Journal of Economic History* 74, no. 3 (2014): 694–729.
- Coleman, James S. *Togoland*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956.
- Commissariat de la République Française au Togo. *Guide de la Colonisation au Togo*. Paris: Larose, 1924.
- Cornevin, Robert. "Evolution dans le Nord du Togo." *Sociologie* 4, no. 1 (1954): 59–66.
- . *Le Togo, Nation-Pilote*. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1963.
- . "La Prise de Sansanné-Mango par l'Administrateur Pierre Duranthon, le 15 Août 1914." *France-Eurafrique* 174 (June 1966): 42–44.
- . "La Tension Franco-Anglaise durant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et la Naissance de la Question Évhé." *France-Eurafrique* 170 (Feb. 1966): 35–40.
- . "La Dernière Période (1906–1914) de la Colonisation Allemande au Ruanda, Urundi, et Nord-Togo." *Problèmes Sociales Congolais* 83 (Dec. 1968): 3–22.
- . *Histoire de la Colonisation Allemande*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969.
- . *Histoire du Togo*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1969.
- . *Le Togo*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973.
- . "Le Togo, 20e Anniversaire." *Afrique Contemporaine* 142 (1987): 41–60.
- . *Le Togo: des Origines à Nos Jours*. Paris: Académie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, 1988.
- Darkoh, M. "Togoland Under the Germans: Thirty Years of Economic Development." *Nigerian Geographical Journal* 10 (1967): 107–122; 11 (1968): 153–168.
- Digre, Brian Kenneth. "The United Nations, France, and African Independence: A Case Study of Togo." *French Colonial History* 5, no. 1 (2004): 193–205.
- Froelich, Jean-Claude. *Cameroun-Togo: Territoires sous Tutelle*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1956.
- Gayibor, Nicoué Lodjou. *Foli Bébé ou l'Epopée des Ga du Togo*. Dakar: NEA, 1983.
- . "Agokoli et la Dispersion de Notsé." In *Peuples du Golfe du Bénin*, edited by François de Medeiros, 21–34. Paris: Karthala, 1984.
- . "Elements de Polémologie en Pays Ewe." *Cultures et Développement* 16, no. 3/4 (1984): 511–536.
- . "Ecologie et Histoire: les Origines de la Savane du Bénin." *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 26, no. 1/2 (1986): 13–41.
- . "Le Remodelage des Traditions Historiques: la Légende d'Agokoli, Roi de Notsé." In *Sources Orales de l'Histoire de l'Afrique*, edited by Claude-Hélène Perrot, 209–214. Paris: CNRS, 1989.
- Glasman, Joël. "'Connaître papier': Police Work and the Late Colonial State in Togo." *Genèses* 86, no. 1 (June 20, 2012): 37–54.

- . “Unruly Agents: Police Reform, Bureaucratization, and Policemen’s Agency in Interwar Togo.” *The Journal of African History* 55, no. 1 (2014): 79–100.
- Knoll, Arthur J. “Togo Under German Administration 1884–1910,” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1963/64.
- . *Togo Under Imperial Germany 1884–1914*. Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1974.
- Kratz, Achim. “Le Togo au Debut de Notre Siècle.” *Revue Française d’Etudes Politiques Africaines* 211–212 (Aug.–Sept. 1983): 144–165; 213–214 (Oct.–Nov. 1983): 125–142.
- Lawrance, Benjamin N. “La Révolte Des Femmes: Economic Upheaval and the Gender of Political Authority in Lomé, Togo, 1931–33.” *African Studies Review* 46, no. 1 (2003): 43–67.
- Luchaire, François. “Le Togo Français de la Tutelle à l’Autonomie.” *Revue Juridique et Politique de l’Union Française* 20, no. 1, (Jan.–Mar. 1957): 1–46; 20, no. 3 (July–Sept. 1957): 501–587.
- Marguerat, Yves. “Education Strategies in Togo under the French Mandate.” *Cahiers d’études africaines* 169–170, no. 1 (July 1, 2003): 389–408.
- Medeiros, François de, ed. *Peuples du Golfe du Bénin*. Paris: Karthala, 1984.
- Newbury, Colin W. *The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers: European Trade and Administration Among the Yoruba and Adja Speaking Peoples of Southwestern Nigeria, Southern Dahomey and Togo*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.
- Nugent, Paul. *Smugglers, Secessionists & Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Life of the Borderlands since 1914*. Western African Studies. Athens : Oxford : Legon, Ghana: Ohio University Press ; James Currey ; Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2002.
- Pauvert, Jean-Claude. *L’Ancienne Colonisation Kabré et Ses Possibilités d’Expansion dans l’Est Mono*. Lomé: ORSTOM, 1955.
- . “L’Evolution Politique des Ewe.” *Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines* 2 (May 1960): 161–192.
- Pazzi, Roberto. “Aperçu sur l’Implantation Actuelle et les Migrations Anciennes des Peuples de l’Aire Culturelle Aja-Tado.” In *Peuples du Golfe du Bénin*, edited by François de Medeiros, 11–21. Paris: Karthala, 1984.
- Schuerkens, U. *Du Togo allemand aux Togo et Ghana indépendants*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001.
- Tété-Adjalogo Têtêvi G. *De La Colonisation Allemande Au Deutsche-Togo Bund*. Collection Etudes Africaines. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998.
- . *Histoire Du Togo: La Palpitante Quête De L’ablodé, 1940–1960*. Créteil: Éd. Auteurs du monde, 2012.
- . *Sylvanus Olympio*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2013.
- Tcham, Badjow, and K Tchamie. *L’intégration De L’hinterland À La Colonie Du Togo*. Collection “Patrimoines,” No 10. Lomé: Presses de l’UB, 2000.
- Videgla, Michel W. “Quelques Aspects des Frontières Coloniales en Pays Aja, Ewé et Yoruba.” In *Peuples du Golfe du Bénin*, edited by François de Medeiros, 103–126. Paris: Karthala, 1984.

- Welch, Claude E. "The Birth and Growth of Ewe Nationalism" and "Conflict over Self-Determination in Togoland." In *Dream of Unity, Pan Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa*, edited by Claude E. Welch, 37–147. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966.
- Wilson, S. "Aperçu Historique sur les Peuples et Cultures dans le Golfe du Bénin: le Cas des 'Mina' d'Anécho." In *Peuples du Golfe du Bénin*, edited by François de Medeiros, 127–150. Paris: Karthala, 1984.
- Yagla, Wen'Saa Ogma. *Les Indigènes Du Togo À L'assaut Du Pouvoir Colonial, 1920–1958: L'histoire Politique D'un Peuple Africain*. Lomé: Les Nouvelles éditions africaines du Togo, 1992.
- Zimmerman, Andrew. "A German Alabama in Africa: The Tuskegee Expedition to German Togo and the Transnational Origins of West African Cotton Growers." *American Historical Review* 110 (2005): 1362–1398.
- Zoeller, Hugo. *Le Togo en 1884*. Lomé: Éditions HaHo, 1990.

ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, AND ETHNOLOGY

- Adedzi, K.A. "Éducation Pour La Santé De La Reproduction Et Ses Implications Anthropologiques Au Togo." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 2020. doi:10.1080/00083968.2020.1717975.
- Abotchi, Tchénnon. "L'immigration des Ehoué du Bénin dans la plaine du Mono au Togo: le cas du Haho oriental." *Les cahiers d'outre-mer* 192 (October–December 1995): 453–475.
- Adubra Ayélé Léa. *Non-Traditional Occupations, Empowerment, and Women: A Case of Togolese Women*. African Studies. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
- Agblemagnon, Ferdinand N'Sougan. "Personne, Tradition et Culture en Afrique Noire." *Recherches et Debats de Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français* 24 (Sept. 1958): 22–30.
- . "Research on Attitudes Toward the Togolese Women." *International Social Science Journal* 14, no. 1 (1962): 148–156.
- . *Sociologie des Sociétés Orales d'Afrique Noire: Les Eve du Sud-Togo*. Paris: Mouton, 1969.
- Agier, M., and T. Lulle. "Elements d'Anthropologie des Lieux de Travail." *Anthropologie et Sociétés* 10, no. 1 (1986): 109–143.
- Ajavon, Pierre-Lawoetry. "Un Certain Conception de la Mort Chez les GeMina du Sud-Est Togo." *Anthropos* 85, no. 1/3 (1990): 182–187.
- Alexandre, Pierre. "The Political Institutions of the Kotokoli, a Tribe of Northern Togo." Thesis, University of London, 1959.
- . "Organisation Politique des Kotokoli du Nord-Togo." *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 14, nos. 2, 4 (1963): 228–274.
- . "Le Facteur Islamique dans l'Histoire d'un Etat du Moyen-Togo [Kotokoli]." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 65 (1964): 26–30.

- Amenumey, D.E.K. "Some Aspects of Ewe Machinery of Government with Special Reference to the Anlo Political System." *Ghana Journal of Sociology* 2 (Oct. 1968): 100–108.
- Amos, Alcione M. "Afro-Brazilians in Togo: The Case of the Olympio Family, 1882–1945 (Les Afro-Brésiliens Du Togo: L'exemple De La Famille Olympio, 1882–1945)." *Cahiers D'études Africaines* 41, no. 162 (2001): 293–314.
- Attignon, Hermann. "Foundation du Village d'Agu-Nyogbo: Origine Evhé des Aguawo." *Documents de Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches de Kara* (Piya, Togo) 3 (1968): 1–17.
- . "Lomé." *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines* 81, (Sept. 1972): 49–57.
- Barros, Philip de. "The Bassar: Large Scale Iron-Producers of the West African Savanna." Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1985.
- . "Bassar: a Quantified, Chronologically Controlled Regional Approach to a Traditional Iron Production Center in West Africa." *Africa* 56, no. 2 (1986): 148–174.
- . "Societal Repercussions of the Rise of Large-Scale Traditional Iron Production." *African Archeological Review* 6 (1988): 91–113.
- Bertho, Jacques. "La Parenté des Yoruba aux Peuplades de Dahomey et Togo." *Africa* 19, no. 2 (April 1949): 121–132.
- . "Le Gbadou Chez les Adja du Togo et du Dahomey." *Première Conférence Internationale des Africanistes de l'Ouest; Comptes Rendus* 2 (1951): 331–350.
- . "Races et Langues du Bas Dahomey et du Bas Togo." *Bulletin d'IFAN* 13, no. 4 (Oct. 1951): 1265–1271.
- Blier, S. "The Dance of Death: Notes on the Architecture and Staging of Tamberma Funeral Performances." *Anthropology and Aesthetics* 2 (1981): 107–143.
- Bris, Emil Le. "Migration and the Decline of a Densely Populated Rural Area: the Case of Vo Koutime in South-East Togo." *African Perspectives* (Leiden) 1 (1978): 109–123.
- . "Suppression-Démographique et Evolution Foncière: le Cas du Sud-Est du Togo." *African Perspectives* (Leiden) 2 (1979): 109–123.
- . *Les Marchés Ruraux dans la Circonscription de Vo*. Paris: Éditions de l'ORSTOM, 1984.
- Cardinal, Allan Wolsey. *Tales Told in Togoland to Which Is Added the Mythical and Traditional History by E. F. Tamakloe*. London: Oxford University Press, 1931.
- Cordonnier, Rita. *Femmes Africaines et Commerce: les Revendeuses de Tissue de la Ville de Lomé*. Paris: ORSTOM, 1982.
- Cornevin, Robert. "Le Centre Urbain de Bassari." *Bulletin de l'IFAN Serie B*, t IX, no. 1 and 2 (1957): 81–84.
- . "Connaissance des Kabré Depuis Frobenius." *Monde non Chretien* 59/60 (July–Dec. 1961): 95–99.
- . "A Propos des Cotokoli du Moyen-Togo." *Notes Africaines d'IFAN* 101 (Jan. 1964): 7–11.

- . “Avec le Lieutenant Plehn à la Recherche d’un Cercle du Moyen-Togo.” *Etudes Dahoméennes* 4 (1962): 43–60.
- . *Les Bassari du Nord Togo*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1962.
- . “Notes sur le Cercle de Dapango (République du Togo), et l’Histoire de ses Habitants.” *Monde non Chrétien* 67 (July–Sept. 1963): 168–186.
- . “Contribution à l’Etude des Populations Parlant des Langues Gouang au Togo et au Dahomey.” *Journal of African Languages* 3, no. 3 (1964): 226–230.
- . “Contribution à l’Histoire de la Chefferie Cotokoli.” *Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines* 4, no. 3 (15) (1964): 456–460.
- . “Note sur la Toponymie des Villages Konkomba de la Circonscription de Bassari.” *Bulletin d’IFAN* 26 3/4 (July–Oct. 1964): 694–708.
- . “A Propos des Masques de Laiton du Nord-Togo.” *Notes Africaines d’IFAN* 101 (Jan. 1964): 12–18.
- . “Totemisme, Liens Communautaires et Coutumes Chez Quelques Groupes Ethniques, Togolais.” *Etudes Dahoméennes* 17 (1964): 9–34.
- . “Kilir, Logba and Lamba.” *Journal of African History* 6 (1965): 23–27.
- . “Structures Agraires et Systèmes de Culture en Pays Kabré.” *Documents de Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches de Kara, Piya (Togo)* (1967): 37–48.
- . “Note à Propos du Canton de Kpessi.” *Bulletin de l’Enseignement Supérieur du Bénin* 8 (Jan. 1969): 11–20.
- . “Dynasties Tyokossi de Sansanné-Mango.” *Annales de l’Ecole des Lettres (Lomé)* 1 (1972): 9–24.
- Cornevin, Robert, and R. Verdier. “Etudes sur le Mariage Kabré.” *Documents de Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches de Kara, Piya (Togo)* (1967): 61–111.
- Ellis, Stephen. “Rumour and Power in Togo.” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 63, no. 4 (1993): 462–476.
- Fiawood, D.K. “Some Reflections on Ewe Social Organization.” In *Peuples du Golfe du Bénin*, edited by François de Medeiros, 221–234. Paris: Karthala, 1984.
- Froelich, J.C. “Généralités sur les Kabré du Nord Togo.” *Bulletin de l’IFAN* 11, no. 1/2 (1949): 77–105.
- . “Les Konkomba du Nord-Togo.” *Bulletin de l’IFAN* 11 (1949): 409–437.
- . “Les Sociétés d’Initiation Chez les Moba et les Gourma du Nord Togo.” *Journal de la Société des Africanistes* 19 (1949): 99–142.
- . *Les Konkomba*. Dakar: Memoire d’IFAN, 1952.
- . “Catalogue des Scarifications en Usage Chez Certaines Populations du Dahomey et du Nord Togo.” *Memoires d’IFAN* 23 (1953): 253–264.
- . *La Tribu Konkomba du Nord Togo*. Dakar: IFAN, 1954.
- . “Le Paysan Noir et le Defi Moderne.” *Civilisations* 19, no. 4 (1969): 452–465.
- . “Le Kina et le Nwi des Konkomba.” *Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines* 11 (1971): 308–374.
- Froelich, J.C., and P. Alexandre. “Histoire Traditionnelle des Kotokoli et des Bi-Tchambi du Nord-Togo.” *Bulletin de l’IFAN* 22(B), no. 1/2 (Jan.–April 1960): 211–275.

- Frœlich, J.C., and Robert Cornevin. *Populations du Nord-Togo*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963.
- Gardini, Marco. "Land Transactions and Chieftaincies in Southwestern Togo." *Afrika Spectrum* 47, no. 1 (2012): 51–72.
- Gbikpi-Benissan, Date Fodio. "La Chefferie Dans la Nation Contemporaine: la Chef-ferie en Pays Bassari, Akposso et Mina." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Paris, 1985.
- Greene, Sandra E. "Notsie Narratives: History, Memory and Meaning in West Africa." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 101, no. 4 (2002): 1015–1041.
- Guézéré, Assogba. "The Territories of Motorbike Taxis in Lomé (Togo): From Daily Practices to the Recomposition of Urban Spaces and Social Bonds." *Géographie, économie, société* 14, no. 1 (September 20, 2012): 53–72.
- Kakaye Léopold N. Napo. *Histoire Politique Et Administrative Du Togo: Regard Sur Un Nationaliste De La Première Heure*. Paris: Harmattan, 2010.
- Kruger, Colleen E. "Locality, Mobility, and 'Nation': Periurban Colonialism in Togo's Eweland, 1900–1960." *Journal of World History* 20, no. 4 (December 2009): 610–611.
- Kubik, Gerhard. "Hubert Kponton, Erfinder, Künstler und Bergrunde Eines Ethnographischen Privatmuseums in Lomé, Togo." *Archiv für Völkerkunde* (Vienna) 40 (1986): 157–171.
- Lasisi, Rashid Oladoja. "Language, Culture, Ethnicity and National Integration: The Togo Experience Since 1900." *African Study Monographs* 14/1 (1994): 1–12.
- . "Togo-Dahomey (Benin Republic) Relations, 1914–1945: A Dent in the Centralized Administration of French West Africa." *Transafrican Journal of History* 25 (1998): 100–109.
- Lawrance, Benjamin N. *A Handbook of Eweland: The Ewe of Togo and Benin*. Ewe-land Series. Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2005.
- . *Locality, Mobility, and "Nation": Periurban Colonialism in Togo's Ewe-land, 1900–1960*. Rochester Studies in African History and the Diaspora, V. 31. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2007.
- Le Bris, E. "Migration and the Decline of a Densely Populated Rural Area: The Case of the Vo Koutime in Southeast Togo." *African Perspectives* (Leiden) 1 (1978): 109–126.
- Lecadet, Clara, and Khosravi, Shahram. "After Deportation: Ethnographic Perspectives." In *Post-Deportation Movements: Forms and Conditions of the Struggle Amongst Self-Organising Expelled Migrants in Mali and Togo*, 187–204. Cham: Springer International Publishing; Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
- Lopez-Escartin, N. *Données de Base Sur la Population Togolaise*. Paris: Centre Français sur la Population et le Développement, 1991.
- Lucien-Brun, Bernard. *La Colonisation des Terres Neuves du Centre-Togo par les Kabré et les Losso*. Paris: ORSTOM, 1974.
- Lucien-Brun, Bernard, and Anne-Marie Pillet-Schwartz. *Les Migrations Rurales des Kabyé et des Losso*. Paris: ORSTOM, 1987.
- Mace, Alain. "Tradition, Technique Et Modernité: Approche Des Ewé De Tsévié (Sud-Togo)." *Socio-Anthropologie* 3 (1998): 1–10.

- Mace, Alain, Emmanuel Terray, and École des hautes études en sciences sociales (Paris). "Technique Du Fer Et Lien Social En Pays Éwé: Un Exemple Au Togo." Dissertation, Atelier national de Reproduction des Thèses, 2006.
- Marguerat, Yves. *Population, migrations, urbanisation au Togo et en Afrique noire: articles et documents (1981–1993)*. Lomé [Togo]: Presses de l'U.B. [Université du Bénin], 1994.
- Marguerat, Yves, and Tchitchekou Pelei. *Si Lomé m'était contée: dialogues avec les vieux Loméens*. Lomé, Togo: Presses de l'Université du Bénin, 1992.
- Medeiros, François de, ed. *Peuples du Golfe du Bénin*. Paris: Karthala, 1984.
- Montgomery, Eric James, and Christian Vannier. "An Ethnography of a Vodun Shrine in Southern Togo: Of Spirit, Slave, and Sea." *Studies of Religion in Africa: Supplements to the Journal of Religion in Africa* 46. Leiden: Brill, 2017.
- Nyatefe, Victor, and Okey Mawussé Nézan Komlagan. "Analyse De La Consommation Des Biens Culturels Au Togo." *African Development Review* 32 (2020): 80–95.
- Pauvert, Jean-Claude. *L'Ancienne Colonisation Kabré et Ses Possibilités d'Expansion dans l'Est Mono*. Lomé: ORSTOM, 1955.
- Perrot Claude-Hélène, Fauvelle-Aymar François-Xavier, and Colloque international Rois et Chef les États africains (1999: Paris). *Le Retour Des Rois: Les Autorités Traditionnelles Et L'état En Afrique Contemporaine*. Paris: Karthala, 2003.
- Piot, Charles. "Of Slaves and the Gift: Kabre Sale of Kin during the Era of the Slave Trade." *The Journal of African History* 37, no. 1 (1996): 31–49.
- . *Remotely Global: Village Modernity in West Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
- . "The 'Right' to Be Trafficked." *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 18, no. 1 (July 16, 2011): 199–210.
- Raunet, Nathalie. *Chiefs, Migrants and the State: Mobility in the Ghana-Togo Borderlands*. Working Papers / Imi, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, Paper 128 (May 2016).
- Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, E. A. B. van. *Mbambim: Un Chef de Famille d'Ayikpéré (Nord Togo)*. Leiden: Afrika Studiecentrum, 1972; 1982.
- . *Essai Sur Quelques Aspects du Droit Matrimonial des Tyokossi: Règlement d'un Litige à la Cour du Chef Supérieur de Sansanné-Mango (Nord-Togo)*. Leyden: Afrika Studiecentrum, 1973.
- . *Changing Views About the Restitution of Marriage Payments Among the Tyokossi of Northern Togo*. Leyden: Afrika Studiecentrum, 1974.
- . "Droit Moderne et Droit Coutumier au Togo." *Penant* 747 (Jan.–March 1975): 5–18.
- . *Sherea: Justice du Chef Supérieur à N'zara, Sansanné-Mango*. Leiden: Afrika Studiecentrum, 1975.
- . "Terre au Nord-Togo: Quelques Aspects sur la Relations Anufo-Ngam en Matière Foncière." *African Perspectives* 1 (1979): 139–151.
- . "The Plot of the Sophisticated Son-in-Law: Old and New Ways of Establishing Rights over Land in N'zara, Northern Togo." In *Anthropology of Law in the*

- Netherlands: Essays on Legal Pluralism*, edited by K. von Benda-Beckmann and F. Stribosch. Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986.
- . “Chef Coutumier: un Métier Difficile.” *Politique Africaine* 27 (1987): 13–31.
- . “Etat et Pouvoir neo-Traditionnel en Afrique: Position Ambigué du Chef Coutumière face à l’Etat Africaine.” *Droit et Cultures* 15 (1988): 71–113.
- . “Sorcellerie et Justice Coutumière dans une Société Togolaise: Une Quantité Negligeable?” *Penant* 99, no. 801 (Aug.–Dec. 1989): 433–453.
- Rouvery van Nieuwaal, E. A. B. van, and Elsa van Nieuwaal. *A la Recherche de la Justice: Quelques Aspects du Droit Matrimoniale des Anufon à Mango*. Leiden: Afrika Studiecentrum, 1976.
- . *Tri Anufo, Un Coup d’Oeil sur la Société des Anufon au Nord Togo*. The Hague: Mouton, 1976.
- . “To Claim or Not to Claim: Changing Views about the Restitution of Marriage Prestations Among the Anufon in Northern Togo.” In *Law and the Family in Africa*, edited by S. Roberts, 94–114. The Hague: Mouton, 1977.
- Schuerkens, Ulrike. *Du Togo Allemand Aux Togo Et Ghana Indépendants: Changement Social Sous Régime Colonial*. Collection Etudes Africaines. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001.
- Sewane, Dominique. *Le souffle du mort: la tragédie de la mort chez les Batāmmariba du Togo*, Bénin. Paris: Plon, 2003.
- Spieth, Jakob, and W. K. Amoaku. *The Ewe People: A Study of the Ewe People in German Togo*. Accra, Ghana: Sub-Saharan, 2011.
- Surgy, Albert de. “Le Culte des Ancêtres en Pays Evhé.” *Systèmes de Pensée en Afrique Noire* 1 (1975): 105–128.
- . “Les Ceremonies de Purification des Mauvais Projets Chez les Mwaba-Gurma du Nord-Togo.” *Systèmes de Pensée en Afrique Noire* 4 (1979): 9–76.
- . *Géomancie et le Culte d’Afu Chez les Evhé*. Paris: Publications Orientales de France, 1981.
- . “Les Libations dans la Sacrifice Mwaba-Gurma.” *Systèmes de Pensée en Afrique Noire* 5 (1981): 127–136.
- . “Le Deuil du Conjoint en Pays Evhé.” *Systèmes de Pensée en Afrique Noire* 9 (1986): 105–133.
- . *De l’Universalité d’Une Forme Africaine de Sacrifice*. Paris: CNRS, 1988.
- Sylvanus, Nina. “A Fake Crisis in Conceptions of Value in Neoliberal Togo.” *Cahiers d’études africaines* 205, no. 1 (April 19, 2012): 237–258.
- . “Chinese Devils, the Global Market, and the Declining Power of Togo’s Nana-Benzenes.” *African Studies Review* 56, no. 1 (2013): 65–80.
- . “Fashionability in Colonial and Postcolonial Togo.” In *African Dress: Fashion, Agency, Performance*, edited by Karen Tranberg Hansen and D. Soyini Madison, 30–44. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
- . *Patterns in Circulation: Cloth, Gender, and Materiality in West Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016.
- Tait, David. “The Role of the Diviner in Konkomba Society.” *Man* 52, Art. 249 (1952): 167–178.

- . “The Family, Household and Minor Lineage of the Konkomba.” *Africa* 26 (1956): 219–249, 332–342.
- . “Konkomba Sorcery.” *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 84, no. 1/2 (1954): 66–74.
- . “The Territorial Pattern and Lineage System of Konkomba.” In *Tribes Without Rulers*, edited by John Middleton and David Tait, 167–202. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958.
- . “The Political System of the Konkomba.” In *Cultures and Societies of Africa*, edited by Simon and Phoebe Ottenberg, 271–283. New York: Random House, 1963.
- . ed. *The Konkomba of Northern Ghana*. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Tcham, Badjow. *Histoire Et Traditions Du Nord-Togo*. 2. Éd. rev. et augmed. Les Cours De L’UB. Série Histoire, No 3. Lomé, Togo: Presses de l’UB, 1997.
- Toulabor, C. M. “L’Enonciation du Pouvoir et de la Richesse Chez les Jeunes de Lomé.” *Revue Française de Science Politique* (June 1985): 446–458.
- . “Violence militaire, démocratisation et ethnicité au Togo.” *Autrepart* 10 (1999): 105–115.
- Verdier, Raymond. *Le Pays Kabyé, Cité de Dieux, Cité des Hommes*. Paris: Karthala, 1982.
- Wasungu, Pascal. “Idée De ‘Sanbande-Dieu’ Des Nawdeba.” *Ethnopsychologie: Revue De Psychologie Des Peuples* 31, no. 2 (1976): 171–179.

POLITICS, ADMINISTRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

- Agbedahin, Komlan. “Interrogating the Togolese Historical Sex Strike.” *International Journal on World Peace* 31, no. 1 (2014): 7–25.
- Agblemagnon, Ferdinand N’Sougan. “Mythe et Réalité de la Classe Sociale en Afrique Noire: Le Cas du Togo.” *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie* 12, no. 38 (Jan.–June 1965): 155–168.
- . “Masses et Elites en Afrique Noire: Le Cas du Togo.” In *The New Elites of Tropical Africa*, edited by P. C. Lloyd, 118–125. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.
- . “Conflits de Passage et Sociologie des Jeunes Etats Africains: Le Cas du Togo.” *Civilisations* 18, no. 2 (1968): 232–246.
- Agboh-Ahouélé, Jean-Paul, and Louis Magloire Keumayou. *Togo: Une démocratie en construction*. Neuilly-sur-Seine: Michel Lafon, 2020.
- Agboyibo, Me Yawovi. *Combat Pour Un Togo Démocratique: Une Méthode Politique*. Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1999.
- Ahadzi-Nonou, Koffi. “Questions about the Establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Togo.” *Afrique contemporaine* 250, no. 2 (2014): 91–102.

- Ahlin, Ekoutiamé A, Kim Yi Dionne, and Tyson Roberts. 2015. "The 2015 Presidential Election in Togo." *Electoral Studies* 39: 168–173.
- Ajavon, Robert. *Naissance d'un Etat Africain, le Togo, Territoire Pilote. Lumière et Ombre (1951–1958)*. Lomé: Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1989.
- Amenumey, D.E.K. "The 1956 Plebiscite in Togoland under British Administration and Ewe Unification." *Universitae* (Ligon, Ghana) 5, no. 2 (May–Nov. 1976): 126–140.
- Apati-Bassah, A. "Role des Préfets et Chefs de Régions au Togo." *Revue Juridique et Politique* 36, no. 2 (June 1982): 797–810.
- Amnesty International. *Togo: Rule of Terror*. London: Amnesty International, International Secretariat, 1999.
- . *Togo: Time for Accountability Has Finally Arrived*. New York: Amnesty International, 2001.
- Amouzou Essè. *Gilchrist Olympio Et La Lutte Pour La Libération Du Togo*. Points De Vue. Paris: Harmattan, 2010.
- Attisso, FS. *La Problematique de l'alternance politique au Togo*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001.
- . *Le Togo sous la dynastie des Gnassingbe*. Paris: L'Harmattan 2012.
- Banjo, Adewale. "The Politics of Succession Crisis in West Africa: The Case of Togo." *International Journal on World Peace* 25, no. 2 (2008): 33–55.
- Bonin, Andoch Nutépé. *Le Togo Du Sergent En Général*. Paris: Lescaret Editeur, 1983.
- Breuer, Anita, Laura Blumenkemper, Stefan Kliesch, Franziska Salzer, Manuel Schädler, Valentin Schweinfurth, and Stephen Virchow. *Decentralisation in Togo: The Contribution of ICT-Based Participatory Development Approaches to Strengthening Local Governance*. Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut Für Entwicklungspolitik, 2017.
- Chardon, Theophile de. "Togo's Liberal General." *Africa Report* 15, no. 1 (Jan. 1970): 8–10.
- Cornevin, Robert. "Evolution dans le Nord du Togo." *Sociologus* 4, no. 1 (1954): 54–62.
- . "Le Togo Independant." *Europe-France-Outre-Mer* 364 (Mar. 1960): 16–27.
- . "Les Militaires au Dahomey et au Togo." *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines* (Dec. 1968): 65–84.
- . "La Politique Extérieure du Togo." *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines* 82 (Oct. 1972): 59–71.
- Da Costa. "The Dictator's Duet." *Africa Report* (Nov.-Dec.1993): 61–5.
- Decalo, Samuel. "The Politics of Military Rule in Togo." *Geneve-Afrique* 12, no. 2 (1973): 62–96.
- . "Togo: Benevolent Rule in a Military State." In *Coups and Military Rule in Africa: Essays on Military Style*, edited by Samuel Decalo, 89–127. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1976.
- . "Military Rule in Togo." *Pula: Journal of African Affairs* (Gaborone) 2 (Summer 1979): 13–17.

- . "Togo: Stability and Stagnation under a Military Brokerage." In *Coups and Military Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints*, edited by Samuel Decalo, 111–163. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Dégli Jean Yaovi. *Togo: la tragedie africaine*. Ivry-sur-seine, Éditions Nouvelles du Sud, 1996.
- . *Togo, À Quand L'alternance Politique? Études Africaines*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008.
- Dogbé, Y. E. "Droits de l'Homme au Togo." *Politique Africaine* 21 (Dec. 1985): 110–113.
- . *Le Rénouveau Démocratique au Togo*. Paris: Akpagnon, 1989.
- Dovi, A. 'Dossier Mandouri', in *Les Echos, Magazine d'information de la Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH)*, no. Special, 14–17, 1992.
- Ebeku, Kaniye S. A. *The Succession of Faure Gnassingbe to the Togolese Presidency: An International Law Perspective*. Current African Issues, 30. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainst, 2006.
- Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH). *Togo: retour sur la crise togolaise, l'exigence de justice demeure* (Rapport: Mission d'enquête internationale). <http://www.ufctogo.com/IMG/pdf/Togo433fr.pdf>. 2005.
- Feuillet, Claude. *Le Togo 'En Général': La Longue Marche de Général Eyadema*. Paris: ABC, 1976.
- Folly, Linus Koué. "Eyadema's Flat-Footed Opponents." *West Africa* (3 May 1993): 728–729.
- Froelich, Jean-Claude. "Togo." In *Année Africaine*. Paris: Pedone, 1967.
- . "Escale au Togo (Mars 1970)." *Revue de Défense Nationale* 26 (Aug.-Sept. 1970): 1299.
- Heilbrunn, John R. "The Social Origins of the National Conferences in Benin and Togo." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 2 (June 1993): 277–299.
- . *Markets, Profits and Power: The Politics of Business in Benin and Togo*. Bordeaux: Institut d'études politiques de Bordeaux, Université Montesquieu, 1996.
- . "Commerce, Politics, and Business Associations in Benin and Togo." *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 4 (1997): 473–492.
- . "Equatorial Guinea and Togo: What Price Repression?" In *Worst of the Worst*, edited by Robert Rotberg, 223–249. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2007.
- . "Presidential Term Limits in Togo: Electoral Accountability Postponed" In *The Politics of Presidential Term Limits* edited by Alexander Baturo and Robert Elgie. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Heilbrunn, John R., and John F. Clark. "Togo: The National Conference and Stalled Reform." Essay. In *Togo: The National Conference and Stalled Reform*, 225–245, 2018.
- Helm, Renate. *Politische Herrschaft in Togo: Das Problem Der Demokratisierung. Demokratie Und Entwicklung*, Bd. 56. Münster Germany: Lit, 2004.
- Houngnikpo, Mathurin C. *Determinants of Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2001.

- . “Democratization in Africa: Double standards in Benin and Togo.” *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 25, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 51–65.
- Howe, Russell Warren. “Togo: Four Years of Military Rule.” *Africa Report* (May 1967): 6–12.
- Iwata, T. “La conférence nationale souveraine et la démocratisation au Togo du point de vue de la société civile.” *Africa Development* XXV 3/4 (2000): 135–160.
- Kitchen, Helen. “Filling the Togo Vacuum.” *Africa Report* 8 (Feb. 1963): 7–10.
- Koffi, K. “Les élections au Togo—cinquante ans de passions politiques.” *Afrique contemporaine* 185, no. 1(1998): 35–52.
- Kohnert, Dirk. “Togo: A Didactic Drama of Misled Democratisation in Africa.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, September 17, 2006.
- Macé, Alain. “Politique et démocratie au Togo: 1993–1998: de l’espoir à la désillusion.” *Cahiers d’études africaines* 44 (2004): 841–85.
- Manley, Andrew. “Togo: After Eyadema?” UNHCR Writenet Paper No. 14. Geneva, Switzerland. 2003.
- Massina, Palouki, “Plaidoyer pour le Fonctionnement de la Juridiction.” *Penant* 804 (Oct.–Dec. 1990): 403–421.
- Mwakikagile, Godfrey. 2001. *Military Coups in West Africa Since the Sixties*. Huntington, NY: Nova Science.
- Morency-Laflamme, Julien. “A Question of Trust: Military Defection during Regime Crises in Benin and Togo.” *Democratization* 25, no. 3 (2018): 464–480.
- Nomedji, Nicolas. “Les Partis Politiques au Togo et au Cameroun.” Thesis, Poitiers University, 1966.
- Nwajiaku, Kathryn. “The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, no. 3 (1994): 429–447.
- Okonofua, Benjamin A. “Democratic Governance in the ‘New’ Republic of Togo.” In *Democratic Contestation on the Margins: Regimes in Small African Countries*, edited by Matti, Stephanie, and Claire Metelits. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2015.
- Osei, Anja. “Elite Theory and Political Transitions: Networks of Power in Ghana and Togo.” *Comparative Politics* 51, no. 1 (2018): 21–42.
- . “Like Father, Like Son? Power and Influence Across Two Gnassingbé Presidencies in Togo.” *Democratization* 25, no. 8 (2018): 1460–1480.
- Osei, A., and H. Akinochi. “Policy-Making in an Electoral Autocracy: Constitutional Reform in Togo.” In *Policy Styles and Policy-Making: Exploring the Linkages*, edited by M. Howlett and J. Tosun. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Perret, Thierry. *Afrique Voyage En Démocratie - Les Années Cha-Cha*. Harmathèque. Paris: Harmattan, 1994.
- Rouvery van Nieuwaal, E.A.B. van. “La Justice Coutumière dans le Nord Togo.” *Penant* 751 (Jan.–Mar. 1976): 35–70.
- . “Chieftainship in Northern Togo.” *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee* 3, no. 2 (1980): 115–121.
- . *L’État en Afrique face à la chefferie. Le cas du Togo*. Paris: Karthala, 2000.

- Sarkin, Jeremy J. Prof and Davi, Tetevi. "The Togolese Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission: Lessons for Transitional Justice Processes Elsewhere," *Peace and Conflict Studies* 24, Article 2, no. 1 (2017).
- Scrive Stéphane. *La Crise De La Démocratie En Afrique: L'exemple Du Togo*. Etudes Africaines. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2009.
- Seely, Jennifer. "The Legacies of Transition Governments: Post-Transition Dynamics in Benin and Togo." *Democratization* 12, no. 3 (2005): 357–377.
- . "The Unexpected Presidential Election in Togo, 2005." *JELS Electoral Studies* 25, no. 3 (2006): 611–616.
- . "Togo's Presidential Election 2010." *JELS Electoral Studies* 30, no. 2 (2011): 372–375.
- Skinner, K. "West Africa's First Coup: Neo-Colonial and Pan-African Projects in Togo's 'Shadow Archives'" *African Studies Review*, 1–24. doi:10.1017/asr.2019.39.
- Soglo, Christian Komi. "Les Hesitations au Togo." In *Les Nouvelles Constitutions Africaines: La Transition Démocratique*, edited by Henry Roussillon, 163–172. Toulouse: IEP, 1992.
- Somali, Kossi, and Vincent Cattoir-Jonville. "Le parlement dans le nouveau constitutionnalisme en Afrique: essai d'analyse comparée à partir des exemples du Bénin, du Burkina Faso et du Togo." Lille: Atelier national de reproduction des thèses, ANRT, 2009.
- Tété-Adjalogo Têtêvi G. *Histoire Du Togo: Le Coup De Force Permanent (2006–2011)*. Etudes Africaines. Paris: Harmattan, 2012.
- Thiriout Céline. 2000. "Démocratisation Et Démilitarisation Du Pouvoir: Étude Comparative À Partir Du Burkina Faso, Congo, Ghana, Mali Et Togo." Dissertation, Atelier reprod. th. Univ. Lille 3.
- Thompson, Virginia. *West Africa's Council of the Entente*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972.
- Tobolka, Radim. "Regionalization of Electoral Politics in Togo." SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, July 30, 2014.
- Togo. "Conference Nationale Souverain." *Resolutions, Declaration et Appel*. Lomé: 1991.
- "Togo." In *Academic Freedom and Human Rights Abuses in Africa*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991.
- "Togo." In *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*, edited by Donald G. Morrison, et al. New York: The Free Press, 1972, 1990.
- "Togo: Game, Set and Match." *Africa Confidential* (Dec. 6, 1991): 4–6.
- "Togo: Leaders at Daggers Drawn." *Africa Confidential* (20 Nov. 1992): 4–5.
- Toulabor, Comi M. "Jeu de Mots, Jeu de Vilains: Lexique de la Derision Politique au Togo." *Politique Africaine*, 1, no. 3 (Sept. 1981): 55–71.
- . *Le Togo sous Eyadema*. Paris: Karthala, 1986.
- . "Dix Ans de 'Démocratisation' au Togo: Les Faussaires de la Démocratie." In *Année Africaine 1989*, 287–310. Paris: Pedone, 1989.
- . "L'Art du Faible." In *Le Politique par le Bas*, edited by J. F. Bayart, A. Mbembe, and C. Toulabor, 107–145. Paris: Karthala, 1992.

- . "Political Satire Past and Present in Togo." *Critique of Anthropology : A Journal for the Critical Reconstruction of Anthropology* 14 (1994): 59–75.
- Yagla, Wen'Saa Ogma. *L'Edification de la Nation Togolaise: Naissance d'une Conscience Nationale dans un Pays Africain*. Paris: Harmattan, 1978.
- Yogo, Emmanuel Kam. "Les organismes indépendants de régulation des élections en Afrique francophone: étude des expériences du Bénin, du Cameroun, du Mali et du Togo." *Law in Africa (Journal of the African Law Association-Germany)* 13, no. 1 (2010): 17–32.
- Ziegler, Jean. *Démocratie et nouvelles formes de légitimation en Afrique: les conférences nationales du Bénin et du Togo*. Geneva: Institut universitaire d'études du développement, 1997.

ECONOMY, AGRICULTURE, AND TRADE

- Afawubo, Komivi, Mawuli K Couchoro, Messan Agbaglah, and Tchapo Gbandi. "Mobile Money Adoption and Households' Vulnerability to Shocks: Evidence from Togo." *Applied Economics* 52, no. 10 (2020): 1141–1162.
- Agbodji Akoété Ega, and Ablamba Ahoefavi Johnson. "Agricultural Credit and Its Impact on the Productivity of Certain Cereals in Togo." *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade* (2019): 1–17. doi:10.1080/1540496X.2019.1602038
- Agier, Michel. "Etrangers, Logeurs et Patrons: l'Improvisation Sociale Chez les Commerçants Soudanais de Lomé." *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 81/3 (1981): 251–265.
- . *Commerce et Sociabilité: Les Négociants Soudanais du Quartier Zongo de Lomé*. Paris: ORSTOM, 1983.
- Akapo-Ahianyo, E., and F. Katendi. "Spécial Togo." *Marchés Tropicaux & Méditerranéens* 62 (2007): 3203–3203; 4–34.
- Antheaume, Benoît. "Coffee in Togo." *Etudes rurales* 180, no. 2 (2007): 155–170.
- Bergeron, Ivan. "Privatization through Leasing: The Togo Steel Case." In *Privatization and Control of State-owned Enterprises*, edited by Ramamurti Ravi and Raymond Vernon, 153–178. Washington: The World Bank, 1991.
- Blédé, Barthélémy, and André Diouf. "Togo's Maritime Challenges: Why Security Remains a Major Issue." Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS, *West Africa Report*, Issue 18, August 2016.
- Boutabba M.A, Diaw D., Lare A., and Lessoua A. "The Impact of Microfinance on Energy Access: A Case Study from Peripheral Districts of Lomé, Togo." *Applied Economics*. doi:10.1080/00036846.2020.1751800 (2020).
- CIDCOM, ed. "Le Togo et son potentiel économique." Supplément to *Jeune Afrique* 47, 2416, 2007.
- Cordonnier, Rita. "Les Commerçants Ouest-Africains Entre Marchés Formels et Informel." *Cahiers de Sociologie Economiques et Culturelles* 5 (1986): 115–136.
- . *Femmes Africaines et Commerce: Les Revendéuses de Tissu de la Ville de Lomé*. Paris: Harmattan, 1987.
- Cornevin, Robert. "La Mise en Valeur de l'Est-Mono (Togo)." *Encyclopedie Mensuelle d'Outre-Mer* 65 (Jan. 1956): 21–27.

- . *Evolution des Modèles Agricoles Chez les Kabyé et Losso du Togo dans Leur Canton d'Origine et dans Les Terres de Colonisation*. Paris: Dessain et Toltra, 1983.
- . "Togo 1987." *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* 2148 (Jan. 9 1987): 57–73.
- Couchoro, Mawuli Kodjovi, and Hamitande Dout. "Dynamique Des Inégalités De Revenu Au Togo Entre 2006 Et 2015." *African Development Review* 31, no. 4 (2019): 476–491.
- Cuevas, Carlos E. "Togo." In *Rural Finance Profiles in African Countries*, edited by Mario Masini, 209–306. Milan: Finafrica, 1990.
- Goeh-Akue, Pr. N'buéké Adovi. *Etude sur le paysage syndicale au Togo*. Lomé: FES, 2013.
- Golub, Stephen S. "Entrepôt Trade and Smuggling in West Africa: Benin, Togo and Nigeria." *The World Economy* 35, no. 9 (2012): 1139–1161.
- International Monetary Fund. *Togo: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. Imf Country Report, No. 08/144. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2008.
- Kenoukon, Chrysal Aguidioli. *Effectivité et efficacité des normes fondamentales et prioritaires de l'OIT: cas du Bénin et du Togo*. Geneva: Institut international d'études sociales, International Labour Office, 2007.
- Koffi, K. "Togo: les deux ruptures de la coopération (1993 et 1998)." *Afrique contemporaine* 185, no. 1 (1999): 63–76.
- Kohnert, Dirk. "Togo: Thorny Transition and Misguided Aid at the Roots of Economic Misery." MPRA Paper, October 8, 2007.
- . "Does Democratic Transition in Africa Enhance Economic Performance? The Case of Togo." SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, August 7, 2008.
- Labarthe, Gilles. *Le Togo, de l'esclavage au libéralisme mafieux*. Marseille: Ag-one, 2013.
- Le Bris, Emile. "Une Politique de Développement Rural dans le Sud-Est du Togo: L'Operation Regeneration des Terres de Barre." *Cahiers de l'ORSTOM* 44, no. 22 (1977): 171–198.
- . *Les Migrations Agricoles Internes dans le Sud-Est du Togo*. Paris: Maspero, 1979.
- . "Supression Démographique et Evolution Foncière: Le Cas du Sud-Est du Togo." *African Perspectives* 1 (1979): 105–125.
- . *Les Marchés Ruraux dans la Circonscription de Vo*. Paris: ORSTOM, 1984.
- Lejeal, F., and G. Agbessi, eds. "Dossier Togo: Vers une sortie de crise?," *Marchés Tropicaux & Méditerranéens* 59, no. 3076 (2004): 2315–2374.
- Lundstrom, Susanna, and World Bank. *Togo Growth Diagnostics*. Policy Research Working Papers. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010.
- Ndembi, Denise Landria. *Le travail des enfants en Afrique subsaharienne: le cas du Bénin, du Gabon et du Togo*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006.
- Ott, Beverly, and Olivier Hauville. "Banking with women in Togo and Benin." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 29, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 556–560.

- Panier, Élise. "Approaching Labor Relations in Africa in Terms of Mobilizing the Law: Contract Employment in Togo." *Droit et société* 90, no. 2 (July 28, 2015): 373–392.
- Pradeilles, Jean-Claude, et al. "L'Organisation Corporative des Chauffeurs de Taxis Collectifs à Bamako et Lomé." *Afrique Contemporaine* 158 (Apr.–June 1991): 4–13.
- Robert, Max. "La Mise en Valeur des Phosphates du Togo." *Annales des Mines* 3 (Mar. 1965): 11–34.
- Silva, Daniela Michelle. "Development Through Data: An Analysis of US Government-Led Efforts for the Development of Togo, West Africa." PhD diss., 2019.
- Surgy, Albert de. *La Pêche Traditionnelle sur le Littoral Evhé et Mina*. Paris: Groupe de Chercheurs Africanistes, 1966.
- . *Géomancie et le Culte d'Afa Chez les Evhé*. Paris: Publications Orientalistes de France, 1981.
- Toulabor, Comi. "Transformation of the Nana Benz of Lomé—A Comprador Bourgeoisie Seen through Fortune and Decline." *Afrique Contemporaine* 244, no. 4 (2012): 69–80.
- World Bank. *Overcoming the crisis, overcoming poverty—A World Bank poverty assessment of Togo*. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1996.

EDUCATION

- Albaugh, Ericka A. *State-Building and Multilingual Education in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Dogbé, Yves-Emmanuel. "La Crise de l'Éducation." Thesis, University of Benin, 1975.
- Hoogeveen, Johannes, and Mariacristina Rossi, eds. *Transforming Education Outcomes in Africa: Learning from Togo*. Palgrave Pivot, 2019. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12708-4.
- Hoogeveen, Johannes, and Mariacristina Rossi. "Transforming Education Outcomes in Africa: Learning from Togo." Essay. In *Primary Education in Togo*, 9–29. Cham: Springer International Publishing; Palgrave Pivot, 2019.
- Quashie, Adjo M., and Ahloko M. Komlan. *Precis d'Histoire de l'Enseignement au Togo des Origines à 1975*. Lomé: University of Bénin, 1986.
- "Togo." In *The Educated African*, edited by Helen Kitchen, 513–518. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Toulabor, C. M. "La Violence à l'École: Le Cas d'un Village au Togo." *Politique Africaine* 2, no. 7 (Sept. 1982): 43–49.

SCIENCE, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT

- Abalo, Kodjo, Agbodji Akoété Ega, and Batana Yélé Maweki. "Nutritional Health Inequalities among Children in Togo." *African Development Review: A Journal of*

- the African Development Bank for the Study and Analysis of Development Issues in Africa* 26, no. 4, (2014): 584–596.
- Adom, Panaveyi Vicky Malou, Charles Patrick Makoutodé, Edgard Marius Ouendo, and Michel Makoutodé. “Community health workers integration model in the National Health System (Benin, Togo).” *Santé Publique* 31, no. 2 (2019): 315–326.
- Ali, E., Egbendewe, A.Y.G., Abdoulaye, T., and Sarpong, D.B. “Willingness to Pay for Weather Index-Based Insurance in Semi-Subsistence Agriculture: Evidence from Northern Togo.” *Climate Policy* 20, no. 5 (2020): 534–547.
- Benin-Goren, Odeda, Nimrod Aviran, Iris Adler, Oran Zlotnik, and Yossi Baratz. 2019. “Development of Trauma and Disaster Response in Togo, Africa.” *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 34 (S1): 120.
- Church, R.J. Harrison. *West Africa*. Chapter 24. London: Longmans, 1968.
- Kpegba, ESSI EDJODJINAM. “Factors Influencing Modern Contraceptive Use among Men in Maritime Region of Togo.” PhD diss., University of Ghana, 2019.
- Lasater, Molly E., Ashley Grosso, Sosthenes Ketende, Carrie Lyons, Vincent Palokinam Pitche, Jules Tchalla, Simplicie Anato, Sodji Dométo, Felicity Nadedjo, and Stefan Baral. 2019. “Characterising the Relationship between Migration and Stigma Affecting Healthcare Engagement among Female Sex Workers in Lomé, Togo.” *Global Public Health* 14 (10): 1428–1441.
- Mathauer, I., Koch, K., Zita, S., Murray-Zmijewski, A., Traore, M., Bitho, N., and Brikci, N. “Revenue-Raising Potential for Universal Health Coverage in Benin, Mali, Mozambique and Togo.” *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 97 (9) (2019): 620–630.
- Moore, Ami R., and Victor R. Prybutok. “Self-Reported Health and Personal Social Networks of Older People Living with Hiv/Aids in Lomé, Togo.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology* 29, no. 3 (2014).
- O’Riordan, Tim. “The Togo Initiative As Sustainability Science.” *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development* 53, no. 2 (2011): 2–2.
- Polorigni, Botolisam, Raoufou A. Radji, and Kouami Kokou. “Politique publique de gestion des espaces verts de la ville de Lomé au Togo.” *International Journal of Biological and Chemical Sciences* 9, no. 4 (2015): 1888–1901.
- Ragetlie, R., Y. Sano, R. Antabe, and I. Luginaah. “Married Women’s Experiences of Intimate Partner Violence and Utilization of Antenatal Health Care in Togo.” *Sexual & Reproductive Healthcare* 23 (2020): 100482.

RELIGION

- Aguessy, Honorat. “Convergences Religieuses dans les Sociétés Aja, Ewé et Yoruba sur la Côte du Bénin.” In *Peuples du Côte de Bénin*, edited by François de Me-deiros. Paris: Karthala, 1984.
- Damome, Étienne. “Religions and media in Ghana and Togo.” *Revue Française des Sciences de l’Information et de la Communication* 13 (2018). doi:10.4000/rfsic.3710.

- Delval, Raymond. "Les Musulmans au Togo." *L'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes* 100 (1974): 4–21.
- . *Les Musulmans au Togo*. Paris: L'Académie des Sciences d'Outremer, 1979.
- Fassinou, Matthieu D. *De grandes figures de l'Église protestante méthodiste: du Dahomey-Togo au Bénin des origines à nos jours 1843–2009*. Agbokou-Porto Novo: CNPMS, 2009.
- Froelich, Jean-Claude. "Problèmes Actuels de l'Islam en Afrique Noire." *Communautés et Continents* 26 (April–June 1965): 35–47.
- Martin, B.G. "Les Tidjanis et leurs adversaires: développements récents de l'Islam au Ghana et au Togo." In *Les ordres mystiques dans l'Islam: cheminements et situation actuelles*, edited by A. Popovic and G. Veinstein, 283–291. Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 1985.
- Meyer, Birgit. "Christianity and the Ewe Nation: German Pietist Missionaries, Ewe Converts and the Politics of Culture." *Journal of Religion in Africa* 32, no. 2 (2002): 167–199.
- Noret, Joël. "Pentecostalism in Togo: History and Development Factors." *Autrepart* 31, no. 3 (2004): 75–92.
- Pawlik, Jacek Jan. *Expérience Sociale de la Mort: Etude des Rites Funéraire des Bas-sar du Nord Togo*. Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires de Fribourg, 1990.
- Rivière, Claude. *Anthropologie Religieuse des Evhé au Togo*. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1978.
- . "Dzo et la Pratique Magique chez les Evhé du Togo." *Cultures et Développement* 11, no. 2 (1979): 193–218.
- . "Mawu. l'Insurpassable Chez les Ewe du Togo." *Anthropos* 74, no. 1/2 (1979): 25–39.
- . "La Sorcellerie au Sud-Togo." *Ethnopsychologie* 35, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1980): 63–84.
- . *Union et Procréation en Afrique: Rites de la Vie Chez Les Evhé du Togo*. Paris: Harmattan, 1990.
- Rouveroy, E.A. Nieuwaal-Baereads van, and E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal. "Het Mogalijke in Verzoening Bij de Anufon in Noord Togo." *Sociologische Gids* 28, no. 4 (July–Aug. 1981): 305–326.
- Surgy, Albert de. "Les Cérémonies de Purification des Mauvais Projets Prénataux Chez les Mwaba-Gurma du Nord-Togo." *Systèmes de Pensée en Afrique Noire* 3 (1979): 9–75.
- . "Les Libations et le Role de la Presentatrice d'Eau Enfarinée dans le Sacrifice Mwaba-Gurma." *Systèmes de Pensée en Afrique Noire* 5 (1981): 127–154.
- . *La Divination par les Huit Cordelettes Chez les Mwaba-Gurma*. Paris: Harmattan 1983.
- . "Objet et Fonction Humanisante de la Mort Selon les Mwaba." *Anthropos* 79, no. 1/3 (1984): 129–143.
- . "L'Objet du Sacrifice Moba." In *Ethnologues: Hommages à Marcel Griaule*, edited by Solange Ganay, et al., 391–413. Paris: Harmattan, 1984.
- . "Examen Critique de la Notion de Fétiche à Partir du Cas Evhé." *Systèmes de Pensée en Afrique Noire* 8 (1985): 263–304.

- . “La Deuil du Conjoint.” *Systèmes de Pensée en Afrique Noire* 9 (1986): 105–134.
- . *La Système Religieux des Evhé*. Paris: Harmattan, 1988.
- . “La Sacrifice à la Lumière des Conceptions Mwaba-Gurma et Evhé.” *Anthropos* 84, no. 1/3 (1989): 63–80.
- Toulabor, Comi M. “Mgr. Dosseh, Archevêque de Lomé.” *Politique Africaine* 35 (1989): 68–76.
- Vannier, Christian. “Intending the Spirits: Experiencing Vodou through the ‘Fetish’ in Togo.” *Material Religion*. doi:10.1080/17432200.2020.1756167.

LITERATURE

- Agbleame, Simon A. “La Théâtre dans la Litterature Ewe.” In *Peuples de la Cote du Golfe de Bénin*, edited by François de Medeiros, 191–200. Paris: Karthala, 1984.
- Aladji, Victor. *Akossiya Mon Amour*. Pour Tous. Yaoundé: Éditions CLE, 1971.
- . *L'équilibriste*. Pour Tous. Yaoundé: Éditions CLÉ, 1972.
- . *La Voix De L'ombre*. Lomé, Togo: Éditions Haho, 1985.
- Alou, Kpatcha A.M. *Un Enfant Pas Comme Les Autres: Contes Du Pays Kabyè*. Lomé, Togo: Nouvelles Éditions africaines du Togo, 1993.
- . *A La Decouverte Du Pays Kabiye: Images Du Togo: Charms D'un Terroir*. Lomé: Éditions Haho, 1999.
- . *Rencontre Avec Mes Souvenirs*. Lomé, Togo: Éditions Haho, 2014.
- Amegbleame, Simon Agbeko. “La Fiction Narrative Dans La Production Littérature Ewe: La Nouvelle Et Le Roman.” *Africa* 50, no. 1 (1980): 24–36.
- Apedo-Amah, Ayayi Togoata. *Théâtres Populaires En Afrique: L'exemple De La Kantata Et Du Concert-Party Togolais: Essai*. Collection Tourbillon. Lomé: Éditions Awoudy, 2013.
- . *Les Trônes Sacrés Jumeaux: Tragédie*. Collection Rideau. Lomé, Togo: Éditions Awoudy, 2015.
- Apedo-Amah, Ayayi Togoata, and Charles Manian. *Radio Tout-Va-Bien-Au-Pays: Théâtre*. Collection Rideau. Lomé, Togo: Éditions Awoudy, 2014.
- Assiba-Akakpo, Claudine. *Cris De Hoingni: (poèmes De Paix)*. Lomé: Grapp, 2011.
- Blake, Susan Louise. *Letters from Togo*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1991.
- Cazenave, O. “Les Femmes Dans Le Processus Littéraire Au Togo, Ed. Ambroise Teko-Agbo and Simon Amegbleame / Francophone Women Writers of Africa and the Caribbean, by Renee Larrier.” *Research in African Literatures* 33 (2002): 208–209.
- Chernoff, John Miller. *Hustling Is Not Stealing: Stories of an African Bar Girl*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- Cornevin, Robert. “Felix Couchoro (1900–1968), Premier Romancier Régionaliste Africain.” *France-Eurafrique* 196 (June 1968): 74–76.
- . “Les ‘Romans Togolais’ de Werner von Rentzell.” *France-Eurafrique* 207 (June 1969): 42–43.
- Dogbé, Yves-Emmanuel. *Affres!* Porto Novo: Rapidex, 1966.

- . *Flammé Bleme*. Paris: Éditions de la Revue Moderne, 1969.
- . *Le Devin Amour*. Paris: Oswald, 1976.
- . *Fables Africaines, Précédées de la Puissance des Mots*. Paris: Harmattan, 1978.
- . *Fables Africaines*. Paris: Akpagnon-ACCT, 1979.
- . *L'Incarcéré*. Paris: Akpagnon-ACCT, 1979.
- . *La Victime*. Paris: Akpagnon-ACCT, 1979.
- . *Anthologie de la Poesie Togolaise*. Paris: Akpagnon, 1980.
- . *Contes et Legendes du Togo*. Paris: Akpagnon, 1981.
- . *Morne Soliloque*. Paris: Akpagnon, 1982.
- Konrad, Zinta. *Ewe Comic Heroes: Trickster Tales in Togo*. Routledge Library Editions: Folklore, Volume 6. Abingdon, Oxon UK: Routledge, 2015.
- Kourouma, Ahmadou. *En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages: roman*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998.
- Kuakuvu Kuamvi Mawulé. *Les Racines Du Mal Nègre*. Le Plaisir De Lire. Lomé, Togo: Éditions Haho, 1985.
- La Littérature Africaine Francophone*. Lausanne: Bibliotheque Cantonale et Universitaire, 1991.
- Magnier, Bernard. "Senouvo Agbota Zinsou: De Lomé à Limoges." *Notre Librairie* 102 (July–Aug. 1990): 61–63.
- Michael, Colette Verger. "Entretien avec Yves Emmanuel Dogbe." *Contemporary French Civilization* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1983): 211–216.
- Midiouhouan, Guy Ossito, and C.A. Amoura. "Entre la Résignation et le Refus: Les Ecrivains Togolais d'Expression Française sous le Régime Eyadema." *Géneve-Afrique* 29, no. 1 (1991): 53–70.
- Obianim, James S. *Amegbetoa alo Agbezuge fe mutinya*. London: Macmillan, 1949.
- . *Pmegbetoa ou les Aventures d'Agbezuge*. Paris: Karthala, 1990.
- Poddar, Prem, Rajeev S Patke, and Lars Jensen. *A Historical Companion to Post-colonial Literatures: Continental Europe and Its Empires*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008.
- Prilop, G. *Contes et Mythes du Togo*. Lomé: Haho, 1985.
- Ricard, Alain. *Naissance du roman africain: Felix Couchoro (1900–1968)*. Paris: Presence Africaine, 1987.
- Riez, Janos, and Alain Ricard. *Le Champ Littéraire Togolaise*. Bayreuth: Echarid Breitinger, 1991.
- Typamm, Paul Akakpo. *Rythmes Et Cadences: (poèmes Et Contes D'afrique)*. Mersur-Seine: Akpagnon, 1981.
- Viderot, Toussaint. *Courage Si Tu Veux Vivre Et T'épanouir Fils De La Grande Afrique!* Palais Miami, Monte-Carlo: Les Cahiers Des Poetes De Notre Temps, 1960.
- . *A La Recherche De La Personnalite Negro-Africaine*. Monte-Carlo: Ed. Regain, 1960.
- Vignondé, Jean-Norbert. "Autour de 'L'Esclave' de Félix Couchoro." *Research in African Literature* 16, no. 4 (1985): 556–563.
- . "Les Precurseurs: Félix Couchoro, Paul Hazoumé." *Notre Librairie* 69 (1989): 33–40.

- Werk, Jan Kees van de. "Publishing and Literature in Togo." *The African Book Publishing Record* 11, no. 1 (1985): 201–204.
- Wilkinson, Jane. "Kofi Anyidoho: An Ewe Poet Between Tradition and Change." *Africa* (Rome) 43, no. 4 (Dec. 1988): 543–573.

LINGUISTICS

- Bertho, Jacques. "Parenté de la Langue Yoruba de la Nigeria du Sud et la Langue Adja de la Région Cotière du Dahomey et du Togo." *Notes Africaines* 35 (July 1947): 10–11.
- . "Langues Voltaïques du Togo-Nord et du Dahomey-Nord." *Notes Africaines* 44 (Oct. 1949): 124–126.
- . "Les Dialectes du Moyen Togo." *Bulletin de l'IFAN* 14, no. 3 (1952): 1046–1107.
- Calvet, Louis-Jean. *Les Langues de Marchés en Afrique* Paris: Didier Erudition, 1992.
- Capo, Hounkpati C. "Le Gbe est une Langue Unique." *Africa* (London) 53, no. 2 (1983): 47–57.
- . "Elements of Ewe-Gen-Aja-Fon Dialectology." In *Peuples du Cote de la Golfe du Bénin*, edited by François de Medeiros, 167–178. Paris: Karthala, 1984.
- . *Renaissance du Gbe: Reflèxions Critiques et Constructions sur l'Évé, le Fon, le Gen, l'Aja, le Gun*. Hamburg: Buske, 1988.
- Cornevin, Robert. "Note au Sujet de la Carte Linguistique du Togo." *Bulletin de Enseignement Supérieur du Bénin* 7 (Oct.–Nov. 1968): 14–18.
- Gayibor, N.L. "Elements de Polemologie en Pays Ewé." *Cultures et Développement* 3–4 (1984): 511–536.
- Gbétó, Flavien. *Le maxi du Centre-Bénin et du Centre-Togo: une approche autosegmentale et dialectologique d'un parler Gbe de la section Fon*. Cologne: R. Köppe, 1997.
- Kozelka, Paul Robert. "The Development of National Languages: A Case Study of Language Planning in Togo." Thesis, Stanford University, 1984.
- Lotven, Samson, and Kelly Berkson. "The phonetics and phonology of depressor consonants in Gengbe." In *Theory and description in African Linguistics: Selected Papers from the 47th Annual Conference on Linguistics*, edited by Emily Clem, Peter Jenks, Hannah Sande. Berlin: Language Science Press, 2019: 249–268.
- Yu, Ella Ozier. "Theoretical Aspects of Noun Classes in Lama (Togo)." Thesis, University of Illinois, 1991.

ART, MUSIC, AND DANCE

- Adedze, Agbenyega. "Togo." *Berg Encyclopedia of World Dress and Fashion. Volume 1: Africa* Pages 345–348 (2010).
- Adler, Peter, and Nicholas Barnard. *African Majesty: The Textile Art of the Ashanti and the Ewe*. London: Thames & Hudson, 1992.

- Agawu, V. Kofi. "Tone and Tune: The Evidence for Northern Ewe Music." *Africa* 58, no. 2 (1988): 127–146.
- . "Variation Procedures in Northern Ewe Song." *Ethnomusicology* 34, no. 2 (1990): 221–244.
- Aithnard, K.M. *Aspects of Cultural Policy in Togo*. Paris: UNESCO, 1972.
- Blier, Suzanne Preston. "Architecture of the Tamberma." Thesis, Columbia University, 1981.
- . "Houses Are Human: Architectural Self-Images of Africa's Tamberma." *Society of Architectural History Journal* 42, no. 4 (1983): 371–382.
- . "Antelopes and Anvils: Tamberma Works of Iron." *African Arts* 17, no. 3 (May 1984): 58–63.
- . *The Anatomy of Architecture: Ontology and Metaphor in Batammaliba Architectural Expression*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- . "Moral Architecture: Beauty and Ethics in Batammaliba Design." In *Dwelling, Settlements, and Tradition*, edited by Jean-Paul Bourdier and Nezer Alsayyad, 335–356. New York: Lanham, 1989.
- . "Vodun Ceramics in Benin and Togo." In *African Terra Cottas: A Millenary Heritage, in the Barbier-Mueller Collections*, edited by James Anquandah, Florain Morin, Boris Wastiau. Geneva: Barbier-Mueller Museum, 2008: 172–185, 433–434.
- Caillé, Patricia, and Claude Forest. *Pratiques Et Usages Du Film En Afrique Francophones: Maroc, Tchad, Togo, Tunisie*. Arts Du Spectacle. Images Et Sons, 1907. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2019.
- Haour, Anne, K. Manning, N. Arazi, and O. Gosselain. *African Pottery Roulettes Past and Present: Techniques, Identification and Distribution*. Havertown, U.S.: Oxbow Books, 2010.
- Jones, Adzele K., and Smithsonian Libraries. African Art Index Project. "Togo on My Mind." *New African Diaspora* chapter 3 (2009): 61–77.
- Kubik, G. "Hubert Kponton, Erfinder, Künstler und Bergrynder eines Ethnographischen Privatmuseums in Lomé." *Archiv für Völkerkunde* 90 (1986): 157–171.
- Marguerat, Yves, and Lucien Roux. *Trésors cachés du vieux Lomé: l'architecture populaire ancienne de la capitale du Togo*. Lomé: Éditions Haho, 1993.
- Sylvanus, Nina, and Smithsonian Libraries. African Art Index Project. "Counterfeited Fashions: The Politics of Dress and Style in Togo." *Africa E Mediterraneo: Cultura E Società* 9, no. 3–4 (2010): 69–70.

TOURISM

- Auzias, Dominique, and Jean-Paul Labourdette. *Togo: Country Guide*. Petit Fute, 2019.
- Borrow, Nik, and Ron Demey. *Birds of Western Africa*. Seconded. Princeton Field Guides. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

- "Forest Elephants of Togo." *African Wildlife* (Cape Town) 46, no. 2 (March–Apr. 1993): 71–75.
- House, Steven, and Cathi House. *Villages of West Africa: An Intimate Journey Across Time*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2018.
- International Council of Museums. *What Museums for Africa?: Heritage in the Future: Benin, Ghana, Togo, 18–23 November 1991*. Paris: International Council of Museums, 1992.
- Lonely Planet Publications. "Togo." In *West Africa Travel Guide*. Oakland: Lonely Planet, 2017.
- "Togo." In *Africa on a Shoestring*, edited by Geoff Crowther, 195–204. Hawthorne (Australia): Lonely Planet Publishers, 1989.
- "Togo." In *Fielding's Guide South of the Sahara*, edited by Sherry A. Shuttles and B. Shuttles-Graham, 156–184. New York: Fielding Travel Books, 1986.
- "Togo." In *West Africa: The Rough Guide*, edited by Richard Trillo and Jim Hudgens. London: Harrap-Columbus, 1990.
- Togo: Travel (Including Points of Interest)*. 2nd ed. Petaluma, Calif.: World Trade Press, 2011.
- Weizenegger, Sabine. *Benin und Togo: Exkursionsbericht 2002*. Munich: Institut für Wirtschaftsgeographie, 2003.
- Wheatley, Nigel. *Where to Watch Birds in Africa*. Princeton Legacy Library. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996.

REFERENCE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Africa Research Bulletin*. Series A: Political Social and Cultural. Series B: Economic Financial and Technical. Exeter, Eng., monthly, 1963.
- Africa South of the Sahara*. London: Europa Publications, annual, 1971.
- Africa South of the Sahara: Index to Periodical Literature*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Africa and Middle East Division, 1985.
- Afrique Contemporaine*. Paris: La Documentation Française, quarterly.
- Année Africaine*. Paris: Pédone, annual, 1963.
- Année Politique Africaine*. Dakar: Société Africaine d'Édition, annual, 1966.
- L'Annuaire d'Afrique Noire*. Paris: Ediafric, annual.
- Africa Confidential*. London: Africa Confidential, 1967.
- Africa Contemporary Record*. Annual Survey and Documents. London: Africa Research Limited, 1969.
- Cahoon, Ben M. "Togo." WorldStatesmen.org. <https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Togo.html>, 2001.
- Centre de développement de l'OCDE, "Examen du bien-être et des politiques de la jeunesse au Togo." Projet OCDE-UE Inclusion des jeunes. Paris, 2017.
- Cornevin, Robert. "Bibliographie." In his *Histoire du Togo*. Paris: Berger Levrault, 1962.

- Country Profiles: Togo, Benin*. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986.
- Country Reports. Togo, Niger, Benin, Burkina*. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986.
- Cyrot, Catherine. *Togo 1990. Series Reference Bibliographie*. Paris: IBISCUS, 1991.
- Decalo, Samuel. *Togo*. Oxford and Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1995.
- Jeune Afrique*. Jeune Afrique Media Group (JAMG). 1960-[biweekly].
- Journal Officiel de la République Togolaise*. Lomé, 1956-[semimonthly].
- Journal Officiel du Territoire du Togo Place Sous le Mandat de la France*. Lomé, 1920–1926 [monthly]; 1927–1956 [semimonthly].
- Legum, Colin, ed. *Africa Contemporary Record*. London: Rex Collins, 1968–1990.
- Pew Research Center. *Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project: Togo*. <http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/togo>, n.d.
- Rake, Alan. *Africa's Top 300*. New York: Africa File, 1990.
- Seely, Jennifer C. "Women in Togo." *Women's Issues Worldwide: Sub-Saharan Africa* (Aili Tripp, Editor) Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003.
- Siler, Michael J. *Strategic Security Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comprehensive Annotated Bibliography*. African Special Bibliographic Series, No. 21. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004.
- "Togo." *Africa Contemporary Record*. New York: Africana, 1975–1991.
- "Togo." In *Surveys of African Economies* 3, 613–688. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1970.
- Togo 1990, Références Bibliographiques*. Paris: Ministère de la Coopération et du Développement, 1990.
- Toporowski, Jan. "Togo: A Structural Adjustment That Destabilizes Economic Growth." *IDA Bulletin* (Brighton) 19, no. 1 (1988): 17–23.
- Westermann, Diedrich, and M. A. Bryan. *Handbook of African Languages. Part 1: Languages of West Africa*. London: Dawsons, 1970.
- Wiseman, John A. *Political Leaders in Black Africa*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991.

SELECTED WEBSITES

acervoaguda.com.br/en/sobre-o-autor
allafrica.com/togo/
borgenproject.org/8-facts-about-education-in-togo/
data.ipu.org/content/togo?chamber_id=13542
embassyoftogousa.com
freedomhouse.org/country/togo
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/togo
hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TGO
tg.usembassy.gov
togopresse.tg/
togoweb.net

travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-tvt.tg/Pages/Togo.html
www.africa.upenn.edu/Country_Specific/Togo.html
www.afrobarometer.org/countries/togo-0
www.afromix.org/html/musique/pays/togo/index.en.html
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14106781
www.britannica.com/place/Togo
www.cartercenter.org/countries/togo.html
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html
www.france.ambassadetogo.org
www.icilome.com
www.ifes.org/togo
www.imf.org/en/Countries/TGO
www.jeuneafrique.com/pays/togo/
www.letogolais.com
www.lonelyplanet.com/togo
www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/togo.htm
www.peacecorps.gov/togo/
www.peacecorpsconnect.org/companies/friends-of-togo
www.radiolome.tg/
www.republicoftogo.com
www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/
www.state.gov/countries-areas/togo/
www.togo-tourisme.com
www.unicef.org/infobycountry/togo.html
www.unir.tg
www.wfp.org/countries/togo
www.who.int/countries/tgo/en/

About the Authors

Jennifer C. Seely is an associate professor and chair of the Politics Department at Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana. She has served as clerk of the faculty at the College, as well as director of the Peace Corps Prep Program. Dr. Seely has also held teaching positions at SUNY Potsdam and the University of California at Davis, and she was a Carnegie Mellon Post-Doctoral Fellow in Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Democracy at Brandeis University. She is the author of *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa: The Cases of Benin and Togo* (2009), and has published articles in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, *Democratization*, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, *Citizenship Studies*, and *Electoral Studies*. Dr. Seely holds a PhD and MA in political science from Washington University in St. Louis. She has been awarded a Fulbright Research Fellowship to Benin and Togo, a Fulbright Teaching Fellowship to Ghana, and served in the Peace Corps in Côte d'Ivoire.

Samuel Decalo (BSc, Ottawa University; MA and PhD, University of Pennsylvania), an expert on civil–military relations, Francophone Africa, and the Middle East, taught at various universities, including the University of Rhode Island; the Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, Emory University; and the University of Florida, as well as at several universities abroad, including the University of Botswana, the University of the West Indies, and the University of Natal, South Africa. He conducted fieldwork and research in 25 African states, including Togo, on numerous occasions, and is the author of 22 books and over a 100 articles on Africa and the Middle East. This includes the initial editions of the historical dictionaries of Chad, Niger, and Benin, along with Togo. He was general editor of Florida Academic Press and an intermittent participant in State Department seminars and workshops in Washington, DC.